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“Because they [the police] are posted on the perimeters of order and 
justice in the hope that their presence will deter the forces of darkness 
and chaos, because they are meant to spare the rest of the people 
direct confrontations with the dreadful, perverse, lurid, and dangerous, 
police officers are perceived to have powers and secrets no one else 
shares.”  
	






“SAPS Members, My Family. Together pushing back the frontiers of 
evil.” 
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practices	 of	 policing	 bodies	 in	 South	 Africa	 for	 centuries,	 from	 the	 mounted	
colonial	paramilitary	forces	of	the	1800s	to	the	21st	century	professional	police.	




area	and/or	populations	 that	reside	within	 the	confines	of	 the	boundary,	or	on	
the	other	side	of	the	boundary.	The	nature	of	the	such	a	threat	is	considered	to	
be	 even	more	 severe	when	 communities	within	 the	 bounded	 space,	 or	 on	 the	
other	 side	 of	 the	 boundary,	 acquire	 significant	 quantities	 of	 firearms	 and	
ammunition,	as	this	provides	such	populations	with	the	lethal	technology	to	defy	
and	 contest	 the	 police’s	 coercive	 authority	 and	 ability	 to	 conserve	 boundaries	
relating	to	the	maintenance	of	order	and	the	enforcement	of	laws.		




been	 at	 the	 sharp	 edge	 of	 the	 application	 of	 authority	 by	 assorted	 forms	 of	
government,	 and	 have	 often	 acted	 to	 safeguard	 the	 interests	 of	 economic	 and	
political	elites.	That	is,	the	police	and	formal	policing	bodies	have	been	required	




concept,	 ‘police	 frontierism’,	 which	 illuminates	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 relationships	
between	 the	 police,	 policing	 and	 boundaries,	 and	 can	 potentially	 be	 used	 for	
future	 case	 study	 research.	 It	 is	 an	 alternative	way	of	 conceptualising	policing,	
one	 in	 which	 police	 work	 is	 fundamentally	 framed	 by	 social	 and	 territorial	




those	 individuals,	 groups	 or	 circumstances	 from	 the	 ‘uncivilised’	 spaces	 that	 a	
government	authority	or	elites	have	deemed	to	be	a	threat	to	order	and	peace.		
An	 essential	 dynamic	 of	 this	 policing	 approach	 is	 that	 the	 boundary	 and	 the	
adjoining	frontier	zone	strongly	influence	police	practices	and	behaviour	in	this	
context.	 In	 particular,	 territorial	 and	 social	 delineations	 amplify	 and	 distort	
existing	 police	 prejudices	 against	 those	 communities	 on	 the	 other	 side	 of	 the	
boundary.	 The	 police	 often	 engage	 in	 othering,	 where	 the	 communities	 of	
interest	are	viewed	negatively,	and	are	predominantly	seen	as	agents	of	disorder	





The	 idea	 for	 this	 thesis	was	 born	 out	 of	 a	 tapestry	 of	 first-hand	 observations,	
personal	musings	 and	published	 scribblings	 about	 firearm	 control	 and	 firearm	
violence	 in	 South	Africa	 and	other	African	 countries	 over	 a	 period	 of	 15	 years	
(1998-2013).	During	 this	 time	 I	was	working	under	 the	 auspices	 of	 two	 South	
African-based	 think	 tanks,	 namely	 the	 Centre	 for	 Conflict	 Resolution	 and	 the	
Institute	for	Security	Studies,	both	of	which	required	of	me	to	frequently	traverse	
most	 of	 sub-Saharan	 Africa.	 During	 these	 travels	 I	 undertook	 research	 and	
interacted	 with	 government	 officials,	 civil	 society	 organisations	 and	 ordinary	
people	 on	 firearms-related	 issues.	 I	 was	 also	 privileged	 to	 have	 been	 able	 to	



















2000.	The	basic	 argument	was	 that	 firearms	had	played	 a	 fundamental	 role	 in	
making	 and	 maintaining	 state	 borders	 in	 Southern	 Africa.	 There	 was	 a	 lively	
debate	about	this	premise	after	a	leisurely	lunch	of	delectable	French	cuisine	and	
fine	 red	 wine,	 and	 consequently	 I	 was	 enthused	 to	 engage	 in	 more	
intellectualising	and	research	on	this	theme.		However,	other	commitments	and	
distractions	 got	 in	 the	way.	 A	 doctoral	 thesis	 therefore	 seemed	 to	 be	 an	 ideal	
opportunity	to	revisit	this	idea	more	than	a	decade	later.		
	
Despite	 having	 authored	 a	 variety	 of	 publications	 on	 firearm	 violence	 and	
control,	 this	 thesis	 is	 nonetheless	 an	 entirely	 new	 piece	 of	 work.	 It	 has	 been	
researched	 and	written	 over	 a	 three-year	 period	 in	which	 I	 have	made	 use	 of	
every	available	spare	moment	in	and	amongst	full-time	work	commitments	and	
family	life.	Aspects	of	earlier	versions	of	this	thesis	have	been	presented	at	four	
conferences	 between	 2014	 and	 2017.	 To	 date,	 parts	 of	 this	 thesis	 have	 also	
formed	 the	 basis	 of	 two	 publications:	 a	 chapter	 in	 the	 Oxford	 Textbook	 on	
Violence	Prevention	edited	by	Cathy	Ward	and	Peter	Donnelly	 in	2015;	and	an	
article	in	Sur	–	International	Journal	on	Human	Rights	that	Daniel	Mack,	a	fellow	





It	 is	 widely	 acknowledged	 across	 various	 academic	 disciplines,	 particularly	 in	
sociology	 and	 criminology,	 that	 the	 police	 are	 the	 coercive	 vanguard	 of	 state	
authority	within	 the	 confines	of	 the	 state’s	 territory.	That	 is,	 in	most	 countries	
the	police	are	the	preeminent	government	body	that	has	the	sanctioned	right	to	
use	 violence	 as	 a	 means	 to	 maintain	 order	 and	 enforce	 the	 law	 within	 the	
borders	 of	 the	 state.	 In	 this	 regard,	 the	 law	 (and	 the	 interpretation	 thereof)	
creates	 the	 distinction	 between	 non-offenders	 and	 offenders,	 with	 most	 of	
coercive	resources	of	the	police	being	directed	towards	the	latter.	The	police	are	




Hence,	 the	police	 are	often	popularly	portrayed	as	 the	 ‘thin	blue	 line’	 between	
order	and	chaos,	in	which	they	protect	the	innocent	and	guarantee	public	safety	
(Brogden,	 2005,	 Glaser	 and	 Parker,	 2001,	 Terrill,	 et	 al.,	 2003);	 and	 are	 the	
definitive	 security	 cordon	 that	 makes	 civilisation	 possible	 (Critchley,	 1978).	
Moreover,	numerous	national	police	organisations	have	incorporated	the	notion	
of	 a	 thin	 blue	 line	 into	 their	 institutional	 insignias	 as	 an	 emblematic	
representation	 of	 the	 primacy	 of	 this	 guardian	 role.	 	 However,	 the	 boundary	
roles	 of	 the	 police	 extend	 beyond	wardenship	 to	 also	 include	 the	 construction	
and	dissolution	of	boundaries.	
	
In	 pursuing	 its	 law	 and	 order	 mandate	 the	 police	 systematically	 divide	 their	
territorial	areas	of	responsibility	into	clearly	identifiable	and	distinctively	named	




police	 strategists	 and	decision-makers.	 These	maps	 are	 then	overlaid	with	 key	
information	concerning	criminal	offending,	and	crime	hot	spots	are	highlighted	
(Chainey	and	Ratcliffe,	2005).	Due	to	the	systematic	and	cohesive	nature	of	most	
institutional	 police	 cultures	 (Foster,	 2003),	 police	 personnel	 are	 acutely	
conscious	 of	 such	 territorial	 boundaries,	 and	 the	 police	 names	 and	 terms	 that	
have	been	ascribed	to	these	areas	tend	to	be	assimilated	into	the	internal	police	
lexicon.	 Moreover,	 as	 portrayed	 by	 Holdaway	 (1983),	 areas	 (or	 ‘the	 ground’)	
assigned	 to	 police	 stations	 to	 administer	 can	 be	 viewed	 by	 those	 police	 that	
patrol	 them	as	 their	 territory	 into	which	no	police	 from	other	areas	may	enter	
without	their	consent.	
	
Both	 crime	 control	 and	 crime	prevention,	which	 are	 principal	 vocations	 of	 the	









prominent	 crime	 prevention	 approaches	 to	 policing,	 namely	 problem-oriented	





in	 criminality	 and	disorder	 (Goldstein,	1990).	 Intelligence-led	policing	 seeks	 to	
detect,	reduce	and	disrupt	criminal	activity	by	 locating	 intelligence	at	the	heart	
of	police	decision-making.	Intelligence-led	policing	places	a	strong	emphasis	on	
the	 gathering	 and	 analysis	 of	 pertinent	 information	 about	 criminals	 and	
criminality	(Ratcliffe,	2008)	in	explicit	geographical	areas	in	order	to	devise	and	
implement	effective	policing	strategies	where	they	are	“expected	to	yield	highest	
dividends”	 (Tilley,	 2006:313).	 Place-based	 approaches	 counsel	 the	 police	 to	
locate	geographical	areas	with	high	concentrations	of	crime	at	the	centre	of	their	
strategies	 and	 practices	 (Braga,	 et	 al.,	 2011),	 and	 then	 concentrate	 their	 skills	
and	resources	 in	 relation	 to	 these	areas,	 rather	 than	distributing	 the	resources	
evenly	over	their	entire	territorial	jurisdiction	(Chainey	and	Ratcliffe,	2005).	
	
Police	 culture,	 actions	 and	 branding	 contribute	 towards	 the	 construction	 and	




a	 unique	 uniform,	 and	 mostly	 drive	 clearly	 identifiable	 vehicles.	 In	 some	
instances	 the	 police	 even	 reside	 within	 their	 own	 barracks,	 separated	 from	
mainstream	 society.	 These	 distinctive	 police	 features	 are	 considerably	 more	
evident	when	the	police	are	deployed	in	response	to	incidents	of	public	disorder,	
such	 as	 volatile	 protest	 action.	 In	 such	 circumstances	 the	 police	 will	 often	 be	
armed	with	 shields,	body	armour	and	an	array	of	weaponry,	 and	behave	 in	an	





the	 police	 are	 feared	 in	 many	 contexts	 (Bittner,	 1970).	 In	 unequal	 and	
heterogeneous	societies	 the	police	 regularly	 impose	a	plethora	of	 less	palpable	
dividing	lines	relating	to	the	governance	of	class,	race	and	ethnicity.	Scholars	and	
public	 commentators	 in	 the	 United	 States	 (US),	 for	 example,	 have	 frequently	
noted	 the	 discriminatory	 disparity	 in	 the	 coercive	 practices	 of	 various	 police	
organisations	towards	different	racial	and	ethnic	groups.	In	some	US	cities,	such	
as	 Los	 Angeles,	 Miami	 and	 Ferguson,	 the	 police	 have	 employed	 considerably	
more	coercive	practices	against	African	American	and	Hispanic	ethnic	minorities	
than	 compared	 to	 the	 Caucasian	 population	 (Escobar,	 1999,	 Hawkins	 and	
Thomas,	 1991,	 Kienscherf,	 2014).	 In	 other	 countries	 an	 entire	 ethnic	 or	 racial	





(such	 as	 in	 Hungary	 and	 Poland)(Cole,	 2003);	 and	 Aboriginal	 populations	 in	
Australia	(Chan,	1996,	Cunneen,	2001).	
	




movements	 and	 breaking	 workers	 strikes	 violently,	 and	 at	 times	 even	 using	
lethal	 force.	 The	 Marikana	 massacre	 that	 took	 place	 in	 August	 2012	 in	 South	
Africa’s	 platinum	 mining	 belt	 is	 an	 apt	 example.	 In	 this	 instance	 34	 striking	
miners	were	 fatally	 shot	 and	 78	were	wounded	 by	 a	 large	 contingent	 of	well-
armed	 police	 personnel	 during	 an	 unprotected	 strike.	 Evidence	 uncovered	 by	
journalists	 and	 researchers	 has	 suggested	 that	 some	 of	 the	 deceased	 had	
possibly	 been	 executed	 by	 the	 police	 (Marinovich,	 2012).	 Both	 published	
research	and	documentary	films	have	strongly	suggested	that	the	police,	acting	
in	 “toxic	collusion”	 (Mpofu,	2012)	with	mine	owners	and	national	government,	





social	 and	 cultural	 boundaries	 are	 fundamental	 to	 both	 the	 police	 as	 an	
organisation	and	police	work,	there	has	been	little	consideration	of	the	texture,	
potency	and	 fluidity	of	 such	boundaries.	Boundaries	 are	 typically	presented	as	
being	 part	 of	 the	 context	 and	 interactions	 of	 policing,	 with	 their	 significance	
being	 largely	 understated.	 However,	 as	 noted	 by	 human	 geographers,	
boundaries	are	dynamic	spatial	expressions	of	power,	and	have	the	capacity	to,	
amongst	other	faculties,	delineate,	limit	and	control	interactions	between	people,	
as	well	 as	 people’s	 access	 to	 resources	 and	 opportunities	within	 social	 spaces	
(Lamont	and	Molnár,	2002,	Minghi,	1963,	Sibley,	1995).	
	
Boundaries	 are	 particularly	 potent	 when	 they	 are	 combined	 with	 the	 abject	
othering	of	bounded	spaces	and	the	people	therein.	This	often	translates	 into	a	
social	 ordering	 expressed	 in	 terms	 of	 inclusion	 and	 exclusion	 (Newman	 and	
Paasi,	 1998,	 Yuval-Davis	 and	 Stoetzler,	 2002)	 that	 frequently	 leads	 to	 the	
depersonalisation,	 stigmatisation	 and	 vilification	 of	 the	 bounded	 area	 and	
community	 therein	 by	 the	 boundary	 makers	 and	 boundary	 enforcers	 (Sibley,	
1998,	 van	 Houtum	 and	 van	 Naerssen,	 2002).	 More	 severe	 othering	 usually	
manifests	 when	 the	 delimited	 space	 and	 population	 are	 perceived	 to	 be	
threatening	 (Bauman,	1997).	 In	 this	 regard,	boundary	architects	and	boundary	
defenders	have	employed	excessive	violence	against	 the	othered	groups	within	
othered	 spaces	 in	 order	 to	 diminish	 or	 eliminate	 the	 apparent	 threats	 they	
present.	
	
The	 police	 are	 a	 key	 instrument	 of	 violent	 bounded	 othering,	 particularly	 in	
relation	to	places	occupied	by	concentrations	of	individuals	and	groups	that	have	
been	identified	as	being	a	nuisance,	unruly,	criminal	or	extremist.	Moreover,	this	
boundary	work	 is	 not	 uniform	 as	 the	 police	 use	 varying	 forms	 and	 degrees	 of	




a	 particular	 neighbourhood	 may	 result	 in	 a	 small	 number	 of	 random	 police	
patrols	 where	 suspected	 criminals	 are	 stopped	 and	 searched	 by	 the	 police.	
However,	 rioting	 in	 the	 same	 neighbourhood	 will	 normally	 lead	 to	 the	
deployment	 of	 large	 numbers	 of	 police	 personnel	who	may	 use	 lethal	 force	 to	
assault,	 and	 possibly	 even	 shoot	 those	 involved.	 Therefore	 the	 concept	 of	 the	
‘thin	blue	line’	is	arguably	a	misnomer,	as	the	boundary	resources	and	efforts	of	
the	police	expand	and	contract	over	 time	 in	relation	 to	othered	spaces	and	the	
actual	or	perceived	dangers	that	they	present.	Furthermore	the	edges	of	the	‘blue	
line’	 can	 vary	 between	 being	 smooth	 and	 jagged,	 depending	 on	 the	 degrees	 of	
violence	used	by	the	police.	
	
The	 availability	 of	 firearms	 within	 othered	 spaces	 and	 amongst	 othered	
communities	has	the	tendency	to	significantly	heighten	the	threat	profile	of	such	




police	 typically	 respond	by	making	 use	 of	more	 protective	 equipment,	 such	 as	
bulletproof	 vests	 and	 armoured	 vehicles	 (Hill	 and	 Beger,	 2009,	 Kraska	 and	
Kappeler,	 1997).	 They	 also	 tend	 to	 employ	 more	 belligerent	 and	 militarised	
strategies.	 In	addition,	police	personnel	are	more	extensively	armed,	and	often	
tend	 to	 discharge	 their	 firearms	 when	 threatened	 (Warren	 and	 James,	 2000).	
Consequently,	 most	 governments,	 and	 the	 police	 in	 particular,	 take	
extraordinary	measures	to	prevent	or	restrict	othered	groups,	or	people	living	in	







threatening	 dynamics	 beyond	 the	 boundary	 directly	 contribute	 to	 changes	 in	
police	 structures	 and	 policing	 methods.	 This	 is	 particularly	 the	 case	 when	
bounded	 othered	 communities	 acquire	 significant	 quantities	 of	 firearms	 and	
ammunition,	 as	 such	weapons	provide	 the	 othered	populations	with	 the	 lethal	










and	 economic	 elites.	 That	 is,	 the	 police	 and	 formal	 policing	 bodies	 have	 been	
required	 to	 subdue	 and	 suppress	 groups	 and	 individuals	 that	 resisted	 or	
threatened	the	process	of	state	building	and	resource	extraction.	The	police	were	
5	
also	 regularly	 deployed	 to	 protect	 the	 territorial	 borders	 of	 South	 Africa	 from	
menacing	others.	
Between	 the	 late	 1600s	 and	 the	 early	 1900s,	 armed	 policing	 bodies,	 often	 in	
cooperation	 with	 the	 military,	 were	 central	 to	 protecting	 and	 extending	 the	
borders	 of	 territories	 that	 the	 colonial	 authorities	 and	 affiliated	 commercial	
entities	 sought	 to	 control.	 Such	 policing	 was	 militarised,	 racially	 biased	 and	
violent.	 Populations,	 particularly	 indigenous	 groups	 that	 resisted	 the	
consolidation	 and	 expansion	 of	 colonial	 control	 over	 the	 territories	 that	 now	
constitute	 the	 Republic	 of	 South	 Africa	 were	 pacified	 and	 disarmed.	 Colonial	
policing	bodies	were	also	central	to	ensuring	the	preservation	of	racial	and	class	




police	 organisation	was	one	of	 the	preeminent	bulwarks	of	white	political	 and	
economic	 hegemony	 as	 the	 police	 were	 mandated	 to	 implement	 an	 array	 of	
coercive	measures	 that	 sought	 to	 continue	 to	 suppress	 and	 disempower	 other	
racial	groups,	particularly	black	South	Africans.	Related	to	this,	 the	police	were	
also	 the	 frontline	 prefects	 of	 enforcing	 laws	 and	 policies	 that	 restricted	 the	
movement	of	black	South	Africans	between	rural	and	urban	areas,	which	was	a	
method	 of	 maintaining	 order,	 and	 ensuring	 sufficient	 cheap	 labour	 for	 the	
economy,	 particularly	 in	 the	 mining	 and	 manufacturing	 sectors.	 The	 police	
frequently	 fought	 beside	 the	 military	 against	 liberation	 movements	 and	 their	
affiliates,	and	sought	to	contain	unrest	in	black	townships.	
The	police	in	South	Africa	were	reconfigured	after	the	1994	all-race	democratic	
elections.	 In	 the	 context	 of	 elevated	 levels	 of	 violent	 crime	 the	 police	 devoted	
most	of	their	energies	to	stemming	and	combatting	such	criminality.	Day-to-day	
policing	resources	were	skewed	in	favour	of	wealthier	areas.	This	was	primarily	
an	 attempt	 to	 stem	 the	 high	 levels	 of	 violent	 crime	 from	 spilling	 over	 from	
poorer	 zones	 where	 it	 was	 concentrated,	 namely	 urban	 and	 peri-urban	
townships	and	informal	settlements,	into	more	upmarket	suburbs	and	business	
districts.	 In	 such	 high	 crime	 places	 the	 police’s	 foremost	 crime	 combatting	
strategy	was	 the	 use	 of	 large-scale,	 high-density	 ‘saturation’	 operations,	which	
were	 often	 undertaken	 in	 conjunction	 with	 the	 military.	 Such	 operations	





firearms.	 The	 reason	 for	 this	was	 that	 access	 to	 such	 lethal	 technology	would	
more	substantially	enable	black	people	to	challenge	the	discriminatory	political	
and	 social	 boundaries	 relating	 to	 race	 and	 class.	 Hence	 the	 police	were	 at	 the	




There	 were,	 however,	 some	 incongruities	 in	 the	 execution	 of	 this	 racially	
partisan	 firearm	 control	 regime.	 Over	 the	 centuries	 a	 small	 minority	 of	 black	
South	 Africans,	 which	 were	 considered	 to	 be	 loyal	 to	 the	 dominant	 political	
authority,	 were	 permitted	 to	 lawfully	 possess	 firearms.	 Such	 concessions	




black	 and	 coloured	 communities	 in	 an	 attempt	 to	 undermine	 the	mobilisation	
efforts	 of	 anti-apartheid	 organisations.	 The	 liberation	movements,	 such	 as	 the	
African	 National	 Congress	 and	 the	 Pan	 Africanist	 Congress,	 countered	 these	
underhanded	 police	 tactics	 by	 smuggling	 arms	 to	 their	 members	 and	
sympathisers	in	conflict-affected	areas.		
	
By	 the	 early	 1990s	 illegal	 firearms	 were	 widely	 available	 in	 most	 urban	
townships	 and	 informal	 settlements,	 which	 led	 to	 a	 dramatic	 escalation	 in	
criminality	and	interpersonal	violence	in	these	areas.	Such	criminality,	especially	
various	 forms	 of	 armed	 robbery,	 also	 began	 to	 affect	 a	 number	 of	 wealthier	
spaces	 that	 had	 traditionally	 experienced	 lower	 levels	 of	 crime.	 In	 an	 effort	 to	
curtail	 this	 crime	wave	 and	 prevent	 a	 further	 blurring	 of	 boundaries	 between	
safe	 and	dangerous	places,	 the	police	prioritised	 the	 seizure	of	 illegal	 firearms	
and	the	arrest	of	those	persons	that	were	unlawfully	in	possession	of	firearms.		
	
Given	 South	 Africa’s	 history	 of	 policing	 and	 current	 state	 of	 affairs	 described	
above,	this	thesis	primarily	seeks	to	analyse	how	boundaries	have	influenced	the	
operational	 approaches	 of	 the	 police	 in	 South	 Africa,	 and	 what	 impact	 these	
policing	 approaches	have	had	on	 violent	 crime.	 In	 pursuing	 this	 objective,	 this	
thesis	will	be	comprised	of	a	further	nine	chapters.		
	
Chapter	 2	 is	 comprised	 of	 a	 literature	 review	 that	 considers	 the	 relevant	
literature	on	the	relationship	between	the	police,	policing	and	boundaries.	Both	
relevant	 international	 and	 South	 African	 literature	 is	 reviewed.	 Chapter	 3	





maintained	 various	 boundaries	 during	 the	 post-unification	 and	 apartheid	
periods	(1910-1994).	Chapter	7	comprises	an	assessment	of	the	creation	of	the	
SAPS	and	the	nature	of	police	boundary	work	in	post-apartheid	South	Africa,	and	
includes	 a	 focus	 on	 firearm	 controls	 as	 a	 boundary	 control	mechanism	 (1994-
2016).	 Chapter	 8	 contains	 a	 detailed	 account	 of	 the	major	 high-density	 police	
operations	 that	 the	 SAPS	 have	 pursued	 in	 high	 crime	 areas	 since	 1994/5.	
Chapter	9	examines	the	potential	impact	that	SAPS	high-density	operations	may	











the	police.	 In	particular,	 it	seeks	 to	assess	 the	extent	 to	which	 theory,	evidence	
and	 analyses	 have	 contributed	 to	 our	 understanding	 of	 the	ways	 in	which	 the	
many	 facets	 of	 police	 work	 are	 shaped	 by,	 and	 shape,	 real	 and	 abstract	
boundaries.	The	pertinent	scholarship	is	diverse	and	is	scattered	across	several	
academic	 disciplines,	 such	 as	 criminology,	 geography,	 history,	 sociology,	
anthropology,	psychology	and	political	studies.	Given	this	considerable	diversity	
and	multiplicity	of	 the	publications	on	 this	 topic	 it	was	not	possible	 to	explore	
every	nook	and	cranny	of	academic	writing	on	boundaries	and	the	police.	Hence	
this	 chapter	 principally	 appraises	 the	 relevant	 criminology	 and	 human	




policing-related	 themes	 namely:	 pre-professional	 policing;	 colonial	 policing;	
national	 territorial	 borders	 and	 policing;	 police	 culture;	 counterinsurgency	
policing;	 and	 place-based	 policing.	 In	 so	 doing	 it	will	 seek	 to	 identify	 common	
characteristics	 and	 dynamics	 concerning	 the	 relationship	 between	 boundaries	
and	 the	 police	 that	will	 frame	 and	 inform	 the	 South	 African	 case	 study	 in	 the	
later	chapters	of	this	thesis.	Given	that	firearm	control	is	a	key	consideration	of	
this	 thesis,	 the	 literature	 on	 the	 relationship	 between	 firearm	 availability,	
policing	and	boundaries	is	also	considered	in	this	chapter.	
	
Across	 all	 the	 themes	 there	 is	 a	 distinct	 Anglo-American	 bias	 in	 the	 literature	
given	 that	 the	 study	 of	 the	 police	 and	 boundaries	 have	 traditionally	 been	
dominated	by	scholars	from	North	American	and	British	universities.	There	are	
however	 some	 publications	 that	 focus	 on	 other	 geographical	 contexts,	
particularly	 Latin	 America	 and	 Australia,	 which	 will	 also	 be	 included	 in	 this	





The	 link	 between	 boundaries	 and	 policing	 predates	 the	 emergence	 of	 the	
professional	police	 in	 the	early	19th	century.	Public	and	private	policing	bodies	
tended	 to	materialise	with	 the	 establishment	 of	 large	 human	 settlements	with	
the	mandate	of	maintaining	order	and	providing	protection	from	suspicious	and	
predacious	 outsiders.	 The	 literature	 on	 these	 early	 forms	 of	 policing	 is	mostly	
limited	 to	 examining	 and	 describing	 policing	 practices	 in	 medieval	 England.	
Scholarly	writings	 suggest	 that	most	 communities	 in	England	at	 the	 time	were	
self-policed	through	a	system	of	social	controls,	such	as	customs	and	patronage	
obligations	 to	 the	 landed	 aristocracy	 and	 the	 Crown,	 principally	 tithing	 and	
pledging.	 Tithing,	 for	 example,	 required	 community	 members	 to	 declare	 that	
they	would	not	steal,	and	would	timeously	inform	the	authorities	of	any	known	
thievery.	 Pledging	 entailed	 community	 members	 undertaking	 “to	 stand	 as	
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security	 for	 other	 villagers	 in	 a	 variety	 of	 circumstances	 at	 the	 manorial	
court…[including	the]	guarantee	of	good	behaviour”	(Postles,	1996:419).	Those	
community	members	who	were	negligent	of	their	crime	control	responsibilities	
were	 liable	 for	 a	 fine	 that	 was	 administered	 by	 representatives	 of	 the	 Crown	
(Griffiths,	2010,	Lee,	1901,	Rawlings,	2006).	
	
The	 literature	 on	 policing	 in	 medieval	 England	 generally	 depicts	 a	 country	 in	
which	villages	and	towns,	due	to	their	policing	measures,	were	distinctive	places	
of	 relative	 order	 and	 safety.	 The	 countryside,	 by	 contrast,	 was	 portrayed	 as	 a	
foreboding	and	unruly	 space	 that	was	 inhabited	by	dangerous	others	who	had	
been	banished	and	shunned	by	‘civilised’	communities.	Frequent	references	are	
made	 to	 travellers	 on	 roads	being	harassed	 and	 robbed	by	 armed	bandits	 and	
highwaymen	 (Carpenter,	 1983,	 Hanawalt,	 1998,	 Summerson,	 1979).	 Similar	
representations	of	this	urban-rural	juxtaposition	are	also	made	in	the	published	
texts	 on	 social	 control	 and	 policing	 in	 western	 continental	 Europe	 during	 the	
Middle	 Ages	 (Emsley,	 1983)	 (Dean,	 2014);	 in	 the	 ‘Old	West’	 frontier	 period	 in	




the	 peasantry	 in	 England	 by	 the	 aristocracy	 and	 clergy	 weakened	 the	 social	
cohesiveness	of	many	communities.	There	is	relative	consensus	among	policing	
historians	that	these	socio-economic	conditions	resulted	in	the	greater	mobility	
of	 the	 population	 of	 England,	 and	 hence	 an	 increase	 in	 the	 relative	 size	 of	
populations	 of	 strangers,	 outsiders	 and	 foreigners.	 This	 in	 turn	 contributed	 to	
increased	 insecurity	 and	 fear	 of	 crime	 in	many	 villages,	 towns	 and	 cities	 (Lee,	
1901,	 Palmer,	 1993,	 Rawlings,	 2006).	 These	 threatening	 developments	 on	 the	







A	 large	proportion	of	 the	 literature	of	pre-19th	 century	policing	 focuses	on	 the	
watchmen,	which	were	specifically	established	to	maintain	order	and	enforce	the	
law	 within	 the	 clearly	 definable	 boundaries	 of	 boroughs,	 wards	 and	 parishes	
under	 the	 supervision	 of	 constables.	 Watchmen,	 who	 were	 typically	 enlisted	
from,	 or	 underwritten	 by	 the	 local	 community,	 guarded	 the	 gates	 of	 these	
communities,	 and	 patrolled	 the	 streets	 enforcing	 after	 dark	 curfews	 (Tobias,	
1972).	 These	 communities	widely	 regarded	 outsiders	 as	 the	 greatest	 threat	 to	
their	 safety,	with	 the	watchmen	being	 required,	by	order	of	 the	King,	 to	arrest	
any	 strangers	 encountered	 after	 sunset	 that	 could	 not	 verify	 their	 identities.	
Therefore,	most	historians	writing	on	this	topic	imply	that	the	watchmen	acted	
as	 a	 type	 of	 shield	 against	 the	 terrors	 of	 the	 night,	 although	 their	 level	 of	






emergence	 of	 the	 professional	 police,	 more	 specifically	 the	 creation	 of	
Metropolitan	Police	 in	 London	 in	 1829	by	 an	Act	 of	 Parliament.	 The	 literature	




That	 is,	 within	 many	 communities	 the	 traditional	 boundaries	 of	 policing	 had	
become	 porous	 as	 the	 watchmen	 and	 constables	 could	 no	 longer	 sufficiently	
regulate	the	movement	of	outsiders,	as	well	as	maintain	adequate	order	within	
their	spheres	of	control	(Palmer,	1993).	The	authorities	in	many	North	American	




Consensual	 police	 historians	 suggest	 that	 the	 formation	 of	 the	 Metropolitan	
Police	was	primarily	motivated	by	the	need	for	a	more	impartial	and	proficient	
policing	 service	 in	 the	 face	of	perceived	 rising	 crime	 levels	 in	London	(Beattie,	
2012,	 Critchley,	 1978,	 Palmer,	 1988,	 Reith,	 1938).	 According	 to	 Emsley	
(2014:16),	 at	 the	 time	 “more	 and	more	 crime	 and	 disorder	 were	 regarded	 as	
things	 which	 should	 not	 exist	 in	 civilised	 society”.	 Researchers	 and	
commentators	 also	 point	 to	 the	 emergence	 of	 specialised	 commercial	 policing	
ventures	in	London	in	the	early	19th	century	to	target	theft	and	robbery	(such	as	
the	Bow	 Street	Runners	 and	 the	Thames	River	 Police),	 as	 evidence	 to	 support	
this	argument.	Historians	of	the	conflict	school,	however,	have	suggested	that	the	
Metropolitan	Police	principally	emerged	as	a	result	of	class	conflict	driven	by	the	
industrial	 revolution	 and	 the	 rapid	 population	 expansion	 within	 London	 that	
subsequently	 led	 to	 an	 increase	 in	 public	 disorder	 and	 radicalism	 (Hart,	 1965,	
Miller,	1999,	Palmer,	1988).		
	
Following	 the	 creation	 of	 the	 centralised	 Metropolitan	 police,	 most	 of	 the	
literature	contends	that	the	traditional	policing	boundary	work	of	crime	control	
was	 consolidated,	 and	extended	 to	 the	edges	of	 the	 city	 in	a	more	 coordinated	
fashion,	with	regular	patrols	being	conducted	both	during	the	day	and	night.	The	
mounted	 patrolling	 of	 the	 main	 thoroughfares	 into	 London	 within	 a	 20-mile	
radius	of	the	city,	which	had	been	initiated	by	the	Bow	Street	Runners	in	1758,	







by	 the	 ‘dangerous	 classes’,	 namely	 the	 poor,	 immigrants	 and	 undesirables,	
received	a	disproportionate	amount	of	police	attention,	including	raids	and	mass	
arrests.	In	Liverpool	for	example,	Brogden	(1991:3)	noted	that	a	“police	cordon	
sanitaire	 [was]	 drawn	 around	 the	 disreputable	 slums	 (‘rookeries’)”.	 Therefore	
some	 of	 the	 literature	 with	 a	 class	 emphasis	 has	 suggested	 that	 the	 early	
professional	police	were	akin	to	apostles	of	order,	as	by	policing	public	spaces	in	
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by	 capitalist	 considerations,	 namely	 the	 need	 for	 a	 cheap	 and	 compliant	
workforce	for	the	booming	economy	(Harring,	1976).		
As	 with	 policing	 in	 England,	 writings	 on	 the	 ‘new’	 police	 in	 US	 cities	 have	
indicated	that	the	police	frequently	targeted	and	were	more	aggressive	towards	
outsiders,	 strangers	 and	 those	 who	 did	 not	 adhere	 to	 community	 norms,	
particularly	 ethnic	 minorities	 (Kelling	 and	 Moore,	 1988).	 Many	 of	 the	 police	
organisations	were	 also	 compelled	 to	 enforce	 a	 series	 of	moral	 codes,	 such	 as	
against	 drunkenness,	 vagrancy	 and	 prostitution.	 However,	 these	 social	 mores	




and	 the	 boundaries	 between	 territories	 yielded	 different	 policing	 methods	 by	




town-and-country	 differentiation	 in	 policing	 approaches.	 That	 is,	 policing	
resources	 were	 concentrated	 in	 major	 towns	 with	 urban	 policing	 bodies	
devoting	their	energies	to	surveillance,	order	maintenance	and	crime	prevention.	
In	the	hinterland,	however,	policing	bodies	were	the	frontline	of	preserving	and	
enforcing	 colonial	 interests	 (Baker,	2008,	Brogden,	1987,	Cole,	 1999,	 Johnston,	
1996).		
Fanon	 (2004:3)	 succinctly	 sums	 up	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 relationship	 between	
boundaries	and	the	security	forces	of	the	colonial	administration	as	follows:	“The	
colonized	 world	 is	 a	 world	 divided	 in	 two.	 The	 dividing	 line,	 the	 border,	 is	
represented	by	the	barracks	and	the	police	stations.	In	the	colonies,	the	official,	
legitimate	 agent,	 the	 spokesperson	 for	 the	 colonizer	 and	 the	 regime	 of	
oppression,	 is	 the	 police	 officer	 or	 the	 soldier”.	 Similarly,	 Anderson	 and	
Killingray	(1991:2),	two	of	the	most	distinguished	scholars	in	this	field	surmise:	
“The	 colonial	 policeman	 –	 be	 he	 a	 European	 officer	 or	 a	 local	 native	 recruit	 –	
stood	at	the	cutting	edge	of	colonial	rule”.	






the	 military.	 These	 frontier	 policing	 bodies	 frequently	 used	 force	 to	 impose	
imperial	 authority,	 as	 well	 as	 facilitated	 and	 protected	 access	 to	 markets	 for	
colonial	authorities	and	commercial	enterprises.	The	sparseness	of	 the	 frontier	
necessitated	that	these	policing	entities	had	to	be	highly	mobile,	and	hence	most	
were	 on	 horseback	 (Ahire,	 1991,	 Alemika,	 1993,	 Das	 and	 Verma,	 1998,	
Gutteridge,	 1970,	 Killingray,	 1986,	 Killingray,	 1991,	 McCracken,	 1992,	 Roth,	
1998,	 Tankebe,	 2008).	 Therefore,	 it	 is	 generally	 implied	 in	 the	 literature	 that	
territorial	 boundaries,	 combined	with	 negative	 notions	 of	 ‘others’	 that	 resided	
beyond	 or	 in	 close	 proximity	 to	 colonial	 frontier,	 had	 an	 impact	 on	 the	
characteristics	of	both	policing	culture	and	policing	behaviour.		
	
Models	 of	 policing	 varied	 between	 colonial	 administrations	 (Arnold,	 2008,	
Mawby,	 2008),	 but	 in	 general	 the	 colonial	 policing	 entities	 were	 typically	
required:	 “to	 delegitimise	 indigenous	 customs;	 to	 impose	 centralized	 social	
control;	 and	 to	 incorporate	 local	 society	 as	 a	 branch	 of	 imperial	 society”	
(Brogden,	1987:10).	 Furthermore,	 they	were	also	 the	prefects	of	 tax	 and	 trade	
controls;	 reinforced	 the	 authority	 of	 indigenous	 groups	 that	were	 allied	 to	 the	
colonial	government;	and	even	facilitated	the	further	territorial	extension	of	the	
colony	and	the	‘civilisation’	of	indigenous	populations	(Anderson	and	Killingray,	
1992).	 In	 some	 instances	 these	 frontier	 forces	 massacred	 specific	 othered	
population	groups,	as	was	the	case	with:	the	San	(‘Bushmen’)	in	Southern	Africa	




was	 typically	 meagre	 relative	 to	 the	 size	 of	 the	 territory	 to	 be	 policed,	 which	
meant	that	“the	maintenance	of	the	‘thin	blue	line’…[became]	a	conjuring	trick	of	
enormous	 proportions”	 (Anderson	 and	Killingray,	 1991:5),	which	 required	 the	
deputation	 of	 policing	 resources	 from	 certain	 indigenous	 groups.	 Those	
population	groups	considered	to	be	martial	 in	outlook	and	loyal	 to	the	colonial	
power	were	typically	recruited	for	policing	duties,	with	such	‘ethnic’	police	being	
deployed	 in	 many	 cases	 to	 act	 as	 a	 buffer	 between	 the	 settlers	 and	 those	
considered	to	be	colonial	subjects.	In	this	regard,	the	model	of	‘strangers	policing	




There	 is	a	body	of	North	American	historical	 literature	that	specifically	 focuses	
on	 frontier	 policing,	 particularly	 the	 North-West	Mounted	 Police	 (NWMP)	 and	
the	 Texas	 Rangers.	 These	 agencies	 plied	 a	 distinct	 type	 of	militarised	 policing	
during	 the	 late	 19th	 century	 on	 the	 frontline	 of	 settler	migration	 and	 colonial	
expansion.	 	 The	 NWMP	 were	 deployed	 to	 enforce	 law	 and	 order,	 and	 clamp	
down	 on	 the	 illicit	 liquor	 and	 firearm	 trade	with	 the	Native	Americans	 on	 the	
Canadian	 Prairies	 (Baker,	 1998).	 This	 frontier	 force	 “provided	 a	 tangible	 and	







historical	 records	 present	 the	 NWMP	 as	 being	 instrumental	 in	 ‘taming’	 the	
frontier,	 as	well	 as	 responding	 to,	 and	 containing	 the	 threats	 posed	 by	 Native	
American	‘savages’	(Monaghan,	2013:123).	
	
The	 Texas	 Rangers	 were	 created	 to	 protect	 settlers	 from	 attacks	 from	 Native	
Americans	and	Mexicans	in	the	unstable	border	regions	with	Mexico.	The	Texas	
Rangers	became	a	 ferocious	 force,	 and	 following	Texas’s	war	of	 independence,	







frontier	 regions,	 as	 coal	 production	 was	 essential	 to	 expansion	 of	 the	 railway	
system	in	North	America	(Webb,	1977).	
	
A	 further	 boundary	 theme	 in	 the	 colonial	 policing	 literature	 is	 that	 policing	
bodies	 have	 been	 described	 as	 being	 fundamental	 to	 the	 preservation	 of	 class	
and	 racial	 divisions.	 It	 is	 widely	 referenced	 that,	 by	 means	 of	 the	 punitive	
measures,	 policing	 bodies	 ensured	 an	 acquiescent	 working	 class	 to	 meet	 the	
requirements	 of	 the	 colonial	 economy,	 as	 well	 as	 protected	 the	 lives	 and	
property	of	the	ruling	elite	from	the	poor	that	were	perceived	to	be	threatening	
and	disorderly	(Ahire,	1991,	Brogden,	1987,	Das	and	Verma,	1998,	Deflem,	1994,	
Ellison	 and	 Smyth,	 2000,	 Tankebe,	 2008).	 In	 some	 instances,	 certain	 ethnic	 or	
indigenous	groups	were	specifically	defined	as	‘criminal’	by	means	of	legislation,	
as	 was	 the	 case	 in	 Northern	 India	 under	 British	 imperial	 rule	 (Dinnen	 and	
Braithwaite,	 2009).	 Moreover,	 Nigam	 (1990)	 suggests	 that	 class	 and	 racial	





In	 the	 extensive	 literature	 on	 police	 culture	 and	 sub-cultures	 there	 is	 some	
consensus	that	the	formation	and	perpetuation	of	customs,	attitudes,	beliefs	and	
actions	of	individual	police	personnel	are	shaped	by	the	context	of	policing.	That	
is,	 police	 culture(s)	 are	 derived	 from	 the	 amalgamation	 of	 the	 experience	 and	
environment	 of	 policing	 and	 the	 organisational	 culture	 of	 the	 police,	 which	 in	
turn	 has	 been	 informed	 by	 previous	 experiences	 of	 policing	 (Brown,	 1988,	
Burton,	2003,	Crank,	1990,	Klinger,	2004,	Reck,	2015).	Janet	Chan,	for	example,	
whose	work	has	been	influenced	by	concepts	of	‘field’	and	‘habitus’	developed	by	
Bourdieu	 (1985),	 has	 found	 that	 in	 the	 context	 of	 Australian	 policing,	 “police	
cultural	practice	results	from	the	interaction	between	the	socio-political	context	







implies	 that	 boundaries,	 particularly	 those	 associated	 with	 class,	 race	 and	
ethnicity,	 have	 a	 significant	 impact	 on	 how	 the	 police	 behave.	 Since	 the	
pioneering	 work	 of	 Skolnick	 (1966)	 and	 Weick	 (1969)	 there	 have	 been	 a	
multitude	of	studies	 that	have	sought	 to	assess	 the	 influence	of	 the	external	or	
operational	environment	on	police	behaviour	and	actions.	A	common	finding	of	
many	of	these	studies	is	that	the	danger	and	uncertainty	associated	with	police	
work	 underlies	 police	 behaviour	 and	 actions	 in	 operational	 spaces	 (Barker,	
1998,	 Crank,	 2004,	 Cullen,	 et	 al.,	 1983,	 Paoline,	 2003,	 Reuss-Ianni,	 1983,	
Rubinstein,	 1973,	 Skolnick,	 1994,	 Skolnick	 and	 Fyfe,	 1993,	 Terrill,	 et	 al.,	 2003,	
Westley,	1970).		
	
However,	 the	available	 literature	 indicates	 that	 in	 the	operational	environment	
the	police	do	not	 consistently	experience	or	perceive	danger;	and	 that	policing	
areas	 are	 comprised	 of	 both	 safe	 and	 unsafe	 spaces,	 the	 risk	 profiles	 of	which	
change	over	time.	For	example,	with	regards	to	the	Royal	Ulster	Constabulary	in	
context	 of	 ‘the	 Troubles’	 in	 Northern	 Ireland,	 Brewer	 (1990:657)	 noted	 that	





research	 within	 a	 relatively	 poor	 UK	 urban	 policing	 sub-division,	 which	 was	
given	 the	 fictitious	 name	of	 ‘Hilton’.	Holdaway	 found	 that	 the	 police	 perceived	
that	 any	 place	 could	 potentially	 be	 a	 zone	 of	 danger,	 but	 that	 danger	was	 not	
constantly	experienced	throughout	 ‘Hilton’.	Nonetheless,	one	space	was	viewed	
as	 being	 “constantly	 dangerous,	 demanding	 vigilance	 from	 the	 officers	 who	
visit[ed]	 it…	 [namely]	 a	hostel	 for	homeless	black	youths,	many	of	whom	have	
been	convicted	for	criminal	offences”	(Holdaway,	1983:39).	
	
The	 influence	 of	 actual	 or	 perceived	 danger	 on	 police	 actions	 has	 received	
considerable	 attention	 in	 the	 research	 on	 police	 use	 of	 excessive	 force.	 In	
general,	studies	suggest	that	the	police	tend	to	be	more	violent	in	places	that	are	
othered	 by	 the	 police	 and/or	 threatening	 to	 the	 police.	 For	 instance,	 in	 urban	
areas	 afflicted	 by	 deep	 racial/ethnic	 inequalities	 which	 correspond	 with	 the	
residential	segregation	of	racial/ethnic	communities,	research	has	revealed	that	
the	 there	 is	 a	 high	 probability	 that	 the	 police	 will	 consistently	 discriminate	
against	marginalised	racial/ethnic	groups,	at	 times	violently.	This	 is	 reportedly	
due	to	the	combination	of	ingrained	racial	prejudice	of	dominant	societal	groups;	
institutionalised	 police	 racism;	 and	 frequent	 antagonistic	 interactions	 between	
the	police	and	the	individuals	from	marginalised	racial/ethnic	groups	(Northam,	
1988,	 Skolnick	 and	 Fyfe,	 1993,	 Terrill	 and	 Reisig,	 2003,	 Waddington,	 1999a)	







Critically	 there	 is	 a	 body	 of	 literature	 that	 attributes	 changes	 in	 policing	
strategies	 and	 tactics	 to	 an	 overarching	 threat	 framing	 with	 regards	 to	
dangerous	 policing	 environments	 and	 populations.	 For	 instance,	 studies	 on	
contemporary	police	militarisation	in	the	US	and	the	United	Kingdom	(UK)	have	
suggested	 that	 the	 conceptualisation	of	 a	 government’s	 response	 to	 crime	 as	 a	
war	 metaphor	 (such	 as	 ‘the	 war	 on	 drugs’),	 combined	 with	 closer	 police	
collaboration	 with	 the	 military,	 has	 largely	 driven	 the	 proliferation	 and	
widespread	 acceptance	 of	 paramilitary	 police	 units	 and	 military-style	 crime	
fighting	methods	 (Fisher,	 2010,	 Hall	 and	 Coyne,	 2013,	 Jefferson,	 1990,	 Kraska	
and	Kappeler,	1997).	It	has	also	been	noted	that	the	militarisation	of	police	also	




The	 literature	 on	 the	 criminal	 activities	 of	 the	 police	 has	 demonstrated	 that	
recurrent	 interactions	between	the	police	and	the	criminal	underworld	has	 the	
capacity	 to	 corrupt	 individual	 police	 members,	 and	 possibly	 even	 the	 entire	
police	organisation	(Brogden,	2005,	Johnson,	1979,	Punch,	1985).	This	dynamic	
is	strongest	with	those	police	that	operate	at	the	frontier	of	the	illicit	economy,	
such	 as	 vice	 squads	 and	 units	 that	 are	 specifically	 designed	 to	 respond	 to	
organised	crime.	The	reason	for	this	is	that	such	police	personnel	are	in	regular	
contact	with	dubious	individuals	and	social	networks	that	have	strong	interests	
in	 adversely	 influencing	police	personnel	 in	 order	 to	mitigate	 the	potential	 for	
disruption	 or	 termination	 of	 their	 criminal	 enterprises.	 In	 addition,	 this	
environment	is	often	characterised	by:	large	amounts	of	accessible	illicit	money	
and	 goods;	 police	 often	 having	 to	 use	 discretion	 to	 respond	 to	 ethically	
ambiguous	circumstances;	and	a	lack	of	adequate	internal	oversight	mechanisms	






clearly	 bounded	 organisation,	 and	 work	 closely	 with	 community	 members,	
groupings	 and	 businesses	 to	 jointly	 determine	 solutions	 to	 neighbourhood	
problems.	 In	reality	 this	approach	entails	 the	blurring	of	 the	 traditional	police-
community	 boundary,	 with	 the	 police	 being	 required	 to	 relinquish	 some	
decision-making	authority	on	 crime	control	 to	outsiders	and	non-professionals	




The	 nexus	 of	 policing	 and	 boundaries	 features	 prominently	 in	 the	
multidisciplinary	 literature	 that	 links	 the	 transnational	 movement	 of	 illicit	
people	 and	 activities	 to	 national	 territorial	 border	 controls.	 A	 common	
intellectual	thread	in	this	literature	is	that	national	borders	tend	to	become	more	
visible,	‘harder’	and	‘thicker’	when	certain	flows	of	people	and	goods	are	deemed	




and	 influential	 conservative	 pressure	 groups	 in	 wealthy	 states	 have	 widely	
regarded	these	illicit	flows	as	criminal	and	harmful	to	an	established	way	of	life.	
The	 policing	 response	 often	 entails	 an	 increase	 in	 the	 size	 and	 resources	 of	
border	policing	agencies.	
	
The	majority	 of	 published	 studies	 on	 the	policing	of	 national	 borders	 relate	 to	
government	 responses	 to	 undocumented	 migrants	 and	 drug	 trafficking.	
Furthermore	 these	 studies	 are	 principally	 concerned	 with	 what	 Andreas	
(2009:3)	 has	 termed	 the	 “geographical	 fault	 lines	 that	 divide	 rich	 and	 poor	
countries”,	more	specifically:	 the	US-Mexico	border;	 the	exterior	borders	of	 the	
European	 Union	 (EU);	 and	 the	 edges	 of	 Australia’s	 territorial	 waters.	
Publications	on	transnational	drug	trafficking	take	into	consideration	a	range	of	
Latin	 American	 and	 Asian	 counties,	 such	 as	 Colombia,	 Peru,	 Afghanistan	 and	




securitisation	 of	 the	 US	 border	 police	 since	 the	 1980s,	 in	 response	 to	 a	 deep-
seated	moral	panic	that	the	American	way	of	life	would	be	eroded	by	large	scale	
illegal	 flows	of	drugs	and	immigrants	 from	Mexico	(Palafox,	2000)	(Purcell	and	
Nevins,	 2005).	 	 As	 evidence	 scholars	 point	 to	 the	 dramatic	 increase	 in	 the	
Immigration	and	Naturalisation	Service’s	budget,	personnel	strength	and	arrest	
levels,	 particularly	 in	 the	 1990s.	 In	 addition,	 there	was	massive	 investment	 in	
border	control	equipment	and	surveillance	technology	(Cornelius,	2001,	Nevins,	
2002).	According	to	some	researchers	and	human	rights	advocacy	groups,	these	




Border	 Patrol	 suggests	 that	 violence	 has	 been	 intrinsic	 feature	 of	 this	 policing	
body,	which	 emerged	 from	 “the	 everyday	 politics	 of	 enforcing	US	 immigration	
restrictions”	(Hernandez,	2010:5).	
	
Some	scholars	have	 identified	a	similar	securitisation	of	 the	national	 territorial	
boundaries	of	EU	member	states.	That	is,	there	has	been	a	significant	increase	in	
border	 protection	 resources	 and	 capabilities	 in	 numerous	 EU	 member	 states	
since	the	1990s	in	response	to	concerns	and	moral	panics	about	undocumented	




of	 the	 securitisation	 of	 borders	 on	 the	 behaviour	 of	 border	 police	 in	 the	 EU.	
However,	reports	by	human	rights	watchdogs	have	indicated	that	some	security	
agencies	 have	 used	 excessive	 force	 in	 apprehending	 and	 constraining	
undocumented	 migrants	 (Andrijasevic,	 2010,	 Fekete,	 2005).	 Ethnographic	
research	on	the	border	police	in	Evros	(Greece)	indicated	that	the	Greek	border	
police	 often	 denied	 humanitarian	 assistance	 to	 undocumented	migrants	 in	 the	
interests	of	protecting	the	Greek/EU	border	(Pallister-Wilkins,	2015).		
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In	 response	 to	 determined	 attempts	 by	 undocumented	 migrants	 and	 asylum	
seekers	 to	reach	Australian	soil	by	boat,	particularly	 from	2000,	 the	Australian	
government	securitised	and	criminalised	the	issue,	and	mandated	the	Australian	
Federal	 Police	 (AFP)	 to	 deter	 and/or	 detain	 such	 persons.	 Apprehended	
migrants	and	asylum	seekers	were	thereafter	confined	to	detention	 facilities	 in	
neighbouring	 Pacific	 island	 states,	 such	 as	 Nauru	 and	 Papua	 New	 Guinea,	 in	
order	to	determine	if	they	should	be	granted	asylum	in	Australia.	Criminologists	
have	 pointed	 out	 that	 this	 development	 has	 had	 major	 implications	 for	 the	
police.	 Firstly,	 the	AFP’s	 border	 control	 responsibilities	were	 further	 extended	
into	Australia’s	territorial	waters,	which	necessitated	an	increased	police	budget	
and	 further	 specialisation	 in	 ocean-based	 policing	 (Grewcock,	 2010,	 Howard,	
2003,	Maley,	2001).	Secondly,	by	being	the	frontline	response	in	the	Australian	
government’s	 highly	 controversial	 policy	 on	migrants	 and	 asylum	 seekers,	 the	
AFP	arguably	became	‘politicised’	(Pickering	and	Weber,	2013).	
The	 existence	 of	 dynamic	 and	 symbiotic	 interactions	 between	 the	methods	 of	
organised	criminal	groups	that	facilitate	illicit	flows	of	people	and	goods	across	
national	borders	and	responses	by	 the	border	police	 is	well	documented,	most	
notably	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 illegal	 activities	over	 the	US-Mexico	border	and	drug	
smuggling	 from	 Colombia.	 That	 is,	 attempts	 by	 the	 police	 to	 fortify	 borders	
against	 illicit	 trafficking	 are	 characteristically	 met	 with	 more	 innovative	
responses	 by	 smugglers	 in	 order	 to	 circumvent	 these	 border	 protection	
measures.	This	in	turn	leads	to	further	border	reinforcement	efforts	by	the	police	
(Bright	 and	 Delaney,	 2013,	 Campbell,	 2009b,	 Payan,	 2006).	 Furthermore,	 a	
number	of	studies	have	indicated	that	strict	border	control	measures	may	lead	to	




A	 number	 of	 scholars	 have	 indicated	 that	 some	 national	 policing	 authorities,	
recognising	 the	 difficulties	 of	 maintaining	 comprehensive	 national	 border	
control	 with	 respect	 to	 illicit	 flows	 of	 people	 and	 goods,	 have	 adopted	
transnational	 (or	 internationalised)	 strategies	as	a	means	 to	counter	perceived	
dangers	 posed	 by	 such	 cross-border	 activities.	 	 Various	 publications	 have	
pointed	 to	 the	 intelligence-gathering,	 training,	 advisory	 and	 operational	 roles	
that	the	police	of	some	recipient	states	of	illegal	trafficking	(especially	the	US	and	
Australia)	have	undertaken	in	those	states	that	are	perceived	to	be	a	source	of,	or	
intermediaries	 for,	 these	 cross-border	 activities	 (Hameiri,	 2009,	 Toro,	 1999)	
(Howard,	 2003,	 Pickering,	 2004,	 Weber,	 2007).	 The	 transnationalisation	 of	
border	control	has	also	entailed	the	patrolling	of	international	waters	in	order	to	
target	 vessels	 ferrying	 illegal	 drugs	 and	 undocumented	 migrants	 (Andreas,	
2003);	as	well	as	establishing	multilateral,	‘harmonised’	policing	responses	with	
a	 range	 of	 other	 states,	 as	 has	 been	 the	 case	 in	 the	 EU	 (Calderoni,	 2010,	
Sheptycki,	1995).	
Likewise,	 studies	 on	 cross-border	 undocumented	 migrancy	 and	 organised	
criminal	 activities	 frequently	 infer	 that	 the	 permeability	 of	 national	 borders	
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For	 example,	 in	 the	 case	 of	 undocumented	migrants,	 the	 police	 and	 specialist	
immigrant	 enforcement	 agencies	 monitor	 and	 inspect	 businesses	 where	 they	
perceive	immigrants	to	employed	illegally	(De	Genova,	2002).		
	
There	 is	 a	 small	 collection	 of	 publications	 that	 give	 some	 consideration	 to	 the	
relationship	 between	 national	 borders	 and	 the	 police	 in	 South	 Africa.	 As	with	
much	 of	 the	 international	 literature,	 the	 publications	 focusing	 on	 South	 Africa	
are	 concerned	 with	 national	 border	 control	 in	 terms	 of	 organised	 crime	 and	
undocumented	migrants.	These	writings	generally	only	make	passing	reference	
to	 the	 police’s	 borderline	 patrolling	 responsibilities	 and	 its	 collaboration	with	






The	 literature	 on	 undocumented	 migrants	 indicates	 that	 there	 has	 been	
considerable	othering	and	criminalisation	of	such	persons	by	both	government	
and	the	general	public	in	South	Africa	(Croucher,	1998,	Matsinhe,	2011,	Morris,	
1998).	 There	 has	 been	 no	 comprehensive	 research	 on	 how	 the	 police	 have	
interacted	 with	 undocumented	 migrants	 other	 than	 minor	 references	 to	 the	
police’s	 oppressive	 measures	 and	 excessive	 harassment	 of	 migrants	 (Crush,	
2001,	Masuku,	 2006).	 Nonetheless,	 a	 Johannesburg-based	 study	 indicated	 that	
undocumented	 migrants	 had	 bribed	 police	 officials	 in	 order	 to	 avoid	 arrest,	






boundary	 connotations.	 Such	 policing	 typically	 seeks	 to	 quell	 or	 restrict	 a	
collective	 threat	 or	 insurgency	 that	 is	 territorially	 delimited.	 In	 addition,	
counterinsurgency	 policing	 encapsulates	 some	 of	 the	 most	 extreme	 forms	 of	
pejorative	othering.	Those	that	are	targeted	by	the	police	are	often	regarded	as	
‘the	enemy’,	and	such	police	actions	are	framed	as	being	part	of	a	‘war’	on	crime,	
insurrection	 or	 terrorism.	 This	 form	 of	 policing	 is	 often	 undertaken	 in	 close	
collaboration	with	the	military,	which	often	results	in	a	blurring	of	lines	between	
these	two	security	agencies.	The	counterinsurgency	approach	frequently	entails	
the	 use	 of	 unsavoury	 and	 heavy-handed	 police	 tactics	 to	 either	 neutralise	 the	
threat	or	discourage	communities	from	supporting	those	targeted	by	the	police.	
As	 part	 of	 counterinsurgency	 approaches	 some	 police	 agencies	 have	 pursued	
‘hearts	 and	 minds’	 interventions,	 which	 were	 mostly	 socio-economic	 and	
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infrastructure	 projects	 geared	 towards	 cultivating	 police	 legitimacy	within	 the	
affected	communities.	
	
A	 significant	 proportion	 of	 the	 publications	 in	 this	 area	 relate	 to	 Britain’s	
counterinsurgency	 strategies	 in	 colonial	 Malaya	 during	 the	 1950s.	 The	 reason	
being	is	that	Malaya	was	one	of	the	few	cases	where	the	police	played	a	pivotal	
role	in	combating	the	anti-colonial	uprisings	as	they	were	considered	to	be	more	
effective	 in	 gathering	 intelligence;	more	 attuned	 to	 local	 conditions;	 and	were	
inexpensive	 as	 compared	 with	 the	 military	 (Dixon,	 2009,	 French,	 2011,	
Hutchinson,	 1969).	 There	 was	 distinct	 use	 of	 boundary	 mechanisms	 in	 the	
Malaya	campaign,	 in	particular	 ‘clear	and	hold’	 tactics	and	the	creation	of	 ‘New	
Villages’.	 This	 entailed	 the	 deployment	 of	 vast	 numbers	 of	 police	 and	 soldiers	
into	 targeted	 areas,	 and	 the	 relocation	 and	 resettlement	 of	 some	 500,000	







the	 police	 lacked	 sufficient	 legitimacy	 amongst	 the	 nationalist/republican	
population	of	Northern	Ireland	as	they	had	historically	been	disproportionately	
targeted	 by	 the	 police	 (Weitzer,	 1995).	 Hence,	 this	 provided	 “vast	 scope	 for	





‘criminalisation’	 of	 the	 IRA	 and	 its	 actions.	 According	 to	 Ellison	 and	 Smyth	
(2000:81),	the	key	motivation	for	this	was	to	“isolate	the	republican	movement	
from	a	wider	 support	 base”.	 It	 is	 also	 underscored	 that	 the	RUC	became	more	
militarised,	 and	more	 focused	 on	 surveillance	 and	 infiltration	 in	 an	 attempt	 to	
defeat	the	IRA.	This	process	subsequently	led	to	the	imprisonment	of	numerous	
IRA	 operatives	 (Feldman,	 1991,	 Mulcahy,	 2013,	 NiAolain,	 2000,	 Ryder,	 1989).	
Publications	on	policing	 in	Northern	 Ireland	also	 indicate	 that	elements	within	
the	RUC	(such	as	the	Special	Branch)	actively	colluded	with	those	Ulster	loyalist	
paramilitaries	 that	 perpetrated	 lethal	 attacks	 on	 suspected	 IRA	 members	 and	
supporters,	as	well	as	ordinary	civilians	(Rolston,	2005).		
	
There	 is	 a	modest	 literature	 on	 counterinsurgency	 policing	 in	Rhodesia,	 South	
West	Africa	and	South	Africa	that	deals	with	the	period	between	the	1960s	and	
1980s.	 It	 indicates	 that	 aggressive	 forms	 of	militarised	 policing	 were	 pursued	
against	 liberation	 movements	 and	 their	 supporters.	 Forced	 population	
relocations,	 similar	 to	 the	Malaya	New	Village	system,	and	area-specific	 ‘hearts	
and	minds’	programming	were	pursued	by	 the	police	and	military	 in	Rhodesia	
(Cilliers,	 1985)	 and	 South	 West	 Africa	 respectively	 (Herbstein	 and	 Evenson,	
1989,	Stiff,	2004).	The	publications	on	counterinsurgency	in	South	Africa	mostly	
focus	on	the	Security	Branch	within	the	police	and	their	methods	of	surveillance	







implicit	 boundary	 dimensions	 is	 that	 of	 police	 death	 squads.	 The	 relevant	
publications,	which	have	a	predominant	Latin	American	focus,	characteristically	
emphasise	 the	 extreme	 violence	 perpetrated	 by	 such	 covert	 police	 groups,	
usually	in	the	form	of	torture,	assassinations	and	‘disappearances’	of	opposition	
leaders	and	activists.	Scholars	have	intimated	that	death	squads	have	tended	to	
be	 active	 in	 communities	where	 the	 police	 lacked	 legitimacy,	 and	where	 there	
has	 been	 concentrated	 opposition	 to	 government.	 Hence,	 death	 squads,	 in	 an	
attempt	 to	weaken	 support	 for	 the	 opposition,	 have	 used	 violence	 to	 terrorise	
such	 communities	 into	 submission	 (Campbell	 and	 Brenner,	 2002,	 Mason	 and	
Krane,	 1989,	 Sluka,	 2000).	 Likewise,	 death	 squads	 have	 undertaken	 ‘false	 flag’	
operations	with	the	objective	of	undermining	the	credibility	of	opposition	groups	
in	 specific	 areas	 by	 performing	 assassinations	 and	 acts	 of	 sabotage	 in	 such	 a	
manner	 that	 it	 appears	 to	 have	 been	 undertaken	 by	 the	 opposition	 groups	
(Rolston,	2005).		
	








This	has	 especially	been	 the	 case	where	 “rewards	of	 extra	 income,	power,	 and	




most	 of	 which	 are	 autobiographical	 recollections	 (De	 Kock	 and	 Gordin,	 1998)	





in	 these	 publications	 has	 been	 aptly	 portrayed	 by	 Pauw	 (1997:16)	 as	 follows:	






(Beck	 and	 Lee,	 2002),	 ‘hot	 spots’	 policing	 (Weisburd,	 2008)	 and	 ‘situational	
problem-oriented’	 policing	 (Braga,	 2005).	 These	 concepts	 direct	 the	 police	 to	





identify	 places	where	 priority	 crimes	 are	 clustered	 and	 then	 concentrate	 their	
resources	within	these	clearly	defined	areas,	rather	than	evenly	distributing	the	
resources	 over	 their	 entire	 territorial	 jurisdiction	 (Braga,	 et	 al.,	 2011).	 The	









on	 crime	 reduction	 (Braga,	 2005,	 Kelling,	 et	 al.,	 1974).	 However,	 the	 unit	 of	
analysis	 in	 this	 study	 was	 the	 neighbourhood	 or	 ‘patrol	 beat’,	 not	 hot	 spot.	
Hence,	with	the	benefit	of	hindsight,	a	nil	response	was	almost	inevitable	(Braga	
and	Weisburd,	2010).	Over	the	past	two	decades	a	more	robust	evidentiary	base	
has	 accrued,	 predominantly	 derived	 through	 experimental	 and	 quasi-
experimental	 studies,	 which	 indicate	 that	 hot	 spots	 policing	 can	 result	 in	 a	
noticeable	 reduction	 in	 crime,	 particularly	 where	 more	 proactive	 policing	




effects	 of	 place-based	 police	 crackdowns,	 which	 was	 comprised	 of	 an	
examination	 of	 18	 US	 case	 studies.	 For	 Sherman,	 crackdowns	 were	 broadly	
defined	 as	 “sudden	 increases	 in	 officer	 presence,	 sanctions,	 and	 threats	 of	
apprehension	 either	 for	 specific	 offenses	 or	 for	 all	 offenses	 in	 specific	
places…with	 a	 clear	 goal	 of	 enhancing	 general	 deterrence	 of	 the	 misconduct”	
(Sherman,	 1990:1).	 The	 crux	 of	 this	 theory	 is	 that	 crackdowns	 result	 in	
reductions	in	crime	in	crime	hot	spots	by	creating	heightened	uncertainty	among	
offenders	and	potential	offenders	over	 the	 level	of	 risk	of	apprehension	 if	 they	
commit	criminal	acts.	It	follows	that	these	individuals	may	then	overestimate	the	
actual	 risk	 of	 apprehension	 and	 subsequently	 desist	 from	 offending	 in	 those	
areas	(Sherman,	1990).		
	
Sherman	 has	 now	become	 one	 of	 the	most	 cited	 scholars	 of	 policing	 research,	
and	his	crackdown	theory	has	been	used	to	study	crackdowns	and	other	types	of	
hot	 spots	 policing	 (Cohen,	 2011).	 It	 has	 also	 been	 extended	 and	 refined	 by	
Sherman	 and	 other	 criminologists,	 especially	 Christopher	 Koper,	 David	




of	 place-based	 policing.	 For,	 Sherman	 (1997a),	 a	 key	 objective	 is	 to	 “regain	 a	
threshold	 level	 of	 public	 order	 and	 safety…[after	 which]	 the	 effectiveness	 of	




focal	 area	 of	 scholarly	 investment	 (Tilley,	 2004).	 Recently,	 however,	 most	 of	
these	theoretical	offerings	have	been	codified	into	the	 ‘Hot	Spots	Patrol	Theory	
of	 Causing	 Crime	 Reduction	 Effects’,	 as	 part	 of	 a	 concerted	 effort	 to	 build	
scholarship	 in	 the	 emerging	 area	 of	 ‘evidence-based	 policing’	 (Sherman,	 et	 al.,	
2014,	Weisburd	and	Telep,	2014).	
	
The	 South	African	Police	 Service	 (SAPS)	has	pursued	place-based	policing	 as	 a	
central	 crime	 control	 philosophy	 since	 the	 mid-1990s.	 This	 hot	 spot	 oriented	
approach	has	been	central	to	policing	at	the	precinct	level,	but	has	also	informed	
the	 design	 and	 implementation	 of	 regular	 large-scale	 saturation	 police	
operations	in	high	crime	areas	over	the	past	two	decades.	Surprisingly,	the	South	
African	 scholarship	 in	 this	 area	 is	 undeveloped,	with	 the	 relevant	 publications	
mostly	entailing	descriptions	of	place-based	policing,	with	limited	analysis	being	
provided	(Burger,	2007a,	Pelser,	2000).	The	few	more	detailed	exceptions	relate	




The	 literature	 on	 firearm	 violence	 and	 firearm	 control	 straddles	 a	 variety	 of	
disciplines	 in	 the	 health	 sciences,	 law	 and	 social	 sciences.	 Nonetheless,	 it	 has	
principally	 been	 in	 criminology	 and	 public	 health	 where	 the	 most	 rigorous	
research	 on	 this	 topic	 has	 been	 pursued.	 	 There	 has	 also	 been	 considerable	
overlap,	 as	both	 criminology	and	public	health	 are	 inter-disciplinary	 in	nature,	






greater	 the	 availability	 of	 firearms,	 the	 higher	 the	 risk	 for	 firearm	 violence,	
particularly	 in	violence-prone	contexts.	However,	 causation	 is	yet	 to	be	proved	
(Hemenway	 and	 Miller,	 2000,	 Hepburn	 and	 Hemenway,	 2004,	 Killias,	 1993,	
Miller,	et	al.,	2002,	Sherman,	et	al.,	2014).	For	example,	a	US	study	published	in	
2013	 found	 that	 there	was	 “a	 robust	 relationship	between	gun	ownership	 and	
firearm	 homicide	 rates”	 (Siegel,	 et	 al.,	 2013:2102).	 Linked	 to	 this	 have	 been	 a	
range	 of	 studies	 that	 have	 indicated	 correlations	 between	 legislated	 firearm	
controls	 (particularly	 background	 checks)	 and	 reductions	 in	 firearm	 violence	






al.,	 2007);	 Brazil	 (Chapman,	 et	 al.,	 2006);	 Canada	 (De	 Souza,	 et	 al.,	 2007,	





(Santaella-Tenorio,	 et	 al.,	 2016:140).	 However,	 despite	 the	 wealth	 of	 research	
and	analysis,	 the	unknowns	are	immense.	A	2005	review	of	the	US	research	on	
the	 impact	 of	 firearm	 legislation/policy	 and	 firearm	 violence	 reduction,	which	
still	 holds	 credence	 today,	 found	 that	 causality	 is	 yet	 to	 be	 incontrovertibly	
established	(National	Research	Council,	2005).		
There	 is	 currently	a	growing	body	of	 literature	on	 the	role	of	 law	enforcement	
interventions	 with	 regards	 to	 firearm	 crime	 within	 certain	 cities.	 Studies	 of	 a	
select	number	of	proactive	 targeted	policing	 interventions	 that	 focus	on	 illegal	
firearms	have	suggested	that	such	interventions	can	contribute	to	a	reduction	in	
firearm	crime,	with	scholars	highlighting	policing	operations	in	Kansas	City,	New	
York	 City,	 Indianapolis,	 Richmond,	 Boston	 and	 Pittsburgh	 (Braga,	 2001,	 Braga	
and	Pierce,	2005,	Golden	and	Almo,	2004,	Hahn,	 et	 al.,	 2005,	Koper	and	Mayo-
Wilson,	2006,	Ludwig,	2005,	Sherman	and	Rogan,	1995).		
In	 the	 predominantly	 US	 literature	 on	 police	 culture	 some	 scholars	 have	
suggested	 that	exposure	 to	dangerous	spaces	and	populations,	namely	 in	areas	
with	higher	 levels	 of	 homicide	 and	density	 of	 firearm	availability,	 accounts	 for	
individual	 incidents	 of	 excessive	 use	 of	 force	 by	 police	 in	 such	 environments,	
especially	 firearm	discharge	 (Fyfe,	 1980,	 Fyfe,	 1988,	 Jacobs	 and	O'Brien,	 1998,	
MacDonald,	 et	 al.,	 2001,	 Sherman	 and	 Langworthy,	 1979,	 Terrill,	 2003).	 This	
dynamic	is	commonly	referred	to	as	the	danger-perception	theory.	Added	to	this	




in	 South	 Africa.	 This	 literature	 is	 mostly	 qualitative	 and	 includes	 a	 common	
boundary	 premise,	 which	 has	 been	 expressed	 in	 varying	 degrees	 of	 analytical	
depth,	 namely	 that	 firearm	 control	 by	 government	 authorities,	 particularly	 the	
police,	 has	 been	 crucial	 for	 crime	 prevention,	 injury	 reduction	 and	 the	
consolidation	 of	 state	 power	 (Centre	 for	 the	 Study	 of	 Violence	 and	
Reconciliation,	 2008,	 Chetty,	 2000,	Gould,	 et	 al.,	 2004,	Hansmann	 and	Hennop,	
2000,	Hansson,	1998,	Hennop,	et	 al.,	 2001,	Keegan,	2005,	Kirsten,	2007,	Lamb,	
2008,	Meek	and	Stott,	2004a,	Minnaar,	2003a,	Oosthuysen,	1996,	Storey,	2008).	
There	 have	 been	 a	 small	 number	 of	 quantitative	 studies	 that	 have	 presented	
surveillance	 data	 on	 the	 reduction	 in	 firearm	 injuries	 and	 deaths	 in	 post-
apartheid	 South	 Africa,	 which	 have	 attributed	 this	 decline	 to	 the	 Firearms	




and	 Stott,	 2004b).	 These	publications	have	predominantly	 focused	on	 the	high	
politics	 of	 establishing	 the	 operations,	 and	 on	 the	 types	 of	 weapons	 and	
ammunition	 collected	 by	 the	 police	 as	 a	 consequence	 of	 these	 operations.	








This	 chapter	 has	 shown	 that	 the	 multidisciplinary	 literature	 that	 gives	 some	
consideration	 to	 the	 interactions	 between	 boundaries	 and	 the	 police	 is	
noticeably	 varied	 in	 nature	 and	 analytical	 depth.	 It	 frequently	 suggests	 that	
various	 manifestations	 of	 boundaries	 can	 potently	 influence	 the	 police	 as	 an	
organisation	 and	 police	 work;	 and	 likewise	 that	 boundaries	 can	 be	
fundamentally	 influenced	 by	 the	 actions	 of	 the	 police.	 The	 above	 selective	
assessment	 of	 the	 available	 literature	 indicates	 that	 there	 are	 six	 key	 features	




Policing	bodies	 and	 the	police	have	historically	 been	 tasked	with	 securing	 and	
guarding	 both	 territorial	 and	 social	 boundaries.	 The	 watchmen	 fortified	 and	
defended	the	perimeters	and	gates	to	parishes	and	wards	in	medieval	England.	
Mounted	policing	 forces	patrolled	 the	 territorial	 frontiers	of	European	colonies	
in	 order	 to	 protect	 settler	 communities.	 Contemporary	 police	 have	 regularly	
attempted	to	seal	off	and	reinforce	national	land	borders.	Within	cities	the	police	






framed	by	pejorative	othering	 towards	 certain	populations	 that	 exist	 in	 spaces	
beyond	 the	 boundaries.	 Such	 groups	 are	 typically	 considered	 by	 dominant	
groups	in	society	and	government	to	be	disorderly,	deviant	and	undesirable.	 In	
this	 regard	 the	 police	 have	 traditionally	 been	 primed	 to	 hound,	 bar	 and	 repel	
those	othered	outsiders	that	attempt	to	traverse	significant	boundaries,	whether	
it	be	national	borderlines	or	socioeconomic	dividing	lines;	and	pursue	and	dispel	
those	 that	 succeed	 in	 crossing	 over.	 Such	 populations	 of	 others	 include,	 for	
instance,	 undocumented	 migrants,	 suspected	 terrorists,	 drug	 smugglers	 and	
those	 social	 and	 racial/ethnic	 groups	 regarded	 as	 criminal	 or	 potentially	






groups	 that	 exist	 beyond	 these	 boundaries,	 such	 as	 undocumented	 migrants,	






become	 activated	 and	 more	 impenetrable	 in	 times	 of	 moral	 panic	 and	
widespread	 pejorative	 views	 in	 relation	 to	 othered	 groups,	 with	 the	 police	
subsequently	engaging	in	intense	monitoring,	physical	bolstering	and	patrolling	
at	 the	 edges	 of	 boundaries.	 The	 police	 have	 also	 made	 boundaries	 more	









adaptation,	 and	 even	 the	 transformation	 of	 police	 organisations	 and	 police	
doctrine.	This	has	subsequently	led	to	changes	in	policing	strategies	and	tactics.	
Such	 was	 the	 case	 in	 the	 professionalisation	 of	 the	 police	 in	 London	 and	 a	
number	of	US	cities	in	the	19th	century.	The	emergence	of	severe	violent	threats,	
as	in	the	form	of	liberation	struggles	and	terrorism,	for	example,	has	given	rise	to	




The	 police	 have	 consistently	 undertaken	 policing	 actions	 against	 othered	
population	groups	within	 spaces	beyond	 the	boundaries	 that	 they	 traditionally	
seek	to	secure.	A	significant	contributing	factor	to	the	actions	and	behaviour	of	
the	police	in	these	contexts	has	been	a	sense	of	close	proximity	to	danger	by	the	
police.	 Where	 areas	 are	 considered	 dangerous,	 the	 police	 are	 more	 likely	 to	
behave	 aggressively,	 and	 may	 even	 display	 excessive	 force	 against	 the	
population	 groups	 they	 seek	 to	 police.	 Such	 danger	 is	 a	 combination	 of	 police	
prejudice	 towards	 the	 othered	 population	 groups	 and	 hostile	 behaviour	 from	












policing	 techniques	and	models	within	 the	bounded	spaces	 that	 target	othered	





Despite	 highlighting	 these	 six	 key	 features	 our	 understanding	 of	 the	 dynamic	
nexus	 between	 boundaries	 and	 the	 police	 still	 remains	 considerably	 limited,	
even	 within	 the	 US	 literature	 where	 majority	 of	 analyses	 and	 related	 studies	
have	 been	 undertaken.	 Hence,	 this	 area	 of	 scholarship	 requires	 considerably	
more	scrutiny,	conceptualisation	and	study.	A	South	African	case	study	is	highly	
relevant	 as	 police	 organisations	 in	 South	Africa	 have	 been	 keenly	 preoccupied	



























the	authority	of	 the	police.	For	Manning,	police	work	 is	pantomime,	where	 the	
police	 endeavour	 to	 bluff	 the	 public	 into	 believing	 that	 the	 police	 are	 actually	
controlling	crime	(Manning,	1997).		
	
Other	 institutionally	 focused	 critiques	 of	 the	 work	 of	 the	 police	 claim	 that	
following	 an	 organisationally-based	 reform	 process	 the	 police	 can	 more	
effectually	deter,	control,	reduce	or	prevent	crime.	However,	such	reforms	entail	
the	 transformation	 of	 the	 police	 from	 an	 overly-reactive	 to	 a	 proactive	 agency	
that	cultivates	a	more	nuanced	understanding	of	crime	and	formulates	responses	
that	are	strategic,	 targeted	and	context-specific	 (Braga,	2001,	Eck	and	Maguire,	
2000,	Goldstein,	1979).	A	 common	conception	within	 this	 literature	 is	 that	 the	






In	 the	 sections	 below	 the	 key	 theoretical	 concepts	 used	 in	 this	 thesis	 will	 be	
outlined,	 namely	 the	 distinction	 between	 police	 and	 policing;	 as	well	 as	 crime	
control,	 crime	 prevention	 and	 crime	 reduction.	 In	 addition,	 there	 will	 be	 an	
exploration	of	the	relevant	academic	debates	and	theories	that	are	fundamental	











diverse	 and	 pluralistic	 set	 of	 social	 acts	 that	 are	 pursued	 by	 individuals	 and	
entities	with	conferred	authority,	either	through	consent	or	coercion.	The	police	
are	 social	 institutions	 that	 undertake	 certain	 types	 of	 policing,	 and	 became	
increasingly	prominent	as	government	institutions	from	the	early	19th	century.	It	






Criminologists	 have	 proposed	 various	 definitions	 of	 policing,	 with	 the	
formulation	 by	 Bayley	 and	 Shearing	 being	 one	 of	 the	 most	 influential.	 They	
contend	that	policing	is	“the	self-conscious	process	whereby	societies	designate	
and	authorise	people	 to	 create	public	 safety”	 (Bayley	and	Shearing,	1996:586).	
This	definition	builds	on	Shearing’s	earlier	definition,	which	conceived	policing	
to	be	a	process	geared	towards	“the	preservation	of	peace”	defined	in	relation	to	





definition,	 which	 is	 more	 applicable	 for	 this	 thesis.	 	 He	 asserts	 that	 policing	
entails	processes	and	actions	that	seek	to	preserve	“the	security	of	a	particular	
social	order,	or	social	order	 in	general…[and]	what	 is	specific	 to	policing	 is	 the	
creation	 of	 systems	 of	 surveillance	 coupled	 with	 the	 threat	 of	 sanctions	 for	




Over	 the	 past	 two	 centuries	 modern	 governments	 have	 typically	 established	
official	 police	 agencies	 to	 enforce	 the	 law,	maintain	 public	 order	 and	 keep	 the	
peace.	However,	studies	of	government	policing	bodies	have	consistently	shown	
that	the	police	have	undertaken	a	diverse	range	of	activities,	many	of	which	are	
outside	 of	 the	 ambit	 of	 order	 maintenance	 and	 law	 enforcement,	 such	 as	






to	employ	coercive	 force	 to	perform	their	duties	 (when	required).	Many	of	 the	
earlier	scholars	of	Anglo-American	policing,	influenced	by	Max	Weber’s	theory	of	
the	 state	 (Weber,	 2009),	 suggested	 that	 the	 police	 are	 characterised	 by	 their	
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monopoly	of	 the	 legitimate	use	of	 force	within	the	territorial	boundaries	of	 the	
state	 (Friedrich,	1980,	Morgan	and	Newburn,	1997,	Reiss,	1971).	Furthermore,	
in	 order	 to	 exercise	 this	 mandate	 formal	 police	 structures,	 sub-divided	 into	
various	 specialisations,	 and	 directed	 by	 means	 of	 standardised	 rules	 and	
procedures,	 were	 constructed	 (Angell,	 1971).	 However,	 Weber	 did	 emphasize	
that	force	is	not	the	only	instrument	of	state	control,	and	that	the	state	has	other	
less	 severe	means	 to	 assert	 its	 authority,	 namely	 through	 influencing	morality	
and	common	values	(Terpstra,	2011).	
The	police’s	monopoly	of	 the	 legitimate	use	of	 force	has	been	viewed	by	many	
scholars	 as	 being	more	 symbolic	 in	nature	 given	 the	 increased	pluralisation	of	
policing	away	from	direct	state	control	(Jones	and	Newburn,	2002,	Loader,	2000,	
McLaughlin	 and	 Levi,	 1995,	 O'Mally	 and	 Palmer,	 1996).	 In	 addition,	 the	
legitimate	 coercion	 feature	 is	 not	 common	 currency	 for	 all	 police	 agencies	
globally,	especially	 in	non-democratic	 states	where	consent	by	citizens	 is	not	a	
key	 component	 of	 governance.	 Hence,	 the	 definition	 penned	 by	 Karl	 Klockars,	
that	 the	 police	 are	 “institutions	 or	 individuals	 given	 the	 general	 right	 to	 use	
coercive	 force	 by	 the	 state	 within	 the	 state’s	 domestic	 territory”	 (Klockars,	




contexts.	 This	 continuum	 is	 delineated	 by	 two	 extremities	 of	 policing	 systems,	
namely	“control-dominated”	and	“community-oriented”.	The	control-dominated	
system	 is	 typical	 to	 non-democratic	 environments	 where	 the	 government	 is	
widely	regarded	as	 illegitimate	by	 those	 that	 it	seeks	 to	govern.	 In	 this	system,	
policing	institutions	tend	to	be	centrally	organised,	militaristic	in	approach,	and	
prioritise	the	maintenance	of	order	through	the	use	of	force	or	the	threat	thereof.	
The	 community-oriented	 system	 usually	 occurs	 in	 fundamentally	 democratic	
states	where	there	 is	a	high	 level	of	trust	between	communities	and	the	police,	
and	where	the	police	are	widely	viewed	as	providing	a	legitimate	public	service	
that	 is	 receptive	 to	 the	 needs	 of	 the	 community.	 In	 such	 situations	 police	
authority	 is	 usually	 decentralised	 to	 the	 regional,	 city	 and	 municipal	 levels	
(Mawby,	2008).	
3.3	Boundaries,	frontiers	and	the	‘cleaning’	work	of	the	police	
The	 literature	 that	 considers	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	 police,	 policing	 and	
boundaries	 is	 reviewed	 in	 Chapter	 2.	 This	 section	 seeks	 to	 provide	 a	 more	
theoretical	synopsis	in	this	regard.		
Boundaries	 have	 the	 capacity	 to,	 amongst	 other	 faculties,	 delineate,	 limit	 and	
control	 interactions	 between	 people,	 as	 well	 as	 access	 to	 resources	 and	
opportunities	 within	 social	 spaces	 (Lamont	 and	 Molnár,	 2002,	 Minghi,	 1963).	
Boundaries	can	occur	naturally	(such	as	rivers);	can	be	erected	(such	as	walls);	
or	 can	 even	 be	 imagined	 or	 socially	 constructed	 (such	 as	 informal	 borders	
between	neighbourhoods).	As	noted	by	the	influential	human	geographer	David	




society	 to	 less	 desirable	 environments”	 (Sibley,	 1995:ix).	 Furthermore,	 such	
boundaries	can	become	 instruments	of	 “purification”	where	they	are	employed	
to	 conserve	 homogeneity,	 as	 well	 as	 emphasise	 and	 reject	 difference	 (Sibley,	
1988).	
	
Hence	 boundaries	 emphasise	 and	 enforce	 the	 difference	 and	distinctiveness	 of	
communities	on	both	sides	of	boundaries.	This	often	results	in	the	emergence	of	
an	 ‘us’	 and	 ‘them’	 abject	 differentiation,	 which	 often	 translates	 into	 a	 social	
ordering	 expressed	 in	 terms	 of	 inclusion	 and	 exclusion	 (Newman	 and	 Paasi,	
1998,	 Yuval-Davis	 and	 Stoetzler,	 2002).	 This	 process	 is	 often	 referred	 to	 as	
‘othering’,	 a	 social	 construction	 that	 leads	 to	 the	 depersonalisation,	





the	 edge	 of	 a	 collective	 of	 people	 or	 an	 area	 inhabited	by	people.	 The	 internal	
dynamics	of	a	frontier	are	intimately	affected	by	the	existence	of	the	boundary,	
and	conversely	the	nature	of	the	frontier	often	determines	the	future	outcomes	
for	 the	 boundary	 (Newman,	 2003,	 Newman	 and	 Paasi,	 1998).	 For	 instance,	
frontier	dynamics	have	 the	potential	 to	 reinforce,	propel	or	even	eliminate	 the	




The	 term	 frontier	 has	 been	most	widely	 utilised	 in	 the	 historical	 literature	 on	
colonisation	 to	 describe	 areas	 on	 the	 territorial	 threshold	 of	 settler	 authority	
“where	 there	 is	 a	 lack	 of	 a	 single	 source	 of	 legitimate	 authority”	 (Legassick,	
2010:6).	 It	 acts	 as	 a	 buffer	 between	 the	 edge	 of	 the	 relative	 safety	 of	 the	
‘civilised’	 colony	 and	 the	 dangerous	 ‘wilderness’,	 and	 is	 a	 fluid	 space	 between	
two	divergent	worlds	 (Anderson,	1996,	 Forbes,	 1968,	Turner,	 1921).	 Frontiers	
have	 also	 received	 some	 attention	 in	 the	 field	 of	 international	 relations	 in	 the	
context	 of	 international	 border	management	 and	 conflict	 (Prescott	 and	Triggs,	
2008,	Ruggie,	1993).	In	recent	years	the	frontier	concept	has	been	more	widely	
applied	 in	 a	 variety	 of	 other	 academic	 disciplines,	 particularly	 in	 relation	 to	
urbanisation	 and	 city	 governance	where	 the	 spaces	 occupied	 by	 the	 poor	 and	




which	 people	 may	 interact	 and	 access	 resources	 and	 opportunities,	 are	
conceivably	embedded	within	boundaries	(Anderson	and	O'Dowd,	1999,	Lyman	
and	Scott,	1967).	Transgressions	of	these	rules	and	norms	can	result	in	forms	of	
negative	 communication	 or	 punitive	 action	 from	 those	 authorities	 that	 uphold	
the	boundaries.	Consequently,	boundaries	are	intrinsically	instruments	of	social	
power	 and	 control	 as	 they	 have	 the	 potential	 to	 impact	 on	 the	 movement	 of	
people	 and	 on	 their	 available	 choices	 (Paasi,	 1998,	 Sack,	 1986,	 Sack,	 1993).	
Hence,	 space	 is	 generally	 “domesticated”	 by	 government	 and	 civic	 authorities	
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(Mbembé	 and	 Rendall,	 2000:261)	 by	 creating	 and	 upholding	 boundaries	 as	 a	
method	of	governing	(Cooper,	1998,	Ferguson	and	Gupta,	2002,	Kettl,	2006).	
	
Zygmunt	 Bauman’s	 scholarship	 in	 relation	 to	 purity	 and	 ‘order-building’	 is	
particularly	relevant	for	 intellectualising	about	the	role	of	the	police	 in	relation	
to	social,	political	and	territorial	boundaries.	For	Bauman,	the	state	has	a	definite	
idea	 of	 purity,	 and	 consequently	 pursues	 order-building	 strategies	 geared	
towards	uniformity,	regularity	and	certainty	as	a	means	to	realise	this	notion	of	
purity	(Bauman,	1997,	Bauman,	2000).	Such	strategies	include	the	construction	
and	 clarification	 of	 “binding	 divisions,	 classifications,	 allocations	 and	
boundaries”	 (Bauman,	 1997:18).	 Those	 individuals	 and	 groups	 that	 are	
considered	 an	 offence	 or	 a	 threat	 to	 establishing	 and	 maintaining	 order	 and	
cleanliness	 by	 the	 state	 are	 therefore	 regarded	 as	 ‘others’,	 ‘strangers’	 or	 even	
‘dirt’.	 Consequently,	 such	 others	 need	 to	 be	 sanitised,	 expunged	 or	 contained,	
with	 policing	 bodies	 being	 amongst	 the	 foremost	 instruments	 of	 the	 state’s	
“cleaning	 activities”	 (Bauman,	 1997:12).	 Hence	 the	 police	 could	 be	 viewed	 as	
agents	 of	 social-spatial	 sanitation	 that	 are	 at	 the	 vanguard	 of	 efforts	 to	
domesticate	these	unruly	spaces	(Smith,	1996).	
	
Within	 the	 literature	 that	 conceptualises	 the	 nature	 of	 police	 work,	 there	 is	
considerable	 reference	 to	 the	 ‘cleaning’,	 ‘tidying’	 and	 ‘sweeping’	 imperative	 of	
the	police	in	relation	to	societal	disorder	and	deviants	(or	‘dirt’	or	‘scum’)	(Balch,	
1972,	 Brogden,	 1987,	 Chan,	 1996,	 Shearing,	 1981).	 Police	 typically	 mind	 the	
boundaries	 of	 cleanliness	 to	 “keep	 people	 in	 their	 place”	 (Waddington,	
1999b:31).	 When	 such	 persons	 are	 encountered	 the	 police	 “reproduce	 order”	
(Ericson,	1991:8)	by	compelling	conformity	in	line	with	the	dominant	notion	of	
purity	 prescribed	 in	 law,	 or	 removing	 or	 expelling	 such	 persons	 from	 the	
sanitised	and	orderly	places.		
	
Many	Marxist	scholars	hold	a	similar	view	on	 the	police,	which	 they	see	as	 the	
defenders	 of	 class	 divisions,	 racial	 segregation	 and	 social	 order.	 That	 is,	 the	
police	 are	 a	 coercive	 ‘apparatus’	 (Costa	 Vargas,	 2013)	 that	 protects	 the	
privileged	 position	 of	 the	 dominant	 classes,	 and	 through	 its	 organisational	
culture	 and	 actions	 it	 quite	 literally	 keeps	 the	 working	 class,	 marginalised	
racial/ethnic	 groups	 and	 the	 poor	 in	 line	 (Davis,	 1992,	 Hallsworth,	 2006,	
Harring,	 1976,	 Hawkins	 and	 Thomas,	 1991,	 Marenin,	 1982,	 Reiner,	 2010).	 	 A	
similar	notion	of	the	police	has	been	adopted	in	‘internal	colonization’	literature	
(Gutiérrez,	2004).	For	 this	school	of	 thought	 the	police	are	viewed	as	a	 type	of	
occupying	 force	 that	 protects	 the	 interests	 of	 the	 dominant	 racial	 classes	 and	
maintains	 the	 territorial	 and	 socio-economic	 subjugation	 of	 marginalised	
racial/ethnic	populations	(Blauner,	1969,	Marx,	1970).		
	
Where	 disorder	 is	 considered	 to	 be	 overly	 acute	 the	 police	 have	 tended	 to	




patrols,	 and	 new	 anti-mugging	 squads	 were	 created.	 Suspected	 drug	 users,	


























Deterrence	 and	 rational	 choice	 are	 vital	 to	understanding	 and	analysing	police	
action	 and	 behaviour,	 and	 are	 premised	 on	 the	 notion	 that	 individuals	 will	
ultimately	make	decisions	that	are	based	on	the	probable	consequences	of	those	
decisions.	In	this	regard,	individuals	are	likely	to	engage	in	deviant	and	menacing	




a	 common	 thread	 interwoven	 within	 both	 the	 Classical	 and	 Neo-Classical	
(founding)	 schools	 of	 criminological	 thought.	 The	 former	 views	 individuals	 as	
rational	 beings	 who	 are	 entirely	 responsible	 for	 their	 own	 actions,	 and	 hence	
should	be	appropriately	and	proportionately	punished	for	any	wrongdoings.	The	
latter	 approach	 adopts	 an	 altered	 interpretation	 of	 the	 ‘rational	 actor’	 model,	
suggesting	 that	 children	 and	mentally	 ill	 people	 are	 inhibited	 from	 expressing	
free	 will,	 and	 therefore	 are	 less	 accountable	 for	 their	 actions	 than	 competent	
adults	 (Burke,	 2009,	 Moyer,	 2001).	 The	 prominent	 ‘General	 Theory	 of	 Crime’	
devised	by	Gottfredson	and	Hirschi	(1990)	contends	that	people	are	consistently	
alike,	 and	 that	 criminal	 acts	 are	primarily	 and	 constantly	 the	 result	 of	 rational	
self-interest	 and	 low	 self-control,	 and	 weak	 social	 and	 material	 bonds	 with	
families	and	societal	groups	on	the	part	of	the	criminal	(Gottfredson,	2009).		
	
For	 deterrence	 scholars,	 individuals	 commit	 crime	 when	 the	 benefits	 are	
appealing.	Hence,	punishment	for	criminal	behaviour	is	integral	to	maintaining	a	
harmonious	 society	 with	 it	 being	 essential	 that	 such	 punishment	 be	 likely,	
evident	 and	 promptly	 applied.	 Crime	 is	 thereby	 averted	 by	 the	 reasoned	
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calculation	 by	 individuals	 that	 the	 pain	 of	 punishment	 (or	 the	 perceived	 risk	
thereof)	outweighs	the	impetus	for	the	crime	(Akers,	1990,	Waldo	and	Chiricos,	
1972).	 Hence,	 essential	 to	 deterrence	 theory	 is	 sufficient	 communication	 to	
potential	 offenders	 about	 the	 consequences	 and	 sanctions	 of	 criminal	 actions	
(Geerken	and	Gove,	1975).		
	
From	 the	 1970s,	 rational	 choice	 found	 new	 disciples	 among	 conservatives	 in	
some	Western	 governments	 (particularly	 in	 the	 US	 and	 the	 UK),	 as	well	 as	 in	
academia,	in	what	has	become	known	as	‘new	right’	or	‘popular	punitivism’.	This	
approach	emerged	out	of	 a	deep	cynicism	of	 the	prevailing	emphasis	on	 social	
welfare	 and	 rehabilitation	 in	 the	 criminal	 justice	 sector	 at	 the	 time.	 The	 new	
right	wholeheartedly	embraced	deterrence	as	a	core	principle	and	advocated	a	
‘get	 tough’	 approach	 to	 crime	 control.	 Such	 conservative	 governments	
consequently	 prioritised	 more	 intensive	 policing	 actions,	 speedier	 criminal	







formal	 (criminal	 justice	 institutions	 of	 the	 state)	 and	 informal	 societal	 entities	
(such	 as	 the	 family	 and	 community)	 with	 the	 intent	 of	 regulating	 behaviour	
towards	 conformity	 and	 imparting	 justice	 (Garland,	 2001).	 It	 has	 been	widely	
used	as	a	 catchall	 term	that	encompasses	a	wide	variety	of	 responses	 to	crime	
and	 criminality.	 It	 some	 cases	 it	 is	 used	 interchangeably	 with	 terms	 such	 as	
crime	 reduction	 and	 crime	 prevention	 (see	 below).	 The	 purposeful	 use	 of	 the	






“catch-all	 nature	 that	 defies	 disciplining”	 and	 “incorporates	 not	 only	 the	
practices	of	the	entire	criminal	justice	system,	but	also	those	of	many	other	social	




2014).	 This	 has	 resulted	 in	 a	 definitional	 conundrum,	 where	 a	 wide	 range	 of	
development,	 upliftment	 and	 infrastructural	 activities	 and	 processes	 can	
potentially	be	portrayed	as	crime	prevention.		
	






interventions	 should	 ideally	 only	 be	 depicted	 as	 crime	 prevention	 where	 the	
crimes	 and	 criminality	 that	 were	 specifically	 targeted	 were	 noticeably	
forestalled.	 However,	 this	 approach	 can	 be	 problematic	 for	 policy	makers	 and	
implementers	 of	 programmes	 with	 crime	 prevention	 intentions,	 as	 logically	
crime	 prevention	 initiatives	 can	 only	 effectively	 be	 identified	 in	 hindsight	
(Sherman,	1997b).		
	
A	 widely	 used	 definition	 of	 crime	 prevention,	 particularly	 by	 practitioners,	 is	
contained	 within	 the	 United	 Nations	 Economic	 and	 Social	 Council	 2002	
Guidelines	 for	 the	 Prevention	 of	 Crime.	 This	 document	 broadly	 defines	 crime	
prevention	as	a	composition	of	“strategies	and	measures	that	seek	to	reduce	the	




Arguably	 the	 most	 influential	 and	 often	 cited	 crime	 prevention	 scholar	 is	
Lawrence	 Sherman.	 His	 landmark	 paper,	 ‘Thinking	 about	 Crime	 Prevention’,	
postulates	 that	 crime	 prevention	 is	 the	 positive	 outcome	 of	 “practices”	 and	
“programmes”	 that	 take	 place	 in	 seven	 “institutional	 settings”:	 communities;	








there	 being	 two	 general	 categorisations	 in	 common	 usage.	 The	 first	 approach	
distinguishes	 three	 types	 of	 crime	 prevention:	 situational,	 community	 and	
developmental	 (Tonry	 and	 Farrington,	 1995).	 Situational	 crime	 prevention	
entails	 the	establishment	of	physical	and	environmental	measures	and	barriers	
(such	 as	 target	 hardening)	 in	 order	 to	 intensify	 the	 risks	 and	 diminish	 the	
rewards	 of	 certain	 offending	 (Clarke,	 1995).	 Community	 crime	 prevention	
involves	 efforts	 to	 influence	 social	 conditions	 that	 contribute	 to	 crime	 in	
residential	 areas.	 Interventions	 can	 include	 changes	 in	 the	 design	 of	 the	
residential	 areas,	 and	 the	 formation	 of	 crime	 deterrence	 social	 organisations,	
such	as	neighbourhood	watch	organisations	(Hope,	1995).	Developmental	crime	
prevention	 prioritises	 resources	 and	 programmes	 for	 individuals,	 families,	
schools	and	communities	in	order	to	reduce	the	risk	and/or	promote	resilience	





prevention.	 Primary	 crime	 prevention	 involves	 programmes	 focusing	 on	






Secondary	 prevention	 entails	 early	 identification	 of	 potential	 offenders,	
individual	 interventions,	 and	 neighbourhood	 programmes	 with	 youth-at-risk.	




Compared	 to	 crime	 control	 and	 crime	 prevention,	 ‘crime	 reduction’	 is	 a	 less	
theoretically	complex	and	more	modest	concept.	In	essence	it	entails	responses	
that	are	geared	towards	containing	and	curtailing	existing	patterns	of	crime	and	
criminality.	 It	 is	 seen	 as	 an	 expedient	 term	 “as	 it	 enables	 one	 to	 count	 crime	
events	 before	 and	 after	 an	 intervention	 and	 to	 allocate	 any	 positive	 effects”	
(Frank,	2006:15).		
The	 terms	 crime	 reduction	 and	 crime	 prevention	 are	 frequently	 used	






According	 to	 Garland	 (2001)	 the	 principal	 Anglo-American	 governmental	
response	to	crime	has	embraced	two	intertwined	but	disparate	approaches.	The	
first	 is	 an	 “adaptive	 strategy”	 advocating	 crime	 prevention	 and	 partnership	
arrangements	 with	 civil	 society	 and	 the	 private	 sector.	 The	 second	 is	 a	
“sovereign	state	strategy”,	which	emphasises	“enhanced	control	and	expressive	
punishment”	 (Garland,	 2001:140),	which	has	 been	backed	by	 a	well-resourced	
criminal	 justice	 sector	 that	 underscores	 the	 investigation	 of	 crime.	 That	 is,	 a	
“new	 penology	 of	 risk	 control”	 has	 been	 combined	 with	 an	 “old	 penology	 of	
vengeance	and	vindication”	(Garland,	2004:169).	As	indicated	in	the	assessment	
of	 the	 ‘new	 right’	 above,	 this	 second	 approach	 has	 emerged	 out	 of	 the	
widespread	 public	 and	 government	 perception	 that	 high	 levels	 of	 crime	 had	
become	 ‘normalised’,	 and	 that	established	criminal	 justice	approaches	were	no	
longer	 sufficient	 to	 ensure	 security	 and	 order.	 This	 approach	 gives	 greater	
prominence	to	the	crime	reducing	potential	of	the	police	and	to	policing	activity	
in	general	(Garland,	2001:187).	
Similarly,	 a	 dual	 approach	 to	 crime	 has	 been	 pursued	 in	 many	 post-
independence	African	countries.	However,	the	application	has	differed	markedly	
from	 the	 Anglo-American	 approach.	 That	 is,	 for	 most	 African	 states	 the	
maintenance	 of	 order	 and	 deterrence,	 which	 has	 typically	 been	 harsh	 and	
retributive,	has	taken	precedence	over	the	prevention	and	investigation	of	crime	
(Baker,	 2002a,	 Simon,	 2000).	 The	 protection	 of	 the	 ruling	 elites	 has	 been	
prioritised	at	the	expense	of	the	safety	of	the	general	population	(Francis,	2012,	
Goldsmith,	 2002).	 This	 is	 largely	 due	 to	 a	 legacy	 of	 exploitive	 colonial	 state	





Police	 ethos	 in	 most	 African	 countries	 has	 been	 informed	 by	 a	 distinctive	
militaristic	 or	 paramilitary	 history	 and	 culture	 (Hills,	 2007,	 Marenin,	 1982).	
Opportunistic	crime	control	relationships	have	nonetheless	been	forged	between	
the	 state	 and	 elements	 of	 civil	 and	 ‘uncivil’	 society	 (and	 at	 times	 the	 private	
sector)	 in	 most	 African	 countries.	 Such	 partnerships	 have	 generally	 not	 been	
progressive	 crime	 prevention	 endeavours,	 but	 have	 rather	 entailed	 the	
delegation	 of	 repressive	 policing	 responsibilities	 to	 customary	 authorities	 or	









severely	 restrict	 their	movements),	 and	 compliance	 among	 the	white	minority	
(Shaw,	1996,	Shaw,	2001,	Singh,	2008).	This	changed	in	the	mid-1990s,	following	
South	 Africa’s	 first	 inclusive	 democratic	 elections,	 with	 the	 African	 National	
Congress	 government	 adopting	 the	 prevailing	 Anglo-American	 (contrasting)	








that	 police	 effectiveness	 had	 been	 stymied	 due	 to	 its	 overly	 reactive,	 ‘fire-
brigade’	posture	and	a	lack	of	strategic	prioritisation	of	addressing	the	causes	of	
specific	crimes;	as	well	as	an	absence	of	long-term	thinking	(Tilley,	2006).	Three	
of	 the	 main	 reformist	 approaches	 include:	 Problem-oriented	 policing,	
intelligence-led	policing	and	community	policing.	According	to	Ratcliffe	(2002),	
this	 new	 thinking	 on	 policing	 was	 swiftly	 embraced	 by	 many	 other	 national	














POP	 is	 conceived	 to	 be	 a	 pre-emptive	 policing	 strategy	 that	 seeks	 to	 more	
coherently	 identify	and	analyse	particular	priority	crimes,	especially	 those	 that	
acutely	affect	communities.	 Its	 subsequent	objectives	are	 to	 formulate	 targeted	
and	 more	 effective	 responses,	 combined	 with	 frequent	 evaluation	 and	
communication	with	affected	communities.	 In	 terms	of	 a	POP	approach,	 senior	
police	 managers	 are	 required	 to	 identify	 the	 persistent	 and	 recurring	 crime-
related	 problems,	 with	 rank-and-file	 police	 personnel	 playing	 a	 key	 role	 in	
assisting	with	 this	process	 (Goldstein,	1990).	 Spelman	and	Eck	 (1987:46)	have	






acronym	 for	 the	 following	 four	 steps.	 Scanning:	 those	 efforts	 that	 seek	 to	
precisely	 identify	 and	 prioritise	 the	 relevant	 problem(s).	 Analysis:	 a	 focused	
assessment	of	the	causes,	scope	and	effects	of	the	problem(s).	Response:	actions,	
at	times	customised,	with	the	objective	of	alleviating	the	problem(s).	Assessment:	
an	 evaluation	 of	 the	 impact	 of	 the	 response.	 The	 other	 prevalent	 approach	 to	
POP	 is	 the	 Problem	 Analysis	 Triangle,	 which	 emphasises	 the	 three	 general	




POP	has	been	pursued	 in	many	policing	precincts	 in	 the	US,	and	has	also	been	
internationalised,	 with	 it	 being	 practised	 in	 Canada,	 the	 UK,	 Australia,	 New	
Zealand,	the	Netherlands,	a	number	of	Scandinavian	countries,	as	well	as	South	
Africa	 (Scott,	 2000).	 POP	 has	 typically	 been	 implemented	 in	 the	 context	 of	
precinct,	 neighbourhood	 and	 city	 policing,	 but	 the	 ethos	 has	 also	 been	
incorporated	into	much	larger	scale	approaches	to	policing.	In	a	comprehensive	
review	 of	 policing	 in	 the	 US,	 it	 was	 suggested	 that	 “there	 is	 strong	 research	
evidence	that	the	more	focused	and	specific	the	strategies	of	the	police,	the	more	





was	 suggested	 that	 this	 approach	 to	policing	has	 “emerged	 as	 one	of	 the	most	
widely	accepted	and	used	strategies	in	US	policing.”	It	was	further	reported	that	
there	had	been	“an	overall	modest	but	statistically	significant	impact	of	POP	on	





POP	 approaches	 have	 been	 used	 in	 an	 attempt	 to	 address	 firearm	 violence.	 In	
such	cases,	the	police	have	typically	concentrated	on	reducing	illegal	possession,	




in	 Richmond,	 California	 revealed	 that	 this	 intervention	 had	 significantly	
contributed	 to	 a	 decline	 in	 the	 homicide	 rate.	 In	 particular,	 firearm	 homicides	
decreased	 from	 46.0	 (between	 1990	 and	 1994)	 to	 26.2	 (between	 1995	 and	
1998)	per	100,000	annually	(White,	et	al.,	2003).		
	
Similar	 studies	 on	 POP	 approaches	 in	 Boston,	 Chicago,	 Kansas	 City,	 New	 York	
and	 Pittsburgh	 have	 suggested	 that	 POP	 can	 significantly	 contribute	 to	 a	
reduction	 in	 firearm-related	 homicide.	 However,	 POP	 as	 a	 firearm-violence	
reduction	approach	has	primarily	been	pursued	at	 the	neighbourhood	and	city	
level.	 No	 studies	 have	 been	 undertaken	 to	 consider	 its	 applicability	 at	 a	
state/province	 or	 even	 national	 level	 despite	 there	 being	 some	 scholarly	




In	 1993	 the	 UK	 Audit	 Commission	 published	 a	 groundbreaking	 report	 on	 the	
state	 of	 British	 policing,	 titled:	 ‘Helping	 With	 Enquiries	 –	 Tackling	 Crime	
Effectively’.	The	report	provided	a	constructive	critique	of	British	policing	at	the	
time,	and	suggested	that	in	order	for	policing	to	be	more	effective	its	work	had	to	
be	 “driven	 by	 [reliable	 and	 timely]	 intelligence”,	 and	 that	 “prolific	 offenders”	
should	 be	 systematically	 targeted,	 rather	 than	 just	 crime.	 This	 report	 was	
complemented	 four	 years	 later	 by	 another	 influential	 report	 authored	 by	 Her	
Majesty’s	 Inspectorate	 of	 Constabulary,	 titled:	 ‘Policing	 With	 Intelligence’.	




principally	 seeks	 to	 detect,	 reduce	 and	 disrupt	 criminal	 activity	 by	 locating	
intelligence	at	the	heart	of	police	decision-making.	ILP	places	a	strong	emphasis	
on	 the	 gathering	 and	 analysis	 of	 pertinent	 information	 about	 criminals	 and	
criminality,	 particularly	 criminal	 groups	 and	 repeat	 offenders,	 including	 those	
who	 perpetrate	 homicide	 (Ratcliffe,	 2008)	 in	 order	 to	 devise	 and	 implement	
effective	policing	strategies	where	they	are	“expected	to	yield	highest	dividends”	
(Tilley,	 2006:313).	 ILP	 is	 seen	 to	 be	 an	 evolving	 concept,	 one	 that	 is	 moving	
towards	the	problem-solving	approach	of	POP	(Ratcliffe,	2008).	
	
Ideally	 for	 ILP	 intelligence	 should	 be	 generated	 through:	 the	 sharing	 of	
information	within	 the	policing	 structures;	 collaborative	partnerships	 between	
detectives	 and	 uniformed	 police,	 as	 well	 as	 with	 other	 relevant	 government	
agencies	 (including	 local	 government)	 and	 community	 organisations;	 technical	
surveillance;	 undercover	 investigations;	 and	 the	 use	 of	 informants	 (Maguire,	






New	 Zealand	 has	 shown	 that	 the	 acceptance	 and	 application	 of	 ILP	 amongst	
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policing	 agencies	 requires	 a	 strong	 commitment	 to	 ILP	 from	 senior	 police	
officials,	 as	 well	 as	 a	 balance	 between	 two	 leadership	 styles,	 namely:	
“transformational”	(leaders	that	motivate	and	inspire	their	subordinates	to	bring	
about	change);	and	 “transactional”	 (leaders	 that	make	use	of	 their	authority	 to	
initiate	 change),	 with	 more	 of	 an	 emphasis	 on	 the	 former.	 Other	 important	
uptake	factors	include:	goal	clarity	and	a	strong	link	between	the	goals	and	day-
to-day	 policing	 operations;	 informal	 management	 style;	 and	 a	 culture	 of	
technology	use	(Darroch	and	Mazerolle,	2012).	
	
ILP	 does	 nevertheless	 have	 potential	 drawbacks,	 especially	 the	 ethical	
implications	 of	 the	 relationship	 between	 police	 and	 informers	 (with	 criminal	
records).	That	 is,	 such	 intelligence	can	be	 tainted	as	 it	 is	drawn	from	a	“murky	
world	 of	 half-truth,	 deception,	 innuendo	 and	 betrayal”	 (Billingsley,	 et	 al.,	
2001:5).	 Interactions	 between	 police	 and	 informers	 also	 have	 the	 capacity	 to	
promote	 corruption	 amongst	 the	 police	 and	 undermine	 police	 legitimacy	






place	 and	 context	 in	 understanding	 crime	 patterns,	 crime	 dispersal,	 as	well	 as	
crime	 prevention	 in	 urban	 areas	 (Weisburd	 and	 Braga,	 2003).	 That	 is,	 the	
manner	and	processes	by	which	the	urban	 ‘backcloth’	has	been	fashioned	have	
the	capacity	to	shape	criminal	behaviour,	activities	and	the	public’s	fear	of	crime	
(Brantingham	 and	 Brantingham,	 1995).	 The	 focus	 on	 the	 place	 of	 the	 crime	
stimulated	 the	 emergence	 of	 a	 new	 branch	 of	 criminology,	 namely	
‘environmental	criminology’	(Brantingham	and	Brantingham,	1981).	There	have	
also	been	 concerted	efforts	 to	 study	 the	potential	 prevention	of	 crime	 through	
‘environmental	 design’	 (Jeffery,	 1977),	 which	 entails	 the	 arrangement	 and/or	





by	 routine	 activities	 theory,	 which	 is	 an	 ecological	 theory	 closely	 related	 to	
rational	 choice	 theory.	 	 It	 holds	 that	 predatory	 crime	 occurs	 when	 there	 is	 a	
nexus	 in	 space	 and	 time	of	 four	 elements:	 appropriate	 targets	 (such	 as	 people	








spaces	 at	 foreseeable	 times	 and	 in	 predictable	 ways,	 and	 that	 this	 pattern	 of	
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human	 behaviour	 creates	 opportunities	 for	 criminal	 offenders,	 and	 makes	
people	more	vulnerable	 to	 criminal	 acts	 (Burke,	2009).	This	 is	particularly	 the	
case	 in	areas	where	guardianship	and	surveillance	of	 the	environment	 is	weak,	
and	 intimate	 handlers	 are	 absent.	 	 ‘Suitable	 targets’	 are	 consequently	more	 at	




affairs”	 (Skogan,	 1990:10).	 Hence,	 places	 themselves	 can	 be	 subject	 to	 routine	
activities,	as	well	as	“formal	and	informal	regulation”	(Sherman,	et	al.,	1989:33).	
	
Routine	 activities	 theory	 has	 been	 expanded	 upon	 by	 scholars	 specialising	 in	
place-based	 crime	 with	 Clarke	 (1992),	 for	 example,	 suggesting	 an	 additional	
element	of	“crime	facilitators”,	such	as	cars,	credit	cards	and	weapons,	which	are	
the	key	tools	for	specific	contact	crimes.	For	criminologists	concerned	about	the	
place	 of	 the	 crime	 there	 is	 agreement	 that	 there	 are	 specific	 features	 and	
characteristics	of	 crime	hot	 spots	 that	 facilitate	a	 convergence	of	 these	various	
elements	 (Weisburd,	 2008).	 Hence,	 from	 a	 policing	 perspective,	 crime	 can	 be	





criminality	 are	 generally	 unevenly	 distributed,	 and	 tend	 to	 be	 clustered	 in	
certain	 geographical	 hot	 spots	 (Pierce,	 et	 al.,	 1988,	 Sherman,	 et	 al.,	 1989,	
















Bars	 and	 taverns	 are	 common	 features	of	most	hot	 spots.	 Such	establishments	





the	 early	 to	mid	 nineteenth	 century	 noticed	 that	 crime	was	 not	 evenly	 distributed,	 with	 high	
levels	of	crime	being	clustered	in	certain	areas.	
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guardianship	 activities	 that	 they	might	 undertake	 in	 less	 busy	 areas”	 (Roncek	
and	Maier,	1991:	726).	
3.7.4	Place-based	and	hot	spots	policing	
As	 a	 consequence	 of	 pondering	 about	 possible	 policing	 responses	 to	 hot	 spot	
crime,	the	concepts	of	‘placed-based	policing’	and	‘hot	spots	policing’	have	been	
devised	by	 scholars	of	policing	and	 crime.	The	 literature	on	 such	placed-based	
forms	of	policing	is	introduced	and	partially	discussed	in	Chapter	2.	
There	 are	 three	 general	 categories	 of	 overlapping	 approaches	 to	 hot	 spots	
policing:	 enforcement	 POP	 (typically	 custom-built	 responses);	 directed	 and	
aggressive	 patrols	 (deployed	 police	 have	 a	 specific	 objective);	 as	 well	 as	
crackdowns	and	 raids	 (Braga,	2008).	Within	 these	 three	 categories	 there	are	a	
diverse	 range	 of	 techniques,	 such	 as:	 roadblock	 checkpoints;	 stop-and-frisk;	
cordon-and-search;	 saturation	 patrols;	 ‘zero	 tolerance’	 (or	 ‘broken	windows’4)	
disorder	 enforcement;	 specific	monitoring;	 and	 focusing	 attention	 on	 parolees	
and	other	individuals	at	high	risk	of	criminal	offending;	specific	crime	reporting	
‘hotlines’;	 and	 the	 arrest	 and	 incapacitation	 of	 criminal	 offenders	 (Koper	 and	
Mayo-Wilson,	 2006,	 Marvell	 and	 Moody,	 1996).	 Hot	 spots	 policing	 may	 also	
employ	 ILP	 techniques	 (Ratcliffe,	 2008).	 Furthermore	 it	 may	 include	 police	
accountability	 measures5,	 where	 police	 commanders	 are	 held	 accountable	 by	






and	Weatherburn,	 2004),	 South	Africa	 (Pelser	 and	Rauch,	 2001),	 Trinidad	 and	
Tobago	 (Wallace,	 2014),	 and	 the	 UK	 (Ariel	 and	 Sherman,	 2012).	 The	 actual	
magnitude	of	its	global	prevalence	is	nevertheless	unknown.	
4	Wilson	and	Kelling	(1982)	coined	the	concept	of	a	‘broken	widows’	approach	to	policing,	which	
has	become	highly	 influential	 in	US	policing	 circles.	 They	 suggested	 that	 overt	 urban	disorder,	
such	as	vandalism,	and	the	neglect	of	the	physical	environment	would	lead	to	more	serious	crime	
and	deviant	behaviour,	and	a	further	deterioration	of	affected	neighbourhoods.	They	advocated	
for	 police	 (mainly	 through	 patrols)	 to	 assertively	 and	 indiscriminately	 tackle	 misdemeanour	
offences,	 such	 as	 public	 drunkenness,	 littering	 and	 vagrancy,	with	 a	 view	 to	 promoting	 norms	
and	behaviours	that	would	foster	healthier	communities.	
5	The	most	well	known	approach	has	been	Compstat,	with	was	pioneered	in	New	York	City	in	the	






Available	 evidence	 from	numerous	US	 studies	 suggests	 that	 the	 lion’s	 share	 of	
urban-based	interpersonal	firearm	violence	in	public	spaces	occurs	in	crime	hot	
spots.	In	the	City	of	Boston,	for	example,	Braga,	et	al.	(2010)	found	that	close	to	
three-quarters	 of	 all	 firearm	assaults	 between	1980	and	2008	occurred	 at	 five	
per	cent	of	street	segments	and	intersections	 in	Boston.	 In	Los	Angeles,	Uchida	




in	 a	 wide	 range	 of	 other	 countries,	 such	 as	 Australia	 (Ralston,	 2011),	 Canada	
(Bell,	 2013),	 France	 (McPartland,	 2012),	 Jamaica	 (Barrett,	 2013),	Kenya	 (Ipsos	
Synovate	 Kenya,	 2013),	 Mexico	 (Martínez-Viveros,	 et	 al.,	 2013),	 the	 UK	
(Whitehead,	2009)	and	South	Africa	(Legg,	2013).		
	
Varieties	 of	 place-based	 policing	 have	 been	 used	 recurrently	 to	 target	 firearm	
crime.	A	key	reason	for	this	is	that	firearms	can	have	a	‘priming’	or	‘instrumental’	
effect.	That	 is,	 the	presence	of	a	 firearm	may	lead	to	an	increased	possibility	of	
aggressive	 behaviour	 (Anderson,	 et	 al.,	 1998,	 Berkowitz	 and	 LePage,	 1967,	
Lindsay	and	Anderson,	2000).	 In	addition,	 firearms	are	more	 lethal	when	used	




physically	 possible	 with	 another	 type	 of	 weapon	 (Zimring,	 1991).	 Firearm	
prevalence	 can	 hence	 lead	 to	 an	 escalation	 in	 the	 level	 of	 violence	 in	
interpersonal	 arguments	 or	 disputes	 (Cook,	 1991,	 Hepburn	 and	 Hemenway,	
2004).	 It	 may	 additionally	 result	 in	 an	 increase	 in	 armed	 robberies,	 as	 such	




also	 has	 the	 potential	 to	 initiate	 a	 spiral	 of	 firearm	 violence,	 as	 it	 can	 lead	 to	
further	 increases	 in	 firearm	 possession	 for	 reasons	 of	 self-protection	 (Hauser	
and	Kleck,	2013,	Kleck	and	Kovandzic,	2009,	Molnar,	et	al.,	2004,	Young,	1985)	
or	group	affiliation	(such	as	gangs)	(Bjerregaard	and	Lizotte,	1995).	This	in	turn	




Firearm	 violence,	 like	 other	 types	 of	 violence	 can	 result	 in	 increased	 disorder,	
which	in	turn	leads	to	further	physical	and	social	degradation	in	the	hot	spot	as	
individuals	and	families	who	value	a	stable	community	environment	either	leave	
the	 area	 (Kasl	 and	 Harburg,	 1972,	 Skogan,	 1990),	 or	 socially	 withdraw	 from	
community	life	due	to	anxiety	and	fear	of	crime	victimisation	(Kidd	and	Chayet,	
1984).	 People	with	 similar	 norms	 tend	 to	 refrain	 from	 settling	 in	 these	 areas,	
which	 in	turn	depresses	house	prices	and	local	economic	development.	 In	such	
conditions	 there	 is	 a	 general	 corrosion	 of:	 adult	 supervision	 of	 youth;	 mutual	
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in	 hot	 spots.	 The	 logic	 of	 the	 theory	 therefore	 follows	 that	 magnifying	 the	
perceived	risk	of	apprehension	and	sanction	by	 the	police	can	discourage	such	
weapons	carrying,	and	hence	potentially	prevent	firearm	crime	in	the	immediate	
future.	 It	 has	 further	 been	 suggested	 that	 the	 police	 do	 not	 have	 to	 confiscate	
large	numbers	of	firearms	to	see	a	decline	in	incidents	of	firearm	crime,	as	long	
as	the	risk	of	sanction	exists	(Moore,	1980,	Wilson,	1994).	Nonetheless,	firearm	
confiscations	 and	 arrests	 of	 offenders	 (for	 firearm	 offences)	 intensifies	 the	




A	 series	 of	 systematic	 experiments	 in	 the	 use	 of	 place-based	 policing	 to	
specifically	 target	 firearm	 crime	have	 been	pursued	 in	 the	US	 cities	 of	 Boston,	




similar	 assessment	 exercise	 in	 Los	 Angeles	 and	 St	 Louis	 respectively.	 The	
common	 policing	 strategies	 in	 all	 cases	 were	 directed	 patrols	 with	 some	








during	 the	 intervention,	 with	 no	 comparable	 decline	 in	 the	 control	 area	
(Sherman	and	Rogan,	1995:673).		
	
In	 Indianapolis,	 McGarrell,	 et	 al.	 (2001)	 piloted	 a	 similar	 experiment	 with	 the	
police	 in	 1997	 over	 a	 three	 month	 period.	 The	 main	 intervention	 entailed	
directed	 (targeted)	 patrol,	 which	 was	 compared	 with	 a	 strategy	 of	 general	





6	Illegal	 firearms	are	 essentially	 those	 firearms	 that	have	either	been	 illegally	manufactured	or	
modified;	or	have	been	legitimately	produced,	but	are	not	in	the	possession	of	those	individuals	
who	are	legally	entitled	to	hold	them.	






intervention	 in	 the	 targeted	 areas	 (Cohen	 and	 Ludwig,	 2003:238).	 In	Houston,	
there	was	a	seven	per	cent	reduction	in	firearm	crime	between	November	2006	
and	August	 2007	 in	 the	 areas	 selected	 for	 directed	patrols	 and	 arrest	 of	 those	







1990s,	 restricting	 the	 carrying	 of	 firearms	 on	 certain	 days,	 such	 as	weekends,	
paydays	 and	 public	 holidays.	 The	 bans	 were	 enforced	 through	 roadblocks,	
checkpoints,	 patrols	 and	 search-and-seizure	 policing	 actions.	 It	 was	 estimated	
that	 the	 enforcement	 of	 the	 firearm	 bans	 resulted	 in	 a	 reduction	 of	 firearm	
homicides	 of	 15%	 and	 10%	 in	 Bogotá	 and	 Cali	 respectively	 (Villaveces,	 et	 al.,	
2000:1208).			
	
Hot	 spots	 operations	 have	 also	 been	 successful	 in	 disrupting	 illegal	 firearm	
markets	 where	 brokers	 of	 such	weapons	were	 targeted,	 as	 was	 the	 case	with	
Operation	 Ceasefire	 in	 Boston	 (Braga	 and	 Pierce,	 2005).	 Additionally,	 this	
intervention	 reportedly	 resulted	 in	 a	 reduction	 in	 firearm	 violence	 in	 the	
targeted	 areas	 through	 a	 strategy	 of	 clearly	 communicated	 threats	 of	
comprehensive	police	crackdowns	on	an	entire	gang	if	individual	gang	members	




As	 both	 this	 chapter	 and	 the	 previous	 chapter	 (which	 contained	 the	 literature	
review)	 have	 shown,	 existing	 theory	 and	 evidence	 infers	 that	 distinctive	 and	
crucial	 relationships	 exist	 between	 social	 and	 territorial	 boundaries	 and	 the	
activities	 of	 the	 police.	 In	 addition,	 the	 nature	 of	 police	work	 appears	 to	 have	
been	 fundamentally	 shaped	 by	 the	 police’s	 construction	 and	 maintenance	 of	
operational	 and	 administrative	 boundaries.	 Moreover,	 the	 academic	 literature	
implies	that	such	boundaries	have	an	even	more	potent	impact	on	the	strategies	
and	 actions	of	 the	police,	 particularly	when	 such	boundaries	 coincide	with	 the	
othering	of	population	groups	on	 the	other	 side	of	 the	boundary	or	within	 the	
bounded	space.	Over	 the	past	 three	decades	 there	have	been	 studies	on	place-
based	 policing	 approaches,	 which	 entail	 a	 highly	 focused	 use	 of	 spatial	











to	pacify	groups	and	 individuals	 that	 that	were	perceived	 to	 threaten	 the	state	
and	elite	interests.	The	police	were	also	frequently	positioned	to	guard	the	South	
Africa’s	 territorial	 borderline.	 Moreover,	 the	 police	 in	 South	 Africa	 have	 also	
made	 use	 of	 extensive	 place-based	 policing	 strategies	 in	 an	 attempt	 to	 control	
and	reduce	crime.	
	












2) The	 boundary	 work	 of	 the	 police	 has	 been	 primarily	 framed	 by	 the	





























in	 South	Africa	were	 extensively	 reviewed,	 including	 the	 annual	 reports	 of	 the	











researchers.	 This	 is	 particularly	 in	 relation	 to	 reports	 pertaining	 to	 police	
operations	 and	 detailed	 crime	 analysis.	 The	main	 reason	 for	 this	 is	 the	 police	
have	 typically	 regarded	 such	 documentation	 to	 include	 sensitive	 information	








operations	 and	 certain	 aspects	 of	 the	 SAPS	 approach	 to	 firearm	 control,	 key	
informant	 interviews	 were	 conducted	 with	 a	 small	 cohort	 of	 key	 serving	 and	
retired	SAPS	officials	that	had	previously	occupied,	or	currently	occupied	senior	
positions	 in	 relation	 firearm	 control,	 firearm	 crime	 investigation	 and	 high-
density	SAPS	operations.		
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A	purposeful	 sampling	selection	method	was	employed	given	 that	only	a	 small	
number	of	individuals	possessed	such	relevant	detail	and	insight	in	SAPS	firearm	
control	and	high-density	operations.	Such	an	approach	has	been	commonly	used	
in	 qualitative	 research	 in	 situations	 where	 the	 individuals	 in	 question	 “are	




The	 University	 of	 Cape	 Town’s	 Faculty	 of	 Law	 Research	 Ethics	 Committee	
provided	 ethics	 clearance	 for	 these	 interviews.	 The	 relevant	 data	 from	 these	
interviews	was	subsequently	used	and	referenced	in	Chapter	6	and	Chapter	7	in	
order	 to	 provide	 a	 more	 detailed	 account	 of	 SAPS	 firearms	 efforts	 and	 high-
density	operations	respectively.	
These	interviews	were	undertaken	in	2015	and	early	2016,	which	was	a	time	of	
intense	 institutional	 turmoil	 within	 the	 SAPS,	 particularly	 at	 the	 senior	
management	 level,	 with	 two	 provisional	 police	 commissioners	 and	 a	 National	
SAPS	 Commissioner	 being	 dismissed	 during	 this	 period.	 In	 addition,	 the	 SAPS	
Central	 Firearms	 Registry	 was	 under	 intense	 scrutiny	 from	 the	 Parliamentary	
Portfolio	 Committee	 on	 Police,	 and	 was	 the	 subject	 of	 severe	 criticism	 in	 the	
electronic	 and	 print	media	 following	 a	 series	 of	 corruption	 and	 administrative	
scandals.	Consequently,	one	of	the	interviewees	requested	that	his/her	 identity	
remain	 anonymous,	 as	 he/she	 was	 concerned	 that	 any	 comments	 linked	 to	
his/her	name	may	have	negative	implications	for	his/her	role	within	SAPS.	The	
other	interviewees	were:	




• Mr	 Stan	 Joubert	 (retired),	 former	 National	 Commander	 of	 the	 Illegal
Firearm	Investigative	Units;
• Gen	 Gary	 Kruzer,	 Deputy	 National	 SAPS	 Commissioner:	 Management
Interventions
• Mr	Martin	Naude,	former	Head,	Serious	and	Violent	Crime,	SAPS;	and
• Ms	Alice	Pienaar-Marais,	 former	senior	SAPS	 firearm	control	officer	and
operational	commander	of	Operation	Sethunya
The	 interviewees	 were	 contacted	 directly	 either	 telephonically	 or	 by	 email	 to	
request	an	interview.	During	this	process	the	interviewees	were	informed	of	the	
aim	of	the	thesis	and	the	general	types	of	questions	that	would	be	asked	during	
the	 interview	 process.	 The	 interviewees	 either	 knew	 the	 author	 of	 this	 thesis	
personally,	or	knew	of	his	 research	credentials	as	he	had	previously	published	
on	firearm	control	issues	in	South	African	and	other	Southern	African	countries,	








The	 interviews	 were	 face-to-face,	 and	 were	 based	 on	 a	 semi-structured	
questionnaire	 in	 which	 both	 open	 and	 closed	 questions	 were	 used,	 given	 the	
respondents’	 different	 ranks,	 roles	 and	 responsibilities	 within	 SAPS	 between	
1994	and	2015.	The	questionnaire	essentially	sought	to	gauge	the	respondents’	
involvement	 in,	 and	 knowledge	 of,	 the	 SAPS’	 firearm	 control	 processes	 and	
interventions,	 as	 well	 as	 verify	 and	 corroborate	 published	 information	 in	 this	
regard.	The	interviews	varied	between	90	and	150	minutes	in	length.	
	
The	 interviews	were	 undertaken	 in	 Pretoria	 and	 Cape	 Town	 throughout	 2015	
and	early	2016.	The	interviews	with	serving	SAPS	officials	generally	took	place	
in	their	offices,	while	interviews	with	retired	SAPS	members	were	conducted	in	
coffee	 shops	and	restaurants.	The	 interviewees	signed	 informed	consent	 forms	
and	were	briefed	about	the	focus	of	the	thesis	at	the	beginning	of	the	interview,	
and	about	how	their	responses	would	be	presented	and	referenced	in	the	thesis.	
Four	 out	 of	 the	 seven	 interviewees	 consented	 to	 having	 their	 interviews	





high-density	 operations	 by	 the	 police	 in	 contemporary	 South	 Africa.	 However,	
the	responses	of	these	interviewees	were	in	no	way	representative	of	the	entire	
population	 of	 senior	 and	 middle-ranking	 SAPS	 officials	 who	 were	 involved	 in	








supplement	 description	 and	 analysis	 that	 had	 been	 derived	 from	 published	




In	 relation	 to	 secondary	 sources,	 this	 thesis	 takes	 account	 of	 the	 vast	 array	 of	
publications	 on	 the	 police	 and	 policing	 bodies	 in	 South	 Africa,	 both	
contemporary	and	historical.	This	written	work	however	is	of	variable	empirical	
and	analytical	rigour.	These	publications	have	mostly	been	penned	by	academics,	
activists	 and	 former	 policemen,	 and	 typically	 exist	 in	 the	 form	 of	 books,	 book	
chapters,	monographs	and	journal	articles.	The	Institute	for	Security	Studies	and	
the	 Centre	 for	 the	 Study	 of	 Violence	 and	 Reconciliation	 have	 produced	 a	
significant	 publication	 stock	 on	 the	police	 and	policing	 over	 the	past	 20	 years,	
and	 hence	 their	 work	 was	 widely	 referenced	 in	 this	 thesis.	 Numerous	 media	
	
	 48	






to	 the	 post-apartheid	 period.	 Key	 data	 sources	 included:	 the	Medical	 Research	
Council	(MRC)/University	of	South	Africa	National	Injury	Mortality	Surveillance	
System	 (NIMSS);	 the	 Department	 of	 Correctional	 Services;	 the	 National	
Prosecuting	Authority;	SAPS	crime	data;	and	data	published	by	the	Independent	




A	 key	 outcome	 of	 the	 qualitative	 approach	 was	 a	 systematic	 and	 detailed	
examination	of	the	relationship	between	boundaries	and	the	police	(particularly	
high-density	 police	 operations)	 in	 post-apartheid	 South	 Africa.	 Crucially	 this	












(as	a	proxy	 for	high-density	police	operations)	and	murder	 is	presented	 in	 the	
form	 of	 line	 graphs	 for	 the	 period	 of	 1994/95	 to	 2014/15.	 This	 approach	 is	












for	 the	 period	 2005/06	 to	 2014/15	 (available	 on	 the	 SAPS	 website)	 was	
supplemented	 with	 data	 transcribed	 from	 archived	 hardcopy	 SAPS	 crime	
statistics	reports	for	the	period	1994/95	to	2004/05	for	170	SAPS	station	areas.	
The	outcome	was	a	Microsoft	Excel	 spread	sheet	of	170	SAPS	station	areas	 for	
the	 period	 1994/95	 to	 2014/15	 for	 the	 following	 data	 categories:	 murder;	
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attempted	 murder;	 robbery	 with	 aggravating	 circumstances;	 and	 IPFA.	 The	












the	various	governments	within	 the	 territories	 that	now	comprise	modern-day	
South	Africa.	It	covers	the	period	from	the	establishment	of	the	Dutch	East	India	
Company’s	commercial	enterprise	in	Cape	Town	in	1652	until	the	election	of	the	
National	 Party	 government	 in	 1948.	 It	 is	 not	 possible	 to	 provide	 a	 detailed	
chronology	or	account	 for	 the	every	 intricacy	and	nuance	of	what	 is	a	complex	
historical	 tapestry	of	policing	 in	South	Africa	over	 this	period	of	 close	 to	 three	
centuries.	 This	 chapter	 rather	 provides	 a	 selective	 and	 highly	 condensed	
chronological	 account	 that	 considers	 the	 broad	 brushstrokes	 of	 how	 policing	




authority	 a	 superior	 means	 to	 perpetrate	 violence	 (as	 compared	 to	 weapons	
used	 by	 indigenous	 populations),	 which	 they	 fervently	 used	 to	 construct	 and	
safeguard	such	boundaries	by	repelling	attacks	from	othered	groups.	In	addition,	
firearms	 more	 easily	 allowed	 for	 the	 conquest	 and	 the	 subjugation	 of	
populations	 beyond	 the	 established	 colonial	 boundaries.	 Nonetheless,	 colonial	
and	 government	 authorities	 were	 deeply	 concerned	 that	 should	 groups	
designated	as	‘other’	secure	access	to	firearms	then	the	security	of	the	state	and	
the	 integrity	 of	 its	 political	 and	 geo-racial	 boundaries	 would	 be	 severely	




This	 chapter	 will	 also	 assert	 that	 militarism	 has	 historically	 been	 an	 intrinsic	
feature	 of	 policing	 in	 South	 Africa.	 That	 is,	 during	 the	 early	 colonial	 period	
paramilitary	entities	were	established	with	a	dual	policing	and	military	purpose.	
The	martial	orientation	of	these	policing	entities	reverberated	forward	into	the	
establishment	 of	 the	Union	 of	 South	 Africa,	 and	was	 nourished	 by	 the	 police’s	
perpetually	 close	 relationship	with	 the	military,	 combined	with	an	overarching	
ethos	of	state	militarism.	Michael	Brogden,	a	prominent	sociologist	and	historian	
of	policing,	has	suggested	that	this	militarism	was	so	pervasive	that	for	close	to	
200	 years	 the	 police	 were	 effectively	 “an	 internal	 army	 of	 occupation	 acting	






Firearm	 possession	 and	 firearm	 controls	 were	 foundationary	 policing	 and	
security	elements	of	the	Dutch	East	India	Company’s	settlement	in	the	Cape	from	
the	 1650s.	 That	 is,	 firearms	 provided	 European	 settlers	with	 an	 exclusive	 and	




the	 early	 European	 settlers	 who	 were	 greatly	 outnumbered	 in	 relation	 to	
surrounding	 Khoisan	 inhabitants.	 That	 is,	 in	 1662	 the	 total	 population	 of	 the	
Cape	 settlement	 was	 394	 (Europeans	 and	 slaves)	 as	 opposed	 to	 an	 estimated	
50,000	Khoisan	in	the	surrounding	areas	(Elphick	and	Malherbe,	1979).	
	
Acclaimed	 historian,	 Noël	 Mostert,	 has	 described	 this	 embryonic	 colonial	








prohibited,	 as	 there	 were	 concerns	 that	 the	 territorial	 and	 social	 boundaries	
between	 the	Dutch	settlers	and	 the	Khoisan	population,	who	were	regarded	as	
dangerous	 and	 inferior	 to	 Europeans	 (Mostert,	 1992),	 would	 be	 severely	
threatened	should	the	Khoisan	acquire	significant	quantities	of	firearms	(Storey,	
2008).	 Jan	 van	 Riebeeck,	 the	 Company’s	 representative,	 who	 held	 a	 highly	
jaundiced	view	of	 the	Khoisan,	 regarded	 them	as	a	 “brutal	gang,	 living	without	
any	conscience”	(Mostert,	1992:106),	and	proclaimed	that:		
	
As	 these	 tribes	 are	 somewhat	bold,	 thievish,	 and	not	 at	 all	 to	be	 trusted	 each	 [settler]	






Malherbe,	 1979).	However,	 from	 the	 early	 1670s	 some	Khoisan	 clans	 attacked	
European	 hunters	 and	 farmers	 along	 the	 territorial	 edge	 of	 the	 colony.	 The	
Company	responded	 in	a	belligerent	 fashion	by	mustering	Europeans	and	men	









The	practice	of	arming	 indentured	or	 loyal	Khoisan	men	continued	 throughout	




From	 the	 late	18th	 century	Xhosa	men	beyond	 the	eastern	 frontier	of	 the	Cape	
Colony	 began	 to	 acquire	 firearms	 from	 Khoisan	 farmworkers	 who	 had	
52	
absconded	 from	 farms	within	 the	Colony	due	 to	poor	working	 conditions	 (and	
had	previously	acquired	firearms	as	a	 form	of	payment)	(Penn,	1992).	Many	of	
these	farmworkers	even	used	their	firearms	in	organised	insurgency	against	the	
colony	 (Elphick	 and	 Malherbe,	 1979).	 In	 addition,	 some	 dissident	 trekboers8	
engaged	 in	 gunrunning	 across	 the	 borders	 of	 the	 Colony	 into	 Xhosa	 territory	
(Storey,	 2008).	 By	 the	 early	 1830s	 firearm	 smuggling	 had	 become	 a	 highly	
lucrative	industry	and	was	being	carried	out	by	a	wide	range	of	entrepreneurs,	
including	hunters	and	Christian	missionaries	 (Storey,	2008).	This	 illicit	 firearm	
trade	 had	 also	 spread	well	 beyond	 the	 eastern	 frontier	 regions	 into	Natal	 and	
Zululand,	as	well	as	into	the	northern	frontier	territories.		
In	 the	 latter	part	of	 the	19th	century	 the	bustling	diamond	mining	areas	 in	and	
around	 Kimberley	 in	 the	 British-administered	 territory	 of	 Griqualand	 West	
became	a	lodestone	for	firearm	trading	and	trafficking	(Marks	and	Atmore,	1971,	
Storey,	2008).	Black	market	firearms	and	gunpowder	often	fetched	a	handsome	
price	 given	 the	 unlawful	 nature	 of	 the	 trade.	 For	 example,	 members	 of	 the	
Bastard	community	on	the	north	western	frontier	reportedly	had	to	part	with	as	
much	 as	 six	 oxen	 or	 a	 ‘hundredweight’	 (50kg)	 of	 ivory	 in	 order	 to	 secure	 a	
musket	of	mediocre	quality	(Legassick,	2010).		
The	 illicit	 and	 poorly	 regulated	 trade	 in	 firearms	 had	 serious	 security	
implications	 for	 the	 settler	 colonies.	 Such	 access	 to	 firearms	 reportedly	
emboldened	some	indigenous	groups	to	engage	in	more	frequent	attacks	against	
settler	 communities	 and	 rustle	 livestock,	 as	was	 the	 case	with	 the	 !Kora	 in	 the	
northern	 frontier	 territories	 from	 the	 1830s	 (Leśniewski,	 2010);	 and	 Venda	
raiders	 in	 the	 Soutpansberg	 in	 the	 late	 1860s	 (Giliomee,	 1981).	 The	Hlubi,	 for	
example,	 used	 their	 firearms	 to	 defy	 colonial	 subjugation	 (Etherington,	 1978).	
Around	the	same	time	firearm	use	by	indigenous	people	began	to	feature	more	
prominently	 in	 the	 various	 battles	 along	 the	 eastern	 frontier,	 as	well	 as	 in	 the	
Anglo-Zulu	War	(1879)	(Guy,	1971,	Marks	and	Atmore,	1971).	
In	 an	 attempt	 to	 reduce	 the	 growing	 threats	 in	 the	 frontier	 regions	 and	 the	
territories	 beyond	 that	 had	 been	 brought	 about	 by	 the	 illicit	 arms	 trade,	 the	
various	colonial	 authorities	 tightened	 firearm	control	 regulations	 in	 relation	 to	
the	 sale	 of	 firearms,	 ammunition	 and	 gunpowder	 to	 non-whites.	 In	 the	 Boer	
republics,	 namely	 the	 South	African	Republic	 (Transvaal)	 and	 the	Orange	 Free	
State	 (established	 in	1852	and	1854	 respectively),	 black	persons	were	banned	












if	 armed,	 would	 subsequently	 not	 be	 a	 compliant	 subject	 of	 the	 colonial	
authorities,	 and	 would	 most	 likely	 engage	 in	 menacing	 and	 defiant	 behaviour	
(Nasson,	2007).		However,	such	a	policing	approach	was	largely	ineffectual	in	the	
outer	reaches	of	the	colonies	as	enforcement	was	ad	hoc,	and	there	was	a	major	





in	 frontier	 regions	 notably	 contributed	 to	 the	 pursuance	 of	more	 forceful	 and	
directed	 forms	 of	 policing	 by	 colonial	 authorities	 in	 these	 areas.	 As	 these	
territories	were	vast	and	sparsely	populated	policing	became	the	responsibility	
of	a	variety	of	armed	mobile	and	quasi-military	policing	entities.	Some	examples	
included:	 Cape	 Mounted	 Police,	 Cape	 Mounted	 Riflemen,	 the	 Natal	 Mounted	




the	 policing	 bodies	mentioned	 above	 enlisted	 or	 coerced	men	 into	 their	 ranks	
from	local	ethnic	groups,	such	as	the	Khoisan	and	amaXhosa,	as	well	as	men	of	
mixed	 descent.	 This	 was	 primarily	 informed	 by	 acute	 shortage	 of	 potential	
recruits	 from	the	European	settler	communities	and	financial	considerations	 in	
that	 non-Europeans	 in	 military	 and	 policing	 formations	 could	 be	 paid	 lower	





As	 it	was	costly	 to	maintain	official	mounted	police	detachments	 in	 the	distant	
border	 areas	 the	 colonial	 authorities	 regularly	 endorsed	 the	 formation,	 or	
deputised,	 bands	 of	 ‘loyal’	 armed	 men	 into	 semi-autonomous	 ‘commandos’	 to	
perform	policing	and	paramilitary	functions.	Veldwachtmeesters	[field	sergeants]	
or	 veldkornetten	 [field-cornets]	 usually	 headed	 these	 commandos,	 which	were	
official	 representatives	 of	 the	 Cape	 Colony	 and	 tended	 to	 be	 prominent	 local	
farmers.	 In	 1739	 commando	 service	 became	 compulsory	 for	 white	 male	









over	 land	 between	 settlers	 and	 indigenous	 populations,	 combined	 with	 the	







whether	 they	 had	 actually	 posed	 a	 serious	 risk	 towards	 white	 settlers	 (Penn,	
1986,	 Williams,	 1970).	 Members	 of	 the	 commandos	 customarily	 appropriated	




men,	women	and	children	 for	use	as	 labour	on	trekboer	 farms	(Adhikari,	2014,	
Dooling,	 2009,	 Penn,	 1992).	 Such	 genocidal	 violence	was	 essentially	 a	 form	 of	
boundary	policing,	as	 the	elimination	of	 the	San	paved	the	way	 for	an	outward	




From	 the	 middle	 of	 the	 19th	 century	 policing	 bodies	 and	 the	 police	 were	
frequently	 directed	 to	 subjugate	 and	 conquer	 indigenous	 populations	 and	
opposition	 groups.	 This	 was	 derived	 from	 bigoted	 colonial	 views	 of	 such	
populations	and	groups,	as	well	as	plans	by	the	various	colonial	administrations	
to	 expand	 the	 territorial	 boundaries	of	 the	 colonies.	 In	 addition,	 these	policing	
practices	 were	 acutely	 informed	 by	 armed	 resistance	 against	 and	 perceived	
threats	to	colonial	rule	that	was	exhibited	by	some	indigenous	communities.	This	




The	 conquest	 form	of	policing	was	particularly	 evident	 on	 the	 eastern	 frontier	
during	the	recurrent	small-scale	wars	that	were	waged	between	the	Cape	Colony	
and	 amaXhosa	 communities	 during	 much	 of	 the	 19th	 century,	 but	 was	 also	
prevalent	in	the	northern	border	areas.	These	policing	and	military	actions	were	
also	 informed	 by	 prejudiced	 and	 panic-stricken	 attitudes	 of	 European	 settlers	
along	 the	 frontier	who	 called	 for	more	 aggressive	 policing	 action	 (Crais,	 1992,	
Elbourne,	2000,	Lester,	1998).		
	
A	 prominent	 example	 was	 in	 1850,	 when	 as	 a	 result	 of	 complaints	 by	 white	
farmers	 on	 the	 eastern	 frontier	 of	 excessive	 vagrancy	 and	 theft	 allegedly	
emanating	 from	 the	 Kat	 River	 Settlement	 (comprised	 of	 predominantly	 black	
residents),	 the	 local	 magistrate	 deployed	 the	 Xhosa	 Police9	to	 evict	 some	 100	
‘squatters’	 and	 destroy	 their	 huts	 (Ross,	 2003,	 Watson,	 1996).	 These	 policing	
actions	 subsequently	 ignited	 rebellion	within	 the	 Kat	 River	 Settlement.	 Rebels	
combined	 forces	with	 amaXhosa	 troops	 in	what	was	 to	 become	 known	 as	 the	
Eighth	 Frontier	 War.	 The	 Cape	 Colony	 mustered	 a	 joint	 military	 and	 policing	
																																																								
9	The	Xhosa	Police	were	a	policing	body	comprised	of	amaXhosa	men	established	in	the	Eastern	
frontier	region	 in	 the	mid-1830s	by	the	colonial	authorities,	and	were	referred	to	as	 the	 ‘Kaffir	





response	 that	 included	 the	 militarised	 Cape	 Mounted	 Rifles,	 which	
indiscriminately	destroyed	houses	in	rebel	areas	(Mostert,	1992).			
	
Similarly,	 in	 response	 to	 the	 armed	 attacks	 by	 the	 !Kora	 (mentioned	 above),	
which	 had	became	 further	 emboldened	 in	 the	 1860s	 and	had	 effectively	made	
large	swathes	of	the	northern	frontier	region	ungovernable	(Leśniewski,	2010),	
the	 Cape	 colonial	 government	 enacted	 the	 Northern	 Border	 Protection	 Act	
(1869).	 This	made	 provision	 for	 considerable	 resources	 to	 be	 deployed	 to	 the	
troubled	 regions,	 including	 a	 large	 detachment	 of	 the	 Frontier	 Armed	 and	
Mounted	 Police	 (FAMP).	 The	 !Kora	 were	 initially	 subdued,	 but	 renewed	 their	
attacks	on	settlers	along	with	other	allied	groups	 in	 the	 late	1870s.	They	were	
eventually	routed	by	the	combined	efforts	of	the	FAMP	and	commandos	in	1879	
(Dooling,	 2009,	 Ross,	 1975)	 and	 the	 colonial	 territorial	 boundaries	 were	
subsequently	expanded	and	secured.	
	
In	 another	 instance,	 in	 1894,	 following	 the	 enactment	 of	 the	 Pondoland	
Annexation	 Act,	 the	 Cape	 Colony	 appropriated	 Pondoland,	 the	 last	 remaining	
non-settler	controlled	wedge	of	 land	between	the	Cape	and	Natal	colonies.	The	
annexation	 was	 achieved	 in	 practice	 through	 the	 threat	 of	 force	 with	 a	
contingent	of	militarised	mounted	police	setting-up	camp	on	the	eastern	borders	
of	Pondoland.	At	the	time	there	were	accusations	that	Pondoland	was:	anarchic;	
had	become	a	haven	for	 fugitives	 from	British	 justice;	and	that	 it	was	a	staging	
ground	 for	 criminal	 assaults	 against	 colonial	 settlements	 and	 farms	 in	 the	
frontier	regions	(Theal,	1908).	Cecil	John	Rhodes,	the	Prime	Minister	of	the	Cape	
Colony	 at	 the	 time,	 indicated	 that	 the	 annexation	 was	 inevitable	 given	 “the	
impossibility	 of	 a	 barbarian	 native	 existing	 between	 two	 civilised	 powers”	




A	key	element	of	policing	during	 this	 colonial	period	was	 forced	disarmament.	
That	 is,	 the	 confiscation	 of	 firearms,	 ammunition	 and	 other	 weapons	 by	 the	
colonial	 authorities	 from	 population	 groups	 deemed	 to	 be	 dangerous	 or	
threatening	to	the	consolidation	of	territorial	and	political	control	in	the	frontier	
regions.	 This	was	 often	 facilitated	 by	means	 of	 legislation	 that	 euphemistically	
framed	 such	 disarmament	 endeavours	 as	 a	 means	 to	 preserve	 ‘the	 peace’.	
However,	such	legislation	codified	the	othering	and	oppression	of	targeted	racial	






1870s	 in	 the	 aftermath	 of	 a	 series	 of	 armed	 conflicts	 with	 amaXhosa	
communities	 on	 the	 eastern	 frontier	 of	 the	 Cape	 Colony	 (Stapleton,	 2009).	 By	






of	 500	 pounds	 Sterling	 or	 a	 seven-year	 jail	 term.	 There	 was	 also	 a	 distinct	
possibility	that	those	who	failed	to	comply	with	the	provisions	of	the	legislation	
would	 have	 to	 forfeit	 their	 arms,	 cattle	 and	 land	 (Storey,	 2008).	 There	 was	
considerable	protestation	by	black	Africans	 against	 this	 racially	discriminatory	





was	met	with	widespread	 resistance.	This	 rapidly	escalated	 into	 the	 ‘Gun	War’	
(1880-81)	 in	 which	 military	 and	 militarised	 police	 forces	 were	 deployed	 to	
quash	the	rebellion	and	enforce	disarmament.	At	the	time,	racist	considerations	
were	clearly	evident	in	the	speeches	of	Bartle	Frere,	the	governor-general	of	the	




and	war”	 (Storey,	 2004:709).	 In	 response	 to	 these	 disarmament	 attempts,	 the	
Basotho,	which	had	resorted	to	guerrilla	tactics,	inflicted	heavy	casualties	on	the	
colonial	 forces.	 Consequently	 the	 Cape’s	 ability	 to	 govern	 Basutoland	 was	
irreparably	 impaired.	 To	 save	 face,	 the	 Cape	 authorities	 abandoned	 their	
disarmament	attempts,	and	Basutoland	subsequently	secured	a	separation	from	




throughout	 the	 Cape	 Colony.	 This	 was	 a	 martial	 law	 measure	 in	 response	 to	
concerns	that	raids	by	commandos	from	the	Boer	republics	in	the	context	of	the	
Anglo-Boer	 War	 (see	 below)	 may	 ignite	 a	 rebellion	 by	 Afrikaners	 within	 the	
Colony.	All	civilians	were	required	to	apply	for	licences	to	retain	their	firearms,	
with	 the	 exception	 of	 rifles,	 which	 were	 to	 be	 surrendered	 to	 the	 authorities.	
However,	 as	 before,	 the	 Peace	 Preservation	 Act	 (1878)	 was	 not	 uniformly	









political	 boundaries	 and	 eliminating	 the	 threat	 that	 the	 Boer	 republics	 had	
posed.		A	number	of	detachments	from	the	mobile	paramilitary	police	units,	such	
as	the	Cape	Mounted	Rifles	(formerly	the	FAMP),	 the	Cape	Mounted	Police	and	






within	 the	 war	 zone,	 which	 was	 a	 mobile	 paramilitary	 force	 with	 the	 specific	
objective	of	targeting	Boer	commandos	(Curtis,	1902).	Counterinsurgency	tactics	
were	 also	 pursued,	 with	 police	 recruits	 actively	 participating	 in	 the	 ‘scorched	
earth’	strategy,	which	entailed	the	burning	of	Boer	farmland	and	farmhouses,	as	
well	as	the	killing	of	livestock.	The	police	were	also	involved	in	skirmishes	with	
Boer	 commandos	 and	 in	 capturing	 enemy	 combatants	 (Downes,	 2007,	Hyslop,	
2009).		
	
Akin	 to	 the	 conquest	 campaigns	 on	 the	 eastern	 frontier,	 forced	 disarmament	
operations	were	 conducted	 during	 and	 after	 the	war	 in	 order	 to	 shore	 up	 the	
British	 control	 of	 the	 South	 African	 Republic	 and	 the	 Orange	 Free	 State	
(Grundlingh,	 1991).	 The	 Boers	 were	 not	 the	 sole	 targets	 of	 disarmament	 as	
racially	 prejudiced	 firearm	 control	 was	 acutely	 perpetuated	 in	 the	 captured	
territory,	 with	 the	 SAC	 being	 required	 to	 seize	 firearms	 from	 approximately	
50,000	black	people,	which	they	had	obtained	during	the	war	(Warwick,	1983).	
This	 disarmament	 process	 was	 underpinned	 by:	 negotiations	 with	 relevant	






In	 1910	 the	 South	 African	 colonies	 under	 British	 administration,	 namely	 the	
Cape	 Colony,	 Natal	 Colony,	 the	 Transvaal	 Colony	 (formerly	 the	 South	 African	
Republic)	 and	 the	Orange	River	Colony	 (formerly	 the	Orange	Free	 State)	were	
amalgamated	 into	 the	 Union	 of	 South	 Africa,	 which	 subsequently	 became	 a	
dominion	of	 the	British	Empire.	 The	 first	 three	decades	 of	 the	post-unification	






by	 black	 South	 Africans	 in	 response	 to	 their	 continued	 subjugation,	 which	
included	the	continuation	of	the	prohibition	on	legal	firearm	ownership	by	black	
South	 Africans.	 The	 police	 were	 at	 the	 forefront	 of	 quelling	 uprisings	 and	
insurrections	 in	 order	 to	 consolidate	 government	 control	 over	 the	 Union.	 The	
police	were	also	tasked	with	enforcing	social	(racial)	boundaries	between	white	
and	black	 South	Africans,	 as	well	 as	 ensuring	 that	 there	would	be	 a	 compliant	




The	 creation	 of	 the	 Union	 led	 to	 a	 centrally	 directed,	 highly	 bureaucratised	
national	 police	 organisation	 being	 established,	 which	 incorporated	 police	
personnel	 from	 the	 four	 former	 colonies.	 This	 new	 national	 police	 body	 was	
christened	 the	 South	 African	 Police	 (SAP).	 The	 blueprint	 for	 the	 SAP	 was	
58	
extensively	 influenced	 by	 the	 structure	 and	 practices	 of	 the	 Royal	 Irish	
Constabulary,	 a	martial,	 frontier-oriented	 colonial	 policing	 body	 that	 had	 been	
created	 in	 Ireland	 in	 the	 early	 19th	 century	 (Brewer,	 1994,	 Brogden,	 1989).	
Hence,	 a	militarised	 frontier	 policing	 ethos	 was	 seemingly	 hardwired	 into	 the	
DNA	 of	 the	 SAP.	 This	 was	 reinforced	 by	 the	 military	 traditions	 and	




of	both	 the	Defence	Act	 (1912)	and	 the	Police	Act	 (1912).	 In	particular,	during	
wartime,	 SAP	 members	 could	 be	 conscripted	 into	 military	 service	 and	 serve	
under	the	command	of	the	Union	Defence	Force.	The	role	of	the	police	was	also	
fundamentally	informed	by	moral	panics	within	white	communities	at	the	time.	






parliament	 about	 the	 future	 of	 policing	 in	 the	 Union,	 Jan	 Smuts,	 who	 was	 to	
become	Prime	Minister,	described	the	SAMR	as	a	“small	permanent	striking	force	
to	 deal	with	 emergencies	which	 arise	 suddenly	 and	which	 you	may	 nip	 in	 the	
bud”	(Chanock,	2001:49).		
The	SAMR	was	structured	and	armed	along	military	lines	and	was	incorporated	
into	 the	 Union	 Defence	 Force.	 It	 had	 dedicated	 order	 maintenance	
responsibilities,	particularly	in	rural	districts	in	times	of	peace.	Its	primary	tasks	
were	the	policing	of	stock	theft	and	tax	collection	(Cooper,	1929),	but	was	also	to	
be	 an	 incontrovertible	 display	 of	 the	 emerging	 state’s	 coercive	 power	 (Beinart	
and	Bundy,	1987).	However,	the	SAMR	was	widely	criticised	by	magistrates	for	
being	 nepotistic	 and	 inept	 in	 the	 execution	 of	 basic	 policing	 tasks.	 In	 the	 late	
1920s	 the	 SAMR	was	 disbanded	 and	 its	 personnel	were	 incorporated	 into	 the	
SAP,	 with	 rural	 policing	 largely	 being	 delegated	 to	 local	 farmers	 who	 were	
deputised	as	police	reservists	(Chanock,	2001).	
5.2.2	Police	responses	to	rebellion	and	insurrection	by	white	South	Africans	




deployed	 to	 forcibly	 subdue	 these	 uprisings.	 Three	 prominent	 examples	 are	
highlighted	below	which	aptly	demonstrate	this,	namely:	the	1914	rebellion;	the	







In	 October	 1914	 an	 armed	 rebellion	 of	 approximately	 11,000	men	 took	 place,	
which	was	spearheaded	by	disaffected	Afrikaner	veterans	of	 the	second	Anglo-
Boer	 War.10 	The	 catalyst	 for	 the	 rebellion	 was	 the	 pronouncement	 by	 the	
government	 of	 South	 Africa’s	 support	 for	 Britain’s	 declaration	 of	 war	 on	
Germany	 (World	War	 I).	 A	 requirement	 of	 such	 a	 commitment	 was	 for	 South	
Africa	 to	 invade	 neighbouring	 German	 South	 West	 Africa	 (now	 Namibia)	
(Chanock,	2001).	The	uprising	was	ultimately	derived	from	a	nostalgic	desire	by	
the	 rebels	 to	 re-establish,	 by	means	 of	 force,	 the	 Boer	 republics	 within	 South	
Africa	 that	 would	 be	 free	 of	 British	 imperialist	 influences	 and	 demands	
(Davenport,	 1963,	 Swart,	 2004).	 The	 rebels’	 aspirations	 were	 bolstered	 by	
poverty	and	alienation	among	large	segments	of	the	Afrikaner	population	which	
had	 worsened	 following	 the	 unification	 process	 and	 rapid	 industrialisation	
(Fedorowich,	2003,	Swart,	1998).	
	
Despite	 the	 close	 historical	 and	 cultural	 ties	 between	 the	 leaders	 of	 the	 ruling	
South	African	 Party	 government	 (particularly	 Louis	 Botha	 and	 Jan	 Smuts)	 and	
the	 rebel	 elite,	 there	was	 considerable	 othering	 by	 the	 leadership	 towards	 the	
rebels,	 referring	 to	 them	 as	 “traitors”	 who	 would	 be	 subjected	 to	 “condign	
punishment”	 (Higginson,	 2015:168).	 The	 government	 subsequently	 responded	
forcefully	 as	 at	 the	 time	 the	 rebellion	 had	 the	 potential	 to	 destabilise	 the	
underpinnings	of	fragile	Union.	Martial	law	was	declared	with	the	Union	Defence	
Force	and	 the	SAP	being	deployed	 to	bring	an	end	 to	 the	uprising	 (Davenport,	
1963).		
	




The	 combined	Union	Defence	 Force-SAP	 forces	 engaged	 in	 cavalry	 assaults	 on	
rebel	positions	and	camps	and	were	able	to	reclaim	rebel-held	areas	and	disarm	
the	 insurgents	 in	a	matter	of	weeks.	 	But	 it	 took	an	additional	 three	months	of	





most	 notorious	 labour	 strikes	 in	 South	 African	 history.	 It	 was	 in	 reaction	 to	
attempts	 by	 mining	 companies	 to	 decrease	 wages	 and	 benefits,	 and	 hire	 a	
greater	 proportion	 of	 black	 employees	 (who	 could	 be	 paid	 lower	 wages)	
following	 a	 drop	 in	 the	 global	 gold	 price	 (Beck,	 2014).	 The	 strike	 was	 highly	
militarised.	 Strikers	 armed	 themselves	 with	 a	 variety	 of	 weapons,	 including	
firearms,	and	were	organised	into	‘commandos’	(Alexander,	1999,	Krikler,	1999).	
As	 the	 strike	 intensified	 vehement	 condemnation	 of	 the	 strikers	 increased	





English	 language	 press.	 The	 Union	 government,	 under	 the	 leadership	 of	 Jan	




Union	 government,	 with	 some	 strike	 leaders	 declaring	 their	 intention	 to	
establish	 a	 Republic	 (Hirson,	 1993).	 Commandos	 attacked	 and	 shot	 at	 police,	
non-striking	white	mineworkers,	 and	 numerous	 black	mineworkers.	 Posses	 of	
white	 strikers	 and	 sympathisers	 went	 on	 indiscriminate	 shooting	 sprees,	
specifically	 targeting	 black	 people	 in	 many	 areas	 throughout	 Johannesburg	
(Breckenridge,	2007,	Krikler,	1999).	Some	commandos	were	also	responsible	for	
sabotage	 activities,	 such	 as	 the	 blowing-up	 of	 railway	 lines	 and	 power	 lines	
(Union	 of	 South	Africa,	 1924).	 The	 SAP	 and	 SAMR	were	 unable	 to	 supress	 the	
strike	comprehensively	and	commandos	captured	some	police	stations,	such	as	
in	 Newlands,	 Fordsburg	 and	 Langlaagte.	 In	 effect	 the	 strikers	 were	 able	 to	
establish	temporary	liberated	zones	(Hyslop,	2009).	
	
Due	 to	 concerns	 that	 the	 revolt	 might	 result	 in	 more	 widespread	 violence	 in	
South	 Africa,	 martial	 law	 was	 declared	 and	 the	 Union	 Defence	 Force	 was	
deployed	 to	 assist	 the	 police	 (Hyslop,	 2009).	 The	 security	 forces	made	 use	 of	





to-house	 searches	 as	 a	 strategy	 to	 forcibly	 regain	 control	 of	 rebel-held	 areas.	
Suspected	 rebels	 were	 detained,	 and	 arms	 and	 ammunition	 were	 seized.	 In	
Brakpan,	 for	 example,	 the	 security	 forces	 undertook	 a	 follow-up	 operation	 a	
week	 after	 their	 initial	 detention	 and	 disarmament	 operations	 in	 order	 to	
apprehend	and	disarm	those	rebels	who	had	fled	the	town	before	the	operation	
but	had	subsequently	returned	to	 their	homes	(Krikler,	2005).	Table	5.1	below	















World	War	 II	 in	1939,	mainly	 in	 response	 to	 the	 security	 threats	posed	by	 the	
Ossewabrandwag	 (OB)	 (Ox	Wagon	Sentinel)	within	South	Africa.	The	OB	was	a	
conservative	 Afrikaner	 social/cultural	 nationalist	 movement	 with	 fascist	
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inclinations	 that	 was	 vehemently	 opposed	 to	 South	 Africa’s	 support	 of	 British	
war	 effort	 in	 relation	 to	 World	 War	 II.	 Some	 OB	 members	 and	 Stormjaers	 (a	







and	 confiscated	 (Brewer,	 1994).	 Following	 on	 from	 this	 operation,	 all	 policing	




From	 its	 inception	 the	 SAP	 was	 at	 the	 forefront	 of	 enforcing	 the	 continued	
subjugation	 of	 black	 South	 Africans,	 and	 in	 particular	 mitigating	 the	 risk	 that	
they	may	rebel	in	large	numbers	against	white	minority	rule.	In	this	regard,	the	
SAP	pursued	 two	key	 containment	 strategies,	namely	 the	pass	 system,	 and	 the	
continuation	 of	 racially	 prejudiced	 firearm	 control.	 Furthermore,	 the	 SAP	used	




The	 pass	 system,	 which	 had	 been	 preserved	 from	 the	 colonial	 period,	 was	 a	









In	 terms	 of	 firearm	 control,	 the	 vast	 majority	 of	 black	 South	 Africans	 were	
prohibited	from	possessing	firearms	out	of	concern	that	 it	may	result	 in	armed	
violence	and	crime	against	white	South	Africans.	 In	addition,	 there	was	a	deep	
concern	 within	 the	 Union	 government,	 informed	 by	 past	 prejudices	 and	
experiences	 of	 frontier	 battles,	 that	 firearms	 could	 be	 used	 to	 achieve	 racial	
equality.	This	was	clearly	evident	in	the	parliamentary	deliberations	concerning	
the	 Defence	 Act	 (1912)	 and	 deployment	 of	 non-white	 South	 African	 troops	 to	
support	Britain	during	World	War	I.	According	to	Nasson	(2016:197),	there	was	
anxiety	that	“having	Africans	bearing	arms	and	sharing	duties	with	whites	would	
erode	 the	 colour-bar	 by	 condoning	 equality	 in	 relations	 between	 black	 and	
white”.	The	Union	government	position	was	reiterated	during	the	parliamentary	
debates	 around	 South	Africa’s	 involvement	 in	World	War	 II	 (1939),	where	 Jan	
Smuts	 declared	 in	 no	 uncertain	 terms:	 “To	 forestall	 any	
misrepresentation…prevent	 any	 possible	 misunderstanding…natives	 will	 not	
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appears	 that	 the	 SAP	was	 efficient	 in	 implementing	 its	 biased	 firearm	 control	
mandate,	 as	 between	 1910	 and	 1948	 reporting	 on	 firearm-specific	 crime	 by	





Between	 1910	 and	 1948	 there	were	 a	 series	 of	 strikes	 and	 uprisings	 by	 black	
South	Africans	in	response	to	government	policies	and	practices.	Both	the	police	
and	 the	 military	 were	 frequently	 deployed	 to	 ensure	 that	 these	 incidents	 of	
protest	 did	 not	 result	 in	 more	 widespread	 insurrection	 by	 black	 people	 and	
disruption	to	the	economy.	The	police	therefore	acted	to	preserve	and	defend	the	
geo-racial	and	class	boundaries	within	South	Africa.	Two	of	the	most	prominent	
uprisings	by	black	South	Africans	 that	primarily	 involved	 the	SAP	are	assessed	
below.	
	
In	October	1920,	 in	 the	midst	of	 a	militant	 strike	 instigated	by	a	 faction	of	 the	
Port	 Elizabeth	 Industrial	 and	 Commercial	 Workers'	 (Amalgamated)	 Union	 of	
Africa,	 a	 combined	 force	 of	 police	 and	 deputised	white	 civilians	massacred	 24	
black	 protestors	 outside	 a	 police	 station	 in	 the	 coastal	 city	 of	 Port	 Elizabeth.	
Prior	 to	 this	 massacre	 there	 had	 been	 general	 angst	 amongst	 white	 residents	
that	the	strike	would	rapidly	escalate	into	widespread	violence	with	black	mobs	
attacking	 white	 homes	 and	 businesses.	 In	 the	 immediate	 aftermath	 of	 the	
shootings	the	local	newspaper,	the	EP	Herald,	reported	that	the	police	had	acted	
in	 self-defence	 following	 shots	 being	 fired	 from	 the	 crowd	 (which	 was	 later	
disproved	 by	 the	 Schweizer	 Commission	 of	 Inquiry).	 The	 EP	 Herald	 further	
stated	that:	“had	the	Police	not	taken	the	extreme	steps	they	did,	Port	Elizabeth	
would,	 in	 all	 probability,	 have	had	 a	 far	 greater	 and	 terrible	 tragedy	 to	mourn	
and	deplore”	(Baines,	1993:5).	These	sentiments	were	shared	by	the	Inspector	of	
Labour,	W.	Ludorf	who	stated	that:	“[U]nless	prompt	action	had	been	taken	Port	





In	 1921	 the	 SAP	 and	 the	 Union	 Defence	 Force	 used	 overwhelming	 force	 to	
suppress	 an	 uprising	 in	 Bulhoek	 (Eastern	 Cape	 province).	 In	 this	 instance	 a	
contingent	of	around	800	policemen	opened	fire	on	members	of	a	religious	sect	
of	 black	 South	 Africans,	 ‘the	 Israelites’,	 which	 was	 illegally	 occupying	
government	land,	and	were	armed	with	swords	and	assegais.	Previous	attempts	
by	government	authorities	to	disperse	the	squatters	by	means	of	negotiation	and	
threat	 of	 force	 had	 failed	 (Webb	 and	 Holleman,	 1997).	 A	 military-style	 police	







The	construction	of	 the	various	colonies	 that	have	now	been	 incorporated	 into	
contemporary	South	Africa	were	intrinsically	born	out	of	violence	as	the	colonial	
authorities	and	 settlers	of	European	descent	 sought	 to	use	 force	 (or	 the	 threat	
thereof)	to	acquire	land,	malleable	labour	and	political	control,	as	well	as	extend	
and	defend	the	borders	of	the	colonies.	At	the	frontiers	of	the	colonial	territories	




formal	 and	 informal,	 whose	 customary	modus	 operandi	 was	 to	 use	 excessive	
force	in	such	areas	to	maintain	and	even	extend	these	territorial	boundaries	by	
means	 of	 defeating	 and/or	 subjugating	 rebellious	 and	 threatening	 groups.	 In	
addition,	 these	policing	entities	 also	 regularly	 fought	 alongside	detachments	of	
soldiers	 in	 battles	 and	 skirmishes	 against	 the	 opponents	 of	 colonial	





policing	 bodies	 and	 the	 police	 were	 central	 to	 maintaining	 and	 enforcing	
boundaries	 relating	 to	 racial	 and	 class	 segregation.	 Strikes,	 protest	 action	 and	
rebellion	by	black	people	 and	working	 class	Afrikaners	were	quashed	as	 these	
forms	 of	 dissension	 were	 ultimately	 perceived	 as	 being	 geared	 towards	
weakening	or	 eradicating	 these	boundaries.	Those	population	groups	engaging	
in	 such	 actions	 were	 generally	 severely	 othered	 by	 government,	 which	




residential	 and	 commercial	 areas.	 Such	 a	 strategy	 was	 also,	 in	 later	 years,	 to	




access	 to,	 firearms	 was	 a	 fundamental	 component	 of	 colonial	 and	 post-
unification	 policing	 and	 the	 maintenance	 of	 social	 boundaries.	 Firearm	
possession	 was	 a	 security	 issue,	 but	 was	 also	 perceived	 to	 be	 a	 touchstone	
towards	 racial	 equality,	 and	 hence	 the	 colonial	 administrations	 sought	 to	
monopolise	control	over	powder	and	shot,	with	 firearm	possession	by	othered	
groups,	 particularly	 black	 populations,	 being	 discouraged,	 restricted	 and	






In	 1948	 the	 National	 Party	 (NP)	 became	 the	 ruling	 party	 in	 South	 Africa.	




population.	 The	 police	 were	 at	 the	 front	 and	 centre	 of	 implementing	 these	
apartheid	 measures,	 and	 as	 this	 chapter	 will	 show,	 the	 policing	 of	 social	
boundaries	 consequently	 became	 even	 further	 engrained	within	 the	 ethos	 and	
strategies	of	the	South	African	Police	(SAP).	Throughout	this	period,	opposition	
and	 violent	 resistance	 to	 government,	 principally	 within	 black	 communities,	
gained	 momentum	 with	 the	 SAP	 also	 being	 at	 the	 vanguard	 of	 the	 state’s	
aggressive	response	to	this	unrest.	Within	the	Southern	African	region	the	South	





various	 approaches	 that	were	 used	 by	 the	 SAP	 to	 uphold	 and	 impose	 societal	
divisions,	as	well	as	respond	to	threats	and	insurrection	within	South	Africa.	In	
addition,	it	will	consider	the	strategies	that	the	SAP	pursued	in	order	to	defend	
and	 fortify	 the	 national	 borderlines.	 Moreover,	 this	 chapter	 will	 explore	 the	
implications	 that	 the	 boundary	 work	 of	 the	 police	 had	 on	 the	 police	 as	 an	
organisation.	 Firearm	 control	 under	 apartheid	 will	 also	 be	 considered	 as	 the	




From	 the	 1960s	 dynamics	 within	 a	 number	 of	 states	 in	 the	 Southern	 African	
region	 became	 more	 threatening	 towards	 the	 South	 African	 government,	
particularly	 Rhodesia	 (now	 Zimbabwe)	 and	 South	 West	 Africa	 (SWA)	 (now	
Namibia).	The	 latter	country	was	occupied	by	South	Africa	at	 the	 time.	 In	both	
territories	 liberation	 movements	 had	 initiated	 armed	 insurgency	 against	 the	
white	 minority	 governments,	 with	 these	 liberation	 movements	 being	
sympathetic	 to	 the	 plight	 of	 the	 African	 National	 Congress	 (ANC)	 and	 the	 Pan	
Africanist	 Congress	 (PAC).	 Southern	 Africa	 was	 to	 become	 an	 even	 more	
unwelcoming	 place	 for	 the	 apartheid	 government	 from	 the	 mid	 1970s	 with	
Angola	and	Mozambique	acquiring	independence	and	subsequently	being	led	by	
pro-communist	 governments.	 The	 SAP	was	 deployed	 in	 significant	 numbers	 in	

















Further	 to	 this,	 the	 Rhodesian	 security	 forces,	 with	 the	 support	 of	 SAP,	
established	 exclusion	 zones	 on	 the	 Rhodesian	 side	 of	 the	 border.	 The	
communities	 that	 had	 resided	 in	 those	 areas	 were	 subsequently	 resettled	 in	
newly	established	‘protected	villages’.	These	depopulation	measures	were	put	in	
place	to	make	the	territory	more	conducive	 for	 the	security	 forces	to	patrol,	as	
well	as	pursue	rebel	fighters.	It	also	thwarted	the	construction	of	guerrilla	bases	
and	undermined	attempts	by	 the	guerrillas	 to	recruit	cadres	and	made	 it	more	
difficult	for	them	to	acquire	food	and	find	shelter	(Cilliers,	1985,	Kesby,	1996).	
	
In	1975	 the	South	African	government	scaled	down	 its	economic	and	 technical	
support	to	its	northern	neighbour,	and	withdrew	most	of	the	SAP	personnel.	This	
stemmed	 from	 the	 emergence	 of	 South	Africa’s	 détente	 regional	 foreign	policy	
towards	 Southern	 Africa,	 a	 key	 component	 of	 which	 entailed	 lobbying	 and	
pressure	 by	 the	 South	 African	 government	 for	 there	 to	 be	 a	 cessation	 of	
hostilities	 in	 Rhodesia.	 It	 was	 the	 Rhodesian	 government’s	 reluctance	 to	
sincerely	pursue	a	ceasefire	and	political	settlement	with	the	principal	liberation	
movements	in	that	country	that	ultimately	resulted	in	the	departure	of	the	South	
African	 policemen	 from	 Rhodesia	 (Barber	 and	 Barratt,	 1990,	 Moorcraft	 and	







SAP	 generally	 policed	 this	 appropriated	 country	 in	 a	 similar	 fashion	 to	 how	 it	
policed	 South	 Africa,	 particularly	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 strict	 and	 often	 repressive	
enforcement	 of	 the	 ‘native	 reserves’	 (bantustans)	 and	 a	 pass	 system	 for	 black	
inhabitants	 (Moorsom,	 1977).	 However,	 the	 sparsely	 populated	 nature	 of	 this	










The	 Police	 Zone	 was	 comprised	 of	 the	 south-central	 regions	 of	 SWA,	 which	
included	 the	 cities	 and	most	 of	 the	major	 towns	 (where	 the	white	 population	
resided),	as	well	as	industry	and	mining	operations.	The	areas	to	the	north	of	the	
Police	Zone	border	were	 referred	 to	as	 the	 ‘Tribal	Area’	 in	which	mostly	black	
communities	were	located.	The	Police	Zone	did	shift	north	under	South	African	
rule	reflecting	a	need	for	the	imposition	of	greater	governmental	authority	in	the	
northern	 regions	 in	 order	 to	 improve	 security	 within	 the	 Police	 Zone.	
Significantly	more	 aggressive	 (and	 lethal)	 policing	was	 pursued	 and	 condoned	
beyond	the	Police	Zone	(McKenna,	2011).		
	
The	perimeter	 of	 the	Police	 Zone	was	 a	 physical	 barrier	 in	 the	 form	of	 fences,	
control	points	and	police	posts	that	had	been	erected	to	restrict	the	movement	of	




the	 boundary	 of	 the	 Police	 Zone	 intently	 (Toase,	 2011).	 Up	 until	 1977	 black	
Namibians	 from	outside	of	 the	Zone	were	only	permitted	 to	 enter	 the	 security	
enclave	 with	 an	 official	 permit.	 The	 northern	 districts	 (outside	 of	 the	 Police	
Zone)	remained	considerably	under-policed,	and	the	SWA	administration	mostly	




From	 the	 1960s	 the	 SAP	 adopted	 a	 pronounced	 paramilitary	 role	 in	 SWA	 and	
noticeably	increased	its	boots	on	the	ground.	This	was	essentially	in	response	to	
South	West	African	People’s	Organisation	(SWAPO)	launching	an	armed	struggle	
against	 South	 African	 occupation.	 SWAPO	 guerrillas	 undertook	 small-scale	
attacks	 (including	 assassinations	 of	 a	 number	 of	 headmen	 with	 perceived	







the	 SAP	 targeted	 SWAPO	 activists	 and	 supporters	 through	 intimidation	 and	
arrest	(Toase,	2011).	Most	of	the	internal	SWAPO	leadership	were	arrested	and	















kill	 guerrillas	 entering	 SWA	 from	 neighbouring	 countries,	 as	 well	 as	 destroy	
SWAPO	bases	 (Toase,	 2011).	 The	 first	 SAP	military-style	 raid	 (in	 collaboration	
with	 the	SADF)	was	 in	Ongulumbashe	where	 inexperienced	SWAPO	 insurgents	
were	routed	by	the	well-armed	SAP	(Els,	2007).	In	1971	a	widespread	strike	and	
unrest	 led	 to	 the	 SAP	and	 the	 South	African	military	being	 granted	 emergency	
powers,	which	they	then	used	to	violently	crackdown	on	strikers,	particularly	in	
areas	beyond	the	Police	Zone,	such	as	Ovamboland.	Strike	meetings	came	under	





body	 to	 counter	 the	 military	 threat	 posed	 by	 SWAPO	 (Seegers,	 1996).	 In	
addition,	 the	 SAP	 had	 expressed	 disquiet	 about	 the	 limited	 resources	 at	 its	
disposal	given	that	it	was	also	involved	in	Rhodesian	conflict	at	the	time	(Brown,	
1995).	 This	 was	 a	 clear	 indication	 that	 the	 South	 African	 government’s	
perception	of	 the	threatening	dynamics	within	SWA	had	escalated,	namely	that	
SWAPO	was	 perceived	 to	 have	 become	 a	 more	 formidable	 military	 force,	 and	









officially	 titled	 Operation	 K,	 but	 it	 became	 more	 widely	 known	 as	 ‘Koevoet’	
(crowbar),	a	crude	analogy	 for	 its	principal	modus	operandi,	aptly	described	by	
Louis	le	Grange,	the	South	African	Minister	of	Law	and	Order	as	being	to	“prise	
terrorists	 out	 of	 the	 bushveld	 like	 nails	 from	 rotten	 wood”	 (Truth	 and	
Reconciliation	Commission	of	South	Africa,	1998).	 It	primarily	targeted	SWAPO	
insurgents	 and	 was	 deployed	 in	 the	 northern	 regions	 of	 SWA	 close	 to	 the	
Angolan	 border.	 It	 was	 mainly	 comprised	 of	 black	 SWA	 Police	 personnel	 and	
retired	special	forces	operators	from	Rhodesia.	SAP	retained	a	close	relationship	
with	 Koevoet	 throughout	most	 of	 its	 existence,	 with	 a	 number	 of	 SAP	 officers	
serving	within	this	unit	until	its	disbandment	(Dale,	1993,	O'Brien,	2001).	
	
Koevoet	 sought	 to	 instil	 fear	 and	 used	 violence	 in	 an	 attempt	 to	 prevent	 the	
establishment	 of	 SWAPO	 liberated	 zones	with	 SWA,	 and	 to	make	 the	 areas	 in	
which	it	operated	more	compliant	to	control	of	the	South	African	administration	
(Brown,	 1995,	 Herbstein	 and	 Evenson,	 1989).	 Koevoet	 platoons	 closely	
resembled	and	operated	 like	 the	 colonial	 commandos,	 albeit	 in	a	more	orderly	
fashion.	That	is,	they	were	small,	well-armed	and	highly	mobile	units.	As	with	the	





In	 the	 vast	 borderland	 areas	 they	 hunted	 and	 killed	 SWAPO	 insurgents	 and	
supporters	 with	 complete	 impunity.	 At	 times	 Koevoet	 operatives	 perpetrated	
violent	 acts	 whilst	 dressed	 in	 clothing	 similar	 to	 SWAPO	 fighters	 and	 then	




of	 SWAPO	 insurgents.	 In	 June	 1984	 Louis	 le	 Grange,	 the	 Minister	 of	 Law	 and	




The	 key	 insight	 for	 SAP	 from	 the	 SWA	 COIN	 operations	was	 that	 such	 violent	
forms	 of	 policing	 could	 be	 effective	 in	 combatting	 liberation	 movements	 and	
refashioning	 those	 zones	 in	 which	 such	 liberation	movements	 and	 their	 allies	







Accord.	 The	 crux	 of	 this	 non-aggression	 pact	 was	 that	 the	 two	 governments	
would	 commit	 themselves	 to	 refrain	 from	 supporting	 armed	 non-state	 groups	
within	their	territories,	particularly	the	ANC	and	Renamo	(Mozambique	National	
Resistance	Movement)13	that	had	launched	attacks	against	the	South	African	and	
Mozambican	 governments	 respectively	 (Metz,	 1986).	 The	 Mozambican	
government	signed	the	agreement	as	its	economy	was	suffering	from	the	ravages	
of	war.	For	South	Africa,	the	Nkomati	Accord	was	a	means	to	further	secure	its	




directly	 benefited	 from	 the	outcome.	That	 is,	 shortly	 after	 the	Nkomati	Accord	
had	 been	 concluded	 ANC	 operatives	 were	 harassed	 by	 the	 Mozambican	
authorities	 and	 were	 compelled	 to	 leave	 the	 country	 (Davies,	 1985),	 thereby	
weakening	 the	 threat	offered	by	 the	ANC	 to	 the	borderline	policing	 function	of	
the	 SAP	 and	 sabotage	 attacks	 on	 government	 facilities.	 This	 development	 also	
severely	 curtailed	 the	ANC’s	 arms	 smuggling	 routes	 into	 South	Africa	 that	 had	
been	uncovered	by	the	SAP	a	few	years	earlier	(Johannesburg	Domestic	Service,	
1980).	However,	the	South	African	security	forces,	particularly	the	SADF,	did	not	












A	 central	 feature	 of	 apartheid	 was	 the	 methodical	 criminalisation	 of	 the	




legislated	 racial	 segregation,	 and	 arrested	 those	 black	 people	 who	 failed	 to	
produce	such	a	permit	on	demand.	In	fact,	considerably	more	time	was	taken	up	
with	the	enforcement	of	‘petty’	apartheid	criminal	codes	than	was	devoted	to	the	
prevention	 and	 combating	 of	 more	 serious	 forms	 of	 crime	 (Prior,	 1989).	 SAP	
members	 also	 harassed	 and	 imprisoned	 numerous	 leaders	 of	 anti-government	
organisations.	The	SAP	also	became	intricately	involved	in	the	heavy	lifting	of	the	












people	 challenged	 or	 disregarded	 regulations	 pertaining	 to	 racially	 segregated	
public	spaces.	This	was	clearly	evident	during	the	1952	Defiance	Campaign	when	
leaders	of	the	ANC	and	other	anti-apartheid	organisations	orchestrated	a	series	
of	 acts	 of	 civil	 disobedience	 against	 petty	 apartheid	 laws.	 Black	 people	 used	
‘Europeans	only’	areas	in	train	stations	and	post	offices;	and	activists	refused	to	
carry	 passbooks	 and	 adhere	 to	 curfews.	 Thousands	 of	 activists	 were	 arrested	




Another	 prominent	 example	 took	 place	 in	 August	 1989	when	 numerous	 black	
families	 held	 a	 picnic	 at	 the	whites-only	 Bloubergstrand	 beach	 in	 Cape	 Town.	
This	 picnic	 had	 reportedly	 been	 organised	 by	 a	 civil	 society	 organisation,	 the	
Black	Sash,	in	deliberate	defiance	of	apartheid	policies	and	laws.	Heavily	armed	













There	 was	 a	 distinct	 difference	 with	 respect	 to	 the	 manner	 in	 which	 the	 SAP	
policed	 ‘ordinary’	 crime	 in	 white	 residential	 areas	 as	 compared	 to	 black	
townships,	 with	 patrolling	 and	 responses	 to	 calls	 for	 assistance	 being	
significantly	 more	 subdued	 in	 the	 latter.	 The	 SAP,	 which	 displayed	 distinct	
othering	 towards	 black	 populations,	 surmised	 that	 a	 minimalist	 approach	 to	
policing	 ‘ordinary’	 crime	 in	 black	 townships	 was	 appropriate	 as	 the	 SAP’s	
enforcement	of	petty	apartheid	laws	would	mostly	keep	crime	contained	within	
townships	(Cawthra,	1993,	Shaw,	2001).	Furthermore,	large	settlements,	such	as	
Soweto,	 were	 viewed	 to	 be	 too	 dangerous	 for	 the	 SAP	 to	 engage	 in	 regular	
patrolling	 (Glaser,	 2005).	 The	 SAP	 nonetheless	 responded	more	 judiciously	 to	
those	categories	of	crime	that	could	potentially	result	in	community	mobilisation	
and	 protest	 against	 the	 police,	 such	 as	 armed	 robbery.	 For	 instance,	 in	 some	
crime	hot	spots	the	police	were	more	visibly	present	on	pay-days	in	an	effort	to	
diminish	the	likelihood	of	theft	and	robberies	(Brewer,	1994).		
From	the	1980s	 the	SAP	also	made	use	of	 ‘special	 constables’	or	kitskonstables	
(instant	 constables),	who	were	 inexperienced,	 poorly	 paid	 black	 recruits	 often	
drawn	from	communities	with	strong	support	for	loyalist	vigilante	groups,	such	
as	Inkatha.	They	were	enrolled	in	a	six-week	crash	course	in	basic	policing	and	
were	 then	 armed	with	 shotguns,	 batons	 and	 sjamboks	 (a	 type	 of	whip).	 These	
special	constables	were	largely	unsupervised	and	often	operated	with	impunity.	






recruited	 to	enforce	 law	and	order	within	 indigenous	 communities	 throughout	
the	 colony,	 as	 well	 as	 deter	 and	 repress	 opposition	 to	 government	 (Deflem,	
1994).	This	form	of	ethnic	policing	in	apartheid	South	Africa	was	aptly	described	
by	 Andrew	 Wilson,	 the	 presiding	 judge	 of	 the	 Trust	 Feed	 Massacre15	trial,	 in	
which	 he	 stated	 that	 special	 constables	 “were	 taken	 from	 the	 community	 and	
placed	 back	 in	 the	 community	 to	 act	 as	 a	 wedge	 against	 the	 comrades	 [anti-
apartheid	 opposition	 groups]”	 (Independent	 Board	 of	 Inquiry,	 1992a:15).	 In	
effect	 the	 special	 constables	 allowed	 the	 SAP	 to	 police	 numerous	 black	
communities	at	 a	distance,	with	 the	SAP	only	being	 required	 to	deploy	 regular	
personnel	into	black	communities	during	times	of	unrest	and/or	crime	waves.	
A	further	SAP	strategy	in	relation	to	policing	black	communities	was	to	provide	
financial	 and	 material	 support	 to	 loyalist	 groups	 that	 were	 predisposed	 to	





opposed	 to	 government	 (Glaser,	 2005).	 This	 in	 effect	 was	 a	 form	 of	 indirect	
policing,	 in	which	partisan	groups	were	deputised	to	undertake	aspects	of	geo-
racial	 boundary	 enforcement.	 In	Natal,	 for	 example,	 during	 the	 1980s	 the	 SAP	
reportedly	 escorted	 and	 permitted	 Inkatha	 impis	 (armed	 vigilante	 groups)	 to	
perpetrate	 violent	 acts	 against	 communities	 aligned	 to	 the	 United	 Democratic	
Front	 (UDF)16	and	 the	 Congress	 of	 South	 African	 Trade	 Unions	 (COSATU).	 In	
addition,	 the	 SAP	 even	 thwarted	 efforts	 to	 prosecute	 Inkatha	 members,	




supplemented	with	mass	 crackdowns	 and	 curfews	 by	 both	 the	 police	 and	 the	




and	 made	 2,000	 arrests.	 The	 following	 year	 the	 SAP	 conducted	 33	 ‘special	
operations’	 in	 and	 around	 Johannesburg	 and	made	 some	 8,000	 arrests	 in	 this	
regard	(Glaser,	2005).	In	October	1984	a	combined	force	of	approximately	7,000	
police	and	soldiers	cordoned	off	and	conducted	pre-dawn	raids	in	the	Transvaal	
townships	 of	 Sebokeng,	 Sharpeville	 and	 Boipatong,	 with	 354	 people	 being	
arrested	in	Sebokeng	alone	(South	African	Press	Association,	1984).	
	
The	 SAP	 also	 facilitated	 the	 establishment	 of	 semi-autonomous	 police	 units	
within	 a	 number	 of	 the	 self-governing,	 ethnically	 based	 ‘bantustans’	 or	
‘homelands’	 for	black	Africans.	These	were	grand	apartheid	constructs	 in	 rural	





By	 1990	 violence	 and	 criminality	 had	 escalated	 in	 numerous	 townships,	 and	
threatened	 to	 overflow	 into	 the	 relatively	 serene	 white	 residential	 and	
commercial	 enclaves,	 as	well	 as	 to	 fundamentally	 destabilise	 the	 efforts	 of	 the	
apartheid	 government	 to	 maintain	 order.	 Such	 townships	 had	 also	 become	
substantially	more	dangerous	for	the	police,	conditions	that	were	exacerbated	by	

















motivated	 by	 concerns	 that	 localised	 protest	 action	 could	 rapidly	 escalate	 into	
more	widespread	collective	disorder	in	other	black	communities,	which	in	turn	




military-style	 vehicles	 and	 incapacitants	 (such	 as	 tear	 gas).	 If	 required,	 SAP	
members	would	engage	in	a	baton	charge	and	use	sjamboks	on	protestors.	Lethal	
force	was	applied	(including	live	ammunition)	in	the	occasions	where	protestors	








In	 March	 1960	 in	 the	 township	 of	 Sharpeville	 (near	 Vereeniging)	 some	 300	
police	 opened	 fire	 on	 a	 crowd	 of	 thousands	 of	 PAC	 supporters	 who	 were	
protesting	 against	 the	 pass	 system,	 killing	 69	 and	 injuring	 approximately	 180	
people.17	First-hand	 accounts	 from	 the	 time	 of	 the	 massacre	 suggest	 that	 the	
policemen	on	the	scene,	feeling	overwhelmed	and	fearful,	had	opened	fire	on	the	
protestors	 in	 a	 state	 of	 agitation	 (Lodge,	 2011,	Nicholson,	 1986).	This	 incident	
was	 a	 wake-up	 call	 for	 government,	 realising	 that	 black	 communities	 had	
become	less	compliant	to	apartheid	regulations	and	policing	techniques,	and	that	
more	 organised	 anti-apartheid	 opposition	 had	 developed	 in	 a	 number	 of	






By	 1961,	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	 Sharpeville	 massacre,	 there	 had	 been	 significant	
organisational	 changes	within	 the	SAP.	The	number	of	white	policemen	within	
the	 force	 was	 increased	 substantially	 at	 an	 annual	 cost	 of	 R1	 million,	 and	 a	
Reserve	 Police	 Force	 (part-time	 citizen	 force)	 was	 created	 (Frankel,	 1980).		
Additional	 funds	 were	 allocated	 to	 the	 SAP	 to	 endow	 them	 with	 the	 “most	
modern	equipment	in	order	to	crush	any	threat	to	internal	security	successfully”	
(Foreign	 Broadcast	 Information	 Service,	 1961:19).	 There	 was	 also	 a	
reconfiguration	 of	 the	 SAP	 territorial	 policing	 boundaries,	 with	 the	 SAP’s	









in	order	 “to	ensure	 that	police	constables	 in	 the	 future	will	be	better	equipped	
for	 their	 task	 both	 physically	 and	mentally	 and	will	 have	 better	 knowledge	 of	
their	 exacting	 duties”	 (Foreign	 Broadcast	 Information	 Service,	 1961:19).	
Subsequently,	 further	 resources	 were	 invested	 in	 more	 forceful	 public	 order	
police	 units	within	 the	 SAP.	 That	 is,	 riot	 squads	were	 established	 in	 the	 early	




Combined	 the	above	developments	 led	 to	 the	SAP	becoming	 increasingly	more	
belligerent	 in	 its	 crowd	 control	 techniques,	 which	 was	 exceedingly	 evident	
during	 the	 June	 1976	 Soweto	 uprising.	 In	 this	 incident	 approximately	 10,000	
school	 learners	 and	 adults	 took	 to	 the	 streets	 of	 Soweto	 to	protest	 against	 the	
government’s	 requirement	 that	 Afrikaans	 be	 used	 as	 a	 mandatory	medium	 of	
instruction	in	schools.	Confrontations	between	the	riot	police	and	the	protestors	
rapidly	 escalated	 and	 culminated	 in	 the	 police	 fatally	 shooting	 hundreds	 of	







cabinet	minister	 responsible	 for	 the	 police,	 stated	 that	 policemen	 had	 opened	
fire	 in	“self-defence”,	as	they	felt	 that	they	were	“overwhelmed”	and	that	“their	
lives	 were	 in	 grave	 danger”	 (Johannesburg	 International	 Service,	 1976).	 The	
minister,	 in	 further	 defending	 the	 shootings,	 maintained	 that	 some	 of	 the	
protestors	 were	 barbaric	 and	 disobedient	 “communists”	 who	 had	 been	
specifically	trained	to	perpetrate	acts	of	arson	(Pohlandt-McCormick,	2005).	The	
emphasis	on	danger	was	 reiterated	by	 the	 findings	of	 the	Cillié	Commission	of	
Inquiry	 into	the	causes	of	the	Soweto	uprising.	The	Commission’s	report	stated	





the	 relevant	 government	 authority	 had	 been	 requested;	 a	 number	 of	 the	
protestors	 were	 “street	 urchins”	 and	 “lawless	 idlers”;	 and	 the	 SAP	 members	
were	duty	bound	to	disperse	the	crowd	and	“restore	peace”	(Cillié,	1980:114).	
	
The	 element	 of	 danger	 was	 emphasised	 in	 the	 Cillié	 Commission	 report	 by	
extensive	references	 to	 the	written	statement	by	Sergeant	M	 J	Hattingh,	one	of	
the	policeman	who	fired	on	the	protestors.	 It	was	likely	that	the	statement	had	
been	embellished	as	 it	over-emphasised	 the	menacing	nature	of	 the	protestors	
and	valour	of	the	police	response	(Pohlandt-McCormick,	2005).	It	does	however	






He	 [Sergeant	Hattingh]	 saw	 that	 other	members	 of	 the	 squad	 had	 been	 injured,	 some	
seriously,	and	it	was	clear	to	him	that	the	crowd	was	going	to	overpower	them.	He	was	
hit	on	the	leg	by	a	stone	and	fell	down	on	the	ground…he	heard	others	firing…He	got	up	
and	drew	his	 firearm.	A	 black	man	 charged	 at	 him	with	 a	 brick	 in	 his	 left	 hand	 and	 a	








badges	 from	his	 uniform.	His	 hand	was	 injured	by	 a	 sharp	 object	 and	 an	 attempt	was	
made	to	take	his	firearm	from	him.	Col	Kleingeld	[the	commanding	officer	on	the	scene]	
drove	 the	 attackers	 off	with	 bursts	 from	 the	 automatic	 rifle,	 and	 the	 sergeant	 and	 his	
vehicle	were	removed	from	the	danger	area	(Cillié,	1980:119).	
	








prompt	 protesting	 crowds	 to	 disperse	without	 violent	 confrontation	 (Cawthra,	
1993).	 In	 addition,	 protest	 action	 was	 further	 discouraged	 through	 the	
provisions	in	the	Internal	Security	Act	(1982)	that	outlawed	public	protests	(see	











(Brewer,	 1994).	 Close	 strategic	 and	 operational	 ties	 were	 forged	 with	 the	
SADF,18	and	 the	 operational	 elements	 of	 the	 SAP	 were	 frequently	 teamed-up	
with	 SADF	 units	 to	 patrol	 high	 priority	 border	 areas,	 as	 well	 as	 subdue	 and	
contain	 unrest	 and	 violent	 protest	 action	 in	 black	 townships.	 In	 addition,	 the	
police	 were	 granted	 extensive	 search-and-seizure	 powers.	 Such	 developments	
were	also	informed	by	an	escalation	in	acts	of	sabotage	by	the	ANC’s	armed	wing,	






electricity	 stations,	 and	military	 facilities.	 This	was	 close	 to	 a	 nine-fold	 annual	
increase	 in	 attacks	 compared	 to	 the	 period	 1977-1980	 (African	 National	
Congress,	1997).	
	
Police	 militarisation	 was	 further	 entrenched	 with	 the	 South	 African	
government’s	adoption	of	a	security-centred	form	of	statecraft	widely	referred	to	
as	 ‘Total	 Strategy’.	 This	 strategy	 was	 informed	 by	 an	 ideology	 that	 a	 ‘total	
[communist]	 onslaught’	 was	 directed	 against	 the	 apartheid	 state	 from	 both	
inside	 and	 outside	 of	 the	 country.	 Total	 Strategy	 entailed	 the	 de	 facto	
centralisation	 of	 high-level	 decision-making	 on	 domestic	 and	 foreign	 policy	
within	the	State	Security	Council	 (SSC)19,	which	was	dominated	by	the	security	





Public	 accountability	 procedures	 and	 mechanisms	 to	 hold	 the	 police	 in	 check	
were	diluted	with	 the	promulgation	of	 the	 Internal	 Security	Act	 (1982)	 (Prior,	
1989).	This	Act	was	also	a	key	legislative	othering	instrument,	amongst	a	variety	
of	repressive	legislation,	which	classified	most	collective	dissent	by	black	people	
as	 illegal.	 It	 further	 legitimatised	the	state’s	repressive	armoury	and	aggressive	
police	 responses	 to	 protest	 action.	 That	 is,	 the	 Act	 sanctioned	 widespread	
banning	of	anti-government	organisations,	activists	and	public	gatherings.	It	also	
permitted	 the	 SAP	 to	 detain	 people	 for	 extensive	 periods	 of	 time	without	 the	






ominous	and	hostile	 spaces	 for	 the	SAP	by	 the	mid	1980s,	with	 there	being	an	
unparalleled	upsurge	in	the	levels	of	protest	violence	against	apartheid	rule.	This	
was	 linked	 to	 the	 ANC’s	 call	 for	 mass	 mobilisation	 to	 ‘make	 townships	
ungovernable’,	 which	 entailed	 the	 destruction	 of	 government	 buildings	 and	




report,	which	 referred	 to	 the	violence	as	 “large-scale”	of	 “serious	proportions”,	
and	 had	 “made	 heavy	 demands	 on	 the	 available	 manpower”	 (South	 African	
Police,	1985:1).	
	
Publicly	 government	 engaged	 in	 selective	 othering	 with	 regards	 to	 the	
perpetration	of	such	violence	in	an	attempt	to	portray	the	unrest	as	orchestrated	





and	 destabilise	 South	 Africa.	 The	 National	 SAP	 Commissioner,	 Johan	 Coetzee,	
attributed	 the	acts	of	unrest	 to	 “relatively	small	groups	of	 rioters	 [that]	spread	
their	 acts	 of	 violence	 over	 a	 wide	 geographical	 area,	 then	 disperse	 quickly	 to	
regroup	and	strike	elsewhere”	 (Johannesburg	 International	Service,	1984).	The	
Minister	 of	 Law	 and	 Order,	 Louis	 Le	 Grange	 referred	 to	 anti-government	
opposition	as	“enemies	of	our	way	of	 life	[that	seek]	to	drive	a	wedge	between	
the	police	and	the	community”	(South	African	Press	Association,	1985g).		
The	 operational	 response	 by	 the	 SAP	 to	 incidents	 of	 public	 disorder	 was	
considerably	 less	 discerning	 in	 terms	 of	 who	 was	 targeted.	 Joint	 SAP-SADF	
crackdown	 operations	 were	 launched,	 such	 as	 Operation	 Palmiet	 (1984)	 in	
townships	 in	 the	 PWV	 area	 with	 the	 objective	 of	 “restoring	 normality”	
(Johannesburg	 Domestic	 Service,	 1984b).	 However,	 according	 to	 Cawthra	
(1993:104):	 “Much	 of	 the	 police	 action	 [Operation	 Palmiet]	 resembled	
unjustified	 provocation	 or	 revenge	 rather	 than	 crowd	 control;	 it	 was	 punitive	
rather	 than	preventative”.	 In	some	respects,	excessive	violence	by	 the	SAP	was	
counterproductive	 as	 it	 “tended	 to	 aggravate	 and	 provoke	 unrest	 rather	 than	
dampen	 it”,	 in	 that	 repressive	 police	 action	 tended	 to	 mobilise	 black	
communities	 to	 engage	 in	 larger	 and	 more	 severe	 forms	 of	 protest	 action	
(Cawthra,	1993:102).	
The	 SAP	 also	 imported	 more	 sophisticated	 riot	 control	 equipment,	 including	
helicopters	 and	 armoured	 vehicles	 fitted	 with	 water	 cannons	 (South	 African	
Press	 Association,	 1985a).	 Additionally,	 in	 July	 1985	 government	 imposed	
emergency	 measures	 that	 specifically	 related	 to	 unrest	 hot	 spots	 in	 36	
magisterial	 districts,	 such	 as	Alexandra,	 Soweto	 and	 a	number	of	 townships	 in	
Port	 Elizabeth,	 Uitenhage	 and	 Fort	 Beaufort.	 These	 emergency	 provisions	





extinguish	 this	widespread	violence	 and	destruction	of	 state	property	 in	many	
townships.	Louis	le	Grange,	the	Minister	of	Law	and	Order	declared:	“as	far	as	we	





African	Defence	 Force”	 (South	African	Police,	 1986:4),	 and	 in	 excess	 of	 30,000	
SADF	 troops	 were	 deployed	 to	 assist	 the	 SAP	 in	 combatting	 this	 collective	
violence	(Nathan,	1989).	
The	warlike	context	combined	with	the	SAP’s	close	collaboration	with	the	SADF	
had	 the	 effect	 of	 sharpening	 the	 policing	 boundaries	 fashioned	 around	 those	
townships	 that	 the	 SAP	 regarded	 as	 dangerous.	 Similarly	 it	 intensified	 the	
process	 of	 othering	 amongst	 SAP	 operational	 personnel	 towards	 black	
protestors	 in	 these	 areas,	 who	 were	 already	 perceived	 to	 be	 part	 of	 a	
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“revolutionary	 onslaught”	 against	 South	 Africa	 (Marks,	 2005)	 instigated	 by	
“terrorists”	 (South	 African	 Police,	 1987:22).	 These	 pejorative	 sentiments,	
combined	with	an	exceedingly	low	threshold	beyond	which	police	could	employ	






crowds	 of	 protestors,	 and	 “defend”	 themselves	 against	 protestors	 that	 were	
throwing	stones	and	petrol	bombs	at	the	police	(South	African	Press	Association,	
1985d).	 In	Parliament	 in	 1986	Louis	 Le	Grange	declared	 that	 individual	 police	
would	 use	 their	 own	 discretion	 with	 regards	 to	 discharging	 their	 firearms	 in	
operational	 contexts:	 “No	 person	 will	 be	 allowed	 to	 attack	 policemen	 with	
firearms	or	petrol	bombs.	 If	 they	do	 so	 they	will	be	 shot”	 (South	African	Press	
Association,	1986a).	
	
The	 police	 also	 became	 even	 more	 belligerent	 in	 pre-emptively	 dealing	 with	
youth	who	policemen	perceived	to	be	predisposed	to	perpetrating	acts	of	unrest	
and	boycotting	class	by	forcefully	ensuring	that	such	youths	attended	school,	and	
arresting	 non-compliant	 learners.	 According	 to	 a	 learner	 in	 KwaThemba	 (East	




We	will	 not	 allow	 5,000	 stupid	 students	 to	 disregard	 law	 and	 order…”	 (South	
African	Press	Association,	1985e).	The	police	subsequently	arrested	800	learners	
in	 Soweto	 for	 boycotting	 school	 attendance	 (South	 African	 Press	 Association,	
1985f).	
	
The	 partial	 state	 of	 emergency	 was	 upgraded	 to	 a	 nation-wide	 state	 of	
emergency	 in	 1986,	which	mostly	 remained	 in	 place	 until	 1990.	 The	 choice	 of	
such	a	repressive	strategy	was	motivated	by	P.W.	Botha,	the	State	President,	due	
to	 an	 “alarming”	 escalation	 in	 “black-on-black”	 violence	 and	 the	 destruction	 of	
property	 by	 “ruthless	 and	 unscrupulous	 people	 [the	 ANC	 and	 affiliated	
organisations]”	who	use	“callous	and	gruesome	methods	of	 terror	and	extreme	
violence	 to	 intimidate	 people	 in	 order	 to	 gain	 control	 of	 the	 various	 black	
population	 groups”	 (South	African	Press	Association,	 1986b).	 This	was	 further	
motivated	 by	 the	 head	 of	 the	 SAP	 Security	 Branch,	 Johan	 van	 der	Merwe	who	
reported	 that	 there	 had	 been	 a	 substantial	 increase	 in	 “terrorism”	 incidents,	
from	60	for	the	period	1	April	1984	to	31	March	1985	to	193	for	the	following	12	
months	 (Johannesburg	 Television	 Service,	 1986a).	 Such	 a	 state	 of	 emergency	
would	 allow	 the	 police	 to	 arrest	 and	 detain	 (without	 standing	 trial)	 suspected	
agitators,	and	in	so	doing	would	physically	remove	threats	from	unrest	areas,	as	
well	 as	 potentially	 weaken	 the	 ability	 of	 anti-government	 organisations	 to	







Press	 Association,	 1986b).	 The	 Railways	 Police,	 which	 had	 been	 historically	
separate	 from	 the	 SAP,	were	 incorporated	 into	 the	 SAP.	 Dramatically,	 the	 SAP	
was	also	withdrawn	from	its	national	border	protection	responsibilities	and	was	
replaced	by	SADF	soldiers,	which	according	to	the	National	SAP	Commissioner,	
P.J.	 Coetzee,	 was	 to	 address	 “widespread	 violence	 within	 South	 Africa”	
(Johannesburg	 Television	 Service,	 1986b).	 This	 was	 an	 indication	 that	 for	 the	
police	 the	 threats	 from	within	 South	 Africa	were	 perceived	 to	 be	 significantly	
greater	than	threats	beyond	South	Africa’s	territorial	borderline.	The	size	of	the	
SAP	was	 to	undergo	 further	 increases	during	 the	 latter	part	of	 the	1980s,	with	
both	 the	 personnel	 size	 and	 budget	 of	 SAP	 doubling	 between	 1985	 and	 1990	
(O'Brien,	2001).	
	
For	 the	 period	 from	September	 1984	 to	May	1990	 the	 SAP	 reported	 that	 they	
had	responded	to	in	excess	of	51,000	unrest	incidents	in	which	4,529	people	had	
died	 and	 12,449	 had	 been	 injured	 (South	 African	 Press	 Association,	 1990a).	
Critically,	much	of	this	violence,	both	unrest	and	lethal	violence	perpetrated	by	
the	 police,	 had	 taken	 place	 from	 the	 mid	 1980s,	 with	 the	 number	 of	 South	
Africans	dying	as	a	result	of	police	shootings	increasing	from	284	in	1984	to	716	
in	1986	(Critcher	and	Waddington,	1996).	Some	of	 this	police	violence	were	 in	























reductions	 in	 violence	 and	 crime	 in	 targeted	 areas.	 For	 example,	 the	 SAP	
National	Commissioner,	Hennie	De	Witt	claimed	that:	“in	spite	of	the	attempts	by	
the	ANC	and	 the	South	African	Communist	Party	 to	promote	 the	 revolutionary	
onslaught,	 the	 police	 had	 succeeded	 in	 forcing	 back	 the	 onslaught	 to	 its	 initial	
phase”.	He	substantiated	this	statement	by	reporting	that	the	incidents	of	unrest	
had	 declined	 from	 approximately	 8,000	 in	 1986	 to	 around	 2,000	 in	 1987	
(Johannesburg	 Domestic	 Service,	 1988).	 The	 following	 year,	 a	 senior	 police	
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official	 in	 Natal	 suggested	 that	 the	 crackdown	 operations	 had	 resulted	 in	
reductions	 in	murders	and	 “other	crimes”	 in	 the	province	 (South	African	Press	
Association,	 1989b).	 These	 sentiments	 were	 repeated	 by	 Adriaan	 Vlok,	 the	
Minister	 of	 Law	 and	 Order	 in	 October	 1990	 in	 relation	 to	 crime	 combating	
operations	 in	 Soweto,	 which	 he	 claimed	 had	 contributed	 to	 a	 62%	 and	 65%	




hand	 over	 the	 anti-apartheid	 organisations	 in	 numerous	 townships	 (Price,	
1991).	 That	 is,	 the	 SAP	 argued	 that	 they	 had	 thwarted	 efforts	 by	 the	 ANC	 to	
consolidate	 control	 in	 these	 areas.	Hence,	 in	1989	 the	 SAP	publicly	denounced	
calls	by	the	ANC	and	allied	organisations	for	the	state	of	emergency	to	be	lifted.	
For	 instance,	 the	SAP	National	Commissioner,	 Johan	van	der	Merwe	stated	that	
the	ANC	had	“lost	ground	due	to	SAP	action	and	desperately	wanted	to	regain	it”,	
and	 that	 should	 the	 state	of	 emergency	be	 lifted	 then	 there	would	be	 a	 risk	of	




Towards	 the	 end	 of	 1990	 regular	 boastful	 statements	 by	 the	 senior	 SAP	
leadership	about	the	effectiveness	of	their	policing	strategies	had	been	replaced	
by	 distinctively	 unnerved	 public	 comments.	 The	 SAP	 National	 Commissioner,	
Johan	 van	 der	 Merwe	 suggested	 that	 crime	 in	 South	 Africa	 was	 had	 reached	
“alarming	proportions”	(Jansen	and	van	Heerden,	1990).	There	was	also	a	clear	
indication	 that	 the	police	 felt	 they	had	 lost	 a	 significant	degree	of	 control	with	
the	lifting	of	the	state	of	emergency	by	President	F.W.	de	Klerk	in	June	1990.	That	
is,	 the	 SAP	 could	 no	 longer	 readily	 employ	 the	 raft	 of	 more	 forceful	 policing	
techniques	that	were	permitted	by	emergency	regulations,	particularly	detaining	
suspects	 for	 lengthy	 periods	 without	 a	 trial.	 The	 SAP	 also	 perceived	 various	
townships	 to	 have	 become	 increasingly	more	 dangerous	 for	 day-to-day	 police	
patrols	(Kopel	and	Friedman,	1997).	
	
In	 response	 to	 an	 escalating	 crime	 rate	 and	 incidents	 of	 violence	 government	









with	 the	 SADF	 aptly	 titled	 ‘Iron	 Fist’.	 The	main	 operational	 zone	was	 the	 high	
violence	 areas	 in	 the	 PWV,	 including	 Tokoza,	 Vosloorus,	 Katlehong,	 Soweto,	
Meadowlands,	 Diepkloof	 and	 Dobsonville	 (South	 African	 Press	 Association,	









According	 to	 the	 senior	 SAP	 officer	 Major-General	 Gerrit	 Erasmus,	 who	 was	
responsible	 for	 Operation	 Iron	 Fist,	 armoured	 police	 vehicles	were	 fitted	with	
light	machine	 guns	 in	 order	 “to	 curb	 attacks	 against	 police	 vehicles…[as]	 they	
attack	us	with	AK-47s	and	other	weapons.	Shotguns	against	an	AK	are	no	good”	
(South	African	Press	Association,	1990b).	This	was	reiterated	by	Leon	Mellet,	the	
spokesperson	for	the	Ministry	of	Law	and	Order	 in	a	 television	 interview	aired	
by	 the	 South	 African	 Broadcasting	 Corporation	 in	 which	 Mellet	 described	 the	
targeted	 townships	as	 “a	warlike	situation”	with	some	residents	being	 “heavily	
armed”	in	which	“snipers”	shot	at	the	police.	Mellet	argued	that:	
	
The	 troublemakers	 have	 become	 totally	 ruthless.	 They	 have	 become	 totally	
bloodthirsty…If	 one	 had	 to	 deal	 with	 these	 people	 you	 must	 expect	 from	 them	
ruthlessness,	 and	 you	 can	 only	 deal	with	 them	 in	 a	 similar	manner.	We	 are	 therefore	
determined	 to	 curb	 the	 violence,	 to	 at	 least	 contain	 it	 [sic]	 (Johannesburg	 Television	
Service,	1990b).	
	




Domestic	 Service,	 1991).	 Raids	 were	 carried	 out	 in	 hostels	 where	 factional	
fighting	 had	 taken	 place	 in	 Alexandra	 and	 Soweto	 (South	 African	 Press	









only	 restoring	 essential	 services,	 but	 wherever	 possible	 to	 upgrade	
infrastructure	 and	 living	 standards”	 (Johannesburg	 Radio,	 1992).	 The	 ANC,	
however,	 objected	 to	 some	 of	 the	 operations	 claiming	 that	 they	 were	




Intertwined	 with	 the	 SAP’s	 more	 profound	 militarisation	 and	 the	 multiple	
threats	presented	by	armed	struggles	by	various	liberation	movements	in	South	
Africa	 and	 elsewhere,	was	 a	 concerted	 shift	within	 the	 police	 to	 develop	more	






essence,	 entailed	 shifting	 the	 frontier	 of	 some	aspects	 of	 offensive	police	work	
into	 the	 shadows,	 a	 theatre	 of	 policing	 that	 was	 largely	 hidden	 from	 public	







The	SB	was	 initially	born	out	of	a	need	 for	a	dedicated	unit	 “to	 investigate	and	
prevent	 subversive	 political	 activities”,	 particularly	 by	 right	 wing	 Afrikaners.	
(South	African	Police,	 1986:34).	With	 the	 demise	 of	 the	Ossewabrandwag	 (see	
Chapter	5)	the	SB	shifted	its	focus	to	the	ANC	and	PAC	(Shear,	2012).	The	SB	was	
a	 relatively	 small	 and	 undervalued	 component	 within	 the	 SAP	 until	 the	 early	
1960s,	but	grew	in	size,	stature,	influence	and	ferocity	following	the	launch	of	the	
armed	struggle	by	ANC	and	PAC,	as	well	 as	 insurgencies	 in	Rhodesia	and	SWA	
(Brewer,	1994,	Frankel,	1980).	
	
The	 SB	 sought	 to	 disrupt	 the	 activities	 of	 anti-apartheid	 groups	 and	 liberation	
movements	by	capturing	or	neutralising	their	leaders	and	operatives.	In	order	to	
achieve	 this	 the	 SB	 required	 actionable	 intelligence,	 which	 was	 generated	 by	
means	 of:	 a	 large	 network	 of	 informers;	 infiltration	 of	 anti-apartheid	
movements;	as	well	as	extensive	use	of	detention	of	suspected	anti-government	
activists	 in	 which	 harsh	 interrogation	 techniques	 were	 employed,	 including	





and	9,500	organisations	 since	 the	 SB’s	 inception,	with	 the	TRC	estimating	 that	
80,000	 individuals	 had	 been	 detained	 without	 trial	 by	 the	 SB	 (Truth	 and	
Reconciliation	Commission	of	South	Africa,	1998).		
	
The	 twilight	 terrain	 in	 which	 the	 SB	 operated,	 combined	 with	 anti-apartheid	
leaders	 and	 organisations	 being	 seen	 as	 ‘terrorists’,	 ultimately	 resulted	 in	
routine	 use	 of	 excessive	 violence	 by	 SB	 members.	 That	 is,	 SB	 members	 were	
responsible	 for	 perpetrating	 extra-judicial	 killings	 both	 inside	 and	 outside	 of	
South	 Africa,	 and	 engaging	 in	 acts	 of	 sabotage	 and	 arson	 (Frankel,	 1980).	 For	
example,	 of	 the	 256	 individuals	 who	 applied	 for	 amnesty	 from	 the	 Truth	 and	
Reconciliation	Commission	(TRC)	for	committing	human	rights	abuses,	90%	had	
served	 in	 the	 SB	 at	 the	 time	 of	 the	 violations	 (Truth	 and	 Reconciliation	
Commission	of	South	Africa,	1998).	Moreover,	between	1	 January	1976	and	30	
April	1990	 the	SAP	reported	 that	 it	had	arrested	and	killed	780	and	224	 “ANC	







From	 the	 late	 1970s	 the	 SAP	 began	 to	 earnestly	 pursue	 clandestine	 forms	 of	
COIN	 policing	 within	 South	 Africa.	 This	 was	 motivated	 by	 a	 perceived	
acceleration	 in	 the	 infiltration	by	ANC	and	PAC	 insurgents	 into	 the	country;	an	
increase	 in	 sabotage	 attacks;	 and	 the	 mobilisation	 of	 popular	 support	 for	 the	
anti-apartheid	struggle.	These	developments,	combined	with	the	SAP’s	intimate	
COIN	 experiences	 in	 Rhodesia	 and	 SWA,	 resulted	 in	 the	 SAP	 leadership	
concluding	 that	 more	 unconventional	 policing	 methods	 were	 required	 to	
augment	the	traditional	forms	of	policing	(Cawthra,	1993).		
The	 SAP	 COIN	 strategies	 sought	 to	 alter	 the	 political	 conditions	 within	 black	
townships,	 specifically	 to	 make	 such	 communities	 less	 supportive	 of,	 or	 less	
receptive	 to,	 the	mobilisation	 efforts	 of	 liberation	movements	 and	 their	 allies.	
This	 form	 of	 COIN	 policing	 had	 four	 core	 elements:	 the	 assassination	 of	 key	
opposition	 activists;	 the	 provision	 of	 support	 to,	 or	 the	 creation	 of,	
criminal/vigilante	 groups;	 the	 clandestine	 supply	 of	 arms	 and	 paramilitary	
training	 to	 such	 criminal/vigilante	 groups;	 and	 the	 orchestration	 and/or	
participation	in	violent	attacks	on	passengers	in	trains	and	minibus-taxis.	These	
strategies	will	be	analysed	in	more	detail	below.	
The	 most	 notorious	 COIN	 element	 within	 SAP	 was	 known	 as	 Section	 C1	 or	
Vlakplaas, 21 	which	 emerged	 from	 within	 the	 SB.	 Its	 core	 activity	 was	 the	
assassination	of	ANC	and	PAC	guerrillas	and	prominent	anti-apartheid	activists.	
It	 ostensibly	 pursued	 this	 strategy	 in	 order	 to	 eliminate	 and	 disrupt	 threats	
posed	by	the	liberation	movements	to	the	apartheid	state,	and	instil	fear	among	
black	communities	in	order	to	undermine	mobilisation	efforts	by	these	liberation	
movements	 (Boraine,	 1989b,	 Pauw,	 1997).	 In	 addition,	 Vlakplaas	 operatives	
engaged	in	sabotage	(bombing)	activities	against	anti-apartheid	targets	(Dlamini,	
2014).	
The	 ANC’s	 strategy	 of	 making	 the	 townships	 ‘ungovernable’	 led	 to	 acute	
concerns	within	the	SB,	namely	that	such	a	state	of	affairs	would	ultimately	lead	
to	the	creation	of	 liberated	zones	and	military	bases.	That	 is,	 it	would	give	“the	
insurgent	 an	 area	 in	 which	 he	 can	 move	 freely,	 rely	 on	 regular	 and	 reliable	
intelligence	 and	 recruit	 cadres	whilst	 carrying	 out	 the	 political	mobilisation	 of	
the	people”.	This	 is	 turn	would	ultimately	 result	 in	 the	emergence	of	 a	 serious	
military	 threat	 for	 the	 South	 African	 government	 (Powell,	 1991:67,71).	 	 COIN	
strategies	were	therefore	devised	to	counter	such	guerrilla	warfare	methods	and	
regain	 control	 of	 such	 areas.	 A	 common	 SB	 approach,	 which	 had	 the	
endorsement	 of	 the	 State	 Security	 Council,	 was	 to	 arrest	 and/or	 execute	 key	
‘instigators’	and	activists	in	ANC	strongholds.		
The	 assassination	 of	 the	 ‘Cradock	 Four’22 	in	 the	 Eastern	 Cape	 in	 1985	 by	
members	of	 the	SB	was	an	apt	 example	of	 this	COIN	policing	 strategy.	At	 least	







been	 highly	 effective	 in	 mobilising	 black	 communities	 in	 the	 area	 to	 actively	
support	the	UDF,	and	had	directly	contributed	to	making	the	Lingelihle	township	
‘ungovernable’.	 According	 to	 Powell	 (1991),	 international	 journalists	
subsequently	portrayed	these	developments	as	a	 leading	example	of	grassroots	
defiance	 against	 apartheid	 rule.	 Amnesty	 applications	 to	 the	 TRC	 by	 seven	
former	SB	members	specified	that	they	regarded	the	‘Cradock	Four’	as	central	to	
the	 violent	 protests	 in	 the	 Eastern	 Cape	 at	 a	 time,	 and	 consequently	 had	




and-rule	 strategy	 in	 relation	 to	 a	 number	 of	 black	 communities	 that	 were	
perceived	to	be	strong	supporters	for	the	ANC,	UDF	and	COSATU.	This	entailed	
the	 formation	 and	 support	 of	 vigilante/gangster	 groups	 (which	 included	 the	
supply	 of	 firearms	 and	 ammunition)	 that	 then	 sought	 to	 unsettle	
ANC/UDF/COSATU	mobilisation	efforts	 in	 targeted	 communities.	These	groups	
also	 terrorised	 and	 attacked	 those	 individuals	 and	 communities	 that	 were	
supportive	of	the	ANC/UDF/COSATU.	The	key	objective	of	such	a	strategy	was	to	
prevent	the	formation	of,	or	undermine,	significant	anti-government	opposition	







elements	 within	 the	 SAP	 were	 successful	 in	 intensifying	 violent	 incidents	 in	
many	 rural	 areas	and	 townships	 in	Natal.	At	 this	 time,	 Inkatha	was	pursuing	a	
violent	power	struggle	against	the	UDF	and	COSATU.	Securocrats	in	government,	
not	 wanting	 the	 UDF	 and	 COSATU	 to	 expand	 their	 influence	 in	 the	 province,	
arranged	 for	 the	delivery	of	 large	quantities	of	 firearms	to	vigilante	and	militia	
groups	 that	 were	 closely	 associated	 with	 Inkatha,	 as	 well	 as	 provided	
paramilitary	 training	 (Truth	 and	 Reconciliation	 Commission	 of	 South	 Africa,	




The	 TRC	 implicated	 SAP	 members	 in	 the	 clandestine	 support	 of	 and/or	
complicity	 in	 attacks	 by	 Inkatha-affiliated	 hostel	 dwellers	 against	 ANC-aligned	
communities,	which	resulted	in	mass	killings	in	the	early	1990s.	Massacres	were	
perpetrated	 in	 the	 Transvaal	 province	 in	 areas	 such	 as	 in	 Sebokeng	 (1990),	
Swanieville	(1991)	and	Boipatong	(1992).	The	TRC	also	reported	that	there	was	
sufficient	 evidence	 to	 suggest	 that	 SAP	 personnel	 had	 sabotaged	 many	 of	 the	
subsequent	 investigations	 into	 these	massacres,	which	 included	 the	 tampering	
with	video	and	ballistics	evidence.	In	addition,	the	SAP	often	confiscated	firearms	
																																																								




from	 Inkatha	 hostel-dwellers	 after	 these	 incidents	 of	 mass	 violence	 in	 such	 a	
cavalier	 fashion	 that	 the	 arms	 could	 not	 be	 later	 linked	 to	 the	 individual	
perpetrators	 of	 violence	 (Ellis,	 1998,	 Marinovich	 and	 Silva,	 2000,	 Truth	 and	
Reconciliation	Commission	of	South	Africa,	1998).		
	












the	 case	with	 the	1988	Trust	Feed	Massacre	 in	 the	Natal	Midlands	where	UDF	
aligned	 anti-eviction	 activists	 were	 assassinated	 in	 a	 SAP	 orchestrated	 hit	




people	 fled	 their	 homes.	 The	 TRC	 implicated	 the	 SAP	 Riot	 Unit	 and	 special	
constables	 in	 providing	 ammunition	 and	 logistical	 support	 to	 the	 Inkatha	
assailants	 (Commission	of	 Inquiry	Regarding	 the	Prevention	of	Public	Violence	





(with	 the	 support	 of	 the	 SAP)	 titled	 ‘Winning	Hearts	 and	Minds’	 (WHAM)	 as	 a	
further	attempt	to	sustain	geo-racial	boundaries.	WHAM	was	effectively	cut-and-
pasted	 from	colonial	COIN	doctrine	 (see	Chapter	2).	That	 is,	 the	aim	of	WHAM	
was	 to	 foster	 and	 leverage	 support	 and	 legitimacy	 for	 government	 in	 target	
communities.	 This	 was	 to	 be	 achieved	 by	 means	 of	 devoting	 resources	 and	
pursuing	 infrastructure	 projects	 in	 an	 attempt	 to	 address	 some	 of	 the	
fundamental	 drivers	 of	 political	 opposition	 and	 insurrection,	 and	 thereby	
dissolve	 the	 “revolutionary	 climate”	 (Katagiri,	 2011).	 Major-General	 Bert	
Wandrag,	the	COIN	chief	within	SAP,	summed-up	WHAM	as	follows:	
	
Drastic	 action	must	 be	 taken	 to	 eliminate	 the	 underlying	 social	 and	 economic	 factors,	




The	 apartheid	 government	 through	 the	 Joint	 Management	 Centres	 of	 the	
National	Security	Management	System	began	to	invest	in	‘orderly’	infrastructural	
upgrading	 and	 housing	 projects	 in	 34	 ‘oil	 spots’	 or	 ‘strategic	 bases’	 and	
	
	 85	
approximately	 200	 townships	 (Jochelson,	 1990)	 through	 local	 government	




[n]o	 real	 effort	 to	 solve	 the	urban	 crisis,	 [but]	merely	 to	 contain	 it	 through	a	policy	of	
divide	 and	 rule…[that	 sought	 to]	 create	 fissures	 and	 cracks,	making	 political	 alliances	
within	townships,	and	between	different	townships	and	even	regions,	more	difficult.		
	
This	 policy	 was	 not	 about	 wooing	 disenfranchised	 black	 communities	 into	
endorsing	 their	 continued	 subjugation,	 but	 rather	 about	 population	 control.	 In	
Mamelodi	in	the	mid	to	late	1980s,	for	example,	government	funded	the	tarring	





In	Alexandra,	similar	upgrading	was	pursued	 in	 the	wake	of	violent	protests	 in	
1986,	such	as	 the	building	of	a	clinic	and	sewerage	works;	 improved	schooling	
and	 public	 recreation	 facilities;	 and	 the	 installation	 of	 high	 mast	 lighting	
(Boraine,	 1989b:62).	 Other	 communities	 that	 were	 targeted	 for	 WHAM	
infrastructure	 upgrading	 included:	 Bonteheuwel	 and	 Crossroads	 (Western	





restructuring	of	 the	police,	but	 the	key	 recommendations	were	only	effectively	
initiated	during	 the	 early	 1990s.	 In	 this	 regard,	 the	 SAP	was	 reconfigured	 into	
five	 divisions,	 namely:	 Crime	 Combatting	 and	 Investigation	 (CCI),	 Visible	
Policing,	 Internal	Stability,	Human	Resource	Management	and	Support	Services	
(Rauch,	 1991b,	 South	 African	 Police,	 1994).	 The	 CCI	 and	 the	 Internal	 Stability	
divisions	were	particularly	relevant	in	the	policing	of	boundaries.	
		
The	 restructuring	 process	 subsequently	 became	 framed	 by	 the	National	 Peace	
Accord	 (NPA),	 which	 was	 signed	 by	 government	 and	 the	 principal	 political	
groupings	 in	 1991.	 This	 document	 had	 a	major	 police	 component,	 including	 a	
Code	of	Conduct	for	SAP	members,	specifically	calling	for	effective,	non-partisan,	
racially	 inclusive	 and	 more	 legitimate,	 community-focused	 and	 accountable	
policing.	 In	 addition,	 SAP	 members	 were	 obliged	 to	 “disarm	 those	 persons	
illegally	 bearing	dangerous	weapons	 in	 any	 gathering	or	procession”	 (National	
Peace	Accord,	1991:7).	Some	analysts	have	argued	that	the	NPA	ultimately	 laid	
the	foundation	for	democratic	policing	and	community-oriented	policing	in	post-
apartheid	 South	 Africa	 (Camay	 and	 Gordon,	 2002).	 Nonetheless,	 persistent	






The	 CCI	 Division	was	 predominantly	 comprised	 of	 personnel	 from	 the	 former	
Crime	 Investigative	 (Detective)	 Branch	 and	 the	 SB	 (which	 was	 disbanded).	
Structurally	 it	 included	 entities	 such	 as	 the:	 Criminal	 Records	 Centre;	
Commercial	 Crime	 Unit;	 Diamond	 and	 Gold	 Branch;	 South	 African	 Narcotics	
Bureau;	Stock	Theft	Unit;	Inspectorate	for	Explosives;	Unit	for	the	Protection	of	
Endangered	Species;	as	well	as	the	various	murder	and	robbery,	child	protection	
and	 vehicle	 theft	 units.	 This	 division	 also	 contained	 covert	 units	 such	 as	
Vlakplaas	(Cawthra,	2003,	South	African	Police,	1992).		
	
The	 Internal	 Stability	 Division	 (ISD)	 was	 effectively	 the	 culmination	 of	 the	
restructuring	of	the	Riot	Unit,	and	was	initially	comprised	of	17,500	personnel.	It	
was	 established	 to	 be	 a	 specialised,	 paramilitary,	 public	 order	 policing	 entity	
with	 ISD	personnel	being	clothed	 in	military-style	camouflage	uniforms,	armed	
with	 military-type	 weapons	 and	 conveyed	 in	 military	 vehicles	 (Marks	 and	
Fleming,	 2004,	 Rauch,	 1991b).	 Operational	 units	 were	 to	 be	 established	 in	
violence	hot	spots.	In	justifying	the	creation	of	the	ISD,	Hernus	Kriel,	the	Minister	
of	Law	and	Order	argued	 that:	 “A	man	 in	a	blue	uniform	must	control	political	
unrest	as	well	as	crime,	and	it	doesn’t	work.	That	is	why	we	believe	there	has	to	
be	a	parting	of	ways”.	Furthermore	Kriel	 stated	 that:	 “This	 force	may	never	be	
crippled	 to	 the	 point	 where	 the	 SAP	 is	 scared	 to	 act	 against	 unrest”	 (South	
African	Press	Association,	1991b).	
	
Hence,	 the	 thinking	 behind	 the	 establishment	 of	 the	 ISD	 at	 the	 time	 was	 that	
there	needed	to	be	a	clear	separation	of	public	order	policing	for	volatile	areas	
and	 commonplace	policing,	 so	 that	 “ordinary	 station-level	 police	 officers	 could	
get	 on	with	 the	 job	of	 building	 relations	with	 the	 citizenry	 and	 fighting	 crime”	
(Shaw,	 2001:26).	 However,	 the	 ISD	 often	 engaged	 in	 operations	 and	
apprehended	 individuals	 without	 prior	 notification	 of	 the	 police	 station	
commanders	 in	 the	 affected	 areas.	 In	 addition,	 the	 ISD	 was	 notorious	 for	 its	
heavy-handed	 tactics.	These	actions	 further	undermined	 the	 relations	between	






most	of	 the	apartheid	period.	This	piece	of	 legislation	perpetuated	 the	colonial	
legacy	 of	 largely	 prohibiting	 black	 South	 Africans	 from	 acquiring	 firearms,	 as	
firearms	would	give	black	people	 the	necessary	 lethal	 technology	 to	effectively	










Chart	6.1	below	 indicates	 that,	 according	 to	 SAP	annual	 reports	between	1984	
(the	earliest	date	at	which	data	is	provided)	and	1990,	on	average	180,000	new	
firearm	licences	were	granted	annually.	There	were	licensing	spikes	in	1986	and	
1990,	 most	 likely	 linked	 to:	 major	 escalations	 in	 acts	 of	 violent	 defiance	 and	
sabotage	by	liberation	movements	and	the	declaration	of	a	state	of	emergency	by	
the	 apartheid	 government	 the	 year	 before;	 and	 the	 unbanning	 of	 the	ANC	 and	
PAC	respectively.	
	
Under	apartheid,	 the	 racialised	 firearm	control	 traditions	of	 the	preceding	 two	
centuries	were	perpetuated.	That	 is,	 a	minority	of	 ‘fit	 and	proper’	 (loyal)	black	
South	Africans	were	permitted	to	possess	licensed	firearms,	such	as	conservative	
traditional	 leaders.	 Within	 the	 self-governing	 ‘homelands’	 government	
authorities	had	 the	mandate	 to	 issue	 firearm	 licences.	 In	Natal,	 some	 Izindunas	
(traditional	amaZulu	leaders)	and	community	leaders	aligned	with	Inkatha	were	
permitted	to	possess	firearms,	with	licence	applications	being	facilitated	by	the	
KwaZulu	 Police	 (KZP)	 (Ellis,	 1998,	 Gould,	 et	 al.,	 2004).	 There	 is	 evidence	 to	
suggest	 that	 these	 licensing	 mechanisms	 were	 abused	 by	 some	 Inkatha	
‘warlords’	during	the	late	1980s	in	that	they	acquired	numerous	legal	firearms	in	








Only	 sketchy	 data	 on	 firearm	 crime	 under	 apartheid	 is	 publicly	 available,	




the	process	 (which	were	not	 subsequently	 recovered).	 In	1964	bank	 robberies	
involving	 the	 use	 of	 firearms	 received	 their	 first	 mention	 in	 the	 SAP	 annual	
reports,	 with	 this	 type	 of	 crime	 being	 emphasised	 in	 the	 immediate	 years	
thereafter.	 From	 this	 point	 onwards	 firearm	 crime	 statistics	 were	 regularly	
included	in	the	SAP	annual	reports	in	varying	degrees	of	detail.	A	key	emphasis	













and	 indicates	 a	 striking	 acceleration	 of	 firearm	 loss/theft	 from	 the	mid	1980s,	
and	 further	 increases	during	 the	 early	 1990s	 (see	Chart	6.2	below).	 	 Similarly,	
from	 the	 late	 1980s,	 there	were	 substantial	 increases	 in	 interpersonal	 firearm	
crime.	For	instance,	between	1989	and	1992,	the	armed	robbery	rate	ratcheted	
up	by	40%	(see	Chart	6.3	below),	and	the	reported	firearm	homicide	rate,	which	






due	 to	 gunshot	 wounds	 from	 354	 in	 1989	 to	 1,109	 in	 1992	 (Schönteich	 and	
Louw,	 1999).	 It	 was	 black	 Africans	 that	 suffered	 the	 most,	 with	 85%	 of	 all	
firearm	homicide	victims	(mainly	men)	between	1983	and	1990	being	from	this	
population	 group	 (Shaw,	 2001).	 In	 the	 PWV	 area	 on	 average	more	 than	 1,000	
conflict-related	deaths	were	recorded	annually	between	1990	and	1994,	many	of	
which	 were	 due	 to	 firearm	 injuries	 (Network	 of	 Independent	 Monitors,	 et	 al.,	
1995).	





to	kill	 or	 injure	police	officials	 from	 the	 late	1980s	 (Kynoch,	2005),	with	 there	





the	 ANC’s	 self-defence	 units	 (SDUs)	 as	 the	 main	 culprits,	 which	 had	 acquired	
firearms	 via	 smuggling	 networks	 (South	 African	 Police,	 1994).	 	 However,	 it	 is	
entirely	 possible	 that	 the	 perpetrators	 of	 police	 murders	 had	 acquired	 the	
murder	weapons	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	 increased	 proliferation	 of	 firearms	 in	 high	
violence	 areas	 brought	 about	 by	 the	 SAP	 COIN	 strategy	 of	 arming	 militias,	
vigilantes	and	criminal	gangs.		
Government	responded	to	the	escalation	in	armed	violence	by	promulgating	the	
Criminal	 Law	 Second	 Amendment	 Act	 (1992)	 to	 further	 regulate	 the	 illegal	
possession	of	dangerous	weapons,	 including	 firearms.	This	 law	made	provision	
for	 minimum	 sentences	 of	 five	 years	 imprisonment	 (with	 a	 maximum	 of	 25	
years)	for	the	commission	of	crime	with	such	dangerous	weapons.	Amnesty	was	
offered	to	those	in	possession	of	illegal	firearms	in	which	firearm	owners	could	
either	 surrender	 the	 firearms	 to	 the	 police	 (cash	 incentives	 were	 offered),	 or	





















Available	data	on	 the	 types	of	 firearms	used	 in	 interpersonal	violence	 in	South	









































disaggregated	 information	 about	 firearms	 involved	 in	 crime,	 particularly	 the	
licensed	 status	 of	 the	 firearms.	The	1992	SAP	annual	 report,	which	provides	 a	
rare	 glimpse	 into	 the	manner	 in	which	 SAP	 recorded	 firearm	 crime,	 indicated	
that	 licensed	firearms	were	used	to	commit	446	and	505	murders	 in	1991	and	
1992	 respectively	 (South	African	Police,	 1993).	Nevertheless	no	 information	 is	
provided	on	the	numbers	of	illegal	firearms	used	to	commit	murder.		
	
Where	 convictions	 for	 serious	 firearm	 crime	 were	 secured,	 which	 was	 a	 very	
small,	 unrepresentative	 proportion	 of	 reported	 firearm	 crime,	 handguns	
featured	 increasingly	 prominently	 between	 1988	 and	 1994	 (see	 Chart	 6.5	
below).	It	is	critical	to	note	that	very	few	of	the	numerous	political	murders	and	
massacres	 perpetrated	 during	 the	 political	 transition	 resulted	 in	 convictions.	










political	 transition	were	 illegal,	 and	were	 derived	 from	 four	 principal	 sources.	
Firstly,	the	upward	trend	in	the	loss	and	theft	of	firearms	accelerated	throughout	
the	 political	 transition	 with	 handguns	 being	 the	 most	 commonly	 lost/stolen	
firearm	(see	Chart	6.6	below).	It	is	highly	likely	that	a	significant	number	of	these	
firearms	 were	 used	 to	 commit	 criminal	 acts.	 Secondly,	 as	 indicated	 in	 the	
sections	 above,	 clandestine	 elements	 in	 the	 SAP	 showered	 Inkatha	 warlords,	
impis	and	SPUs	with	firearms	to	fight	the	ANC,	UDF	and	COSATU,	particularly	in	
Natal	 and	 the	 Transvaal.	 Criminal	 gangs	 and	 vigilantes	 were	 also	 armed.	 It	 is	
entirely	 possible	 that	many	 of	 these	weapons	were	 subsequently	 used	 in	 non-
political	 violence.	 Thirdly,	 as	 also	 indicated	 above,	 the	 ANC	 armed	 its	 SDUs	 in	
conflict	hot	spots,	with	it	being	entirely	feasible	that	many	of	these	firearms	were	
also	employed	to	commit	crime.	Fourthly,	the	SAP	reported	that	arms	smuggling	
into	 South	 Africa	 from	Mozambique	 and	 Angola	 was	 a	 major	 source	 of	 illegal	






















ordinary	 firearm	 crime	before	 the	mid	1980s.	 Prior	 to	 the	 1960s	 reporting	 on	
firearm	crime	is	conspicuously	absent.	The	most	plausible	reason	for	this	state	of	
affairs	was	 because	 the	 vast	majority	 of	 black	 South	 Africans	were	 prohibited	
from	 possessing	 firearms.	 When	 interpersonal	 and	 collective	 violence	
perpetrated	 by	 black	 people	 against	 other	 black	 people	 was	 reported	 it	 was	
almost	 exclusively	 stones,	 sticks,	 axes	 and	 assegais	 that	were	 used.	One	 of	 the	
only	 remarks	 in	 the	 SAP	 annual	 reports	 during	 the	 1950s	 about	 the	 use	 of	




Critically	 the	 annual	 SAP	 annual	 reports	 from	 the	 1950s	 emphasised	 the	
advantage	 that	 firearms	 gave	 the	 police	 in	 maintaining	 dominion	 over	 black	
communities,	 and	 the	 strategic	 use	 of	 such	 weapons	 for	 containing	 violence	
within	black	 townships	and	hostels.	 In	 this	 regard,	as	 stated	 in	 the	SAP	annual	
reports,	 SAP	 personnel	 frequently	 used	 their	 service	 firearms	 to	 disrupt	 and	
subdue	“native	unrest”,	“tribal	fights”	and	“faction	fights”,	or	to	shoot	their	way	
out	of	situations	where	 they	 found	themselves	hemmed	 in	by	agitated	mobs	 in	
order	 to	 prevent	 themselves	 from	being	 “overwhelmed”.	 SAP	 also	 appeared	 to	
have	devoted	 considerable	 energy	 to	 ensuring	 that	 a	 large	percentage	of	 cases	










The	 SAP	 Firearm	 Unit	 was	 established	 in	 the	 immediate	 aftermath	 of	 the	
Sharpeville	massacre	(1960).	 It	sought	to	“recover	stolen	 firearms	 lest	 they	get	
into	black	hands,	and	to	check	for	smuggling	of	arms	over	the	borders”	(Brewer,	
1994:264).	Internationally	the	establishment	of	focused	police	units	is	usually	an	




























report	 indicating	 that	 50	 revolvers	 and	1,212	 rounds	 of	 ammunition	had	been	
recovered.	 Later	 reports	 provided	 concise	 annotations	 of	 the	 numbers	 of	




Moreover	 the	 SAP	 annual	 reports	 create	 an	 impression	 of	 two	 contrasting	
aspects	 of	 the	 policing	 of	 firearms:	 namely	 the	 mundane,	 which	 entailed	 the	
licensing	of	firearms	and	enforcement	thereof	carried	out	by	the	Central	Firearm	







1971	 508	 46	 251	
1973	 702	 146	 433	
1972	 n/a	 n/a	 n/a	
1974	 713	 246	 455	
1975	 407	 89	 170	
1976	 505	 86	 562	
1977	 288	 110	 1351	
1978	 291	 166	 682	
1979	 308	 262	 632	
1980	 352	 138	 300	
1981	 357	 282	 390	
1982	 n/a	 n/a	 n/a	
1983	 n/a	 n/a	 n/a	
1984	 n/a	 n/a	 n/a	














also	 involved	 the	mass	 arrest	 of	 alleged	 criminals)	 that	 focused	 on	 high	 crime	
93	
areas,	and	in	locations	were	ANC	weapons	caches	were	supposedly	being	stored	
(Cawthra,	 1993).	 These	 areas	 were	 predominantly	 in	 Natal	 and	 the	 PWV.	
Examples	 of	 such	 operations,	 as	 listed	 in	 the	 SAP	 annual	 reports,	 included:	
‘Sentinel’,	 ‘Alpo’,	 ‘Diver’	 and	 ‘Stabilize’.	 The	 following	 numbers	 of	 military	
personnel	were	deployed	to	support	the	police	in	such	operations	between	1989	
and	1992:	 2,814	 (1989);	 5,628	 (1990);	 1991;	 7	 821	 (1991);	 and	6,968	 (1992)	
(South	African	Police,	1993).	




that	 year	 entailed:	 22,106	 roadblocks	 (in	which	 178,082	 vehicles	 and	 894,216	
persons	were	searched);	7,509	cordon-and	search	procedures	(in	which	155,320	
vehicles	 and	 536,041	 persons	 were	 searched);	 and	 the	 confiscation	 of	 2,354	
firearms	and	14,231	rounds	of	ammunition	(South	African	Police,	1993).	In	1993	
the	ISD	confiscated	2,599	firearms	(South	African	Police,	1994).	
SAP	 was	 widely	 criticised	 for	 allegedly	 being	 more	 thorough	 in	 their	




by	 the	 hazardous	 nature	 of	 such	 spaces,	 which	 were	 effectively	 governed	 by	
‘warlords’.	On	some	occasions	the	police	were	fired	upon	by	hostel	residents	and	




South	 Africa	 and	 the	 various	 internal	 social	 boundaries	 of	 racial	 segregation,	
fundamentally	 influenced	 the	 police	 and	 official	 policing	 during	 the	 apartheid	
era.	 That	 is,	 throughout	 this	 period	 the	 SAP	was	 primarily	 required	 to	 uphold	
and	reinforce	these	boundaries.	Nonetheless	the	SAP’s	boundary	work	varied	in	
intensity	 over	 time	 and	 tended	 to	 prioritise	 some	 boundaries	 over	 others.	 For	
example,	SAP	personnel	were	deployed	in	the	mid	1960s	to	bolster	and	defend	




devoted	more	 resources	 and	 attention	 to	 the	maintenance	 and	 fortification	 of	
certain	 boundaries	 over	 others,	 especially	 those	 related	 to	 the	 more	 volatile	
townships	in	the	PWV	region,	and	in	conflict-prone	urban	and	rural	communities	
in	Natal.	 However,	 even	 the	 potency	 of	 the	 enforcement	measures	 in	 terms	 of	
these	prioritised	boundaries	were	not	consistent	over	time.	
Therefore,	as	this	chapter	has	shown,	it	was	not	the	manifestation	of	boundaries	
that	 singularly	 shaped	 the	police	and	policing	during	 the	apartheid	period,	but	
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rather	 the	 circumstances	 on	 the	 other	 side	 of	 the	 boundaries.	 The	 police	
habitually	 directed	 and	 concentrated	 their	 resources	 towards	 the	 frontiers	 of	
such	 boundaries,	 and	 even	 penetrated	 such	 boundaries	 when	 individuals	 and	











belligerent	methods	 at	 the	 frontiers	 of	 their	 boundary	work,	 with	 the	 level	 of	
coercion	applied	by	the	police	having	been	frequently	 informed	by	the	severity	
of	 the	 perceived	 threat.	 In	 circumstances	where	 threats	were	 regarded	 as	 less	
severe	the	police	tended	to	use	minimal	overt	force	to	neutralise	the	threats	and	
ensure	 that	 the	 threats	were	 contained	beyond	 the	boundary.	This	was	 clearly	
evident	with	the	passbook	system	and	ethnic	policing	approaches.	In	situations	
where	 the	 police	 were	 confronted	 by	 organised	 protest	 action	 and	 civil	
disobedience	 the	 police,	 as	was	 the	 case	 in	 numerous	 townships	 in	 the	 1980s,	
would	temporarily	penetrate	the	boundaries	in	large	numbers	to	overwhelm	and	
extinguish	 such	 threats.	 Where	 the	 threats	 were	 more	 impervious	 to	
conventional	policing	methods,	unconventional	and	unsavoury	approaches	were	
adopted	in	an	attempt	to	convert	the	targeted	areas	into	less	threatening	places.	
These	 policing	 tactics	 included	 the	 use	 of	 death	 squads	 and	 loyalist	militias	 to	
eliminate	key	opposition	figures	and	 instil	 fear	 in	the	targeted	communities;	as	
well	 as	 attempts	 to	 incentivise	 acquiesce	 to	 government	 control	 through	 the	
introduction	of	infrastructure	and	development	projects.	In	those	circumstances	
where	 the	South	African	government’s	control	and	governance	of	certain	areas	





The	 nature	 of	 the	 police’s	 boundary	 enforcement	 efforts	 also	 had	 discernible	
impacts	 on	 the	 SAP	 as	 an	 organisation.	 Escalations	 in	 organised	 protest	 and	
defiance	 in	 townships,	 combined	with	 increases	 in	armed	attacks	by	 liberation	
movements,	consistently	resulted	in	an	increase	in	the	personnel	size	and	budget	
of	 the	 SAP,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 acquisition	 and	 adoption	 of	 more	 modern	 policing	
equipment	 and	 techniques	 respectively.	 	 The	 SAP’s	 close	 relationship	with	 the	
SADF,	 which	 was	 an	 effort	 to	 more	 effectively	 maintain	 and	 reinforce	 social	
boundaries,	directly	contributed	to	the	further	militarisation	of	the	police,	which	
was	 reflected	 in	 the	 manner	 in	 which	 the	 SAP	 was	 managed,	 organised	 and	
trained.		
	




boundaries	 in	 South	 Africa.	 That	 is,	 the	 SAP’s	 efforts	 to	 prevent	 black	 people	
from	acquiring	firearms,	and	subsequently	using	them	to	disrupt	the	established	
social	order	and	defy	the	government,	were	central	to	preserving	apartheid.	This	
included:	 racially	 discriminatory	 firearm	 licensing;	 prioritising	 cases	 where	








This	 chapter	 provides	 an	 analysis	 of	 circumstances	 surrounding	 the	
establishment	of	 the	South	African	Police	Service	 (SAPS)	and	an	assessment	of	
policing	strategies	and	approaches	in	relation	to	crime	and	violence	after	1994.	It	
considers	 the	 attempts	 by	 the	 post-apartheid	 government	 led	 by	 the	 African	
National	 Congress	 (ANC)	 to	 reform	 the	 police	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 the	 principles	 of	
inclusive	 policing,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 implementation	 challenges	 in	 this	 regard.	 In	
particular	 it	 will	 reflect	 on	 how	 the	 characteristics	 and	 dynamics	 of	 the	
changeover	from	apartheid	rule	to	democracy	influenced	the	boundary	work	of	
the	 police,	 as	 the	 promulgation	 of	 a	 new	 Constitution	 ultimately	 required	 the	
dissolution	of	the	lingering	official	racially	discriminatory	social	boundaries.	
	





relatively	 small	 number	 of	 areas.	 Firearms	 were	 a	 central	 feature	 of	 such	








South	 Africa’s	 Interim	 Constitution	 (1993),	 which	 was	 negotiated	 during	 the	
political	 transition	 in	 the	 early	 1990s,	 required	 the	 government	 to	 create	 the	
SAPS	 by	 means	 of	 an	 act	 of	 Parliament.	 Such	 a	 police	 organisation	 was	
subsequently	 established	out	 of	 the	 integration	of	 various	 apartheid-era	police	
bodies,	 including	 the	 Bantustan	 police	 forces,	 as	well	 as	 the	 inclusion	 of	 some	
individuals	 from	 the	 armed	wings	 of	 the	ANC	 and	 the	 Pan	Africanist	 Congress	
(PAC)	into	the	South	African	Police	(SAP)	structures	(Rauch,	2000,	Shaw,	2001).		
	
The	 SAPS	 was	 initially	 legally	 compelled	 to:	 prevent	 and	 investigate	 crime;	
uphold	law	and	order;	and	maintain	“internal	security”	(Republic	of	South	Africa,	
1994).	However,	in	an	effort	to	transcend	what	was	tantamount	to	a	rebranding	
exercise,	 the	 final	 Constitution	 (1996)	 reframed	 the	police’s	 “internal	 security”	
obligation	 as	 follows:	 “maintain	 public	 order”	 and	 “protect	 and	 secure	 the	
inhabitants	of	the	Republic	and	their	property”	(Republic	of	South	Africa,	1996).	
The	subsequent	SAPS	Act	(Act	no.	68	of	1995)	sought	to	re-engineer	the	police,	
and	 how	 they	 related	 to	 government	 structures	 and	 how	 they	 acted	 within	









new	 police	 for	 South	 Africa	 that	 would	 disregard	 the	 internal	 geo-racial	
apartheid	 policing	 boundaries	 and	 police	 all	 people	 with	 professionalism,	
compassion	 and	 respect,	 particularly	 those	 population	 groups	 that	 had	
previously	 been	 treated	 with	 suspicion	 and	 fear.	 Flowing	 from	 this	 the	 new	
political	 leaders	 from	 the	 ANC	 and	 their	 civilian	 policing	 advisors	 set	 about	
drafting	 the	 National	 Crime	 Prevention	 Strategy	 (NCPS).	 The	 strategy	 was	 an	
attempt	 to	 “reorganise	government”	 in	order	 to	 reduce	and	prevent	 crime,	but	
emphasised	the	need	for	the	SAPS	to	be	more	efficient	and	effective	(Department	
of	 Safety	 and	 Security,	 1996).	 This	 approach	 was	 informed	 by	 development-
centred	 crime	 reduction	 efforts	 in	 other	 countries	 (Newham,	 2005).	 The	NCPS	
was	 an	 idealistic	 attempt	 to	 fundamentally	 address	 the	 various	 social	 and	
economic	 determinants	 of	 crime	 and	 violence	 in	 South	 Africa	 by	means	 of	 an	




Such	 a	 crime	 prevention	 strategy	 ultimately	 required	 the	 SAPS	 to	 work	more	
intimately	 and	 collaboratively	 with	 a	 range	 of	 other	 government	 departments	
that	the	police	had	traditionally	not	 interacted	with,	such	as	the	Department	of	
Welfare	and	 the	Department	of	Education,	 to	address	 the	risks	associated	with	
crime	perpetration	and	victimisation	(Department	of	Safety	and	Security,	1996).	
At	 the	 time	 there	 seemed	 to	 have	 been	 little	 consideration	within	 government	
that	the	SAPS,	like	most	police	organisations,	was	an	inherently	aloof	institution	
that	 was	 not	 predisposed	 to	 actively	 cooperating	 with	 other	 government	
departments,	 especially	 those	 with	 very	 different	 institutional	 cultures.	 In	






amidst	 considerable	 political	 and	 socio-economic	 volatility.	 Intense	 political	
violence	persisted	in	many	peri-urban	and	rural	areas	in	KwaZulu-Natal	after	the	
1994	general	elections.24	In	addition,	criminal	violence	escalated	in	most	policing	
areas	 in	 South	 Africa	 throughout	 the	 remainder	 of	 the	 1990s,	 with	 high	
concentrations	 of	 such	 violence	 being	 experienced	 in	 Gauteng,	 KwaZulu-Natal	
and	the	Western	Cape.	The	SAPS’	traditional	monopoly	over	the	lethal	means	of	









During	 the	 latter	 part	 of	 the	 1990s	 the	 ethos	 and	 orientation	 of	 the	 SAPS	 had	




deal	 with	 crime	 (Department	 of	 Safety	 and	 Security,	 1996).	 Consequently,	 the	
SAPS	 responded	 to	 the	 radical	 policy	 shift	 that	 was	 recommended	 within	 the	
NCPS	in	a	relatively	superficial	and	perfunctory	manner.25	The	police	leadership	
narrowly	interpreted	the	notion	of	crime	prevention	to	conform	to	its	tried-and-
tested	 policing	 approaches,	 with	 the	 SAPS	 Annual	 Plan	 (1996/97)	 providing	
clear	evidence	of	this.		
	
The	 SAPS	 1996/97	Annual	 Plan	 stated	 that	 the	NCPS	was:	 “A	medium	 to	 long	
term	 supportive	 strategy	 which	 seeks	 to	 desegregate	 the	 various	 crime	
combating	 endeavours	 and	 to	 support	 operational	 endeavours	 by	 creating	 a	
favourable	 environment	 for	 the	 combating	 of	 crime”	 (South	 African	 Police	
Service,	1996b:7).	Likewise,	according	to	a	media	statement	by	George	Fivaz,	the	
National	SAPS	Commissioner,	the	SAPS	Annual	Plan	represented	“a	no-nonsense	




be	 directed	 towards	 those	 provinces	 with	 the	 greatest	 intensities	 of	 violent	
crime,	 namely	KwaZulu-Natal	 and	Gauteng,	 and	 that	 “all	 provinces	would	 thus	
benefit”	 from	 this	 approach	 (South	African	 Police	 Service,	 1996b:10).	 By	 1999	
the	SAPS	determined	that	their	policing	endeavours	should	focus	on	high	crime	
areas	 in	 all	 nine	 provinces,	 but	 there	 needed	 to	 be	 a	 continued	 emphasis	 in	
KwaZulu-Natal	and	Gauteng,	as	well	as	in	the	Western	Cape	and	Eastern	Cape.	In	
operational	 terms	 the	 key	 principle	 was	 “maximum	 support	 [resources	 and	




the	 SAPS	 was	 increasingly	 viewing	 crime	 prevention	 as	 an	 overarching	
normative	and	legitimising	aspiration,	while	the	actual	policing	of	priority	crime	
was	 to	 be	 forceful	 and	 militarised.	 Following	 the	 1999	 general	 elections	 the	
security	 cluster	 of	 Cabinet	Ministers,	 led	 by	 Steve	 Tshwete	 (Minister	 of	 Safety	
and	 Security),	 which	 had	 initially	 supported	 the	 social	 crime	 prevention	
orientation	 of	 the	 NCPS,	 began	 to	 endorse	 a	 ‘get	 tough	 on	 crime’	 approach.	
Escalating	 levels	 of	 violent	 criminality	 and	 widespread	 perceptions	 that	 the	
police	were	underperforming	when	it	came	to	containing	and	combatting	crime	







interpreted	as	a	community	 liaison	 function	and	appeared	 to	be	part	of	a	 ‘winning-hearts-and-
minds’	counterinsurgency	strategy.	
99	
and	 Security	 Secretariat,	 the	 NCPS	 champion	 within	 government,	 was	
downgraded	 to	 relative	 insignificance	 (Thulare,	 2002).	 The	 NCPS	 was	
subsequently	supplanted	by	the	SAPS’	own	National	Crime	Combatting	Strategy	




Crime	prevention	 is	 the	 core	policing	 function	 and	provides	 for	 the	 activities	 of	 police	




The	 principal	 emphasis	 of	 the	 NCCS	was	 serious	 and	 violent	 crime,	 as	well	 as	
organised	crime,	with	the	aim	being	to	substantially	reduce	the	incidents	of	such	
crime	over	the	next	15	years.	It	also	focused	on	policing	service	delivery	in	order	
to	 provide	more	 visible	 and	 immediate	 accomplishments	 (Burger	 and	Boshoff,	











be	clustered	 into	 ‘crime-combating	zones’	(Omar,	2010,	Rauch,	2002).	 In	effect,	
many	of	the	high	crime	areas	in	the	mid	1990s	were	the	same	ones	that	had	been	
regarded	as	being	threatening	and	dangerous	by	the	police	during	the	apartheid	
period.	 Hence	 boundary	 policing	 became	 profoundly	 re-affirmed	 and	
reinvigorated	as	an	underlying	police	ethos	during	the	post-apartheid	period.		
The	NCCS	also	became	the	foundation	on	which	the	police’s	political	leadership	




country”	 (South	 African	 Police	 Service,	 2011a).	 Similarly	 police	 have	 been	
encouraged	 to:	 “shoot	 to	 kill”;	 “fight	 fire	 with	 fire”;	 “show	 no	mercy”	 towards	
dangerous	 offenders;	 and	 “squeeze	 crime	 to	 zero”	 (Faull	 and	 Rose,	 2012)	





As	 suggested	 by	 Altbeker	 (2009),	 the	 conceptualisation	 of	 crime	 and	 the	
formulation	of	crime	fighting	remedies	that	were	envisaged	within	the	NCCS	was	
most	 likely	 a	 nostalgic	 response	 by	 the	 SAPS	 to	 policing	 during	 the	 apartheid	
period	 when	 threats	 were	 easily	 identifiable,	 as	 in	 the	 post-apartheid	 period	
criminal	offending	became	complex	and	confusing	to	the	police	where	those	that	
undermine	 the	maintenance	 of	 law	 and	 order	were	 not	 clearly	 identifiable.	 In	
addition,	 Altbeker	 (2009:277)	 further	 iterated	 that	 “tightly	 organised	








the	 Orkin	 Commission	 of	 Inquiry	 (1997-1998)	 into	 the	 SAPS	 crime	 statistics	
recommended	the	use	of	a	geographical	information	systems	(GIS)	to	map	crime	
(De	 Kock,	 2007).	 Thereafter	 a	 GIS	 crime	 analysis	 approach	 was	 piloted	 in	
Johannesburg	 by	 the	 SAPS	 Crime	 Information	 Analysis	 Centre	 (Cooper,	 et	 al.,	
1999,	Stylianides,	2000).		
	
By	 the	 early	 2000s	 a	 sophisticated,	 web-based	 GIS	 crime	 mapping	 and	
information	 system	 had	 been	 developed	 for	 the	 SAPS	 with	 backdated	 crime,	
population	 and	 socio-economic	 data.	 High	 crime	 stations	 were	 the	 first	 to	
acquire	this	technology,	with	it	being	implemented	in	the	remainder	of	the	SAPS	
stations	shortly	thereafter	(Smit	and	Schnetler,	2004).	The	system	also	allowed	
for	 real-time,	 multi-variant	 crime	 assessment	 at	 the	 SAPS’	 smallest	 unit	 of	
analysis,	the	Crime	Administration	System	(CAS)	block	(Breetzke,	2006).	It	also	
equipped	the	SAPS	with	the	necessary	 information	to	make	 informed	decisions	
regarding	 the	 planning	 of	 operations	 and	 other	 policing	 actions	 (Ellis,	 2004).	
Additionally,	 new	 station-level	 maps	 with	 up-to-date	 information	 were	
distributed	to	the	priority	police	stations	(Boshoff,	2001).		
	
Electronic	 forms	 of	 crime	 mapping	 have	 crisply	 demarcated	 the	 spatial	
intensities	 of	 reported	 disorder	 and	 criminal	 offending	 in	 South	 Africa.	 They	
have	revealed	that	violent	crime	has	been	intensely	concentrated,	in	a	relatively	
small	 number	 of	 places.	 This	 consequently	 contributed	 to	 the	 prioritisation	 of	
crime	 reduction	 responses	 in	 high	 crime	 spaces	 (Vigneswaran,	 2014).	 Such	 a	
vivid	graphical	representation	of	the	territorial	intensities	of	crime,	however,	has	
tended	to	limit	and	distort	interpretations	of	crime	as	being	specifically	bound	to	





By	 2001	 the	 SAPS	 had	 resolved	 that	 between	 140	 and	 148	 police	 station	
precincts	with	 ‘high	 contact	 crimes’	would	 be	 prioritised	 in	 terms	 of	 receiving	
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years	 the	 number	 of	 focal	 high	 crime	 station	 areas	 has	 not	 remained	 entirely	
static	as	the	SAPS	has	established	additional	police	stations	where	there	was	dire	





Eastern	Cape	 Kwazakele*;	 New	 Brighton;	 Umtata*	 (Mthatha);	 Kwanobuhle;	 Motherwell;	
Mdantsane;	 Bethelsdorp;	 Duncan	 Village;	 Gelvandale;	 East	 London;	
Grahamstown;	 Queenstown;	 Kamesh;	 Walmer;	 Cambridge;	 Humewood;	
Buffalo	Flats;	King	Williams	Town;	Lusikisiki;	Cradock;	Butterworth;	Inyibiba;	




Gauteng	 Hillbrow*;	 Sophia	 Town;	 Yeoville;	 Johannesburg	 Central*;	 Booysens;	
Alexandra*;	 Jeppe*;	 Mamelodi*;	 Pretoria	 Central;	 Rietgat;	 Atteridgeville;	
Sunnyside;	 Tembisa*;	 Daveyton;	 Ivory	 Park*;	 Benoni;	 Katlehong*;	
Roodepoort;	 Randfontein;	 Krugersdorp;	 Evaton*;	 Orange	 Farm;	 Sebokeng;	
Vanderbijlpark;	Meadowlands;	Dobsonville;	Lenasia;	Moroka*;	Kliptown	
KwaZulu-Natal	 Durban	 Central;	 KwaMashu*;	 Umlazi*;	 Inanda*;	 Empangeni;	 Plessislaer*;	
Phoenix;	 Point;	 Eshikawini*;	 Kwadabeka;	 Mount	 Rise;	 Chatsworth;	
Ladysmith;	 Madadeni;	 Pietermaritzburg;	 Mariannhill;	 Pinetown;	
Bhekithemba;	 Eshowe;	 Kwadukuza;	 Kwamsane;	 Cato	 Manor;	 Richards	 Bay;	
Osizweni;	Verulam;	Nongoma;	Hillcrest	
Limpopo	 Thohoyandou;	Polokwane;	Mokopane;	Seshego;	Giyani;	Tzaneen;	Mankweng;	
Bolobedu;	 Maake;	 Lebowakgomo;	 Calcutta;	 Bushbuckridge;	 Letsitele;	
Makhado;	Malamulele;	Bele	Bele;	Tubatse	
Mpumalanga	 Vosman;	 Kanyamazane;	 Tonga;	 Nelspruit;	 Siyabuswa;	 Kwamhlanga;	
Embalenhle;	 Kabokweni;	 Witbank;	 Ermelo;	 Kwaggafontein;	 Masoyi;	 Piet	
Retief;	Mhluzi	
Northern	Cape	 Galeshewe;	 Kimberley;	 Rosedale;	 Upington;	 Roodepan;	 Kakamas;	
Groblershoop;	Pabablello	
North-West	 Temba;	 Ikageng;	 Rustenburg;	 Loate;	 Jouberton;	 Phokeng;	 Garankuwa;	
Mabopane;	Mmabatho;	Vryburg;	Brits;	Klerksdorp;	Potchefstroom;	Tlhabane	
Western	Cape	 Khayelitsha;	Nyanga*;	Kuils	River*;	Mitchells	Plain*;	Worcester;	Gugulethu*;	







Most	 of	 the	 high	 crime	 areas	 were	 densely	 populated,	 infrastructurally	
marginalised	and	characterised	by	elevated	levels	of	poverty,	such	as	large	urban	
townships	and	 informal	 settlements.	Within	 these	high	crime	areas	 there	were	
micro	 hot	 spots	 where	 criminal	 offending	 was	 even	 more	 magnified,	 such	 as	
hostels,	shebeens	and	taxi	ranks.	For	the	SAPS	leadership	one	of	the	reasons	for	
this	 state	 of	 affairs	 was	 that	 the	 distorted	 and	 discriminatory	 approach	 to	
policing	 that	 the	SAP	had	pursued	under	apartheid	had	 left	many	poorer	areas	
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resembled	warzones,	 as	was	 the	 case	with	KwaZulu-Natal	 towns	of	Richmond,	
KwaMashu	and	Inanda	in	the	mid	to	late	1990s;	and	the	Cape	Flats	communities	
of	Manenberg	 and	Mitchells	 Plain,	which	 have	 been	 intermittently	wracked	 by	
fierce	 gang	 conflicts.	 Furthermore,	 day-to-day	police	 service	delivery	has	 often	
been	negated	by	the	overwhelming	extent	of	reported	crime	and	calls	for	service,	








protection,	 which	 often	 resulted	 in	 more	 immediate	 forms	 of	 justice	 and	
punishment.	 Much	 of	 this	 non-state	 policing	 endured	 after	 1994	 (Buur,	 2006,	
Schärf,	2001,	Super,	2015,	Tshehla,	2002),	with	additional	forms	of	both	benign	
and	 predatory	 community	 policing	 emerging	 (Baker,	 2002b,	Marks	 and	Wood,	
2010).		
	
In	 such	 spaces,	 the	 state	 has	 “porous,	 constructed	 borders”	 (Cooper-Knock,	
2014),	where	the	police	have	often	been	required	to	perform	subtle	and	intricate	
manoeuvres	 and	 negotiations	 (Steinberg,	 2008)	 with	 community	 members	 in	




walls,	 a	vivid	architectural	demonstration	of	 the	SAPS’	unease	with	working	 in	
such	 areas,	 and	 have	 had	 clear	 similarities	 in	 functional	 design	 to	 the	 police	






numbering	 systems	 and	 lighting.	 Police	 have	 been	 frequently	 at	 risk	 of	 being	
attacked	by	armed	criminals	(Bruce,	et	al.,	2007,	Minnaar,	2003b),	particularly	at	
night	 	 (Rauch,	 1998).	 Steinberg	 (2014b)	 reflecting	 on	 the	 testimony	 of	 SAPS	
officials	 to	 the	 Khayelitsha	 Commission	 of	 Inquiry	 (2014),	 and	 his	 own	
ethnographic	 research,	 has	 suggested	 that	 it	 was	 not	 inconceivable	 that	 SAPS	
members	have	been	“afraid”	to	work	within	many	such	high	crime	areas.		
	
Such	 fear	 was	 a	 prominent	 theme	 in	 the	 interview-based	 research	 on	 SAPS	




with	 dread	 or	 bravado.	 Both	 responses	 have	 had	 the	 potential	 to	 lead	 to	
aggressive	 behaviour	 towards	 suspected	 offenders,	 particularly	 from	
paramilitary	 policing	 formations,	 such	 as	 the	 Public	 Order	 Policing	 Units.	 For	
example,	Monique	Marks	 reflecting	 on	 a	 ride-along	with	 Public	 Order	 Policing	
members	in	KwaMashu	(one	of	the	most	unsafe	policing	areas	in	KwaZulu-Natal)	
during	 the	 time	 of	 an	 intense	 national	 high	 density	 operation,	 recounted	 the	
following	apt	example	from	her	field	notes:	
	
Sergeant	Marais	(SAPS	member):	 It	 is	 fucking	quiet	out	here	 tonight.	Monique,	 it	 looks	
like	you	jinxed	us.	There	is	nothing	exciting	taking	place.	Monique:	What	do	you	hope	to	
take	place?		Sergeant	Marais:	A	bit	of	shooting	at	least.	That	is	what	we	live	for…	[Later	





Elevated	 murder	 levels	 of	 policemen	 and	 policewomen,	 mostly	 in	 high	 crime	
areas,	have	also	informed	such	fear,	with	firearm	injuries	being	the	main	cause	of	
death.	The	incidents	of	police	murders	were	in	excess	of	200	per	year	in	the	mid	
to	 late	 1990s,	 and	 have	 subsequently	 declined	 significantly	 since	 then,	
decreasing	from	263	in	1994/95	to	77	in	2013/14,	which	was	more	than	a	300%	
decline	over	that	period	of	20	years.	Nonetheless,	the	murder	of	police	personnel	
has	 remained	 an	 area	 of	 grave	 concern	 to	 both	 the	 police	 and	 its	 political	
leadership.	 	 For	 example,	 in	 June	 2013,	 in	 a	 speech	 at	 the	 funeral	 of	 a	 senior	
police	official,	 the	Minister	of	Police	at	the	time,	Nathi	Mthethwa	eulogised	that	








Over	 the	 past	 20	 years	 senior	 political	 leaders	 and	 police	 officials	 have	
repeatedly	articulated	 that	high	crime	areas	are	dangerous	spaces	of	contested	
governance,	which	should	be	repossessed	by	 the	security	 forces	and	thereafter	
the	 authority	 of	 the	 state	 should	 be	 reasserted.	 For	 example,	 according	 to	 the	




























































































gangs.	We	 want	 to	 create	 a	 safe	 environment	 where	 children	 can	 grow	 up	 in	
peaceful,	stable	conditions”	(van	Dyk,	2003).	In	2015,	Jeff	Radebe,	the	Minister	in	
the	 Presidency,	 declared	 that	 in	 the	 context	 of	 Operation	 Fiela-Reclaim,	 large-





Despite	 the	 perpetuation	 of	 a	militaristic	 policing	 ethos,	 the	 SAPS	 nonetheless	
initiated	 a	 series	 of	 organisational	 changes,	 which	 were	 motivated	 by	 both	
legislative	 imperatives	 (for	 the	 introduction	 of	 more	 democratic	 policing	
approaches)	 and	 operational	 considerations.	 Nonetheless	 as	 this	 section	 will	
show,	 these	adaptations	were	ultimately	 fashioned	 to	support	 the	enforcement	
of	 post-apartheid	 policing	 boundaries,	 especially	 the	 prioritisation	 and	
combatting	of	crime	in	high	crime	areas.	This	was	evident	with:	the	introduction	





The	 SAPS	 did	 embrace	 some	 policing	 approaches	 that	were	 in-line	with	more	
progressive	 thinking	 on	 crime	 prevention.	 A	 key	 example	 was	 that	 of	
community-oriented	policing.	 In	principal	 it	 is	 an	approach	 that	 seeks	 to	make	
the	 police	 and	 community	 members	 “co-producers	 of	 public	 safety”	 (Skolnick	
and	Bayley,	1988:iii).	It	was	seen	by	the	new	generation	of	South	African	policy	







be	 committees	 of	 community	 members	 that	 would	 be	 mandated	 to:	 promote	
communication	and	cooperation	between	communities	and	SAPS;	engage	in	joint	
problem-solving	 between	 civilians	 and	 the	 police;	 facilitate	 transparency	 and	
accountability	 of	 the	 police;	 and	 improve	 the	 delivery	 of	 police	 services.	
Nonetheless,	 the	 SAPS	 modified	 the	 notion	 of	 community-oriented	 policing	 to	
suit	 the	 dominant	 policing	 ethos	 and	 the	 objectives	 of	 the	 NCCS,	 especially	 in	
support	 of	 the	 policing	 of	 boundaries	 in	 relation	 to	 high	 crime	 areas.	 That	 is,	
community-oriented	policing	was	chiefly	used	as	a	means	to	mobilise	and	co-opt	




frontier	 communities	 were	 deputised	 (in	 the	 form	 of	 commandos)	 to	 perform	 some	 of	 the	
policing	 functions	 of	 the	 colonial	 authorities.	 This	 also	 occurred	 under	 apartheid	 where	
community	 members	 and	 community	 structures	 were	 enlisted	 to	 defend	 and	 maintain	 white	
minority	rule.	
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The	 SAPS	 even	 developed	 their	 own	 brand	 of	 community-oriented	 policing	 in	
2001,	 which	 has	 been	 referred	 to	 as	 sector	 policing,	 with	 the	 National	 SAPS	
Commissioner	 issuing	 a	 Final	 Draft	 National	 Instruction	 on	 Sector	 Policing	 in	
2003.	 It	 was	 a	 hybrid	model	 that	 fused	 together	 elements	 of	 both	 community	
policing	 and	 problem-oriented	 policing,	 and	 was	 influenced	 by	 the	 limited	




to:	 deliver	 more	 community-specific,	 partnership	 policing;	 increase	 response	
times;	and	strengthen	CPFs	(South	African	Police	Service,	2003a,	South	African	
Police	 Service,	 2013b).	Within	 the	 SAPS,	 according	 to	 an	 interview	with	 Johan	
Burger,	sector	policing	was	often	referred	to	as	“soft	policing”	(Burger,	2015a).		
Sector	policing	was	to	be	phased	in	over	the	next	decade,	starting	initially	with	
145	 priority	 police	 stations	 in	 high	 crime	 areas	 (Government	 Communication	
and	 Information	 System,	2005).	By	March	2012	 sector	policing	had	 reportedly	
been	 implemented	 in	 1,056	 police	 station	 areas	 (Government	 Communication	
and	 Information	 System,	 2013).	 However,	 by	 this	 point	 in	 time,	 the	 problem-
solving	 aspects	 had	 been	 de-emphasised	 with	 sector	 policing	 having	 been	 re-
interpreted	 as	 an	 ‘operational’	 form	 of	 visible	 policing	 (Burger,	 2014).	 Since	
2000	there	have	been	a	handful	of	studies	of	sector	policing.	Published	studies	
that	 have	 focused	 on	 the	 West	 Rand	 (Steinberg,	 2004a)	 and	 Hillbrow	 (Quest	
Research	 Services,	 2013)	 has	 indicated	 that	 there	 had	 been	 some	 successes	 in	
building	 legitimacy	 and	 improving	 service	 delivery,	 but	 other	 studies	 have	
indicated	 that	 the	 effectiveness	 of	 sector	 policing	 was	 undermined	 by	 scant	
community	 involvement	 and	 inadequate	 resources	 (Buthelezi,	 2014,	 Montesh,	
2007).	
7.3.2	Reforming	public	order	policing	
Efforts	were	 also	made	 to	 reform	 the	 SAPS	 approach	 to	 the	 policing	 of	 public	
disorder	 in	 an	 attempt	 to	 align	 this	 form	 of	 policing	 with	 the	 principals	 of	
policing	in	a	multiracial	democracy.	In	this	regard	the	SAPS	Public	Order	Policing	
Unit	was	established	 in	1995,	which	was	the	merger	of	 the	personnel	 from	the	
former	 Riot	 Units	 and	 Internal	 Stability	 Units	 from	 the	 SAP	 and	 the	 various	
Bantustan	 police	 forces.	 It	 was	 envisaged	 that	 the	 Public	 Order	 Policing	 Unit	
would	 pursue	 a	 “more	 soft	 approach	 than	 previous	 historical	methods”	 to	 the	
policing	 of	 gatherings,	 marches	 and	 protests,	 which	 included	 the	 showing	 of	
restraint	 and	 using	 force	 as	 a	 last	 resort	 (South	 African	 Police	 Service,	
1997b:50).	Public	Order	Policing	personnel	were	“re-selected”	(Omar,	2006)	and	
underwent	training	based	on	 international	standards	of	crowd	management	by	








supporting	 crime	 prevention	 and	 crime	 combatting	 operations.	 This	 strategy	
was	 encapsulated	within	 SAPS	 Standing	Order	No.	 262	 (2002),	which	 outlined	
how	the	police	should	act	in	circumstances	where	force	was	required	to	control	
collective	 disorder	 (Ministry	 of	 Police,	 2013,	 Omar,	 2006).	 The	 Public	 Order	




The	1998	White	Paper	 on	 Safety	 and	 Security	 clearly	 indicated	 that	 the	public	
order	 component	of	 the	police	would	entail	boundary	policing,	with	 the	public	
order	 units	 being	 earmarked	 as	 the	 lead	 SAPS	 agency	 when	 it	 came	 to	 high-
density	 operations.	 Such	 operations	 were	 defined	 as	 “the	 saturation	 of	 areas	
experiencing	high	levels	of	crime	with	patrolling	police	officers…to	stabilise	high	





incidents	 of	 public	 violence,	 these	 units	were	 renamed	 Area	 Crime	 Combating	
Units	 (ACCUs).	 Informed	 by	 the	 principles	 of	 sector	 policing	 the	 ACCUs	 were	
regionalised	and	were	assigned	an	adjusted	mandate,	namely	to	focus	on	serious	
and	 violence	 crimes	 (Omar,	 2006).	 Five	 years	 later	 the	 ACCUs	 were	 further	




From	 the	 early	 2000s	 the	 SAPS	 established	 specialised	 paramilitary	 policing	
bodies	 that	 could	 be	 swiftly	 deployed	 to	 react	 to	 incidents	 of	 public	 disorder,	









Detective	 Service,	 such	 as:	 murder	 and	 robbery	 units;	 firearm	 investigation	
units;	 gang	 units;	 gold	 and	 diamond	 theft	 units;	 child	 protection	 units;	 vehicle	









These	 organisational	 changes	was	 reportedly	 driven	 by	 the	 concerns	 of	 senior	
SAPS	decision-makers	that	many	of	the	specialised	units	were	underperforming	
in	 terms	 of:	 securing	 satisfactory	 conviction	 rates;	 were	 too	 expensive	 to	
maintain;	 and	 were	 largely	 isolated	 from	 community	 policing	 endeavours	
(Redpath,	2002).	Officially	the	SAPS	claimed	that	this	restructuring	was	to:	better	
coordinate	 criminal	 investigations;	 promote	 collaboration	 and	 the	 sharing	 of	





their	members	 being	 redeployed	within	 the	 SAPS	 structures.	 For	 example,	 the	
Serious	 and	 Violent	 Crime	 component	 was	 decentralised	 and	 its	 members	
deployed	to	police	stations	in	high	crime	areas.	The	SAPS	management	envisaged	





One	 of	 the	 benefits	 of	 South	 Africa’s	 transition	 to	 democracy	 was	 that	
government	 found	 itself	 in	 a	 considerably	 less	 hostile	 environment	within	 the	




that	 of	 transnational	 organised	 criminal	 organisations,	 which	 facilitated	 cross-
border	smuggling	of	illegal	goods,	such	as	stolen	vehicles,	drugs,	precious	metals	
and	 minerals,	 as	 well	 as	 illicit	 firearms	 (Shaw,	 1998).	 The	 SAPS	 leadership	
therefore	resolved	that	augmented	border	policing	approaches	were	required	to	
defend	 South	 Africa’s	 borders	 from	 the	 new	 trans-national	 threats	 posed	 by	
organised	criminal	groups	(Gastrow,	1998).	
	
An	 early	 innovation	 within	 the	 SAPS	 in	 this	 regard	 was	 the	 creation	 of	
specialised	 units,	 such	 as	 Organised	 Crime	 Investigation	 Units	 and	 the	 Border	
Police.	These	units	were	to	engage	in	a	range	of	joint	operations	with	other	SAPS	
entities	 in	 order	 to	 combat	 organised	 crime	 (South	 African	 Police	 Service,	
1997b).	The	Border	Police,	for	example,	had	members	stationed	at	border	posts,	
harbours	 and	 airports	 in	 order	 to	 net	 smugglers	 and	 contraband	 (Minnaar,	
2003a).	By	2002	the	Border	Police	had	a	presence	at	53	 land	border	posts,	 ten	
airport	 border	 posts	 and	 nine	 sea	 border	 posts	 (South	 African	 Police	 Service,	










protection	 and	 crime	 fighting	 in	 the	 regions	 along	 South	 Africa’s	 national	
borderline	 (Hennop,	 2001b).	 The	 Border	 Police	 continued	 to	 function	
nonetheless.	 Cabinet	 resolved	 in	 2003	 that	 the	 SAPS	 should	 be	 reallocated	 the	
border	 protection	 mandate,	 and	 that	 the	 SANDF	 presence	 in	 the	 frontier	
territories	should	be	gradually	phased	out.	However,	due	to	capacity	constraints	
and	 poor	 performance,	 the	 SAPS	 were	 unable	 to	 fully	 assume	 the	 mantle	 of	






identified	 by	 the	 SAPS	 in	 its	 1996/97	 annual	 report,	 firearms	 featured	
prominently	 in	 five,	 namely:	 vehicle	 hijacking;	 minibus-taxi-related	 violence;	




two	 decades,	 as	 consistently	 illustrated	 in	 most	 SAPS	 strategic	 and	 policy	
documents.	For	example,	the	2015/16	SAPS	Annual	Performance	Plan	reiterated	
that	 firearm	 loss	 and	 theft	 was	 a	 “key	 concern”	 and	 a	 major	 “contributor	 to	
crime”	 (South	 African	 Police	 Service,	 2015a:vi).	 The	 elevated	 levels	 of	 firearm	
possession,	 especially	 in	 high	 crime	 areas,	 was	 to	 significantly	 influence	 the	






in	 South	 Africa	 of	 which:	 civilians	 owned	 3,554,336;	 487,401	 were	 in	 the	
possession	 of	 government	 departments;	 firearm	 dealers	 and	 manufacturers	
were	holding	397,146	and	10,100	respectively;	and	95,722	were	in	the	hands	of	
private	 companies.	 At	 this	 time	 more	 than	 60%	 of	 these	 firearms	 were	
handguns;	 28%	 were	 commercial	 rifles	 and	 10%	 were	 shotguns.	 In	 terms	 of	
licensed	civilian	firearms,	the	greatest	concentration	of	licensed	civilian	firearm	
ownership	was	 in	Gauteng,	 followed	by	 the	Western	Cape,	KwaZulu-Natal,	 and	
the	Eastern	Cape	(Chetty,	2000).	However,	as	there	are	some	problems	with	the	





Firearm	 Summit	 that	 between	 2004	 and	 2015	 some	 3,189,861	 firearm	
applications	(new	applications	and	renewals)	had	been	submitted	to	the	CFR	of	
which	 3,106,438	 had	 been	 ‘finalised’.	 She	 further	 noted	 that	 at	 this	 time	 that	
there	 were:	 1,749,034	 individual	 firearm	 owners,	 who	 possessed	 3,081,173	
firearms;	 425	 official	 institutions	with	 1,270,405	 firearms	 under	 their	 control;	
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and	 8,937	 non-official	 institutions,	 owning	 136,259	 firearms	 (Phiyega,	 2015).	




A	1999	report	by	 the	SAPS	 Joint	 Investigation	Team	suggested	 that	 there	were	
approximately	 500,000	 illegal	 firearms	 in	 South	 Africa.	 	 This	 figure	 was	
formulated	 by	 adding	 an	 estimated	 200,000	 missing	 government	 firearms,	
150,000	stolen	from	or	lost	by	private	owners,	some	30,000	homemade	firearms,	
and	 anticipated	 unreported	 losses	 from	 all	 sectors	 (Ministry	 of	 Safety	 and	
Security,	 1999).	 SAPS	 and	 independent	 researchers	 identified	 the	 principal	
sources	 of	 illegal	 firearms	 at	 this	 time	 being:	 firearms	 lost	 by,	 or	 stolen	 from	
licensed	 civilians,	 government	 departments	 (such	 as	 SAPS,	 the	 SANDF	 and	 the	
former	 Bantustan	 security	 forces)	 and	 private	 security	 companies;	 homemade	




the	 scope	 of	 the	 proliferation	 of	 the	 different	 sources	 of	 illegal	 firearms	 at	 the	
time.	 For	 example,	 in	 1994	 AK-47s	 accounted	 for	 11%	 of	 all	 SAPS	 firearm	
seizures	 for	 that	 year,	 while	 handguns	 and	 homemade	 firearms	 accounted	 for	
53%	and	21%	respectively.	By	1998	AK-47	and	homemade	firearm	seizures	had	
shrunk	significantly	to	2.5%	and	15%	of	all	SAPS	firearm	seizures	respectively,	
while	handgun	confiscations	had	 increased	 to	72%	(Chetty,	2000).	Such	 trends	










particularly	 business	 owners,	 sought	 to	 acquire	 illegal	 firearms	 for	 self-
protection.	 The	 reason	 being	 that	 the	 official	 licensing	 route	 had	 been	 largely	
opaque	and	unresponsive	to	many	black	South	Africans	 in	these	areas	(Burger,	
2015b,	 IRIN,	 2006,	 Jacobs,	 2004,	 Wines,	 2005).	 Individuals	 with	 criminal	
intensions	also	sought	to	acquire	illegal	firearms.	
	
According	 to	 interviews	 with	 existing	 and	 retired	 senior	 SAPS	 firearm	 crime	
investigators,	namely	Stan	Joubert,	Alice	Pienaar-Marais	and	a	former	senior	CFR	
official	 (name	withheld),	 most	 serious	 firearm	 crimes	 in	 South	 Africa,	 such	 as	
murder,	 attempted	murder,	 and	 robbery	with	 aggravating	 circumstances,	 have	
been	committed	with	illegal	firearms	(Anonymous,	2015,	Joubert,	2015,	Pienaar-
Marais,	 2015).	 Case	 study	 and	 ethnographic	 research	 in	 South	 Africa	 suggests	




theft/robbery,	 or	 indirectly	 via	 black	 market	 entrepreneurial	 intermediaries.	
Those	 individuals	 that	 steal	 firearms	 for	 their	 personal	 use	 are	 predominantly	
part	 of	 small	 criminal	 groupings	 that	 engage	 in	 street,	 house	 and	 business	
robberies	 where	 firearms	 were	 stolen	 in	 addition	 to	 other	 valuable	 items	
(Altbeker,	1999,	Thaler,	2011,	Zinn,	2010).		
	
The	 illegal	 firearm	intermediaries	have	often	been	 linked	to	organised	criminal	
groups	(including	street	gangs)	(Kinnes,	2000,	Shaw,	1998,	Standing,	2006)	that	
steal	 or	 buy	 stolen/misplaced	 licensed	 or	 government-held	 firearms,	 or	 bribe	
corrupt	 government	 officials	which	 have	 access	 to	 firearms.	 In	 addition,	 some	
drug	 dealers,	 hostel	 residents,	 minibus	 taxi	 drivers,	 shebeen	 owners,	 corrupt	







The	exact	dimensions	of	 the	current	pool	of	 illegal	 firearms	 in	South	Africa	are	








crime	 in	 South	 Africa	 were	 originally	 licensed	 civilian	 firearms,	 both	 namely	
firearms	licensed	to	individuals	and	private	security	companies,	as	together	they	
accounted	for	77%	of	all	lost	and	stolen	firearms	between	1999	and	June	2015.	
This	 is	 a	 view	 that	 has	 been	 shared	 by	 the	 SAPS,	 with	 the	 Minister	 of	 Police	
noting	 in	 2012	 that	 licensed	 civilian	 firearm	 owners	will	 “continue	 to	 become	
arsenals	for	criminals”	(South	African	Police	Service,	2012a:25).		
	
This	 view	 is	 somewhat	 supported	 by	 firearm	 seizure	 figures	 from	 the	 Border	
Police,	 which	 indicates	 a	 general	 decreasing	 trend	 in	 firearm	 confiscations	 at	
points	 of	 entry	 into	 South	 Africa	 from	 2002/03.	 That	 is	 in	 2002/03	 reporting	
year	433	 firearms	were	confiscated	by	 the	Border	Police,	while	 in	2014/15	81	
firearms	were	seized	(see	Chart	7.2	below).	The	SAPS	reported	in	2005	that	this	
trend	 could	 be	 attributed	 to	 the	 “tightening	 up	 of	 border	 controls”	 and	
“improving	 other	 security	 measures	 at	 most	 of	 the	major	 points	 of	 entry	 and	






reports.	 In	 addition,	 the	 official	 Southern	 African	 Development	 Community	
statement	 to	 the	 Fourth	 Biennial	 Meeting	 of	 States	 to	 Consider	 the	
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Given	 that	 the	 widespread	 availability	 of	 firearms	 in	 South	 Africa	 was	 a	 key	
driver	 of	 the	 high	 levels	 of	 violent	 crime,	 particularly	 in	 high	 crime	 zones,	 the	
SAPS	 prioritised	 the	 collection	 and	 seizure	 of	 illegal	 firearms	 in	 such	 areas.	
Furthermore,	 as	 a	 large	 proportion	 of	 illegal	 firearms	 in	 South	 Africa	 had	
originally	 been	 legally	 held	 by	 civilians	 and	 members	 of	 the	 security	 forces,	
government	 initiated	 a	 process	 of	 reforming	 South	 Africa’s	 national	 firearm	
controls	 as	 a	means	 of	 restricting	 the	 flow	of	 licensed	 firearms	 into	 the	 illegal	
economy	and	hence	further	destabilising	high	crime	areas.	
In	 addition,	 the	 SAPS’	 internal	 assessments	 in	 the	 mid	 1990s	 found	 that:	 the	
overall	 management	 of	 firearm	 control	 by	 the	 SAPS	 was	 inadequate;	 the	
information	 technology	 systems	 and	 software	 used	 for	 firearm	 control	 and	
criminal	 investigation	 was	 problematic;	 communication	 between	 provincial	
structures	 and	 the	 Central	 Firearms	 Registry	 (CFR)	 in	 Pretoria	was	 poor;	 and	
that	 the	 Illegal	 Firearm	 Investigation	 Units	 (IFIUs)	 were	 under-resourced	
(Naudé,	1996,	South	African	Police	Service,	1996a).	Consequently	improvements	
to	 the	 SAPS	 firearm	 control	 and	 investigation	 architecture	 and	 infrastructure	
was	initiated.	
7.6.1	Operation	Rachel	
One	 of	 the	 first	 major	 post-apartheid	 operational	 interventions	 in	 relation	 to	
firearms	 entailed	 the	 destruction	 of	 firearms	 caches	 within	 Mozambican	
territory	that	had	accumulated	during	the	civil	war	 in	that	country.	The	reason	
for	 this	 operation	 was	 that	 in	 the	 mid	 1990s	 SAPS	 crime	 intelligence	 was	
reporting	 that	 a	 substantial	 number	 of	 such	 firearms,	 particularly	 automatic	
















criminal	 activities	 in	 Gauteng	 and	 in	 the	 internecine	 conflict	 between	 the	ANC	
and	the	IFP	in	KwaZulu-Natal	(Chachiua,	1999).		
	
Unlike	 during	 the	 apartheid	 period	 when	 the	 SAP	 would	 often	 illegally	 cross	
national	 borders	 to	 eliminate	 insurgent	 threats,	 the	 SAPS	 were	 compelled	 to	
broker	an	official	agreement	with	the	Mozambican	police	that	resulted	in	a	joint	
operation	 between	 the	 two	 police	 organisations.	 This	 bilateral	 policing	
intervention,	 which	 was	 titled	 Operation	 Rachel,	 was	 launched	 in	 1995,	 with	
there	having	being	at	least	28	iterations	of	this	type	of	operations	between	1995	
and	2008.	The	Mozambican	government	was	supportive	of	such	an	operation	as	
they	 did	 not	 have	 the	 resources	 to	 fund	 such	 an	 undertaking	 itself,	 and	 the	




cross	 over	 into	Mozambican	 territory	 to	 work	with	 the	Mozambican	 police	 to	
identify	 and	 then	 destroy	 caches	 of	 firearms,	 ammunition	 and	 explosives	 in	
mainly	 rural	 and	 underdeveloped	 areas.	 The	 operations	 were	 intelligence-
driven,	 and	 informants	 were	 provided	 with	 financial	 rewards	 for	 successfully	
identifying	 arms	 caches.	 In	 an	 attempt	 to	 encourage	 more	 Mozambicans	 to	
identify	weapons	caches	no	punitive	measures	were	pursued	against	those	found	
in	 possession	 of	 arms	 (Hennop,	 2001a).	 Due	 to	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 terrain	 GIS	
techniques	were	piloted	to	map	the	location	of	the	arms	caches	(Chachiua,	1999).	
























weapons,	 explosive	 devices	 and	 equipment	 and	 to	 determine	 their	 origin	 in	
order	to	ensure	safer,	crime	free	communities”.	The	main	objectives	of	the	Plan	




to	 remove	 and	 destroy	 illegal	 firearms;	 “upgrade”	 firearm	 control	 legislation;	
develop	 cooperative	 agreements	 with	 other	 Southern	 African	 governments	 in	
relation	to	firearm	operations;	and	improve	controls	over	legal	firearms	held	by	
government,	 civilians,	 firearm	 dealers	 and	 private	 security	 companies	 (South	
African	Police	Service,	1997a).	
	
Interviews	with	 two	 senior	 SAPS	personnel	 that	were	 responsible	 for	 devising	
the	 SAPS’	 firearm	 control	 policies	 revealed	 that	 the	 NFP	 was	 never	 officially	
published.	According	 to	Alice	Pienaar-Marais,	 the	NFP	was	assimilated	 into	 the	
SAPS	 Firearm	 Strategy	 and	 accompanying	 implementation	 plan,	 which	 had	 a	




retrofitting	 exercise	 that	 fused	 together	 existing	 SAPS	 firearm	 control	 thinking	
and	activities	 into	a	relatively	coherent	plan	(Burger,	2015b).	28	This	document,	
which	 had	more	 of	 a	 firearm	 violence	 prevention	 orientation	 compared	 to	 the	
NFP,	was	comprised	of	the	following	key	components	or	“pillars”:	
	
• The	 establishment	 of	 policies,	 procedures	 and	 operational	 mechanisms	
that	would	enable	the	Firearms	Control	Act	implementation,	particularly	
the	Regulations	for	the	Act;		
• The	 creation	 of	 administrative	 means	 (such	 as	 Firearm	 Registration	
Centres,	an	information	technology	based	licensing	system,	and	licensing	
standards),	 the	 acquisition	 of	 the	 necessary	 equipment	 (such	 as	 for	 the	
destruction	 of	 firearms),	 and	 the	 appointment	 of	 SAPS	 Designated	
Firearm	Officers	at	the	station-level;		
• The	reduction	and	eradication	of	 the	 illegal	pool	and	the	criminal	use	of	
firearms	 through	 an	 evaluation	 of	 firearm	 control	 weaknesses,	
investigations	 into	 the	 main	 sources	 of	 illegal	 firearms,	 the	 linking	 of	
cases	 to	 criminality,	 procedural	 and	 focused	 organised	 crime	
interventions,	cross-border	operations,	and	the	destruction	of	redundant	
and	obsolete	firearms;	and	
• Awareness-raising	 and	 the	 development	 of	 social	 crime	 prevention	







from	 crimes	 associated	with	 both	 illegal	 and	 legal	 firearms…[;]	 encourage	 a	 culture	 of	














close	 to	85%	in	 the	2006/07	planning	document	 (South	African	Police	Service,	
2006a).	However,	in	an	interview	with	Col	Johan	A	P	Burger	he	indicated	that	the	








problematic	 nature	 of	 firearm	 control	 in	 South	 Africa,	 Parliament,	 with	 the	
support	of	the	Safety	and	Security	Secretariat	and	the	SAPS,	initiated	an	overhaul	
of	firearm	legislation	in	the	late	1990s.	The	Firearms	Control	Act	(FCA)	(No.	60	of	
2000)	 was	 subsequently	 formulated	 by	 means	 of	 lengthy	 parliamentary	
deliberations	 and	 public	 consultations	 with	 relevant	 stakeholders.	 This	 Act	
eventually	 became	 fully	 operational	 in	 2004	 with	 the	 promulgation	 of	 its	
requisite	 regulations.	 The	 FCA	 was	 amended	 in	 2006,	 principally	 to	 address	
technical	deficiencies	and	administrative	oversights.	
	
The	 FCA	 included	 the	 introduction	 of	 more	 rigorous	 firearm	 licencing	
requirements,	such	as:	extensive	background	checks	of	applicants;	an	increase	in	
the	 legal	 minimum	 age	 to	 possess	 a	 firearm	 to	 21	 years;	 a	 reduction	 in	 the	
maximum	 number	 of	 licensed	 firearms	 and	 rounds	 of	 ammunition	 that	 an	
individual	may	possess;	 and	 the	 requirement	 that	 firearms	be	 stored	 in	 secure	
safes.	 Penalties	 for	 licensing	 infringements	 and	 firearm	 misuse	 also	 became	
more	stringent.	 In	addition,	all	 licence	applicants	were	required	 to	successfully	
complete	 a	 written	 test	 relating	 to	 firearm	 legislation,	 as	 well	 as	 undergo	





the	 police	 would	 only	 consider	 applications	 for	 firearm	 licences	 from	 “fit	 and	
proper”	 persons.	 In	 terms	 of	 the	 Act,	 such	 a	 person	 is	 required	 to	 meet	 the	
following	 criteria	 (amongst	 others):	 To	 be	 of	 a	 stable	 mental	 condition;	 not	
dependent	 on	 any	 substance	 which	 has	 an	 intoxicating	 or	 narcotic	 effect;	 not	
have	any	convictions	relating	to	the	negligent	handling	of	a	firearm	and	firearm-
related	crime;	not	have	any	convictions	relating	to	violence	or	sexual	abuse;	not	
having	 any	 convictions	 relating	 to	 alcohol	 and	 drug	 abuse;	 and	 not	 have	 been	
declared	unfit	to	possess	a	firearm	(Republic	of	South	Africa,	2001).	The	reforms	
also	 required	 that	 all	 existing	 firearms	 licensed	 under	 the	 previous	 Act	 be	 re-
																																																								




licensed,	 and	 that	 excess	 firearms	 be	 surrendered	 to	 the	 SAPS	 (South	 African	
Police	Service,	2000b).		
	
The	 racial	 discrimination	 that	 was	 a	 feature	 of	 both	 colonial	 and	 apartheid	
firearm	 control	 legislation	 was	 abandoned.	 However,	 many	 aspirant	 black	
firearm	 owners	 with	 lower	 incomes	 found	 the	 licensing	 requirements	
prohibitive	in	terms	of	licensing	costs,	and	many	did	not	meet	the	firearm	safety	
requirements	 of	 the	 FCA,	 and	 hence,	 according	 to	 the	 Black	 Gunowners	
Association	 of	 South	 Africa,	 numerous	 black	 applicants	 had	 their	 licence	
applications	rejected	(eNCA,	2015,	Molosankwe,	2015).	For	example,	those	that	




Likewise,	 the	 FCA	 introduced	 more	 rigorous	 controls	 in	 relation	 to	 those	
firearms	 held	 by	 official	 government	 institutions,	 such	 as	 the	 SAPS,	 the	
Metropolitan	Police,	the	SANDF,	the	Department	of	Correctional	Services,	and	the	
Department	 of	 Justice.	 A	 key	 provision	 was	 that	 government	 personnel	 could	
only	 carry	 an	 official	 state	 firearm	 if	 they	 were	 also	 “fit	 and	 proper”,	 and	 in	
possession	of	an	official	permit,	which	would	only	be	granted	if	the	government	
official	had	 successfully	 completed	 firearm	competency	 training	and	 testing.	 In	
addition,	 firearm	controls	were	 tightened	 in	 relation	 to	 firearm	manufacturers,	
dealers,	 gunsmiths,	 and	 private	 security	 companies.	 In	 this	 regard	 the	 Act	




“on	 reasonable	 grounds”	 and	 search	 for,	 and	 seize,	 firearms	 and	 ammunition	




firearms	 where	 there	 was	 “reasonable	 suspicion”	 that	 the	 firearms	 and	
ammunition	were	being	held	 in	contravention	of	 the	FCA;	or	 to	ascertain	 if	 the	




In	 an	 interview	 with	 Stan	 Joubert,	 the	 former	 National	 IFIU	 Commander,	 he	
indicated	 that	 the	 National	 IFIU	 was	 established	 in	 1993	 “to	 address	 the	
increasing	number	of	 illegal	 firearms	in	circulation”	(Joubert,	2015).	More	than	
thirty	 IFIUs	were	 subsequently	 established	 at	 the	 provincial	 level.	 These	 units	
were	 mainly	 staffed	 by	 personnel	 from	 the	 former	 Security	 Branch	 (Burger,	
2015c,	 Rauch,	 2004),	 but	 also	 drew	 personnel	 from	 the	 former	 Riot	 and	 the	
Murder	 and	 Robbery	 components	 (Joubert,	 2015).	 These	 units	 were	 located	





The	objectives	 of	 the	 IFIUs	were	 to	 effectively	 prevent	 and	 investigate	 firearm	
related	 crimes;	 as	 well	 as	 ensure	 the	 successful	 implementation	 of	 firearm	
related	legislation	(South	African	Police	Service,	NDb).	Members	of	the	Unit	also	
provided	 training	 to	 other	 SAPS	 components,	 the	 intelligence	 services,	 SANDF	
and	 police	 personnel	 from	 other	 Southern	 African	 countries	 in	 the	 handling,	
identification,	storage	and	tracing	of	firearms	(Joubert,	2001).	
	
These	 firearm	units	 pursued	operations	 that	 primarily	 entailed	 the	 “cordoning	
off	of	flash	point	areas	[high	crime	zones]	and	the	searching	thereof”,	as	well	as	
“sweep	and	clean-up	operations”,	 such	as	Operation	Cifat	 (South	African	Police	
Service,	 1997b:25-26).	 According	 to	 Stan	 Joubert,	 operations	 were	 based	 on	
intelligence	 generated	by	 the	 IFIU’s	 own	 informer	networks	 (Joubert,	ND)	 that	
were	 separate	 from	 SAPS	 Crime	 Intelligence.	 Firearm	 tracing	 and	 case	
monitoring	systems	were	also	 introduced	 to	determine	 the	origin	of	 recovered	
illegal	firearms,	as	well	as	link	illegal	firearm	cases	to	actual	illegal	firearms	and	
maximise	the	conviction	rate	(Joubert,	2001,	South	African	Police	Service,	NDb).	
However,	 intelligence	 on	 firearm	 smuggling	was	 not	 always	 forthcoming	 from	
















hostels	 in	 order	 to	 predominantly	 apprehend	migrants	 in	 possession	 of	 illegal	
firearms	 that	 were	 returning	 to	 their	 family	 homes	 for	 the	 festive	 season.	 In	
KwaZulu-Natal	IFIU	members	would	undertake	“camps”	in	which	they	would	be	
deployed	 in	 rural	 parts	 of	 the	 province	 in	 order	 to	 confiscate	 illegal	 firearms	
(Joubert,	2015).		
	
The	 IFIUs	 also	 conducted	 inspections,	 and	 supported	 the	 SAPS	 firearm	 control	
systems	 and	 activities,	 such	 as	 checking	 firearms	 and	 searching	 for	 illegal	
firearms	 at	 ports	 of	 entry.	 In	 2003,	 for	 example,	 the	 Unit	 also	 undertook	 an	
investigation	at	OR	Tambo	(Johannesburg)	International	Airport	and	reported	at	
the	time	that:	“the	procedures	and	handling	of	firearms	is	not	secure,	there	are	
no	 transit	 permits	 for	 firearms	 in	 transit,	 and	 the	 storage	 of	 firearms	 is	 not	
secure	enough”	(Joubert,	2003).	
	
The	 IFIUs,	 however,	 were	 reportedly	 undermined	 by	 the	 provincial	 SAPS	
management,	with	the	personnel	of	these	units	often	being	directed	to	attend	to	





exceedingly	 vulnerable	 within	 the	 SAPS	 bureaucracy	 at	 this	 time,	 as	 the	
restructuring	process	had	left	them	without	a	strong	institutional	mandate	and	a	








KwaZulu-Natal	 162	 Mpumalanga	 16	
Pinetown	 50	 Middleburg	 8	
Ladysmith	 7	 Ermelo	 2	
Tugela	Ferry	 16	 Nelspruit	 6	
Richards	Bay	 16	 Northern	province	 8	
Vryheid	 41	 Pietersburg	 8	
Port	Shepstone	 10	 Western	Cape	 10	
Pietermaritzburg	 16	 Parow-East	 10	
Jozini	 6	 Gauteng	 105	
Free	State	 26	 Soweto	 25	
Bloemfontein	 5	 Gen.	Johan	Coetzee	 15	
Welkom	 7	 Pretoria	 23	
Bethlehem	 7	 East	Rand	 15	
Qwa-Qwa	 7	 Vaal	Triangle	 27	
Northern	Cape	 8	 North	West	 21	
Kimberley	 8	 Potchefstroom	 4	
Eastern	Cape	 35	 Klerksdorp	 9	
Port	Elizabeth	 16	 Lichtenburg	 3	





The	 immediate	 evaluation	 and	 restructuring	 of	 existing	 units	 as	 well	 as	 the	
formation	 of	 new	 units	 in	 order	 to	 effectively	 address	 the	 problem	 of	 illegal	
firearms…extending	 existing	 and	 establishing	 new	 abilities	 to	 gather	
information	 and	 improve	 investigation…[and]	 improving	 liaison	 and	
coordination	(South	African	Police	Service,	1997a:	3-4).	
	
In	 addition,	 a	 “new	 or	 improved	 computer/network/database”	 was	 to	 be	
established	 (South	African	Police	 Service,	 1997a:11).	However,	 in	 an	 interview	
with	Martin	Naudé,	 he	 stated	 that	 this	 proposed	 expansion	 did	 not	 take	 place	
(Naudé,	 2015).	 In	 January	 2000,	 there	were	 34	 FIUs	 inexistence,	 but	 by	 early	
2006	all	 of	 these	units	had	been	 formally	disbanded	and	 the	personnel	 largely	






Visible	 Policing	 Division.	 The	 CFR	 has	 been	 responsible	 for	 administering	 and	






government	 institutions;	the	 import	and	export	of	 firearms;	as	well	as	 firearms	





level	of	 reported	dysfunctionality,	 and	 in	order	 for	 the	CFR	 to	more	effectively	
take	on	the	additional	roles	and	duties	 that	had	been	assigned	to	 it	by	the	FCA	
(South	African	Police	Service,	2000b).	Prior	to	this	restructuring	the	CFR	had	245	
employees	 with	 105	 vacant	 posts.	 Furthermore,	 it	 was	 reported	 that	 an	
investigation	 into	 the	 reliability	 of	 the	 CFR’s	 database	 indicated	 that	 the	 CFR	
database	was	“less	than	30%	accurate”	in	terms	of	licence	holders’	personal	data.	





The	 new	CFR	management	 team	made	 considerable	 progress	 in	 reforming	 the	
Firearm	Registry	and	implementing	many	of	the	new	measures	required	by	the	
FCA	 and	 the	 SAPS	 Firearm	 Strategy,	 such	 as	 the	 introduction	 of	 Designated	
Firearm	 Officers	 at	 the	 station-level,	 and	 the	 establishment	 of	 Firearm	
Registration	Centres.	However,	the	more	rigorous	civilian	licensing	process	was	
highly	 labour-intensive,	 particularly	 the	 background	 checks.	 Furthermore,	
holders	of	firearm	licences	issued	under	the	AAA	were	required	to	renew	these	
licences	with	the	CFR,	with	the	number	of	such	licences	running	into	the	millions	
(Gould,	 et	 al.,	 2004,	Mthembu-Salter	 and	 Lamb,	 2008).	 These	 dynamics	 placed	
considerable	 administrative	 strain	 on	 the	 staff	 of	 the	 CFR,	 and	 as	 a	 result	
licensing	decisions	often	took	an	inordinate	amount	of	time	to	finalise.	This	was	
compounded	 by	 the	 lack	 of	 a	 fully	 functional	 electronic	 Enhanced	 Firearm	




of	 licence	applicants	 for	 the	period	2000	 to	2010	was	 that	considerably	higher	
numbers	of	firearm	licence	applications	were	rejected	by	the	CFR	(especially	for	
handguns)	 compared	 to	 the	 pre-2000	 period	 (Potgieter,	 2011).	 Between	 1994	
and	1999	an	annual	average	of	194,000	 licence	applications	were	approved	by	
the	 CFR.	 For	 the	 years	 2000	 and	 2001,	 the	 annual	 average	 of	 approvals	
decreased	by	24	per	cent	to	146,500,	with	an	annual	average	of	107,203	licences	
being	approved	by	the	CFR	for	the	period	2000/2001	to	2003/2004.	By	2003	the	
number	of	 total	 licensed	 firearms	recorded	on	 the	SAPS	Firearms	Registry	had	
dropped	to	3.7	million	as	compared	to	4.5	million	in	1999	(Mthembu-Salter	and	
Lamb,	 2008).	 For	 the	 period	 2004/2005	 to	 2009/2010	 the	 annual	 average	 of	







In	 an	 attempt	 to	 reduce	 the	 number	 of	 civilian-held	 firearms	 that	 could	
potentially	 enter	 the	 illegal	market	 the	Minister	 responsible	 for	 SAPS	declared	
two	 national	 firearm	 amnesties,	 namely	 in	 2005	 and	 2010.	 The	 aim	 of	 these	
amnesties	was	to	encourage	civilian	firearm	owners	to	surrender	those	firearms	
to	 the	 SAPS	 that	 they	 either	 no	 longer	 wished	 to	 possess,	 or	 were	 in	 their	






recoveries	were	 also	 prioritised	 during	 high-density	 operations	 (which	will	 be	












processes	were	defective.	 In	1999	 the	Ministry	of	Safety	and	Security	 reported	
that	 between	 1990	 and	 1999	 some	 14,636	 police	 firearms	 had	 been	 lost	 or	
stolen,	 which	was	 an	 average	 of	 1,626	 per	 year	 (South	 African	 Police	 Service,	
2010a).	One	of	the	most	embarrassing	incidents	for	the	SAPS	was	in	1998	when	
























Chart	 7.4	 below	 provides	 a	 depiction	 of	 available	 annual	 data	 on	 the	 SAPS	




reported	 SAPS	 firearm	 losses	 and	 thefts	 between	 2005/2006	 and	 2009/2010	










An	examination	of	 the	SAPS	data	provided	 to	SAHA	revealed	a	 troubling	 trend,	
namely	 that	 the	 losses/thefts	 of	 SAPS	 service	 firearms	 were	 more	 prolific	 in	
policing	precincts	with	exceedingly	high	 rates	of	violent	 crime.	 In	addition,	 the	
SAPS	 had	 prioritised	many	 of	 these	 areas	 to	 receive	 additional	 resources	 and	
enhanced	 policing	 interventions	 through	 the	 Priority	 and	 Presidential33	police	










Soweto	 710	 Grahamstown	 74	
Mthatha	 528	 Thohoyandou	(Presidential)	 68	





























Pretoria	Central	(Priority)	 329	 Booysens	(Priority)	 63	
Moroka	(Priority)	 283	 Nongoma	 60	
Kwamhlanga	 274	 Rustenburg	(Priority)	 59	
Durban	Central	(Priority)	 197	 Kliptown	 57	
Nelspruit	(Priority)	 192	 Pietermaritzburg	(Priority)	 55	
Polokwane	(Priority)	 188	 Sebokeng	 55	
Alexandra	(Presidential)	 187	 Vanderbijlpark	(Priority)	 54	
Phokeng	 105	 Delft	 54	
King	William’s	Town	 132	 Queenstown	 53	




Mamelodi	(Priority)	 86	 East	London	(Priority)	 47	
Jeppe	(Priority)	 85	 Pinetown	(Priority)	 47	
Lebowakgomo	 83	 Daveyton	 46	
Inanda	(Presidential)	 80	 Umlazi	 42	
Kanyamazane	(Priority)	 80	 Witbank	(Priority)	 41	
Krugersdorp	(Priority)	 79	 Nyanga	 34	





stations	 where	 confiscated	 and	 surrendered	 firearms	 are	 kept.	 As	 of	 January	
2011	 there	were	188,848	 firearms	 in	SAPS	Section	13	stores	 (Auditor-General,	
2001),	which	was	equivalent	to	70%	of	 the	number	of	official	SAPS	firearms	at	
the	 time.	 The	 security,	 management	 and	 administration	 of	 these	 Section	 13	
stores	 has	 reportedly	 been	 inconsistent	 across	 police	 stations	 (Mawson,	 2004,	
South	 African	 Police	 Service,	 2011b),	 and	 consequently	 some	 firearms	 from	
these	 stockpiles	have	been	 stolen,	 and/or	 sold	onto	 criminals	by	 corrupt	 SAPS	
officials.	However,	 the	 response	 from	 the	Minister	of	Police	 to	a	parliamentary	
question	 about	missing	 firearms	 from	 police	 custody	 in	 2011	was	 a	 cause	 for	




requested	 information	 every	 police	 station	 will	 have	 to	 manually	 check	 its	 SAPS	 13	
stores	 registers.	 This	 information	 will	 also	 have	 to	 be	 verified	 for	 correctness	 and	
completeness.	 This	 process	 represents	 a	 significant	 administrative	 burden	 that	 may	
impact	 on	 SAPS	 service	 delivery.	When	 firearms	 have	 been	 reported	 as	 lost	 or	 stolen	






13	stores	has	only	been	available	 in	media	 reports,	 SAPS	statements	and	audit	
reports.	 The	 only	 exceptions	 were	 small	 qualitative	 studies	 commissioned	 by	
Gun	 Free	 South	 Africa	 that	 indicated	 that	 some	 SAPS	 Section	 13	 stores	 were	








store.	 He	 subsequently	 received	 a	 20	 year	 jail	 sentence	 (Mnisi,	 2010).	 A	 site	
inspection	 by	 the	 Parliamentary	 Portfolio	 Committee	 on	 Police	 in	 June	 2010	
suggested	 that	 poor	 management	 and	 administrative	 practices	 at	 the	 Inanda	
station,	 and	 a	 lack	 of	 effective	 oversight	 by	 the	KwaZulu-Natal	 firearm	 control	
structures,	 had	 contributed	 to	 conditions	 that	were	 conducive	 to	 firearm	 theft	
(Parliamentary	 Portfolio	 Committee	 on	 Police,	 2011).	 Similar	 incidents	 have	
reportedly	 taken	 place	 at	 police	 stations	 in	 Nelspruit	 (South	 African	 Press	







firearms,	 while	 others	 had	 previously	 been	 surrendered	 to	 the	 SAPS	 for	
destruction	 as	 part	 of	 a	 national	 firearm	 amnesty	 (South	 African	 Press	
Association,	2014)	at	the	Linden	Police	Station	(Hosken,	2014).	
	




allegedly	 sourced	 the	 firearms	 from	 a	 stockpile	 in	 the	 SAPS	 custody	 that	 had	
been	earmarked	for	destruction	(Baadjies,	2015).	Gang	members	then	allegedly	
used	 these	 firearms	 in	 at	 least	 three	murder	 cases.	 Prinsloo	was	 also	 charged	
with	 corruption,	 racketeering,	 murder,	 attempted	 murder,	 and	 money	
laundering	(Serrao,	2015).	
	
The	 SAPS	have	 had	 some	 limited	 successes	 in	 recovering	 lost	 and	 stolen	 SAPS	
firearms.	They	have	also	reportedly	implemented	measures	aimed	at	minimising	
loss	 and	 theft	 of	 service	 firearms,	 such	 as	 regular	 firearm	 inspections	 and	
stocktaking;	as	well	as	 the	 issuing	of	 safes	and	pistol	 retention	cords34	to	SAPS	
personnel	 to	 prevent	 snatching	 and	 loss	 during	 active	 duty	 (Eggington,	 2015).	
The	Minister	 of	 Police	 (Nathi	Mthethwa)	 also	 previously	 threatened	 to	 ensure	
that	 those	 SAPS	 members	 that	 lost	 their	 firearms	 would	 be	 “relieved	 of	 their	
duties”	 (South	 African	 Police	 Service,	 2014a).	 These	 developments	 appear	 to	
have	 possibly	 contributed	 to	 narrowing	 the	 gap	 between	 lost/stolen	 firearms	
and	recovered	firearms	since	2010	(see	Chart	7.5	below).	On	average,	between	


















concerns	 voiced	 publicly	 by	 firearms	 enthusiasts	 resulted	 in	 the	 Minister	 of	
Police	 instructing	 the	 Civilian	 Secretariat	 for	 Police	 to	 establish	 a	 task	 team	 in	
2010	to	scrutinise	the	working	methods	of	the	CFR	and	the	legislative	provisions	
that	 related	 to	 the	 firearm	 licensing	 process,	 and	 make	 recommendations	 to	
remedy	 these	 alleged	 shortcomings.	 The	 task	 team	 was	 mainly	 comprised	 of	
officials	 from	the	Civilian	Secretariat	 for	Police	and	pro-firearm	interest	groups	
(Jaynes,	 2013).	 Published	 summaries	 of	 the	 task	 team’s	 report	 asserted	 that	
there	 had	 been	 considerable	 inefficiencies,	 irregularities	 and	 poor	
communication	in	the	manner	in	which	the	CFR	had	administered	the	licensing	
processes.	The	abridged	version	of	 the	 task	 team	report	also	made	unspecified	
allegations	 of	 bribery	 and	 corruption	 against	 some	 CFR	 personnel	 (Mthethwa,	
2010a).		
	
A	 key	 recommendation	 of	 the	 task	 team	 report	 was	 for	 the	 CFR	 senior	
management	 team	 to	 be	 re-deployed,	 which	 was	 endorsed	 by	 the	 Minister	 of	
Police	 (Nathi	Mthethwa)	 at	 the	 time.	The	Minister	 subsequently	 instructed	 the	
SAPS	to	deploy	an	‘Intervention	Team’	to	take	charge	of	the	CFR	and	implement	a	




the	 task	 team’s	 report	 existing	 administrative	 challenges	 and	 dysfunctions	
within	 the	CFR	appeared	 to	 intensify	 (Bopape,	2014).	 In	addition,	 the	 licensing	
body	 became	 embroiled	 in	 a	 series	 of	 scandals	 in	 which	 CFR	 officials	 flouted	
control	 measures	 (see	 below)	 (Foster,	 2013).	 In	 response	 the	 South	 African	
Gunowners	 Association	 requested	 the	 Public	 Protector	 to	 intervene	 (Hood,	
2012),	 and	 Gun	 Free	 South	 Africa	 called	 for	 a	 moratorium	 on	 the	 issuing	 of	



















One	of	 the	most	prominent	public	scandals	 in	relation	to	 the	CFR	took	place	 in	
2013	 when	 the	 newly	 appointed	 head	 of	 the	 CFR,	 Brigadier	 Mathapelo	
Mangwani,	 was	 implicated	 in	 accepting	 bribes	 from	 the	 management	 of	 Dave	
Sheer	Guns,	a	large	firearm	dealer	in	Johannesburg,	in	order	to	facilitate	the	fast	
tracking	 of	 licence	 applications	 from	 this	 gun	 dealership	 (Serrao,	 2013).	










of	 firearm	licences	would	 be	 established,	 and	 that	 the	 CFR	 would	 strive	 to	
finalise	 such	 licences	 within	 90	 working	 days	 (Phiyega,	 2015,	 South	 African	
Police	 Service,	 2015b).	It	 was	 unclear	 at	 the	 time	 if	 the	 CFR	would	 be	 able	 to	
judiciously	 fulfil	 all	 the	 necessary	 background	 checks	 as	 required	 by	 the	 FCA	





he	 claimed	 that	 the	 closure	 of	 the	 IFIUs	 had	 adverse	 implications	 for	 the	





had	 been	 seized	 and	 recovered	 (South	 African	 Police	 Service,	 2015b).	 Hence,	
weaknesses	 in	 the	 firearm	 control	 systems,	 especially	 in	 terms	 of	 government	
stocks,	 could	 not	 be	 consistently	 detected.	 Furthermore,	 reliable	 information	





role	of	 the	Firearms	Control	Strategy	 to	 the	CFR	was	 that	 the	 leadership	of	 the	
Firearm	 Registry	 prioritised	 those	 aspects	 of	 the	 Firearms	 Strategy	 that	 were	
closely	 aligned	 with	 their	 mandate	 and	 expertise,	 namely	 FCA	 compliance,	
especially	 firearm	 licensing,	and	 the	auditing	of	government	and	private	sector	
firearm	 stockpiles.	 Dedicated	 firearm	 operations	 were	 allegedly	 deprioritised	
with	 operational	 leadership	 and	 expertise	 effectively	 “diminishing	 and	
disappearing”	 (Burger,	 2015b).	 At	 the	 station-level	 the	 focus	 of	 the	 Firearm	
Strategy	was	on	firearm	licensing	by	Designated	Firearms	Officers	(DFOs),	with	
the	 tracing	of	 illegal	 firearms	 and	 analyses	 of	 the	 illegal	 firearm	economy,	 and	
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Priority	 Crime	 Investigation	 (DPCI)	 initiated	 a	 process	 of	 re-establishing	 an	
illegal	firearm	investigation	entity	within	the	ranks	of	the	DPCI,	referred	to	as	the	
National	 Bureau	 for	 Illegal	 Firearm	 Control	 and	 Priority	 Violent	 Crime.	 The	
principal	 objective	 was	 reportedly	 to	 trace	 firearms	 used	 to	 commit	 violent	
crime	 back	 to	 their	 legal	 origins	 through	 conventional	 investigation	 and	
systematic	 analysis	 and	 forensic	 assessments	 (including	 ballistics,	 fingerprints	
and	DNA).	This	would	be	undertaken	with	a	view	to:	countering	firearm	violence	





The	 1996/97	 SAPS	 Plan	 (mentioned	 earlier	 in	 this	 chapter)	 was	 to	 be	 boldly	
implemented	by	means	of	a	large-scale	national	operation	with	the	martial	title	
of	 ‘Sword	 and	 Shield’.	 During	 this	 operation	 the	 SAPS	 reported	 that	 it	 would	
“take	 the	 offensive	 in	 hunting	 down	 criminals	 while	 concurrently	 trying	 to	
prevent	 crime	 by	 systematically	 reclaiming	 the	 streets	 and	 rural	 areas	 from	
criminals…”	 (South	 African	 Police	 Service,	 1997b:5).	 This	 operation	 was	 an	
overwhelming	demonstration	of	the	continuation	of	the	highly	aggressive	forms	
of	 boundary	 policing	 carried	 over	 from	 the	 apartheid	 period.	 Between	 1	 April	
1996	and	31	March	1997	some	157,432	sub-operations	in	conjunction	with	the	
SANDF	were	launched.	More	than	300,000	individuals	were	arrested,	and	more	
than	100	civilians	and	63	SAPS	personnel	died	 in	 the	 context	of	 this	operation	
(South	African	Police	Service,	1997b).	
	
In	 the	 immediate	 aftermath	 of	 Operation	 Sword	 and	 Shield	 (see	 Chapter	 8	 for	
details	 of	 this	 operation),	 the	 SAPS	 stated	 in	 its	 annual	 report	 that	 such	
operations	had	 “proved	 their	worth	 in	 crime	prevention”	 (South	African	Police	
Service,	1997b:4).	High-density	policing	was	subsequently	to	become	embedded	
within	 the	NCCS	 (South	 African	 Police	 Service,	 2002:6),	 and	 thereafter	 rapidly	
became	 the	 flagship	 policing	 approach	 for	 major	 crime	 hot	 spots,	 eclipsing	
alternative	crime	prevention	models	such	as	sector	policing.		
	
Such	 operations	 were	 planned	 by	 Crime	 Combatting	 Task	 Groups	 after	 which	
targeted	high	crime	areas	would	be	saturated	with	police	and	military	personal	
that	would	make	use	of	a	range	of	tactics,	including	roadblocks	and	cordon-and-
search	 methods.	 Operation	 Crackdown	 was	 to	 be	 the	 initial	 implementation	
vehicle	of	 the	NCCS	with	 the	objective	being	 to	 stabilise	145	policing	precincts	
that	 were	 experiencing	 high	 levels	 of	 reported	 priority	 crimes	 (South	 African	
Police	 Service,	 2002).	 Thereafter	 a	 multitude	 of	 national	 and	 provincial	







As	 this	 chapter	 has	 shown,	 notwithstanding	 the	 formal	 dissolution	 of	 the	
apartheid	requirements	for	the	police	to	enforce	geo-racial	restrictions	and	some	
democratic	 policing	 reforms,	 boundaries	 remained	 central	 to	 the	 SAPS’	 crime	
reduction	strategies	 in	post-apartheid	South	Africa.	Such	boundary	police	work	
was	driven	by:	persistently	elevated	levels	of	reported	crime	and	fear	of	crime;	a	





The	 SAPS	 adopted	 novel	 crime-fighting	 technology,	 such	 as	 the	 use	 of	 crime	
mapping	techniques,	to	identify	crime	hot	spots,	and	regularly	named	and	made	
pronouncements	 about	 the	 most	 troublesome	 policing	 spaces.	 The	 SAPS	
frequently	stated	that	these	communities	were	the	principal	procreation	sites	for	
serious	 and	 violent	 crime	 in	 South	 Africa	 with	 such	 areas	 being	 viewed	 as	
amongst	 the	most	 treacherous	places	 in	which	 the	police	operated.	 In	 terms	of	
policing	such	areas	the	SAPS	chiefly	sought	to	contain	and	combat	the	criminality	
therein	 through	 the	 dedicated	 and	 focused	 concentration	 of	 physical	 police	






Furthermore,	as	 firearms	were	permeating	 into	 these	danger	zones	 from	other	
parts	of	 South	Africa,	 the	SAPS	prioritised	 the	overhaul	of	 the	national	 firearm	




weapons	 stocks	were	 allegedly	 fuelling	 violent	 crime	 in	 South	 Africa.	 The	 SAP	
had	pursued	similar	penetrative	boundary	policing	during	the	apartheid	period,	
some	of	which	were	covert	and	illegal,	in	an	attempt	to	neutralise	threats	on	the	
other	 side	 of	 the	 boundary.	 As	 was	 the	 case	 with	 such	 interventions	 under	
apartheid,	 the	 Mozambican	 operations	 necessitated	 more	 innovative	 policing	
tactics	and	technology,	such	as	the	use	of	GIS.	
	
This	 re-emphasis	 of	 policing	 of	 boundaries	 was	 further	 sustained	 through	 the	
initial	requirement	that	SAPS	take	the	lead	responsibility	for	South	Africa’s	land	
borders	 given	 that	 military-type	 threats	 had	 dissipated	 and	 were	 replaced	 by	
new	threats	to	which	the	SAPS	were	supposedly	more	attuned.	Police	units	were	
subsequently	 created,	 such	 as	 the	 SAPS	 Border	 Police,	 to	 counter	 these	
transnational	 threats.	However,	as	was	 the	state	of	affairs	under	apartheid,	 the	
intensity	 of	 police	 work	 within	 South	 Africa	 in	 terms	 of	 containing	 and	







From	 the	 mid	 1990s	 the	 South	 African	 Police	 Service	 (SAPS)	 embarked	 on	 a	
series	 of	 large-scale,	 high-density	 operations	 in	 an	 attempt	 to	 diminish	 the	
excessively	high	 levels	of	violent	crime,	which	was	decidedly	concentrated	 in	a	
relatively	 small	 number	 of	 areas	 (as	 described	 in	 Chapter	 7).	 The	 principal	
motivation	 behind	 the	 adoption	 of	 this	 approach	 was	 that	 by	 concentrating	
police	 resources	on	 such	crime	hot	 spots	government	 “hoped	 that	 the	national	
level	of	serious	crime	w[ould]	be	reduced”	(Tshwete,	2000:28).		
	
Over	 the	past	 two	decades	high-density	operations	have	become	 the	preferred	
crime-fighting	 weapon	 of	 choice	 for	 the	 SAPS	 and	 its	 political	 overseers	 with	
respect	 to	 law	 enforcement	 and	 order	 maintenance	 in	 high	 crime	 areas.	 Such	
operations	 have	 constituted	 forceful	 attempts	 by	 the	 police	 to	 eradicate	 the	
threats	presented	to	the	South	African	state	and	society	by	high	crime	places	and	









As	 indicated	 in	 Chapter	 7,	 militarised	 forms	 of	 law	 enforcement	 in	 post-
apartheid	 South	 Africa	 have	 been	 perpetuated	 in	 relation	 to	 high	 crime	 areas,	
which	 are	 places	 that	 have	 generally	 been	 viewed	 as	 grave	 threats	 to	 the	
established	social	order.	This	 state	of	 affairs	 is	not	uncommon,	as	a	number	of	
scholars	have	shown	that	there	are	clear	connections	between	the	manifestation	
of	militarised	policing	and	threats	to	the	status	quo,	especially	in	North	America	
and	 Western	 Europe	 (Brodeur,	 2010,	 Jefferson,	 1990,	 Kraska	 and	 Kappeler,	
1997).	 Huggins	 (1998),	 for	 example,	 has	 associated	 the	 framing	 of	 domestic	
political	opposition	as	a	threat	to	socio-economic	stability	by	governments	to	the	
emergence	 of	 militarised	 forms	 of	 policing	 in	 a	 variety	 of	 Latin	 American	
settings.		
	
The	 most	 definitive	 aspect	 of	 militarised	 policing	 approaches	 in	 South	 Africa	
have	been	high-density	operations,	which	the	SAPS	has	defined	as	the	noticeable	






there	 has	 been	 excessive	 violence,	 have	 been	 in	 place	 for	 several	 days.	 In	 an	






As	 indicated	 in	 Chapter	 3,	 such	 operations	 have	 been	 based	 on	 a	 perceived	
pragmatism	 that	 criminal	 offending	will	 feasibly	 drop	 in	 circumstances	where	




levels,	 as	 they	 “offer	 the	promise	of	 firm,	 immediate	 action	and	quick,	decisive	
results”	(Scott,	2004).	
	
Dating	 back	 to	 World	 War	 I	 militaries	 have	 pursued	 a	 tradition	 of	 assigning	
evocative	codenames	to	specific	military	operations,	often	as	a	means	to	overtly	
communicate	fortitude	against	an	enemy	and	bolster	troop	morale;	or	to	deceive	




1995).	 The	 South	African	Defence	 Force	 adopted	 this	 custom	with	 enthusiasm	
during	 the	 ‘bush	war’	 in	 Angola	 and	 South	West	 Africa,	 as	well	 as	 in	 terms	 of	
counterinsurgency	 operations	 (Seegers,	 1996).	 The	 South	 African	 Police	








while	 at	 times	 helicopters	 have	 hovered	 overhead.	 Similar	 to	 the	 militarised	
township	 policing	 of	 the	 1980s	 and	 early	 1990s,	 the	 SAPS	 has	 entered	 and	





Residents,	 vehicles	 and	 premises	 have	 been	 searched,	 and	 at	 times	 doors	 to	
homes	have	been	rammed	open.	Illegal	firearms	and	ammunition,	drugs,	alcohol	
and	 stolen	 goods,	 including	 vehicles,	 have	 been	 seized.	 Those	 in	 possession	 of	









































In	 essence,	 these	 high-density	 dragnets	 have	 been	 grandiose	 meldings	 of	 a	
multitude	 of	 police	 entities.	 That	 is,	 rank-and-file	 police	 personnel	 that	 were	
generally	 responsible	 for	 day-to-day	 order	maintenance,	 as	well	 as	 detectives,	
have	been	deployed	alongside	specialised,	paramilitary	police	groupings,	such	as	
the	 Public	 Order	 Policing	 Units,	 Dog	 Units	 and	 the	 Special	 Task	 Force	 in	 the	
context	of	 a	martially	branded	operation.	 In	an	 interview	with	a	 former	 senior	
SAPS	official	the	analogy	of	a	rugby	team	was	used	to	illustrate	ideal	operational	
strategy	for	high-density	operations.	That	 is,	various	police	entities	would	have	





of	 the	 socio-political	 terrain	 of	 high	 crime	 spaces,	 where	 reliable	 crime	





to	 temporarily	 reclaim	 its	 authority	 in	 relation	 to	 law	 enforcement	 and	 order	
maintenance	in	such	places,	has	often	resorted	to	using	overwhelming	numbers	




state	 of	 affairs	 in	 his	 testimony	 to	 the	Khayelitsha	 Commission	 of	 Inquiry	 into	
police	inefficiency	as	follows:	
	
On	 a	 Saturday	 night	 if	 you	 go…to	 close	 a	 shebeen	 that	 is	 operating	 that	 has	 60-100	
people,	you	can’t	do	it	with	a	vehicle	and	two	members,	you	have	to	have	enough	people	
to	close	 that	 [illegal]	 shebeen…[as]	 they’re	going	 to	walk	all	over	you…So	 it’s	better	 to	
have	numbers	so	that	you	can	prevent	injuries	to	people.	People,	when	they	realise	that	
there’s	few	police	officials,	they	say,	we	can	take	a	chance	here,	and	we	end	up	using	live	






of	 high	 crime	 areas.	 That	 is,	 it	 has	 adopted	 community-oriented	 policing	
approaches	 within	 its	 high-density	 policing	 operations.	 The	 customary	
motivation	behind	such	dual	approach	is	what	scholars	in	the	US	have	cynically	
referred	to	as	‘the	iron	fist	inside	the	velvet	glove’,	in	which	community	policing	




In	 South	 Africa,	 however,	 the	 inclusion	 of	 community-oriented	 policing	within	
high-density	 operations	 appears	 not	 to	 have	 been	 about	 subterfuge,	 but	 have	
been	 perceived	 by	 the	 SAPS	 to	 be	 a	 legitimate	 ancillary	 strategy	 for	 reducing	
criminality	 through	 militaristic	 means.	 That	 is,	 the	 SAPS	 have	 regularly	
incorporated	 members	 of	 Community	 Policing	 Forum	 (CPF)	 structures	 and	
neighbourhood	 watch	 organisations	 into	 the	 implementation	 of	 many	 of	 its	
large-scale	operations,	with	 the	SAPS	at	 times	 regarding	 this	arrangement	as	a	
type	 of	 community	 policing.	 For	 example,	 Monique	 Marks,	 reflecting	 on	
ethnographic	 research	 undertaken	 in	 relation	 to	 SAPS	 roadblocks	 in	 Umlazi	
(KwaZulu-Natal)	 in	 the	 context	 of	 high-density	 operations,	 suggested	 that	 the	
police	 manning	 the	 roadblocks	 saw	 such	 actions	 as	 a	 clear	 indication	 that	 a	




It	 does	 appear	 that	 the	 SAPS	 has	 sincerely	 sought	 to	 build	 more	 constructive	
relations	 with	 residents	 in	 these	 communities	 through	 the	 allocation	 of	
additional	policing	resources	and	the	pursuance	of	community-oriented	policing	
approaches.	 However,	 over	 the	 past	 two	 decades	 this	 has	 been	 an	 unsteady,	
uneven	and	an	under-resourced	process,	given	the	frequent	disjuncture	between	
the	 day-to-day	 services	 that	 residents	 have	 expected	 from	 the	 SAPS,	 and	 the	
actual	capability	of	the	police	to	respond	to	calls	for	assistance,	reduce	criminal	
offending	and	 facilitate	 adequate	 justice	 for	 victims	 (Gastrow	and	Shaw,	2001)	
(Bradford,	 et	 al.,	 2014,	Bruce,	 et	 al.,	 2007).	Added	 to	 this,	 the	 establishment	of	
new	police	stations	in	violent	areas	has	rarely	been	accompanied	by	substantial	
and	 sustained	 improvements	 in	 service	 delivery	 by	 the	 police	 (Redpath	 and	
Nagla-Luddy,	2015).	Therefore,	there	have	often	been	strong	motivations	for	the	
SAPS	 to	 become	 overly	 reliant	 on	 high-density	 operations	 as	 a	 means	 of	 self-
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approach	 in	a	high	crime	area.	Since	 the	mid	1990s	Khayelitsha	has	 frequently	
been	 a	 site	 of	 militarised	 policing	 activities,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 recipient	 of	 two	
additional	 police	 stations	 (Dugmore,	 2003).	 However,	 the	 operational	
environment	 has	 been	 exceedingly	 complex	 (Freeman	 and	 McDonald,	 2015).	
CPFs	 are	 largely	 ineffective,	 and	 station-level	 police	 members	 have	 protested	
that	there	have	been	insufficient	police	for	this	sprawling	settlement,	which	they	
have	 viewed	 as	 being	 “rough	 and	 at	 times	 impenetrable”	 (van	 der	 Spuy	 and	
Armstrong,	2014:388).	The	report	of	the	Commission	of	Inquiry	into	policing	by	
the	SAPS	 in	Khayelitsha	(2014),	which	 is	an	unrivalled	scrutiny	of	policing	 in	a	
high	crime	area	 in	post-apartheid	South	Africa,	 found	that	despite	considerable	
infrastructural	police	 resources	being	allocated	 to	Khayelitsha,	more	 than	50%	
of	Khayelitsha	residents	were	highly	dissatisfied	with	the	service	offered	by	the	
SAPS,	 as	well	 the	police’s	work	 ethic	 and	 level	 of	 professionalism	 (Khayelitsha	
Commission	of	Inquiry	into	Allegations	of	Police	Inefficiency	in	Khayelitsha	and	a	






criminal	 threat	 framing	 and	 othering	 at	 senior	 government	 levels,	 which	 has	
been	 characterised	 by	 an	 explicit	 antipathy	 towards	 perceived	 criminality	 and	
criminals.	 This	 has	 contributed	 to	 the	 validation	 of	 militarised	 approaches	 to	
high-density	 policing,	 especially	 in	 neighbourhoods	 where	 excessive	 levels	 of	
deviance	 and	 violent	 law	 breaking	 have	 been	 concentrated.	 Some	 examples	 of	
this	 belligerent	 othering,	 as	 espoused	 by	 cabinet	 ministers	 responsible	 for	
policing	since	the	late	1990s,	are	selectively	replicated	below.	
	










In	 April	 2008,	 Susan	 Shabangu,	 the	 Deputy	 Minister	 of	 Safety	 and	 Security	
controversially	proclaimed	at	a	community	meeting	on	crime	in	Pretoria	West:		
	







In	 July	 the	 following	 year,	 Fikile	 Mbalula,	 Shabangu’s	 successor,	 announced	
during	 the	 SAPS	 budget	 vote	 in	 Parliament	 that	 there	would	 be	 a	 launch	 of	 a	
policing	operation	in	the	coming	months	titled	Operation	Wanya	Tsotsi,	which	he	
claimed	 was	 a	 “radical	 African	 expression	 and	 display	 of	 strength	 and	








Between	 2008	 and	 2014,	 Nathi	 Mthethwa,	 the	 Minister	 of	 Police,	 with	 the	
support	 of	 other	 cabinet	ministers	 and	 senior	 SAPS	 officials,	 frequently	 stated	
that	 “those	who	 commit	 crime	 have	 automatically	 declared	 themselves	 as	 our	
enemies”	(Mthethwa,	2012),	and	reiterated	that	“collectively,	we	shall	defeat	this	
scourge”	 (Murugan	 and	 SAnews,	 2012)	 by	 “closing	 the	 escape	 routes	 for	









as	 outcasts,	who	must	 neither	 have	 place	 in	 the	 society	 nor	 peace	 in	 their	 cells.	 They	
must	be	treated	as	cockroaches	(Sotyu,	2015).35	
	
Government	 has	 however	 repeatedly	 emphasised	 that	 police	 actions	 and	













“uproot	 the	 cancer	 of	 crime	 from	 our	 communities”	 (Mbalula,	 2009),	 but	 this	
should	 be	 “balanced…with	 the	 need	 to	 ensure	 our	 police	 embrace	 our	 human	
rights	 culture”	 (Mthethwa,	 2010d).	 However,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 note	 that	 the	
																																																								
35	A	Democratic	Alliance	Member	of	Parliament	submitted	a	written	question	to	the	Minister	of	















their	 criminal	 acts	 and	 place	 them	 behind	 bars	 for	 the	 rest	 of	 their	 lives.	 During	 this	
period	 we	 will	 not	 rest	 in	 our	 endeavours	 to	 make	 the	 province	 a	 safer	 place	 for	 all	






Law-abiding	 citizens	 have	 nothing	 to	 fear	 from	 our	 operations,	 which	 are	 targeted	 at	




police’s	 political	 leadership,	 particularly	 during	 the	 tenure	 of	 Nathi	Mthethwa,	
presented	these	operations	as	a	form	of	righteous	“crusade”	(Mthethwa,	2009a,	
Mthethwa,	2010b)	in	which	the	police	have	sought	to	“push	back	the	frontiers	of	
evil”	 (Mthethwa,	 2010c).	 Similar	 stances	 were	 also	 adopted	 at	 a	 few	 SAPS	
stations.	For	example,	Oswald	Reddy,	the	SAPS	commander	of	Hillbrow	precinct,	
and	an	influential	SAPS	official	in	Johannesburg,	unilaterally	launched	Operation	
Divine	 Intervention	 in	 this	 notorious	 crime-ridden	 inner-city	 slum	 to	 focus	 on	
the	“spiritual	dimension	of	crime”.	According	to	Reddy:	
	
Because	 in	 Ephesians	 6:12	 God	 says	 our	 struggle	 is	 not	 against	 flesh	 and	 blood,	 but	





Given	 that	 criminals	 had	 recurrently	 been	 labelled	 as	 ‘enemies’	 of	 the	 South	
African	 state	 and	 citizens,	 and	 it	 had	 been	 resolved	 that	 militaristic	 policing	
approaches	were	 required	 to	eliminate	 such	 foes,	 it	was	almost	 inevitable	 that	
the	approach	and	 content	of	high-density	operations	would	draw	heavily	 from	
counterinsurgency	 (COIN)	 doctrine,	 tactics	 and	 terminology.	 In	 an	 interview	
with	Johan	Burger,	a	retired	SAPS	Assistant	National	Commissioner,	a	catalyst	for	
the	use	of	COIN	approaches	was	that	the	architect	and	emphatic	champion	of	the	
National	 Crime	 Combatting	 Strategy	 (NCCS)	 (see	 Chapter	 7),	 André	 Pruis,	 the	
Deputy	National	 SAPS	Commissioner	 at	 the	 time,	 had	 previously	 served	 in	 the	
SADF	 where	 he	 had	 been	 schooled	 in	 COIN	 strategies	 (Burger,	 2015a).	 In	
addition,	the	SAPS	had	institutional	experience	in	pursuing	COIN	strategies	in	the	
former	 Rhodesia	 and	 South	 West	 Africa	 (see	 Chapter	 6).	 The	 use	 of	 COIN	
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philosophy	 in	 the	 design	 and	 implementation	 of	 post-apartheid	 high-density	
operations	has	been	evident	in	at	least	four	respects.		
	
Firstly,	 national	 operations	 have	 been	 centrally	 planned	 and	 directed,	
predominantly	by	the	SAPS	National	Joint	Operational	and	Intelligence	Structure	
(NATJOINTS),	which	has	been	responsible	 for	coordinating	all	security	and	 law	
enforcement	 operations	 throughout	 South	 Africa.	 Table	 8.2	 below	 provides	 a	
listing	of	the	2015	composition	of	the	NATJOINTS.	The	National	Joint	Operational	
Centre	 (NATJOC)	 has	 been	 responsible	 for	 driving	 the	 implementation	 of	 the	
















































and	 seize	 illegal	 weapons	 and	 other	 contraband.	 Cordon-and-search	 was	
originally	 pursued	 by	 colonial	 armed	 forces	 in	 order	 to	 pacify	 recalcitrant	
communities	 and	 capture	 suspected	 insurgents	 in	 Africa,	 South-East	 Asia	 and	
Northern	 Ireland	 (French,	 2012,	 Kilcullen,	 2006,	 Toft	 and	 Zhukov,	 2012).	 The	
South	 African	 Police	 also	 frequently	 employed	 such	 tactics	 under	 apartheid	
(Cawthra,	1993).		
	
Thirdly,	 the	COIN	concept	of	 ‘flood-and-flush’	 (Byman,	2006,	Mackinlay	and	Al-
Baddawy,	2008)	also	found	resonance	amongst	high-density	policing	strategists	
in	South	Africa.	That	 is,	 targeted	areas	have	been	 ‘flooded’	with	a	vast	 security	
force	presence	in	order	to	‘flush	out’	the	perpetrators	of	various	crimes	(Burger,	





Fourthly,	 the	 SAPS	 have	 at	 times	 referred	 to	 its	 high-density	 operational	
approach	as	an	‘oil	stain	strategy’	(South	African	Police	Service,	1998).	This	is	a	
French	 COIN	 pacification	 approach	 initially	 developed	 in	 Vietnam	 in	 the	 19th	
century.	 It	 posits	 that	 in	 order	 for	 a	 government	 to	 overcome	 an	 enemy	COIN	
efforts	 should	be	 concentrated	on	 securing	 and	developing	 strategic	 areas	 and	





namely	 Sword	 and	 Shield	 and	 Monozite,	 as	 well	 as	 a	 number	 of	 specialised	
provincial	 operations,	 most	 of	 which	were	 in	 KwaZulu-Natal	 and	 the	Western	
Cape.	 These	 operations	 were	 umbrella	 operational	 policing	 trademarks	 under	
which	a	series	of	smaller	high-density	policing	actions	were	pursued	in	a	variety	
of	high	crime	areas.	These	operations	were	often	undertaken	in	cooperation	with	
other	 governmental	 bodies,	 particularly	 the	 SANDF.	 In	 the	 context	 of	 a	 crime	
wave,	 these	 operations	 included	 familiar	 (apartheid	 era)	 forceful	 policing	
techniques,	 combined	 with	 a	 ‘broken	 windows’	 or	 ‘zero	 tolerance’	 policing	





As	 indicated	 in	 Chapter	 7	Operation	 Sword	 and	 Shield	was	 intended	 to	 be	 the	
central	 implementation	mechanism	 of	 the	 SAPS	 1996/97	 Plan.	 The	 name	was	
purposefully	symbolic,	with	the	‘Sword’	representing	the	police’s	aggressive	and	
targeted	 approach	 towards	 criminals,	 while	 the	 ‘Shield’	 was	 illustrative	 of	 the	
protection	 that	 the	 SAPS	 sought	 to	 provide	 to	 those	 who	 adhered	 to	 the	 law	
(Burger,	2007a).		
	
This	national	operation	was	 comprised	of	 a	 variety	of	 individually	named	 sub-
operations,	 such	 as	 Urban	 Strike,	 Omega	 and	 Gladiators	 (South	 African	 Police	
Service,	 1997b),	 which	 focused	 on	 areas	 where	 priority	 crimes	 were	
concentrated,	and	on	the	apprehension	of	10,000	of	the	‘most	wanted	criminals’.	
In	 KwaZulu-Natal,	 for	 example,	 a	 sub-operation	 titled	 Operation	 Jambo	 was	
launched	within	the	context	of	Sword	and	Shield	in	an	attempt	to	contain	party-
political	 murders	 in	 various	 areas	 in	 the	 run-up	 to	 the	 local	 government	
elections.	 These	 sub-operations	 were	 implemented	 in	 conjunction	 with	 the	
deployment	 of	 approximately	 47,000	 SANDF	 personnel	 (South	 African	 Police	
Service,	 1997b).	 In	 a	 number	 of	 such	 volatile	 areas	 in	 KwaZulu-Natal,	 such	 as	




157,432	 sub-operations	 and	 27,382	 roadblocks.	 Some	 13,893	 illegal	 firearms	




and	 1,164	 for	 serious	 robbery).	 As	 the	 Table	 8.3	 below	 indicates	 Operation	
Sword	 and	 Shield	 appears	 to	 have	 been	more	 concentrated	 in	 the	North	West	























violation	of	 bail	 conditions.	The	operation	 also	 focused	on	 illegal	 drug	dealing,	
illegal	drug	possession	and	illegal	immigrants	(Dlamini,	1999).		
	
As	 with	 Sword	 and	 Shield,	 Monozite	 made	 extensive	 use	 of	 flood-and-flush	
policing	tactics	(Burger,	2007a).	Its	chief	objective	was	“to	stabilise	the	affected	
areas,	 and	 to	 ensure	 a	 greater	 feeling	 of	 safety	 and	 security	 amongst	 the	
communities”	 (Government	Communication	and	Information	System,	2006:35).	
According	 to	 the	SAPS	Divisional	Commissioner	at	 the	 time,	André	Pruis:	 “Law	
enforcers	would	try	to	stabilise	such	areas,	creating	a	suitable	environment	 for	







search	actions	 in	 targeted	areas	 throughout	South	Africa.	 In	addition,	a	 total	of	
183,496	vehicles	and	21,644	premises	were	searched.	In	the	first	two	months	of	
the	 operation	 58,413	 suspected	 criminals	 were	 arrested	 and	 2,482	 illegal	
firearms	 were	 recovered	 (Zuma,	 2000).	 In	 the	 same	 year,	 the	 Premier	 of	
Mpumalanga	 province	 claimed	 that	 the	 work	 of	 Operation	 Monozite	 in	 his	
province	had	resulted	in	approximately	12,000	arrests	(which	included	in	excess	






Three	 prominent	 high-density,	 intelligence-driven	 SAPS	 operations	 were	
implemented	 in	 the	Western	 Cape	 between	 October	 1997	 and	March	 2000	 in	
cooperation	 with	 the	 SANDF.	 These	 province-specific	 interventions	 were	
essentially	due	to	this	province	not	being	a	major	focus	of	Operation	Sword	and	
Shield.	 In	 addition,	 there	 had	 been	 an	 intensification	 of	 gang	 violence;	 conflict	
between	 gangs	 and	 a	 prominent	 vigilante	 movement,	 the	 People	 Against	
Gangsterism	 and	 Drugs	 (PAGAD);	 and	 acts	 of	 urban	 terrorism	 perpetrated	 by	
individuals	 aligned	 with	 PAGAD.	 The	 three	 operations	 in	 question	 were:	
Operation	 Recoil	 (October	 1997	 –	 January	 1999);	 Operation	 Saladin	 (January	
1998	–	January	1999);	and	Operation	Good	Hope	(January	1999	–	March	2000).	
	
As	 a	 consequence	 of	 these	 Western	 Cape	 operations	 the	 SAPS	 reported	 that	
between	October	 1997	 and	 January	1998	 there	were	 3,769	 arrests	 for	 serious	
crime,	 of	 which:	 175	 were	 for	 murder;	 269	 for	 robbery;	 and	 181	 for	 illegal	
possession	of	 firearms.	Operation	Good	Hope	resulted	 in	4,014	arrests	and	 the	
recovery	 of	 489	 firearms	 and	 5,803	 rounds	 of	 ammunition	 (Boshoff,	 2001).	
There	were	 numerous	 complaints	 by	members	 of	 the	 public	 about	 the	 alleged	
excessive	 use	 of	 force	 by	 SAPS,	 which	 was	 possibly	 reflected	 in	 the	 annual	
statistics	 published	 by	 the	 SAPS	 watchdog,	 the	 Independent	 Complaints	











the	 perpetration	 of	 mass	 shootings	 and	 assassinations.	 In	 some	 areas	 the	
instigators	 of	 political	 violence	 transitioned	 into	 becoming	 perpetrators	 of	
violent	criminality,	particularly	in	the	minibus	taxi	 industry	(Kaarsholm,	2005).	





high-density	 operations	 in	 these	 areas,	 such	 as	 Operation	 Pax	 (1998)	 in	
Richmond;	 and	 Operation	 Ventilation	 (1999)	 in	 KwaMashu	 and	 Inanda	
(Nebandla,	2005a,	Nebandla,	2005b).	 In	 terms	of	Operation	Ventilation,	a	SAPS	
spokesperson	at	the	time	stated	that	the	main	objective	of	the	operation	was	“to	
arrest	 wanted	 criminals	 and	 bring	 normality	 to	 the	 area”	 (Green,	 1999).	
Furthermore,	 the	 National	 Minister	 of	 Safety	 and	 Security	 appointed	 a	 new	
Station	 Commissioner	 in	 KwaMashu	 (from	 outside	 of	 the	 area)	 due	 to	
																																																								









Operation	Crackdown	was	 officially	 launched	on	1	April	 2000	 and	became	 the	
primary	 implementation	 mechanism	 for	 the	 NCCS.	 It	 was	 a	 three-year	
nationwide	operation	that	sought	to	stabilise	what	was	perceived	to	be	rampant	
criminality	 in	 South	 Africa,	 as	well	 as	 improve	 public	 confidence	 in	 the	 police	







and	 intelligence	 resources	were	 to	 be	 shared	 between	 policing	 agencies	 in	 an	
integrated	manner	(South	African	Police	Service,	2001b).	At	the	provincial	level	
police	authorities	were	instructed	to	implement	sub-operations	in	crime	hot	spot	
areas	 (South	 African	 Police	 Service,	 2005c).	 In	 addition,	 in	 an	 interview	 with	
Alice	Pienaar-Marais,	who	had	been	a	key	SAPS	official	in	the	implementation	of	
high-density	operations	from	the	early	2000s,	the	‘broken	windows’	approach	to	







Generally	 Operation	 Crackdown	 focused	 on	 the	 169	 high	 crime	 areas,	 but	 the	
SAPS	and	the	SANDF	did	undertake	sub-operations	in	additional	police	precincts,	
such	 as	 Alberton,	 Brakpan,	 Boksburg,	 Springs,	 Primrose,	 Germiston,	 Atlantis,	
Strand,	 Philippi	 East,	 Somerset	West	 and	Woodstock	 (to	name	but	 a	 few).	 The	














For	 operational	 purposes	 these	 station	 areas	 were	 grouped	 into	 76	 Crime	
Combatting	Zones,	with	each	Zone	having	 its	own	dedicated	Crime	Combatting	
Task	 Group	 (CCTG)	 led	 by	 a	 SAPS	 commander	 (South	 African	 Police	 Service,	
2000a,	South	African	Police	Service,	2002).	Each	CCTG	was	comprised	of	officials	
from	the	SAPS,	the	SANDF	and	the	Metro	Police.	From	within	the	SAPS	a	variety	





encouraged,	 and	 CPFs	 were	 incorporated	 into	 sub-operations	 where	
appropriate.	 Organised	 Crime	 Task	 Teams	 were	 also	 established	 to	 tackle	
criminal	syndicates.	According	to	SAPS	reports,	personnel	from	a	range	of	other	






For	 the	 first	 12	 months	 (1	 April	 2000	 to	 31	 March	 2001)	 of	 Operation	
Crackdown	 485,551	 arrests	 were	made	 by	 the	 police,	 of	 which	 176,235	 were	
related	 to	 serious	 crimes.	 In	 addition,	 20,580	 firearms	 were	 collected	
(Government	Communication	and	Information	System,	2002).	The	high	number	
of	arrests	continued	throughout	the	remainder	of	2001	and	into	the	first	quarter	
of	 2002,	with	 524,419	 arrests	 being	made	 by	 the	 SAPS	 between	 January	 2001	




The	 Operation	 Crackdown	 intervention	 in	 Hillbrow	 in	 2000,	 for	 example,	 as	
outlined	in	a	report	by	the	Institute	for	Security	Studies	(ISS),	was	in	place	for	a	
week,	 and	 entailed	 the	 deployment	 of	 884	 SAPS	 and	 240	 SANDF	 personnel.	 It	




1,606	 loose	 rounds	 of	 ammunition	 and	 more	 than	 70kg	 of	 illegal	 drugs	 were	
seized	(Pelser,	2000).	
	
A	 sub-operation	 of	 Operation	 Crackdown	 was	 initiated	 in	 August	 2000	 in	
Khayelitsha	 following	 intense	 violence	 in	 the	 public	 transport	 sector	 in	 this	
township.	 The	 SAPS	 and	 the	 SANDF	 blockaded	 Khayelitsha	 for	 24	 hours,	 and	
prevented	buses	and	minibus	taxis	from	entering	the	township.	Scores	of	armed	
security	 force	 personnel	 undertook	 patrols	 with	 the	 support	 of	 armoured	
personnel	 carriers	 and	 helicopters.	 At	 the	 time,	 Col.	 Piet	 Paxton,	 a	 SANDF	




warfare”.	 Similarly,	Ryan	Coetzee,	 adviser	 to	MEC	 for	Community	 Safety	 in	 the	
Western	 Cape	 stated	 that:	 “We	 [Western	 Cape	 Provincial	 Government]	 are	
prepared	 to	 do	 anything	 and	 everything	 to	 win	 the	 war	 against	 criminals”	
(News24,	2000).	
	
In	 a	 number	 of	 high	 crime	 informal	 settlements	 in	 close	 proximity	 to	 the	








Operation	 Crackdown	 was	 not	 without	 its	 controversies.	 For	 example,	 in	 July	
2000	an	ANC	Member	of	Parliament,	Bheki	Mkhize	was	fatally	shot	by	police	in	
Mahlabathini	 (KwaZulu-Natal)	 during	 an	 alleged	 Operation	 Crackdown	 sub-
operation.	Three	members	of	 the	SAPS’	Ulundi	Public	Order	Policing	Unit	were	
arrested	 and	 charged	 with	 Mkhize’s	 murder	 (South	 African	 Press	 Association,	
2000a).	A	subsequent	investigation	by	the	ICD	found	that	the	SAPS	personnel	in	
question	did	not	have	a	search	warrant	to	enter	the	premises	and	had	sought	to	
plant	 firearms	on	 the	 scene	after	 the	 shooting	 in	 an	attempt	 to	 justify	 the	 raid	
and	 their	 lethal	use	of	 force	 (Independent	Complaints	Directorate,	2001,	South	
African	 Press	 Association,	 2000b).	 One	 of	 the	 accused,	 Sergeant	 SP	 Buthelezi,	
was	 found	 guilty	 of	 Mkhize’s	 murder	 by	 the	 Pietermaritzburg	 High	 Court	 in	
September	2001	(South	African	Press	Association,	2001).	
	
By	 early	 2002	 SAPS	 strategists	 feared	 that	 Operation	 Crackdown	 was	 losing	
momentum	 and	 therefore	 rebranded	 it	 as	 Operation	 Tsipa	 (Sesotho	 word	
meaning	‘to	pinch’)	(Burger,	2015a).	Tsipa	was	in	place	from	early	January	until	
mid	March	2002,	and	sought	 to	provide	additional	operational	 interventions	 in	
close	to	50	police	station	areas	(that	were	part	of	the	focal	stations	for	Operation	
Crackdown),	which	were	 yet	 to	 experience	 a	 stabilisation	 of	 crime	 levels.	 This	





Lancer	 and	 Tshwane.	 Operation	 Slasher	 was	 launched	 in	 March	 2001	 and	
focused	specifically	on	gangs,	and	gang-related	crime	in	the	Western	Cape.	These	
operations	 predominantly	 targeted	 the	 residential	 areas	 of	 Mitchells	 Plain,	
















police	 on	 how	 to	 evaluate	 the	 successes	 of	 Operation	 Crackdown.	 National	
Commissioner	Selebi	reportedly	appraised	its	successes	in	terms	of	the	numbers	
of	 policing	 actions,	 such	 as	 roadblocks,	 search-and-seizure	 interventions	 and	
arrests.	In	an	interview	with	Johan	Burger	he	suggested	that	a	number	of	senior	
SAPS	operational	officers,	conversely	advocated	for	an	assessment	that	reflected	
the	 impact	 that	 policing	 actions	 had	 had	 on	 crime	 levels	 (Burger,	 2015a).	
Nonetheless,	 public	 comments	 about	 Operation	 Crackdown	 by	 government	
representatives	 made	 reference	 to	 both	 policing	 actions	 and	 their	 short-term	
crime	reduction	impact.	
	
For	example,	 in	his	Budget	Speech	to	Parliament	 in	June	2000,	 Jacob	Zuma,	the	
Deputy	 President	 of	 South	 Africa	 proudly	 declared	 Operation	 Crackdown	 “a	
major	success	in	our	fight	against	crime,	resulting	in	the	arrest	of	a	considerable	
number	of	suspects	for	serious	crimes	and	the	recovery	of	a	significant	amount	
of	stolen	property,	drugs	and	 illegal	 firearms”.	Zuma	further	 indicated	that	 this	
operation	 had	 been	 “a	major	 improvement	 in	 the	 operational	 efficiency	 of	 our	
integrated	and	 coordinated	approach	 [compared	 to	Monozite]”…[and]	we	have	
improved	 both	 in	 our	 tactics	 and	 in	 the	 number	 of	 arrests	 and	 property	
recovered”	 (Zuma,	 2000).	 In	 the	 North	West	 province,	 the	 SAPS	 stated	 that	 a	
48%	 reduction	 in	 crime	 had	 been	 achieved	 in	 Mafikeng	 (South	 African	 Press	





African	 History	 Archive	 at	 the	 University	 of	 the	 Witwatersrand	 for	
documentation	 on	 Operation	 Crackdown,	 the	 SAPS	 indicated	 that	 the	
documentation	could	not	be	located	(Allan,	2009).	It	is	entirely	conceivable	that	
no	such	reports	were	actually	placed	within	the	general	SAPS	filing	system	as	the	
operational	 leadership	 kept	 tight	 control	 over	 the	 data	 that	 was	 used	 to	
determine	 the	 successes	 of	 Operation	 Crackdown.	 In	 an	 interview	 with	 Johan	
Burger	 he	 suggested	 that	 there	 were	 also	 suspicions	 at	 the	 time	 that	 the	
outcomes	 of	 day-to-day	 policing	 were	 incorporated	 into	 the	 Operation	









operations	 like	 Sword	 and	 Shield,	 Monozite	 and	 Crackdown.	 The	 explicit	
objective	 of	 Sethunya	was	 to	 “trace	 illegal	 firearms	 and	 to	 check	 legal	 firearm	
owners’	 compliance	 with	 the	 legislation”	 (Meek	 and	 Stott,	 2004b:27),	
particularly	high	risk	individuals	that	had	lost	or	had	had	their	firearms	stolen	on	
numerous	 occasions,	 as	well	 as	 those	 in	 possession	 of	more	 than	 five	 licensed	
firearms.	 Sethunya’s	 operational	 techniques	 were	 nonetheless	 similar	 to	
previous	 operations,	 such	 as	 the	 use	 of	 roadblocks	 and	 cordon-and-search	
actions,	 with	 a	 focus	 on	 high	 crime	 areas.	 A	 ‘normalisation	 phase’	 was	
implemented	 from	 1	 October	 2003	 to	 30	 March	 2004	 in	 which	 station	
commissioners	were	encouraged	to	pursue	firearm-specific	operations	as	part	of	




Operation	 Sethunya	 was	 pursued	 as	 a	 shoo	 in	 for	 the	 official	 rollout	 of	 the	
Firearms	Control	Act	(FCA)	(No.	60	of	2000).	That	is,	the	police	sought	to	gather	
and	 seize	 as	 many	 unlicensed37	and	 illegal	 firearms	 as	 possible,	 as	 well	 as	
demonstrate	 to	 the	 public	 that	 the	 SAPS	 was	 firmly	 committed	 to	 strictly	
enforcing	the	provisions	of	the	new	firearm	control	legislation	(Meek	and	Stott,	
2004b).	 According	 to	 an	 interview	with	 a	 former	 senior	 SAPS	 firearm	 control	
official	 (name	withheld),	 he	disclosed	 that	 it	was	during	 the	planning	phase	of	
Operation	Sethunya	that	it	was	resolved	that	in	order	for	the	FCA	to	be	effective	
the	 police	 had	 to	 generate	 a	 “fear	 factor”	 in	 order	 to	 demonstrate	 to	 those	 in	
possession	 of	 unlicensed	 and	 illegal	 firearms	 that	 the	 SAPS	 “meant	 business”,	
and	would	take	firm	action	against	transgressors	(Anonymous,	2015).		
	
Operation	 Sethunya	 also	 judiciously	 probed	 the	 internal	 SAPS	 firearm	 control	
measures,	especially:	the	management38	and	proper	disposal	of	Section	13	stores	
at	station-level;	the	processing	of	declarations	of	unfitness	to	possess	a	firearm;	
and	 the	 sharing	 of	 information	 within	 the	 SAPS	 regarding	 lost	 and	 stolen	
firearms.	 Firearm	dealers,	manufacturers	 and	private	 security	 companies	were	
to	be	scrutinised	by	the	SAPS	to	ensure	compliance	with	the	relevant	legislation	
(Gould,	et	al.,	2004,	South	African	Police	Service,	2004).	To	accommodate	these	
various	 activities,	 and	 facilitate	 more	 accurate	 reporting,	 an	 electronic	
Operational	 Planning	 and	 Monitoring	 (OPAM)	 system	 was	 developed.	 In	
interviews	 with	 Alice	 Pienaar-Marais	 and	 Col	 Johan	 A	 P	 Burger	 they	 both	
indicated	 that	 OPAM	 was	 subsequently	 used	 as	 the	 principal	 electronic	




sub-operations	 in	 some	 high	 crime	 areas	 being	 almost	 a	 daily	 occurrence.	
Shebeens	 were	 a	 focal	 point,	 with	 shebeen	 owners	 often	 being	 compelled	 by	










Alice	Pienaar-Marais	 she	 indicated	 that	often	 firearms	would	 remain	behind	 in	
such	 containers	 after	 the	 shebeen	 had	 closed	 for	 the	 night	 (Pienaar-Marais,	
2015).	 In	 the	 Sebokeng/Orange	 Farm	 area,	 for	 example,	 Pienaar-Marais	 stated	
that	 shebeen	 owners	 often	 required	 patrons	 to	 deposit	 their	 firearms	 into	 a	
container,	 such	 as	 a	 box	 or	 chest	 freezer,	 as	 a	 precondition	 for	 entering	 their	
premises.	 At	 one	 point	 the	 SAPS	was	 confiscating	 between	 100	 and	 150	 such	
discarded	firearms	every	weekend	in	this	area	(Pienaar-Marais,	2015).	
	
According	 to	 Pienaar-Marais,	 the	 roadblocks	 under	 the	 auspices	 of	 Operation	
Sethunya	were	often	mobile	 in	that	the	operational	teams	varied	the	roadblock	
locations	 to	 create	 a	 greater	 sense	 of	 visibility	 throughout	 the	 focal	 areas,	 and	
“box-in”	 the	 targeted	 areas	 (Pienaar-Marais,	 2015).	 Minibus	 taxis	 were	 prime	
targets	 during	 these	 roadblocks,	 and	 when	 minibus	 taxis	 were	 stopped	 at	
roadblocks	and	the	occupants	were	informed	by	the	SAPS	officials	that	they	were	
searching	 for	 firearms	 the	police	members	on	 the	 scene	would	at	 times	hear	a	
quick	 succession	 of	 thudding	 sounds.	 After	 the	 occupants	 had	 alighted	 the	
vehicle	 police	would	 then	 often	 find	 firearms	 on	 the	 floor	 of	 the	 taxi.	 On	 such	
occasions	 the	 SAPS	 did	 not	 have	 the	 necessary	 technology	 and	 fingerprint	
information	 to	 link	 the	discarded	 firearms	 to	 the	various	occupants,	and	hence	
no	 charges	 were	 laid.	 The	 police	 nonetheless	 seized	 the	 abandoned	 firearms	
(Pienaar-Marais,	2015).		
	
Furthermore,	 the	 SAPS	 devised	 custom	 built	 sub-operations	 that	 focused	 on	
specific	 persons	 of	 interest.	 That	 is,	 such	 policing	 actions	 were	 based	 on	
information	 provided	 by	 SAPS	 Crime	 Intelligence	 concerning	 individuals	 or	
entities	in	possession	of	large	quantities	of	potentially	illegal	firearms,	as	well	as	
data	 gleaned	 from	 the	 Central	 Firearms	 Registry	 database	 concerning	 persons	
who	 had	 either	 lost	 or	 had	 had	 their	 firearms	 stolen	 on	 multiple	 occasions	
(Hlongwa,	2004,	Pienaar-Marais,	2015).	For	example,	one	case	in	2004	entailed	
alleged	 gun-running	 between	 Lesotho	 and	 South	 Africa,	 with	 the	 individuals	





London)	 led	 to	more	 than	3,880	 illegal	 firearms	being	seized	and	4,161	people	
being	arrested	in	connection	to	these	firearms	(News24,	2003).	An	added	feature	




For	 the	 SAPS,	 Operation	 Sethunya	 exposed	 serious	 inadequacies	 in	 the	
administration	 of	 the	 civilian	 firearm	 licensing,	 and	 a	 high	 level	 of	 negligence	
amongst	firearms	owners	in	terms	of	reporting	firearm	loss/theft,	as	well	as	re-











The	 SAPS	 publicly	 claimed	 that	 Operation	 Sethunya	 had	 led	 to	 significant	
reductions	 in	 a	 number	 of	 violent	 crime	 categories	 (Pretorius,	 2003,	 South	
African	 Press	 Association,	 2003a).	 For	 example,	 according	 to	 Charles	 Nqakula,	
the	Minister	of	Safety	and	Security,	Operation	Sethunya	resulted	in	the	decrease	










Firearms	seized	 13,859	 12,116	 25,975	










which	 focused	 on	 arresting	 repeat	 offenders,	 and	 those	 wanted	 for	 serious	
violent	 crimes,	 such	 as	 murder,	 attempted	 murder,	 rape,	 robbery	 with	
aggravating	 circumstances	 and	 vehicle	 hijacking.	 Dedicated	 police	 teams	were	
established	 to	 trace	 and	 apprehend	 such	 ‘wanted’	 persons.	 This	 operational	
strategy	 became	 a	 key	 feature	 of	 high-density	 operations	 from	 that	 point	
onwards.	 For	 example,	 during	 2008/09,	 tracing	 teams	 arrested	 some	 39,697	




had	 taken	place	 before,	 but	 in	 a	more	 ad	 hoc	manner.	 For	 example,	Operation	
101	Dalmatians	was	established	in	the	2000/01	reporting	year	with	the	aim	of	
arresting	 approximately	 1,500	 of	 the	 most	 ‘wanted’	 persons	 for	 serious	 and	




operations.	For	 instance,	 in	2014	 the	SAPS	established	Operation	Tornado	as	a	
national	intelligence-driven	operation	to	be	in	place	until	the	end	of	March	2016.	
The	 intention	 of	 this	 operation	 was	 reportedly	 to	 coordinate	 policing	 efforts	
through	‘Provincial	War	Rooms’	in	order	to	track	down	‘wanted’	persons,	as	well	
as	 gather	 the	 necessary	 evidence	 and	 link	 the	 relevant	 criminal	 cases	 to	 these	
individuals	 (South	African	Police	Service,	2015d).	Two	of	 the	 focal	crimes	have	










at	 the	provincial	 level,	with	Gauteng	 and	 the	Western	Cape	 receiving	 the	most	
attention.	The	focus	of	these	operations	was	high	profile	violent	crimes,	such	as	






until	31	December	2006	 that	 focused	on	numerous	high	crime	station	areas	 in	
Gauteng.	 It	was	extended	 in	February	2007	as	Operation	 Iron	Fist	 II.	A	unique	
development	was	 the	key	 involvement	of	 the	Gauteng	Provincial	Government’s	
Department	of	Community	Safety,	which	was	publicly	presented	as	the	principal	
driver	of	the	operation.	Approximately	3,000	police	officers	were	dispatched	to	
the	 focal	police	 stations	with	CPFs	being	drawn	 in	 to	assist	where	appropriate	
(Cachalia,	2007).		
	
The	 following	 police	 actions	 took	 place	 during	 Operation	 Iron	 Fist:	 93,757	
vehicle	 patrols;	 698,555	 vehicle	 searches;	 1,705,235	 person	 searches;	 10,727	
roadblocks;	and	4,416	suspect	raids.	This	operation	resulted	in	218,572	arrests	
for	 all	 offences	 (of	which	80,729	were	 for	 serious	 crimes)	 and	 the	 recovery	 of	
8,324	 firearms	 (Cachalia,	 2007).	 In	 addition,	 it	 was	 reported	 by	 the	 Gauteng	
Member	 of	 the	 Executive	 Council	 (MEC)	 for	 Community	 Safety,	 Firoz	 Cachalia,	




Operation	Trio,	which	was	 implemented	 in	parallel	with	Operation	 Iron	Fist	 II,	
focused	on	‘trio	crimes’	(carjacking,	house	robberies	and	business	robberies)	in	
21	policing	clusters	where	levels	of	these	crimes	had	escalated,	and	was	also	led	
by	 the	 Gauteng	 Provincial	 Government’s	 Department	 Community	 Safety.	 After	
four	months	133	 suspects	 had	been	 arrested	 (Gauteng	Provincial	Government,	
2009,	 Mvoko,	 2007).	 Between	 July	 to	 December	 2007	 the	 following	 policing	
actions	 were	 undertaken:	 7,055	 roadblocks;	 5,315	 cordon-and-search	 actions;	




of	 townships,	 established	 a	 similar	 operation	 with	 the	 same	 name,	 but	 with	 more	 draconian	







Operation	 Big	 Wave	 was	 established	 in	 2011	 with	 a	 distinctive	 focus	 on	 trio	
crimes,	cash-in-transit	robberies	and	ATM	bombings	in	the	greater	Pretoria	area.	
The	 SAPS	2011/12	 annual	 report	 indicated	 that	 this	 operation	had	 resulted	 in	
127	arrests	for	a	range	of	crimes,	including	attempted	murder,	corruption,	illegal	






Operation	 Combat	was	 initiated	 in	 the	Western	 Cape	 in	 2012	with	 a	 focus	 on	
between	15	 to	17	 criminal	 gangs	 in	 a	 select	number	of	 areas,	 such	as	 (but	not	
limited	 to)	 Mitchells	 Plain,	 Bishop	 Lavis,	 Philippi,	 Atlantis,	 Lavender	 Hill	 and	
Manenberg.	 Some	 of	 its	 foremost	 objectives	were	 to:	 “dislodge	 and	 terminally	
weaken”	the	ability	of	gangs	to	operate	in	high	crime	communities	and	prisons;	
“disorganise	and	fundamentally	disable”	the	gang-related	economy,	through	the	
targeting	 of	 senior	 members	 of	 organised	 criminal	 networks	 and	 large	
consignments	of	 contraband;	and	 “mobilise	and	organise	 communities”	against	




Operation	 Combat	 has	 been	 intelligence-driven,	 drawing	 on	 information	
provided	 by	 informants	 (Sylvester,	 2014),	 and	 has	 had	 a	 strong	military	 ethos	
and	 doctrine.	 According	 to	 Gen	 Jeremy	 Vearey,	 the	 head	 of	 the	 Operation	
Combat,	 this	 gang-focused	 policing	 intervention	 sought	 to	 “target	 the	 enemy,	
neutralise	the	enemy	in	the	target	environment,	cut	and	disrupt	the	movement	of	
the	enemy	and	disrupt	the	supply	lines	of	firearms	and	drugs”	(eNCA,	2013).	The	
core	 strategy	 in	 this	 regard	has	been	 to	use	dedicated	 investigation	 teams	and	
paramilitary	 SAPS	 bodies,	 such	 as	 the	 Tactical	 Response	 Teams,	 that	 are	
supported	by	station-level	personnel,	to	disrupt	gang	operations.	This	has	been	
pursued	 through	 assertive	 visible	 policing,	 as	 well	 as	 arresting	 gang	 leaders	
(eNCA,	 2013,	 Loggenberg,	 2014).	 More	 surreptitious	 methods	 have	 also	 been	




firearms	 being	 confiscated	 each	 month	 (eNCA,	 2013).	 The	 SAPS	 have	 also	
celebrated	the	securing	of	severe	prison	sentences	for	a	number	of	gang	leaders,	
including	 from	 the	 Fancy	Boys,	 Junior	 Cisko	 Yakkies	 and	 the	 28s	 gangs.	 A	 key	
innovation	 has	 been	 to	 use	 of	 the	 Prevention	 of	 Organised	 Crime	 Act	 (1998),	






In	March	 2016,	 the	 SAPS	 established	 a	 very	 similar	 intervention	 to	 Operation	
Combat	in	the	Eastern	Cape,	which	has	been	referred	to	as	Operation	Lockdown.	
This	 operation	 primarily	 focused	 on	 gang	 hot	 spots	 in	 Port	 Elizabeth,	 namely	
Gelvandale	and	Bethelsdorp,	with	the	objectives	of	“stabilizing	these	areas”	and	
“build[ing]	 the	 community’s	 confidence	 in	 the	 SAPS”	 (South	 African	 Police	







From	2007	onwards,	 national	 SAPS	high-density	 operations	 became	 an	 annual	
fixture	 in	 and	 around	 the	 summer	 holiday	 period,	 typically	 implemented	




Eskom).	 They	 were	 branded	 either	 as	 Operation	 Festive	 Season	 or	 Operation	
Duty	 Calls,	 with	 the	 principal	 motivation	 being	 that	 criminality,	 both	 serious	
offences	and	misdemeanours,	tended	to	spike	during	this	period.		
	
A	 ‘zero	 tolerance’	 approach	 to	 most	 forms	 of	 criminality,	 including	 firearm-,	
alcohol-,	and	drug-related	crime,	as	well	as	road	offences	has	been	adopted.	This	
has	 been	 enforced	 through	 roadblocks,	 cordon-and-search	 actions,	 and	
inspections	of	firearm	dealers	and	liquor	outlets,	such	as	taverns	and	shebeens.	
The	 tracing	 and	 apprehension	 of	 ‘wanted’	 persons	 has	 also	 been	 a	 priority	
(Kanyane,	2015,	South	African	Police	Service,	2011c).	These	operations	have	also	
been	 accompanied	 by	 belligerent	 othering	 by	 the	 senior	 police	 political	






patrol	 at	malls,	 taxi	 ranks,	 and	 recreational	 areas,	 as	well	 as	 identified	 key	 ‘hot	 spots’.	
The	only	people	who	must	have	a	 jolly	season	are	 law-abiding	citizens.	Criminals	must	




reduction	 successes.	 For	 instance,	 the	Police	Minister	 stated	 that	 robbery	with	
aggravating	 circumstances	 and	motor	 vehicle	 theft	 noticeably	 declined	 during	




Furthermore,	 these	 annual	 operations	 have	 resulted	 in	 the	 confiscation	 of	
thousands	 of	 firearms	 and	 numerous	 arrests	 of	 individuals	 found	 to	 be	 in	
	
	148	
possession	 of	 illegal	 firearms	 and/or	 ammunition.	 For	 example,	 during	 the	
2012/13	Festive	Season	operation	the	SAPS	confiscated	721	illegal	firearms	and	
7,638	 rounds	 of	 ammunition	 (South	 African	 Police	 Service,	 2013a).	 In	 late	




The	 police	 undertook	 close	 to	 six	 million	 searches	 (of	 vehicles,	 people	 and	
premises)	during	 the	2015/16	 iteration	of	Operation	Duty	Calls.	Some	362,795	
people	 were	 arrested	 for	 a	 wide	 variety	 of	 offences,	 but	 were	 predominantly	
apprehended	 for	 order	 maintenance	 related	 crime,	 such	 as:	 drug-related	
offences	(17%);	‘riotous	behaviour’	and	‘pedestrian	source	of	danger’	(12%);	and	
drinking/being	drunk	in	a	public	space	(11%).	Some	3,579	‘wanted’	persons	and	
3,841	 murder	 suspects	 were	 arrested.	 Furthermore	 2,652	 and	 961	 suspects	
were	 arrested	 for	 illegal	 possession	 of	 firearms	 and	 ammunition	 and	 robbery	
with	 a	 firearm	 respectively.	 The	 SAPS	 also	 reported	 that	 5,310	 firearms	 and	
112,339	 rounds	 of	 ammunition	 were	 confiscated	 (85%	 were	 handguns).	 The	
SAPS	concluded,	on	the	basis	of	a	initial	analysis,	that	this	operation	had	resulted	
in	 a	 reduction	 in	 serious	 crime	 in	 five	 provinces	 during	 December	 2015	




The	 SAPS	 began	 to	 make	 policing	 preparations	 for	 the	 2010	 Fédération	
Internationale	de	Football	Association	(FIFA)	World	Cup	from	2006	(which	South	
Africa	hosted	in	2010).	A	particular	focus	was	the	establishment	of	tracing	teams	
to	 track	 down	 suspects	 for	 which	 arrest	 warrants	 had	 already	 been	 issued	
(Burger,	2007b).	No	major	operations	were	however	undertaken,	with	the	SAPS	
rather	 pursuing	 “extremely	 high	 levels	 of	 police	 visibility”	 between	 April	 and	
June	2009,	due	to	a	number	of	prominent,	nationwide	mega-events	such	as	the	
general	 elections,	 international	 cricket	 matches	 (such	 as	 the	 Indian	 Premier	





the	 immediate	 aftermath	of,	 the	2010	FIFA	World	Cup	 (Pienaar-Marais,	 2015).	
During	 this	 time	 there	 were	 elevated	 levels	 of	 security	 in	 place	 (Cornelissen,	
2011),	and	there	was	a	strong	operational	focus	in	Gauteng	and	KwaZulu-Natal,	












known	 to	 be	 frequented	 by	 criminals”	 (Radebe,	 2015).	 This	 was	 pursued,	
according	to	Cabinet,	in	order	“to	rid	our	country	of	illegal	weapons,	drug	dens,	
prostitution	 rings	 and	 other	 illegal	 activities”	 (Evans,	 2015).	 State	 Security	
Minister,	David	Mahlobo	has	also	suggested	that	the	South	Africans	were	highly	
supportive	 government’s	 intention	 to	 “clean	 out	 those	 criminal	 services”	
throughout	the	country	(Njamela,	2015).	
	
The	NATJOINTS	 penned	 the	 operational	 blueprint	 for	Operation	 Fiela-Reclaim,	
which	was	branded	as	the	‘Multi-Disciplinary	Integrated	National	Action	Plan	to	
Reassert	 the	 Authority	 of	 the	 State’.	 This	 document	 revealed	 a	 deep	 sense	 of	
disquiet	 within	 government’s	 security	 cluster,	 namely	 the	 perception	 that	 the	
authority	 of	 the	 state	had	been	extensively	 eroded	 in	high	 crime	 communities.	
According	 to	 this	plan,	 the	security	 forces	would	“dominate	and	stabilise”	 focal	
areas	by	pursuing	high	visibility	policing	actions;	arresting	‘wanted’	persons;	fast	
tracking	 criminal	 investigations;	 and	 adopting	 a	 ‘zero	 tolerance’	 approach	 to	
lesser	forms	of	criminality,	such	as	traffic	offences,	operating	illegal	businesses,	
selling	 counterfeit	 goods,	 illegal	mining,	 drinking	 in	 public,	 and	 being	 in	 South	
Africa	illegally	(NATJOINTS,	2015).		
	
In	 terms	 of	 this	 operation	 the	 SAPS	 has	 sought	 to	 implement	 weekly	 sub-
operations	 throughout	 the	 country,	 which	 entailed	 numerous	 roadblocks,	
cordon-and-search	actions	and	directed	patrols.	By	19	June	2015	some	343	sub-
operations	had	been	 conducted	 in	 these	areas,	which	are	outlined	 in	Table	8.5	
below	 (Minister	 of	 Police,	 2015b).	 The	 SAPS	 expanded	 its	 operational	 focus	 to	
further	high	crime	areas	in	the	second	half	of	2015,	including,	but	not	limited	to:	
Point,	 Pinetown,	 Grahamstown,	 Parow,	 Nyanga,	 Summer	 Greens,	 Pudimoe,	









Gauteng	 Alexandra,	 Benoni,	 Brakpan,	 Carletonville,	 Katlehong,	 Boksburg,	 Ga-
Rankuwa,	 Johannesburg,	 Krugersdorp,	 Mamelodi,	 Springs,	 Tembisa,	
Vereeniging,	 Alrode,	 Diepsloot,	 Johannesburg	 Central,	 Hillbrow,	Moroka,	
Orlando,	Pretoria	Central,	Pretoria	West,	Sunnyside,	Temba	
KwaZulu-Natal	 Inanda,	Newcastle,	Pietermaritzburg,	Kokstad,	Ladysmith,	Port	Shepstone,	








North	West	 Brits,	 Klerksdorp,	 Rustenburg,	 Taung,	 Vryburg,	 Wolmaranstad,	 Zeerust,	





Northern	Cape	 Alexandra	 Bay,	 Calvinia,	 De	 Aar,	 Kimberley,	 Kuruman,	 Port	 Nolloth,	
Postmasburg,	 Windsorton,	 Griekwastad,	 Hartswater,	 Jan	 Kempdorp,	









forces	 also	 honing	 in	 on	 the	 traditional	 micro-spaces	 of	 disorder	 and	 law	
breaking,	such	as	hostels,	abandoned	inner	city	buildings,	taverns,	shebeens,	and	
taxi	 ranks.	 For	 example,	 in	 April	 2015	 security	 force	 personnel	 stormed	 the	
Madala	Hostel	in	Alexandra	and	the	Wolhuter	Road	Hostel	in	Jeppestown	(both	
in	 Gauteng).	 Similarly,	 in	 October	 2015,	 the	 notorious	 Glebelands	 hostel	 in	
Umlazi	 (KwaZulu-Natal)	 was	 saturated	 with	 security	 force	 personnel	 that	
subsequently	arrested	60	individuals	on	various	criminal	charges.	In	Manenberg,	
during	an	 intense	gang	 turf-war	 (May	2015),	 approximately	300	security	 force	
members	were	deployed	into	the	area,	which	then	raided	suspected	drug	houses	
and	 gangster	 hideouts.	 Numerous	 arrests	 were	 made	 for	 illegal	 possession	 of	
firearms	and	drugs	(Koyana,	2015).	
	
On	30	and	31	 July	policing	 sub-operations	were	undertaken,	which	 resulted	 in	









As	 with	 most	 of	 the	 previous	 high-density	 operations,	 the	 SANDF	 actively	
participated	in	Operation	Fiela-Reclaim,	but	only	in	the	formative	stages,	namely	
between	April	 and	 June	2015	 (Wilhelm,	2015).	The	military	were	extricated	 in	
June	2015	following	public	concerns	about	the	adverse	repercussions	that	their	
long-term	 internal	 deployment	 would	 have	 on	 the	 state	 of	 democratic	
governance	in	South	Africa	(African	News	Agency,	2015,	RDM	News	Wire,	2015).	
In	addition,	there	was	intensive	civil	society	advocacy	concerning	the	arrest	and	
the	 apparent	 disproportionate	 targeting	 of	 undocumented	 migrants	 by	 the	




related	 to	 undocumented	 migrants;	 traffic	 offences;	 and	 possession	 of	 drugs.	
Some	144	persons	were	arrested	for	illegal	possession	of	firearms/ammunition;	
29	 for	murder;	and	18	 for	armed	robbery.	Some	159	 illegal	 firearms	were	also	













At	 times	 high-density	 operations	 have	 been	 presented	 as	 having,	 and	 being	
linked	 to,	 a	 type	 of	 conquest	 imperative,	 namely	 that	 government	 has	 publicly	
expressed	 concerns	 that	 criminal	 elements	 have	 seized	 complete	 control	 of	
certain	 high	 crime	 public	 spaces	 and	 neighbourhoods.	 This	 has	 been	 the	 case	
with	Operation	Fiela-Reclaim	 (2015),	where	 government	has	declared	 that	 the	
principal	 operational	 objective	 has	 been	 to	 “take	 back	 the	 communities	 from	
criminals	and	to	re-assert	the	authority	of	the	state”	(Radebe,	2015).	In	addition,	




In	 some	 cases	 government	 has,	 together	 with	 high-density	 police	 operations,	
attempted	 to	 re-establish	 its	 formal	 authority	 in	 high	 crime	 spaces	 through	
infrastructure	and	development	projects.	These	interventions	have	also	been	an	
attempt	to	mitigate	the	environmental	conditions	and	determinants	of	criminal	
offending	 in	 the	target	areas.	 In	 this	regard,	 these	projects	have	predominantly	
focused	 on	 the	 building	 and	 refurbishment	 of	 community	 facilities	 and	 the	
upgrading	of	housing.	Some	of	 these	 interventions	are	nonetheless	reminiscent	




gang	 violence,	 the	Western	 Cape	 Provincial	 Government	 and	 the	 City	 of	 Cape	
Town	 launched	 a	 major	 upgrading	 project	 in	 the	 wake	 of	 Fiela-Reclaim	
interventions.	A	central	component	of	this	project	has	been	the	development	of	a	
‘youth	lifestyle	campus’	in	Manenberg	which	has	been	publicised	as	including	the	
following:	 increased	 support	 for	 early	 childhood	 development	 facilities	 and	
schools;	 implementation	 of	 ‘community	 cohesion’	 programmes;	 upgrading	 of	


















the	 funding	 of	 specific	 projects	 with	 the	 brief	 of	 improving	 community	 safety	
(Western	Cape	Government	and	City	of	Cape	Town,	2015).	A	new	hospital	and	an	




KwaZulu-Natal	 and	Gauteng,	 there	 are	 large	hostels	 that	were	built	 during	 the	
apartheid	 period	 in	 order	 to	 accommodate	 and	 control	 black	 male	 migrant	
labourers	from	rural	areas	and	other	Southern	African	countries.	These	hostels	
have	 typically	 been	 places	 with	 intense	 concentrations	 of	 violent	 criminality	
where	 possession	 of	 illegal	 firearms	 has	 been	 commonplace.	 These	 densely	
populated,	and	often	dilapidated	residential	compounds	were	estimated	to	have	
housed	 five	 per	 cent	 of	 South	 Africa’s	 population	 in	 1994	 (Department	 of	
Housing,	1994).	They	are	also	places	typically	governed	by	informal	pro-violence	
patriarchal	 systems	 where	 formal	 government	 bodies	 have	 exercised	 very	
limited	authority,	and	are	amongst	 the	most	dangerous	places	 for	 the	police	 to	
operate	(Pienaar	and	Cloete,	2003).	Since	the	mid	1990s	government	policy	has	




Following	 the	 launch	 of	 Operation	 Fiela-Reclaim,	 the	 Minster	 of	 Human	
Settlements,	Lindiwe	Sisulu,	stated	in	her	2015/16	budget	vote	speech	that	there	
was	 going	 to	 be	 a	 policy	 shift	 on	 hostels,	 namely	 that	 government	 was	 now	
seeking	to	“gradually	abolish	hostels”,	and	provide	hostel-dwellers	with	access	to	
a	 special	housing	 subsidy	 scheme	 (Sisulu,	2015).	This	 is	 arguably	a	 strategy	 to	
eliminate	such	crime	hot	spots	and	regain	control	of	such	spaces.	For	example,	
the	 eThekwini	 Municipality	 reportedly	 assigned	 approximately	 R72	 million	 in	
late	2015	to	upgrade	the	physical	security,	recreational	facilities	and	gardens	in	
and	 around	 the	 Glebelands	 and	 KwaMashu	 hostels	 (KwaZulu-Natal).	 This	 will	
reportedly	 include	 the	upgrading	of	 the	Glebe	 Stadium,	 the	 refurbishment	 of	 a	
swimming	pool	and	other	recreational	amenities,	as	well	as	the	 introduction	of	
closed	circuit	television	and	access	control	systems	(Rondganger,	2015).	Hostel	




The	 South	 African	 prison	 population	 increased	 in	 size	 significantly	 from	 1997	
with	the	amendment	of	the	Criminal	Procedure	Act,	which	introduced	minimum	
















The	 most	 violent	 offenders,	 such	 as	 murderers,	 armed	 robbers	 and	 those	 in	
possession	 of	 illegal	 firearms	 and	 ammunition,	 were	 frequently	 handed-down	














court	 (Leggett,	 et	 al.,	 2003).	 For	 example,	 in	 2001	 54%	 of	 the	 782,013	 cases	
brought	to	the	courts,	many	of	which	were	the	direct	consequence	of	Operation	


































































































This	 chapter	 has	 explored	 the	 SAPS’	 attempts	 to	 leverage	 control	 over	 violent	
crime	 in	 South	 Africa	 through	 the	 use	 of	 large-scale	 high-density	 police	
operations.	Similar	to	apartheid-era	policing	of	the	1980s	and	early	1990s,	such	
operations	have	been	militarised,	with	the	police	(often	in	partnership	with	the	
military)	doggedly	honing-in	and	 targeting	 their	 efforts	 and	 resources	 towards	
those	relatively	disorderly	zones	where	crime	has	been	intensely	concentrated.	
The	SAPS	leadership	and	their	political	overseers	have	demarcated	and	classified	
such	 places	 as	 being	 disproportionately	 dangerous	 for	 both	 the	 police	 and	 the	
law-abiding	 public,	 as	 such	 spaces	 have	 contained	 cohorts	 of	 threatening	 and	
criminal	others,	especially	 ‘wanted’	persons,	who	have	been	viewed	as	enemies	
that	are	an	affront	 to	 the	South	African	state	and	society.	Hence,	 the	SAPS’	key	




with	 the	 aim	 of	 (temporarily)	 imposing	 order	 and	 disrupting	 the	 dynamics	 of	
criminality	 within	 high	 crime	 areas	 as	 a	 means	 to	 reduce	 the	 predisposition	
towards	law	breaking.	These	approaches	have	typically	entailed	the	deployment	
of	 large	 numbers	 of	 security	 force	 personnel	 to	 engage	 in	 visible	 policing	
activities,	such	as	patrols,	roadblocks	and	cordon-and-search	interventions.	The	
police	 have	 also	 sought	 to	 remove	 the	 most	 problematic	 catalysts	 for	 violent	
crime	from	the	target	areas,	namely	illegal	firearms	and	ammunition.	In	addition,	
the	 SAPS	 arrested	numerous	 ‘wanted’	 persons	 for	 a	 range	 of	 crimes,	 including	
murder	 and	being	 in	possession	of	 illegal	 firearms	 and	 ammunition.	Therefore	




Furthermore,	 through	 a	 zero	 tolerance	 approach	 to	 a	 wide	 range	 of	
misdemeanours,	 such	 as	 traffic,	 drugs,	 alcohol	 and	 prostitution	 transgressions,	
and	the	mass	arrest	of	offenders	in	this	regard,	the	SAPS	has	specifically	sought	
to	 sanitise	 such	 areas	 and	 compel	 residents	 to	 become	more	 law-abiding.	 This	
was	crudely	depicted	with	the	naming	and	objectives	of	the	most	recent	national	
high-density	 police	 operation,	 Operation	 Fiela	 (clean	 sweep)-Reclaim.	 In	 some	
instances	 the	 government	 has	 sought	 to	 diminish	 the	 criminogenic	 nature	 and	












declared	 that	 these	 flagship	 forms	 of	 the	 policing	 of	 boundaries	 have	 had	
substantial	crime	reduction	effects.	Crime	data	indicating	a	short-term	declining	
trend	 in	 certain	 crime	categories	has	 typically	been	offered	as	 evidence	 in	 this	
regard.		
	
The	 plausibility	 of	 such	 claims	 is	 supported	 by	 academic	 research	 from	 the	
United	 States	 (US)	 and	 the	 United	 Kingdom	 (UK),	 which	 indicates	 that	 place-
based	policing	can	have	a	durable	reduction	effect	on	criminal	offending	 in	 the	
focal	 areas;	 and	 possibly	 even	 in	 the	 surrounding	 areas	 with	 no	 significant	
displacement	effects	(Braga,	2001,	Caeti,	1999,	Cordner,	1996)	(see	Chapter	2).	
Further	 to	 this,	 evidence	 suggests	 that	 high-density	 operations	 should	 be	
“sufficiently	 long	 and	 strong”	 in	 order	 to	 have	 a	 more	 meaningful	 impact	 on	
crime	 levels	(Scott,	2004).	However,	 the	research	also	 implies	 that	 if	 the	police	
are	overly	aggressive	and	do	not	actively	 communicate	 their	 intensions	during	
high-density	 operations	 then	 police	 credibility	 with	 regards	 to	 targeted	
communities	 and	 the	 general	 public	 could	 be	 undermined	 (Eck	 and	 Maguire,	
2000,	Maher	and	Dixon,	1999,	Sherman,	1997a).	
	




directly	 addressed	 by	 such	 high-density	 operations;	 and	 that	 such	 operations	
may	result	in	the	displacement	of	crime	to	other	areas	(Altbeker,	2009,	Samara,	
2010,	 Shaw,	 2001).	 However,	 no	 thorough	 and	 detailed	 studies	 have	 been	
presented	to	substantiate	such	views.	
	
Hence,	 this	 chapter	will	 seek	 to	objectively	assess	 the	 impact	 that	high-density	
police	 operations	 may	 have	 had	 on	 recorded	 violent	 crime	 levels,	 specifically	
murder	 in	high	crime	areas	 in	post-apartheid	South	Africa.	Such	an	assessment	
has	been	pursued	by	means	of	a	 retrospective	case-series	study	of	a	 sample	of	






the	 methodology	 and	 findings	 of	 such	 a	 study,	 this	 chapter	 reviews	 the	


























overlaying	 both	 data	 sets	 spatially	 and	 then	 estimating	 the	 population	 and	
number	 of	 households	 for	 the	 selected	 precincts.	 The	 ISS	 researchers	 readily	
admit	that	there	are	some	significant	limitations	to	such	an	approach	as:	census	
data	 is	 not	 entirely	 accurate	 at	 the	 small	 area	 level,	 especially	 in	 informal	
settlements;	 the	 estimation	 of	 number	 of	 households	 per	 precinct	 will	 likely	
result	 in	 the	 misallocation	 of	 some	 households;	 and	 the	 technique	 cannot	








Police	 Service,	 2008:1-2).	 In	 addition,	 given	 the	 high	 level	 of	 diversity	 among	
station	 areas,	 small	 increases	 in	 reported	 criminal	 incidents	 between	 years	 in	
low	 crime	 areas	 will	 likely	 result	 in	 a	 high	 year-on-year	 ratio,	 while	 large	
increases	 in	criminal	cases	 in	high	crime	areas	will	 likely	not	yield	a	high	year-
on-year	ratio	(South	African	Police	Service,	2008:2).	
	
Most	 crime	 data	 is	 initially	 recorded	 at	 the	 station	 level	 on	 the	 SAPS’	 Crime	
Administration	 System	 (CAS).	 This	 information	 is	 then	 accessed	 by	 the	 SAPS	
Crime	Information	Analysis	Centre	(CIAC),	which	analyses	and	then	finalises	the	
annual	data	for	analysis	and	publication.	The	convention	has	been	to	publish	the	







To	date,	 the	 Statistician-General	 has	 not	 designated	 the	 SAPS	 crime	data	 to	 be	
‘official	statistics’	 in	terms	of	the	provisions	of	the	Statistics	Act.	In	essence	this	
means	that	Statistics	South	Africa	has	not	been	afforded	the	opportunity	by	the	
SAPS	 to	 vet	 and	 assure	 the	 quality	 of	 this	 crime	data	 (Lukhwareni,	 2015).40	At	
the	time	of	writing	the	SAPS	had	initiated	a	process	with	Statistics	South	Africa	to	










who	 have	 published	 articles	 that	 have	 made	 use	 of	 this	 data.	 Much	 of	 this	
disparagement	relates	to	the	accuracy	and	reliability	of	the	SAPS	data,	primarily	
due	 to	manner	 in	which	 it	 is	 collected,	 collated	 and	 presented.	 Concerns	 have	
also	 been	 voiced	 about	 the	method	 that	 the	 SAPS	 crime	 analysts	 have	 used	 to	
infer	 proportionality	 (Berg	 and	 Schärf,	 2004,	 Leggett,	 2005,	 Palmary,	 et	 al.,	
2003).		
	
In	 2015	 the	 Centre	 of	 Criminology	 at	 the	University	 of	 Cape	Town	 released	 ‘A	
Citizen’s	 Guide’	 to	 the	 SAPS	 crime	 data,	 which	 was	 not	 peer	 reviewed.	 This	
document	 made	 the	 following	 pronouncement:	 “all	 [SAPS]	 stats	 [sic]	 prior	 to	
about	2003	should	be	treated	with	utmost	caution,	and	thought	of	as	only	a	very	
broad	indication	of	what	might	have	been	the	reality”	(De	Kock,	et	al.,	2015:5).	It	






The	 actual	 SAPS	 crime	 statistics	 reports	 in	 question	 indicate,	 based	 on	 a	 SAPS	




gaps	 within,	 the	 SAPS	 crime	 administration	 system	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	
incorporation	of	 the	various	policing	bodies	 into	SAPS	 in	 the	mid	1990s,	and	a	
backlog	 in	 processing	 crime	 data	 as	 a	 result	 (Crime	 Information	Management	
																																																								
40	At	the	time	of	writing	the	SAPS	had	initiated	the	process	with	Statistics	South	Africa	to	improve	
















that	 this	 decision	 was	 a	 “politically	 convenient”	 move	 by	 government	 at	 the	




the	 opportunity	 to	 roll-out	 computer	 equipment,	 as	 well	 as	 geographic	
information	systems,	 to	various	police	stations,	and	 to	 train	personnel	 in	more	




under-reporting	 for	 certain	 crime	 categories	 by	 researchers	 and	 analysts,	
especially	various	forms	of	robbery	and	assault	(Bruce,	2010),	as	well	as	sexual	
crimes	 (Jewkes	 and	Abrahams,	 2002,	 Statistics	 South	Africa,	 2015).	 Perception	
surveys	have	suggested	that	this	under-reporting	has	been	due	to	a	combination	
of	 factors,	 such	 as:	 a	 lack	 of	 trust	 in	 the	 police;	 the	 inaccessibility	 of	 police	
stations	(particularly	 in	rural	areas);	adverse	notions	of	 the	utility	of	 reporting	
criminal	 incidents	 to	 the	 SAPS;	 concerns	 about	 being	 stigmatised	 by	 family	




The	 introduction	 of	 a	 station-level	 personnel	 performance	 appraisal	 systems	
(SAPS	 Performance	 Chart)	 that	 links	 reductions	 (quotas)	 in	 most	 crime	
categories	 to	 financial	 bonuses	 and	 career	 advancement	 have	 inadvertently	
undermined	 the	 credibility	 of	 the	 SAPS	data	 collection	 process	 in	 a	 number	 of	
stations.	That	is,	some	officials	in	some	stations	have	fraudulently	misreported43	









44	This	 has	 typically	 taken	 the	 form	 of	 front	 office	 SAPS	 personnel	 responsible	 for	 taking	





to	 the	 modus	 operandi	 used	 to	 determine	 crime	 ratios	 at	 the	 national	 and	
provincial	 levels	 and	 decode	 the	 relevance	 of	 such	 ratios.	 The	 core	 critique	
relates	 to	 the	 use	 of	 “out-dated	 population	 figures”	 to	 compare	 the	 change	 in	
crime	 ratios,	 especially	 between	 2011/12	 and	 2012/13	 (Institute	 for	 Security	
Studies,	 2013,	Wilkinson,	 2013).	 Curiously,	 the	 SAPS	 did	 not	 include	 ratios	 or	
rates	 in	 the	 2014/15	 crime	 data,	 which	 was	 possibly	 the	 result	 of	 this	 public	
furore.		
	
Despite	 the	 various	 criticisms	 of	 the	 SAPS	 crime	 data,	 some	 of	 its	 aspects	 and	
categories	 are	 sufficiently	 reliable	 and	 accurate	 for	 robust	 analyses	 to	 be	
constructed.	Nonetheless,	 the	data	needs	 to	be	carefully	navigated	to	moderate	
the	risk	of	one’s	research	findings	being	discredited	due	to	the	abovementioned	
hazards.	 Fortunately	 the	 two	 crime	 categories	 that	 are	 most	 pertinent	 to	 this	








Nations	 Office	 on	 Drugs	 and	 Crime,	 2014).	 The	 reason	 for	 this	 is	 that	 the	




has	 been	 methodically	 followed	 in	 South	 Africa.	 As	 Gillespie	 (2014:207)	
irreverently	 notes:	 “murder	 is	 a	 relatively	 reliable	 statistical	measure	 that	 the	
state	 is	obliged	 to	manage,	because	of	 the	presence	of	killed	bodies”.	However,	
murder	 data	 is	 not	 always	 entirely	 accurate	 as	 in	 a	 small	 number	 of	 cases	
accidental	killings	and	suicide	may	be	recorded	as	murder,	and	vice	versa.			
	
South	 African	 crime	 and	 public	 health	 researchers	 concur	 that	 murder	 is	 the	
most	 reliable	 SAPS	 crime	 category	 statistically	 (Altbeker,	 2005,	Masuku,	2002)	
(Abrahams,	et	al.,	2009,	De	Kock,	et	al.,	2015,	Seedat,	et	al.,	2009).	The	robustness	















	 1998	 2011	 2012	 2013/14	 2014/15	
Percentage	 of	 household	 sample	
that	would	report	murders	to	SAPS	
83%	 93.2	 98.2	 88.7	 95.7	




lower	 reporting	 levels	 and	 increased	 possibility	 of	misreporting.	 For	 example,	
attempted	murder,	which	entails	the	commission	of	a	crime	with	the	intention	of	
killing	another	person,	but	 the	actions	of	 the	perpetrator	does	not	result	 in	the	
death	 of	 the	 victim,	 requires	 SAPS	 officials	 to	 subjectively	 determine	 if	










The	modest	 research	on	homicide	 (including	murder)	 in	South	Africa	 indicates	
that	 over	 the	 past	 20	 years	 both	 the	 victims	 and	 perpetrators	 of	 all	 forms	 of	
homicide	 in	 South	 Africa	 have	mostly	 been	 young	 black	 African	 and	 coloured	
men	 between	 the	 ages	 of	 15	 and	 39.	 Such	men	 are	 predominantly	 unmarried,	
unemployed,	 and	 live	 in	 relatively	 impoverished	 areas	 (Ratele,	 et	 al.,	 2010)	
(Centre	 for	 the	 Study	 of	 Violence	 and	 Reconciliation,	 2008).	 Such	 men	 have	
typically	 witnessed	 and/or	 experienced	 violence	 as	 a	 child,	 and	 possibly	
possessed	 an	 illegal	 firearm	 (Abrahams	 and	 Jewkes,	 2005).	Women	 accounted	
for	between	10%	and	15%	of	homicide	victims,	with	even	fewer	women	having	
perpetrated	 homicide	 (Matzopoulos,	 et	 al.,	 2013,	 Matzopoulos,	 et	 al.,	 2015).	
These	dynamics	correspond	with	studies	on	homicide	in	other	countries,	which	
demonstrate	that	young	men	in	lower	socio-economic	situations	are	the	most	at	
risk	 of	 being	 both	 the	 agents	 and	 targets	 of	 such	 violence	 (Krug,	 et	 al.,	 2002,	
Mouzos,	2000,	Wilson	and	Daly,	1985).		
	
Homicides	 in	 South	 Africa	 have	 often	 been	 the	 outcome	 of	 aggressive	 verbal	
disagreements	in	the	context	of	alcohol	consumption	(Kramer	and	Ratele,	2012,	
Matzopoulos,	 2005),	 or	 during	 the	 perpetration	 of	 another	 crime,	 such	 as	
robbery.	 In	 some	areas,	 gang	 rivalries	may	 result	 in	killings	 (Steinberg,	2004b,	
Ward,	2007a).	 	An	analysis	of	an	unspecified	number	of	murder	dockets	by	the	
SAPS	that	was	presented	within	the	SAPS	2002/03	annual	report	indicated	that	
56%	of	murder	 cases	 reviewed	had	 reportedly	 “started	 as	 an	 argument	which	
degenerated	 into	 a	 fight	 and	 then	 a	 [fatal]	 assault”.	 In	 addition,	 28%	 of	 the	
perpetrators	in	the	assessed	murder	cases	were	family	members,	or	were	in	an	






reporting	 year	 found	 that	 61.9%	 of	 perpetrators	 of	 murder	 were	 relatives,	
friends	 or	 acquaintances	 of	 the	 victims	 (South	 African	 Police	 Service,	 2005b).	
Further	 to	 this,	 an	 analysis	 by	 the	 SAPS	 of	 1,348	 murder	 dockets	 from	 the	
2007/08	 reporting	 period	 indicated	 that	 the	main	motives	 and	 circumstances	
associated	 with	 murder	 during	 that	 period	 had	 been:	 misunderstandings	 or	
arguments	 (50.4%	 of	 dockets);	 consequences	 of	 other	 crimes	 (15.9%	 of	
dockets);	 “domestic-related”	 (7.3%	 of	 dockets);	 and	 “jealousy/love-triangle”	
(5.5%	 of	 all	 dockets).	 This	 study	 also	 found	 that	 alcohol	 abuse	 was	 a	 key	
contributing	factor	in	murder	cases	(South	African	Police	Service,	2009).		
	
Comparable	 findings	 have	 been	 reported	 in	 subsequent	 SAPS	 annual	 reports,	
especially	 the	 2010/11	 report,	 which	 stated	 that	 the	 Crime	 Research	 and	
Statistics	component	within	the	SAPS	Crime	Intelligence	had	estimated	that	over	
the	 previous	 ten	 year	 period	 that	 the	 victims	 and	 perpetrators	 had	 been	





found	 that	 the	 availability	 of	 firearms	 significantly	 increased	 the	 risk	 of	 the	
lethality	 of	 violence	 in	 such	 contexts	 in	 South	 Africa	 (Centre	 for	 the	 Study	 of	
Violence	and	Reconciliation,	2008,	Matzopoulos,	et	al.,	2013,	Swart,	et	al.,	2015).	
	
The	 literature	 on	 masculinity	 and	 violence	 in	 South	 Africa	 suggests	 that	 the	
perpetration	 of	 homicide	 has	 been	 closely	 tied	 to	 notions	 of	 manhood	 that	
reveres	dominant	men	that	are “always	ready	for	a	fight, never	show	fear,	ignore	
pain,	and	play	it	cool.”	Such	a	type	of	masculinity	encourages	bravado,	weapon-















45	Murder,	 according	 to	 the	SAPS	entails	 the	unlawful	and	 intentional	killing	of	 a	human	being.	









Between	 1994	 and	 1998	 South	 Africa’s	 firearm	 homicide47 	rate	 remained	
relatively	 constant,	with	 an	 annual	 average	 of	 close	 to	 28	 per	 100,000	 people,	
with	the	proportion	of	homicides	involving	firearms	rising	from	41.5%	to	49.4%	
respectively	 (United	 Nations	 Office	 on	 Drugs	 and	 Crime,	 2011).	 At	 this	 time	
firearm	homicide	was	not	evenly	spread	throughout	South	Africa,	but	was	rather	
concentrated	 in	 small	 number	 of	 urban	 areas.	 Close	 to	 half	 of	 all	 firearm	
homicides	in	1998	took	place	in	KwaZulu-Natal	and	Gauteng	(Chetty,	2000).		
	
From	 1998	 South	 Africa’s	 firearm	 homicide	 rate	 steadily	 declined	 to	 17	 per	
100,000	in	2007	(a	40%	reduction),	with	the	total	number	of	firearm	homicides	
in	 South	 Africa	 shrinking	 from	 12,413	 to	 8,319	 over	 the	 same	 period	 (a	 33%	
reduction)	 (United	 Nations	 Office	 on	 Drugs	 and	 Crime,	 2011).	 Official	
disaggregated	SAPS	data	on	the	firearm	homicide	rate	for	the	period	after	2008	
has	not	been	made	publicly	available.	A	study	of	2009	mortuary	data	nonetheless	
indicated	 that	 there	 continued	 to	 be	 noticeable	 variations	 in	 firearm	homicide	
across	 provinces,	 with	 such	 homicides	 continuing	 to	 be	 more	 pronounced	 in	





















































































































(including	 homicide)	 in	 South	 Africa	 (13.6%	 of	 total	 non-natural	 deaths),	
followed	 by	 firearms	 (10.8%	 of	 total	 non-natural	 deaths).	 Blunt	 force	 injuries	
accounted	 for	 6.9%	 of	 such	 deaths.	 Johannesburg,	 Durban	 and	 Cape	 Town	
experienced	 the	 most	 noticeable	 reductions	 in	 firearm	 homicides,	 with	 such	
reductions	 evident	 for	 all	 age	 groups	 (National	 Injury	 Mortality	 Surveillance	
System,	 2009).	 This	 trend	 was	 maintained	 in	 2009,	 with	 sharp	 force	 injuries	


















underlying	 logic	 of	 the	 FCA.	 That	 is	 (as	 described	 in	 Chapter	 7),	 this	 Act	 has	






However,	 there	are	 two	 fundamental	 shortcomings	with	 this	 reasoning.	Firstly,	
despite	the	text	of	the	FCA	having	been	approved	by	Parliament	in	2000,	this	Act	
only	 entered	 into	South	African	 law	 in	 late	2004	after	 the	promulgation	of	 the	






















the	 literature	 given	 the	 South	 African	 government’s	 mediocre	 track	 record	 in	
implementing	 the	 array	 of	 other	 legislation	 that	 has	 violence	 prevention	
aspirations	as	shown	by	Seedat,	et	al.	(2009)	and	Jewkes,	et	al.	(2002).	
	
As	 discussed	 in	 Chapter	 7	 of	 this	 thesis,	 the	 SAPS	 have	 been	 at	 the	 front	 and	
centre	 of	 the	 execution	 and	 enforcement	 of	 firearm	 controls	 in	 post-apartheid	
South	 Africa.	 It	 has	 principally	 been	 due	 to	 the	 actions	 of	 the	 police	 that	 the	
provisions	 of	 firearm	 control	 legislation	 have	 been	 applied	 or	 disregarded.	 In	
other	words,	the	effectiveness	of	firearm	controls	in	South	Africa	has	ultimately	




firearm	 homicide	 in	 South	 Africa	 to	 date,	 suggested,	 in	 general	 terms,	 that	
firearm	 collections,	 confiscations	 and	 destruction	 by	 the	 police	 and	 military,	
combined	with	the	stricter	application	of	the	firearm	licensing	provisions	of	the	
previous	 legislation,	may	have	 contributed	 to	 the	decline	 in	 firearm	homicides	




















an	 unlicensed	 firearm	 or	 the	 firearm	 license	 is	 fraudulent	 then	 the	 SAPS	 are	
																																																								
49	The	 term	 “illegal”	 was	 replaced	 by	 the	 term	 “unlawful”	 in	 the	 2012/13	 SAPS	 annual	 report	
crime	statistics	table	for	the	first	time	in	order	to	bring	reporting	in	line	with	the	FCA.	A	person	
would	 be	 guilty	 of	 this	 offence	 if	 they	 were	 “unlawfully	 in	 possession	 of”	 firearms	 and	
ammunition,	and	were	“not	the	holder	of	a	licence,	permit	or	authorisation	to	possess”	firearms	
and	ammunition.	In	2014/15	the	term	“illegal”	was	reinstated	replacing	“unlawful”.	
50	In	 2013/14	 SAPS	 renamed	 this	 category	 “unlawful	 possession	 of	 firearms	 and	 ammunition”,	
but	reverted	to	using	IPFA	in	2014/15.	





Section	 13	 stores	 (see	 Chapter	 7).	 In	 this	 regard	 the	 SAPS	 are	 required	 to	





level,	 and	 hence	 the	 incentive	 to	 intentionally	 misreport	 such	 crimes	 is	
minimised.		
	
It	 is	 important	 to	note	 that	 IPFA	cases	 relate	 specifically	 to	persons	whom	 the	
SAPS	determine	to	have	been	unlawfully/illegally	in	possession	of	firearms	and	
ammunition.	 It	does	not	 relate	 to	 the	amount	of	 firearms	and	ammunition	 that	
have	been	confiscated	by	the	police.	That	is,	a	single	IPFA	case	can	range	from	a	





was	 a	 general	 upward	 trend	 between	 1994/95	 and	 1999/2000,	 with	 there	
having	 been	 a	 25%	 increase	 between	 these	 two	 reporting	 years.	 This	 was	
followed	 by	 a	 slight	 decline	 (2%)	 the	 following	 year,	 which	was	 subsequently	
followed	 by	 an	 11%	 increase	 between	 2000/01	 and	 2003/04.	 Thereafter	 the	
level	of	reported	IPFA	cases	declined	significantly	(20%)	during	the	subsequent	
two	 years,	 which	 was	 then	 followed	 by	 a	 gradual	 upswing,	 with	 some	 minor	
variations	over	the	next	nine	years	(see	Chart	9.4	below).	The	distinctive	peaks	
in	 1999/2000	 and	 2003/04	 correspond	 with	 the	 periods	 in	 which	 Operation	
























IPFA	 data	 at	 the	 SAPS	 station	 level	 in	 132	 precincts	 for	 the	 period	 1994/95-
2014/15,	reveals	that	significant	annual	increases	and/or	peaks	in	such	reported	
crime	 closely	 corresponds	 to	 major	 police	 operations	 that	 were	 reportedly	
relevant	to	these	precincts.	This	was	particularly	the	case	the	between	1998/99	
and	 2001/02	 (Monozite/Crackdown/Tsipa	 back-to-to-back	 operations)	 and	 in	
2003/04	 (Operation	 Sethunya).	 In	 addition,	 there	 were	 also	 noticeable	
increases/peaks	 in	 the	 IPF	 trajectory	 patterns	 in	 many	 of	 the	 sample	 station	
areas	 during	 large	 province-specific	 operations,	 such	 as	 Operation	 Iron	 Fist	
(Gauteng)	and	Operation	Combat	(Western	Cape).	
	
Hence,	 given	 such	 checks,	 verifications	 and	 dynamics	 IPFA	 appears	 to	 be	 a	
relatively	 robust	data	 category.	Furthermore,	 IPFA	data	 is	one	of	 the	 strongest	
indicators	 of,	 or	 proxy	 for,	 the	 occurrence	 and	 intensity	 of	 high-density	 police	









to	 if	 SAPS	high-density	 operations	 (using	 the	 annual	 number	 of	 reported	 IPFA	




This	 study	 adopts	 a	 case	 series	 approach	 that	 examines	 and	 retrospectively	
compares	trends	in	the	number	of	annual	cases	of	murder	with	respect	to	trends	
in	 number	 of	 annual	 IPFA	 cases	 for	 132	 SAPS	 stations	 areas	 over	 a	 21-year	
period	 (the	 SAPS	 reporting	 years:	 1994/95	 to	 2014/15).	 The	 SAPS	 had	
previously	 identified	 all	 of	 these	 132	 station	 areas	 to	 be	 the	 target	 of	 high-
density	operations	over	much	of	the	study	period.	The	data	for	both	murder	and	
IPFA	were	 then	 displayed	 in	 the	 form	 of	 line	 charts.	 The	 use	 of	 such	 incident	
data,	rather	than	crime	rates,	 is	 in	keeping	with	a	significant	number	of	studies	
that	 have	 focused	 on	 place-based	 criminality	 and	 place-based	 policing	 (Braga,	
2001,	 Braga,	 et	 al.,	 2015,	 Groff,	 et	 al.,	 2010,	 Koper,	 1995,	 Sherman,	 1990,	
Weisburd,	et	al.,	2004).	
	
Using	 crime	 incident	data	 rather	 than	 crime	 rates	has	 an	obvious	drawback	 in	
that	 incident	 data	 does	 not	 reflect	 population	 growth/decline	within	 the	 focal	
areas	 over	 the	 21-year	 period.	 However,	 as	 indicated	 above,	 historical	 crime	
ratio	data	for	the	SAPS	station	areas	is	not	publicly	available;	and	estimating	the	
population	 size	 per	 precinct	 per	 annum	 for	 crime	 analysis	 purposes	 is	
exceedingly	 challenging	 given	 that	 numerous	 non-residents	may	 be	 present	 in	
some	 areas	 for	 significant	 periods	 of	 time	 (such	 as	 for	 employment	 of	
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entertainment	purposes).	Furthermore,	 in	majority	of	areas,	 the	annual	 level	of	
murder	 fluctuated	considerably	over	relatively	short	periods	of	 time	(less	 than	





murder	 and	 IPFA	 cases	 over	 the	 period	 of	more	 than	 two	 decades.	 Trajectory	
pattern	analysis	was	originally	used	to	study	criminal	careers	by	Nagin	and	Land	





trajectory	 analysis	 to	 examine	 temporal	 crime	 trends	 within	 crime	 hot	 spots	
over	time	in	order	to	determine	if	such	criminogenic	spaces	display	unique	crime	
patterns	relative	to	other	areas	(Groff,	et	al.,	2010,	Ratcliffe,	2004,	Stults,	2010,	
Weisburd,	 et	 al.,	 2004,	 Weisburd,	 et	 al.,	 2009).	 Moreover	 Griffith	 and	 Chavez	




Researchers	 that	 have	 used	 trajectory	 pattern	 analysis	 have	 typically	 grouped	
the	 multitude	 of	 trajectory	 observations	 into	 a	 small	 number	 of	 common	




year	 period.	 Thereafter	 three	 common	 trajectory	 patterns	 of	 criminality	 were	
discerned	 in	 order	 to	 frame	 the	discussion	of	 the	 study	 findings.	 Similarly,	 the	
crime	hot	spot	study	by	Groff,	et	al.	(2010),	which	was	also	of	street	segments	(n	
=	 24,023)	 in	 Seattle,	 categorised	 the	 various	 trajectory	 findings	 into	 eight	
common	patterns.			
	
Such	studies	have	 typically	used	statistical	modelling	 techniques,	but	 there	has	
been	 some	 studies	 that	 have	 used	 visual	 inspection,	 along	 with	 other	
methodological	 techniques,	 to	determine	common	patterns	(Allard,	et	al.,	2013,	
Braga,	 et	 al.,	 2010,	 Payne	 and	 Gallagher,	 2016).	 Visual	 inspection	 or	 visual	
analysis	 is	 a	 sub-category	of	 visual	 research	methods	 that	has	most	 commonly	
been	 employed	 within	 anthropology	 and	 sociology	 (Pauwels,	 2010),	 and	 is	
gaining	currency	within	other	social	science	disciplines	(Hamilton,	2006,	Wiles,	
et	 al.,	 2012).	 The	 reason	being	 is	 that	 it	 can	potentially	 provide	 a	 “deeper	 and	
more	 subtle	 exploration	 of	 social	 contexts	 and	 relationships”	 that	 are	 less	
possible	 with	 more	 established	 social	 science	 research	 methods	 (Spencer,	
2011:1).	 It	 has	 primarily	 been	 used	 to	 scrutinise	 visual	 data,	 such	 as	
photographs,	 video	 footage,	 and	 graphics	 (usually	 in	 the	 form	 of	 charts	 and	
maps).	 Moreover	 it	 is	 a	 technique	 that	 has	 been	 used	 to:	 identify	 patterns	 of	
societal	 phenomena;	 the	 relationship	 between	 such	 patterns;	 and	 the	 relative	




interventions	 in	 psychology	 (Bulté	 and	 Onghena,	 2012),	 with	 statisticians	




In	 criminology	 some	 researchers	 have	 increasingly	 suggested	 that	 graphical	
representations	 of	 criminal	 justice	 data	 can	 “provide	 insights	 that	 would	 not	
have	 been	 possible	 using	 standard	 statistical	 methods”,	 especially	 in	 terms	 of	
“complex,	 non-linear	 relationships”	 and	 “dynamic	 interactions”	 between	
variables	 (Maltz,	2010:28).	 In	 the	area	of	 crime	mapping,	visual	 inspection	has	
been	 a	 commonly	 used	method	 of	 research	 and	 analysis	 (Bowers,	 et	 al.,	 2004,	
Buerger,	 et	 al.,	 1995,	 Hiropoulos	 and	 Porter,	 2014).	 Visual	 inspection	 has	 also	




An	 attempt	was	made	 to	 construct	 a	 representative	 control	 group	 in	 order	 to	
minimise	 bias	 and	 develop	 a	 benchmark	 that	 would	 reflect	 movements	 in	




A	 lack	 of	 available	 and	 reliable	 population,	 socio-economic	 and	 disaggregated	
case	 data	 (such	 as	 seasonal	 or	 monthly	 variations	 in	 reported	 crime)	 at	 the	
station	 level	 precluded	 a	 more	 sophisticated	 trend	 analysis.	 Small-scale	 civil	




impact	 on	 murder	 trends	 throughout	 the	 entire	 precinct.	 Furthermore,	
international	and	South	African	evidence	suggests	that	the	availability	of	alcohol	
and	 excessive	 alcohol	 consumption	 have	 directly	 contributed	 to	 violence	





studies	 on	 urban	 upgrading	 have	 shown	 that	 such	 interventions	 have	 the	
potential	 to	 contribute	 to	 reductions	 in	 violence	 and	 criminal	 offending,	 but	 at	
that	time,	no	studies	had	been	undertaken	in	middle-	and	low-income	countries.	





For	 example,	 in	 a	 study	 of	 the	 impact	 of	 urban	 upgrading	 programmes	 in	
Freedom	Park	 (Mitchells	 Plain),	 Sheffield	Road	 (Philippi)	 and	Monwabisi	 Park,	
(Khayelitsha),	 Brown-Luthango,	 et	 al.	 (2016:1-2)	 found	 that:	 “In	 a	 context	
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marked	 by	 high	 unemployment,	 poor	 education	 and	 limited	 opportunities	 to	
break	the	cycle	of	poverty,	the	long-term	impact	and	sustainability	of	upgrading	
interventions	 is	 limited	 in	 the	 absence	 of	 targeted	 programmes	 aimed	 at	
addressing	the	structural	factors	which	drive	and	sustain	high	levels	of	violence	
and	 crime”.	 Furthermore,	 preliminary	 (unpublished)	 study	 findings	 by	
researchers	 closely	 associated	 with	 Violence	 Prevention	 through	 Urban	
Upgrading	(VPUU)	have	indicated	that	robberies	declined	significantly	within	the	
VPUU	 business	 development	 upgrade	 site	 in	 Harare	 (Khayelitsha)	 after	 the	
implementation	of	the	upgrade	and	other	crime	prevention	interventions	in	this	
small	 area	 (Krause	 and	 Shay,	 2016).	 However,	 ethnographic	 research	 in	





In	 order	 to	 assess	 the	 impact	 of	 high-density	 police	 operations	 on	 annual	
reported	 cases	 of	 murder	 in	 South	 Africa	 a	 criterion	 purposeful	 sampling	
strategy	was	adopted,	 the	 logic	of	 such	a	strategy	was	 to	 “review	and	study	all	
cases	 that	 [met]	 some	 predetermined	 criterion	 of	 importance”	 (Patton,	
2002:238).	This	entailed	the	selection	of	“the	most	productive	sample	to	answer	





leadership	 earmarked	 169	 such	 precincts	 for	 regular	 high-density	 police	
operations.	The	SAPS	continued	to	prioritise	the	majority	of	these	station	areas	
well	into	the	2010s.	A	full	listing	of	these	station	areas,	which	was	drawn	from	all	
nine	 provinces,	 was	 provided	 in	 Chapter	 7.	 This	 grouping	 of	 station	 areas	






to	be	established	about	 the	possible	effects	of	SAPS	operations	 in	 these	station	
areas.	 Such	 an	 approach	mitigated	 the	 possibility	 of	 selection	 bias,	 which	 has	
been	 common	 to	 retrospective	 studies,	 as	 well	 as	 improved	 the	 significance,	
accuracy	and	representivity	of	the	findings	(Marshall,	1996).	A	large	sample	also	
greatly	 increased	 the	 prospects	 that	 outliers	 would	 be	 identified,	 and	 the	




are	 four	 considerations	 about	 the	 reliability	 and	 accuracy	 of	 the	 SAPS	 station-





Firstly,	 over	 the	 past	 two	 decades	 the	 SAPS	 has	 constructed	 additional	 police	
stations	 and	 demarcated	 new	 station	 areas,	 many	 of	 which	 have	 been	 within	
existing	 high	 crime	 precincts.	 This	 has	 ostensibly	 been	 an	 attempt	 to	 improve	
policing	effectiveness	and	public	reporting	on	crime.	The	subdividing	of	station	
areas	 has	 significant	 implications	 for	 historical	 analyses	 of	 crime	 statistics	 as	
crime	 reporting	 becomes	 split	 between	 the	 original	 station	 area	 and	 the	 new	
area(s).	In	addition,	the	construction	of	new	police	stations	has	the	potential	to	
change	 the	 relationship	 between	 residents	 and	 SAPS	 personnel,	 which	 in	 turn	
can	affect	crime-reporting	patterns	during	the	 focal	period.	Hence,	such	station	
areas	 were	 not	 included	 in	 the	 sample.	 Secondly,	 for	 similar	 reasons,	 station	
areas	 that	 were	 re-zoned	 between	 provinces	 during	 the	 focal	 period	 were	
omitted.	 Thirdly,	 station	 areas	 with	 consistently	 low	 levels	 of	 murder	 were	
excluded	 from	 the	 study,	 as	murder	 levels	were	 unlikely	 to	 have	been	notably	
influenced	 by	 the	 implementation	 of	 police	 operations.	 Fourthly,	 station	 areas	
where	 the	credibility	of	 the	crime	data	had	been	called	 into	question	were	not	
included	in	the	sample.	
	
Nonetheless,	 some	 exceptions	 were	 made	 due	 to	 the	 importance	 of	 certain	






and	Tembisa	precincts,	 new	policing	 areas,	 namely	Katlehong	North,	 Sebayeng	
and	 Tembisa	 South	 police	 stations	 were	 founded	 in	 2012/13,	 2013/14	 and	
2014/15	respectively.	These	developments	arguably	only	had	a	marginal	impact	




reporting	 and	 intentional	 misclassification)	 at	 the	 Bishop	 Lavis,	 Knysna,	
Oudtshoorn	 and	 Paarl	 East	 stations.	 However,	 these	 data	 problems	 reportedly	
did	 not	 relate	 to	 murder	 or	 IPFA	 cases	 (Bruce,	 2010),	 and	 hence	 these	 four	
station	areas	were	retained	in	the	sample.	
	
As	 a	 result	 of	 taking	 these	 considerations	 into	 account	 37	 station	 areas	 were	
excluded	 from	 the	 final	 sample,	 the	 details	 of	which	 are	 provided	 in	Table	 9.2	
below.	 Hence	 the	 final	 sample	 includes	 132	 station	 areas,	 from	 all	 nine	
provinces:	Western	Cape	(13);	Gauteng	(24);	KwaZulu-Natal	(24);	Eastern	Cape	





Additional	 SAPS	 station	 areas	 established	 in	
original	area	
Khayelitsha;	 KwaMashu;	 Lenasia;	 Mamelodi;	
Upington;	 Kuilsriver;	 Paarl;	 Queenstown,	
Witbank;	 Sasolburg;	 Potchefstroom,	 Pinetown	
and	Klerksdorp	
Low	 levels	 of	 reported	 murder	 (relative	 to	 Humewood;	Makhado;	Malamulele;	Makopane;	
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other	high	crime	areas	in	the	province)	 Sophia	 Town;	 Pretoria	 Central;	 Sunnyside;	
Pabablello;	 Rosedale;	 Roodepan;	 Kakamas;	











Code	 SAPS	station	area	 Code	 SAPS	station	
area	
	 Western	Cape	 Se	 Sebokeng	 Dv	 Duncan	Village	 We	 Welkom	
Bl	 Bishop	Lavis	 Te	 Tembisa	 El	 East	London	 	 North	West	
De	 Delft	 Ye	 Yeoville	 Nc	 Ngcobo	(Engcobo)	 Br	 Brits	
Er	 Elsies	River	 Va	 Vanderbijlpark	 Ge	 Gelvandale	 Ik	 Ikageng	
Gu	 Gugulethu	 	 KwaZulu-Natal	 Gr	 Grahamstown	 Jo	 Jouberton	
Kn	 Knysna	 Bh	 Bhekithemba	 Id	 Idutywa	 Mm	 Mmabatho	
Kr	 Kraaifontein	 Cm	 Cato	Manor	 Iy	 Inyibiba	 Pk	 Phokeng	
La	 Langa	 Ch	 Chatsworth	 Kh	 Kamesh	 Ru	 Rustenburg	
Ma	 Manenberg	 Dc	 Durban	Central	 Kt	 King	Williams’	
Town	
Tl	 Tlhabane	
Mp	 Mitchells	Plain	 Em	 Empangeni	 Kb	 Kwanobuhle	 Vr	 Vryburg	
Ny	 Nyanga	 Es	 Eshikawini/	
Esikaleni	
Kk	 Kwazakele	 	 Limpopo	
Ou	 Oudtshoorn	 Eh	 Eshowe	 Lu	 Lusikisiki	 Bg	 Bolobedu	
Pe	 Paarl	East	 Hc	 Hillcrest	 Li	 Libode	 Gi	 Giyani	
Wo	 Worcester	 In	 Inanda	 Mn	 Mdantsane	 Le	 Lebowakgomo	
	 Gauteng	 Kw	 Kwadabeka	 Mw	 Motherwell	 Mr	 Maake	
Al	 Alexandra	 Kz	 Kwadukuza	 Mf	 Mount	Frere	 Mx	 Mankweng	
At	 Atteridgeville	 Km	 Kwamsane	 Mq	 Mqanduli	 Pw	 Polokwane	
Be	 Benoni	 Ls	 Ladysmith	 Mt	 Mthatha	 Ss	 Seshego	
Bo	 Booysens	 Md	 Madadeni	 Nb	 New	Brighton	 Ty	 Thohoyandou	
Da	 Daveyton	 Mh	 Mariannhill	 Nq	 Ngqeleni	 Tu	 Tubatse	
Do	 Dobsonville	 Ng	 Nongoma	 Ps	 Port	St	Johns	 	 Mpumalanga	
Ev	 Evaton	 Os	 Osizweni	 Vu	 Vulindlela	 Eb	 Embalenhle	
Hi	 Hillbrow	 Ph	 Phoenix	 Wa	 Walmer	 Eo	 Ermelo	
Ip	 Ivory	Park	 Pb	 Pietermaritzburg	 Zw	 Zwelitsha	 Ke	 Kabokweni	
Je	 Jeppe	 Pl	 Plessislaer	 	 Free	State	 Ky	 Kanyamazane	
Jc	 Johannesburg	
Central	
Po	 Point	 Bt	 Bethlehem	 Kf	 Kwaggafontein	
Ka	 Katlehong	 Rb	 Richards	Bay	 Bs	 Bloemspruit	 Kx	 Kwamhlanga	
Kl	 Kliptown	 Um	 Umlazi	 Bi	 Boithuso	 Ms	 Masoyi	
Kd	 Krugersdorp	 Ve	 Verulam	 Bb	 Botshabelo	 Nl	 Nelspruit	
Me	 Meadowlands	 	 Eastern	Cape	 Kg	 Kagisanong	 Pi	 Piet	Retief	
Mo	 Moroka	 Bd	 Bethelsdorp	 Mk	 Maokeng	 Sy	 Siyabuswa	
Of	 Orange	Farm	 Bf	 Buffalo	Flats	 Od	 Odendaalsrus	 To	 Tonga	
Ra	 Randfontein	 Bu	 Butterworth	 Pr	 Park	Road	 	 Northern	Cape	
Ri	 Rietgat	 Ca	 Cambridge	 Sl	 Selosesha	 Gw	 Galeshewe	
Ro	 Roodepoort	 Cr	 Cradock	 Th	 Thabong	 Gh	 Groblershoop	
	 	 	 	 	 	 Ki	 Kimberley	
9.2.3.2	Absence	of	a	control	group	
	
Ideally	 a	 cohort	 research	 design	 should	 have	 been	 employed	 for	 this	 study,	
which	would	 have	 entailed	 the	 construction	 of	 equal	 sized	 and	 representative	
‘treatment’	 and	 control	 groups.	 Conventional	 scientific	 wisdom	 suggests	 that	
																																																								








the	 findings	 of	 a	 study	 (Mann,	 2003,	 Schulz	 and	 Grimes,	 2002,	Wittes,	 2002).	
However,	 as	 with	 all	 retrospective	 studies,	 one	 is	 at	 the	 mercy	 of	 historical	
decisions	that	were	made	regarding	‘treatment’;	and	the	type	of	data,	the	manner	
in	which	the	data	was	recorded,	and	the	level	of	detail	of	the	data	that	has	been	




high	 levels	 of	 violent	 crime	 (particularly	 murder)	 appeared	 to	 have	 been	









The	 section	 below	 describes	 the	 findings	 derived	 from	 the	 trajectory	 pattern	













However,	 the	 charting	 of	 station	 level	 data	 between	 1994/95	 and	 2014/15	
revealed	a	more	complex	state	of	affairs.	Annual	reported	cases	of	murder,	even	
in	places	deemed	 to	be	high	 crime	areas	by	 the	SAPS,	were	disproportionately	
distributed.	 In	 the	 132-sample	 station	 areas	 the	 mean	 of	 the	 annual	 average	
number	of	reported	murders	over	these	21	years	was	60,	but	the	annual	average	
over	this	period	varied	substantially	between	stations,	from	14	in	Vryburg	to	256	




54	It	 is	 predominantly	 only	 in	 prospective	 cohort	 studies,	 such	 as	 the	 random-controlled	 trials	
conducted	by	scholars	 interested	 in	hot	spots	policing,	where	the	cooperation	of	 the	police	has	





cities	 (in	 the	 Western	 Cape,	 KwaZulu-Natal	 and	 Gauteng),	 which	 generally	




average);	Tembisa	 (143	annual	average);	Katlehong	 (142	annual	average);	 and	
Alexandra	 (130	 annual	 average)	 (Marx	 and	Charlton,	 2003,	Noble,	 et	 al.,	 2014,	
Statistics	South	Africa,	2016).	
	
Station	 areas	 that	 were	 located	 in	 rural	 areas	 in	 more	 sparsely	 populated	
provinces	 tended	 to	 experience	 lower	 levels	 of	 murder,	 as	 is	 the	 case	 with	
Vryburg.	Other	examples	 included:	Groblershoop	 (15	annual	average);	Tubatse	
(15	annual	average);	Selosesha	(20	annual	average);	Lebowakgomo	(21	annual	
average);	 Kwaggafontein	 (22	 annual	 average);	 and	 Bolobedu	 (23	 annual	
average).	
	
In	 many	 of	 the	 high	 crime	 areas	 in	 this	 sample	 there	 was	 considerable	
fluctuation	in	the	trends	in	reported	murder	cases	over	time.	That	is,	the	overall	
murder	trend	was	in	a	downward	direction,	but	there	were	significant	peaks	and	
troughs	 at	 the	 station	 level,	 with	 some	 station	 areas	 showing	 an	 aggregate	
upward	 trend	 in	 reported	murders	 from	 the	 late	 1990s,	 such	 as:	 Bethelsdorp;	
Delft;	 Ngcobo;	 Roodepoort;	 Botshabelo;	 Kagisanong;	 Rustenburg;	 and	
Thohoyandou.	In	high	crime	areas	in	more	rural	areas,	or	areas	close	to	small-	to	
medium-sized	towns,	the	variability	in	the	annual	level	of	reported	murder	was	
pronounced,	 as	 in	 the	 case	 of:	 Ladysmith;	 Osizweni;	 Brits;	 Engcobo;	








in	 many	 of	 these	 large	 townships.	 The	 trend	 in	 Umlazi,	 one	 of	 the	 most	
dangerous	policing	areas	in	South	Africa	(Marks,	2005),	was	somewhat	different.	
That	 is,	 there	was	a	gradual	decline	in	the	annual	 incidents	of	murder	after	the	
substantial	 decrease	 in	 political	 violence	 in	 KwaZulu-Natal	 in	 the	 mid	 to	 late	







late	 1990s	 and	 early	 2000s,	 with	 an	 escalation	 in	 reported	 murders	 from	
2009/10.	 In	other	 such	areas,	 as	 in	 the	 case	of	Delft,	Kraaifontein,	Chatsworth,	










At	 the	station	 level	 the	mean	average	of	 the	132	sample	station	areas	over	 the	
period	of	21	years	was	41,	but	 there	was	considerable	variation	across	 station	
areas	 throughout	 that	 period	 (see	 Appendix	 2).	 There	 were	 some	 similarities	
with	 the	 manner	 in	 which	 average	 annual	 murder	 cases	 were	 distributed,	
particularly	in	those	policing	areas	that	included	major	townships	with	sizeable	
informal	 settlements,	 which	 consistently	 reported	 high	 levels	 of	 IPFA	 cases.	
Relevant	examples	included:	Nyanga	(140	annual	average);	Tembisa	(126	annual	
average);	 Inanda	 (125	 annual	 average);	 Katlehong	 (110	 annual	 average);	 and	
Gugulethu	 (102	 annual	 average).	 Similarly,	 station	 areas	 in	 most	 rural	 areas	
(with	 low	 murder	 levels)	 typically	 reported	 significantly	 lower	 than	 average	










violence	 (Quest	 Research	 Services,	 2013),	 also	 recorded	 amongst	 the	 highest	
IPFA	levels	(147	annual	average).	Other	policing	areas	that	included	major	inner	
city	slums	also	experienced	elevated	levels	of	IPFA,	such	as	Johannesburg	Central	




Crackdown	were	 implemented	 (1998/99-2002/03)	 there	was	 a	 clear	 surge	 in	
annual	reported,	or	a	sustained	elevation	in	IPFA	cases,	in	at	least	112	of	the	132	
sample	 station	 areas	 (85%).	 The	 outcome	 of	 Operation	 Sethunya	 (2003/04),	
which	was	almost	exclusively	 focused	on	 illegal	 firearms	and	ammunition,	was	








It	was	not	possible	 to	 reliably	determine	 if	 the	 impact	of	Operation	Sword	and	
Shield	 (1996/97)	was	 reflected	 in	 this	 data	 series,	 as	 available	 crime	 data	 for	
most	 high	 crime	 station	 areas	 prior	 to	 1994/95	 has	 been	 widely	 regarded	 as	
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being	 inaccurate	and	unreliable	 (De	Kock,	 et	 al.,	 2015).	Nonetheless,	 the	above	
charts	 revealed	 that	 in	at	 least	45	station	areas	 (34.1%)	 there	were	 significant	




an	 annual	 national	 operation	 that	 was	 pursued	 during	 the	 extended	 festive	
season	 period	 from	 2007/08	 onwards.	 There	 was	 some	 variation	 in	 the	 focal	
station	areas	for	this	operation	from	2007/08,	with	the	IPFA	being	one	of	many	
priorities.	Nevertheless,	in	at	least	87	of	the	sample	police	station	areas	(65.9%)	
the	 effect	 of	 Operation	 Duty	 Calls	 /	 Festive	 Season	was	 clearly	 perceptible	 by	
means	of	 at	 least	 one	 significant	upswing	 in	 reported	 annual	 cases	of	 IPFA.	 	 It	
was	not	 possible	 to	 determine	 if	Operation	Fiela-Reclaim	had	had	 an	 effect	 on	
IPFA	levels	as	this	operation	took	place	during	the	2015/16	reporting	period.	
	
In	 the	Western	Cape	 significant	 peaks	 in	 annual	 IPFA	 cases	 in	 areas	with	 high	
levels	 of	 gang	 violence	 closely	 corresponded	 with	 the	 implementation	 of	
dedicated	anti-gang	SAPS	operations	in	this	province,	such	as	Recoil	(1997-99),	
Saladin	 (1998),	 Slasher	 (2001)	 and	 Combat	 (2011/12	 –	 2014/15).	 The	 key	
precincts	 in	 this	 regard	were:	Bishop	Lavis;	 Elsies	River;	Manenberg,	Mitchells	
Plain;	 Kraaifontein;	 and	 Delft.	 A	 similar	 effect	 was	 observable	 in	 Gauteng	 in	
relation	 to	 Operation	 Iron	 Fist	 (2006/07),	 especially	 in	 Hillbrow	 and	











Sword	&	Shield	 Er;	Gu;	At;	Be;	Do;	Ev;	Hi;	 Je;	 Jc;	Ka;	Me;	Of;	Ri;	 Se;	







































Each	 of	 the	 line	 charts	 from	 the	 132	 SAPS	 station	 areas	 presented	 a	 unique	
trajectory	 pattern	 of	 annual	 murder	 and	 annual	 IPFA	 data	 for	 the	 period	
1994/95	–	2014/15	(see	Appendix	3).	By	means	of	visual	inspection	six	general	
trajectory	 patterns	 that	 related	 to	 the	 level	 and	 direction	 of	 the	 sequential	
changes	 in	 the	 two	 crime	 categories	 over	 time	were	 identified	 from	 these	132	






This	 pattern	 entails	 an	 elevated	 level	 of	murder	 during	 the	mid	 to	 late	 1990s,	
while	 IPFA	 levels	 are	 relatively	 low	at	 this	 time.	 	 Thereafter	 the	murder	 trend	
line	 declines	 until	 2010/11	 (or	 thereabouts).	 From	 that	 point	 onwards	 the	
murder	trajectory	displays	minor	variations	or	may	plateau.	The	IPFA	trend	line	
increases	from	1994/95	until	around	1999/00	with	it	being	noticeably	elevated	
at	 the	 times	 of	 relevant	 SAPS	 major	 high-density	 operations	 thereafter,	
particularly	between	2000/01	and	in	2004/05.	The	trajectory	of	the	IFPA	trend	
line	subsequently	converges	with	the	IPFA	line	in	a	general	downward	direction	




townships	 and	 inner	 city	 slum-like	 areas	 in	 Gauteng	 and	KwaZulu-Natal	 (with	
the	 exception	of	 the	 Johannesburg	Central	 precinct),	with	 the	 greatest	 number	
station	 areas	 (41	 out	 of	 132	 or	 31%)	 displaying	 this	 general	 type	 of	 pattern.	
Some	 25	 station	 areas	 (out	 of	 the	 41	 station	 areas)	 were	 from	 Gauteng	 and	
KwaZulu-Natal,	 with	 Alexandra,	 Hillbrow,	 Inanda,	 Rietgat	 and	 Nongoma	 being	








2010/11.	 From	 that	 point	 onwards	 the	 murder	 trend	 line	 displays	 minor	
variations	 or	 plateaus.	 The	 IPFA	 trend	 line	 increases	 from	1994/95	 to	 around	
1999/00	with	 it	being	noticeably	elevated	at	 the	 times	of	 relevant	SAPS	major	
high-density	operations,	particularly	between	1999/00	and	in	2004/05.	The	two	
trend	 lines	do	not	 cross,	but	 converge	 closely	after	2003/04,	both	 in	a	general	







townships,	 such	 as	 Bhekithemba,	 Plessislaer,	 Motherwell	 and	 Mdantsane;	 to	





the	murder	 trend	 line	mostly	 being	 above	 the	 IPFA	 trend	 line.	 The	 IPFA	 trend	
line	displays	noticeable	peaks	or	 is	at	an	elevated	 level	at	 the	times	of	relevant	
major	 SAPS	 high-density	 operations	 for	 these	 areas,	 particularly	 between	
1998/99	and	2001/02,	and	in	2003/04.	In	many	such	cases	the	murder	and	IPFA	
trend	 lines	 converge	 at	 a	 number	 of	 points,	 with	 there	 being	 some	 minor	
crossovers	at	some	points	in	time,	and	then	typically	converge	towards	the	end	






In	 this	 pattern	 both	 the	 murder	 and	 IPFA	 trend	 lines	 vary	 considerably	
throughout	 the	 focal	period,	with	murder	 levels	being	mostly	higher	 than	 IPFA	
levels,	although	both	trend	lines	prominently	intersect	on	at	least	one	occasion.	
The	 IPFA	 trend	 line	 is	markedly	 elevated	 at	 the	 times	 of	 relevant	 SAPS	major	
high-density	 operations,	 particularly	 between	 2000/01	 and	 in	 2004/05.	 This	
pattern	 array	 is	 exhibited	 in	 21	 station	 areas	 (15.9%),	 with	 it	 being	 mainly	
prevalent	in	Gauteng	and	KwaZulu-Natal,	and	includes	areas	that	have	typically	




In	 this	 pattern	 both	 the	 murder	 and	 IPFA	 levels	 are	 significantly	 elevated	 in	
1994/95,	with	the	IPFA	trend	line	remaining	above	the	murder	line	for	most	of	
the	 focal	 period.	 The	 IPFA	 trend	 line	 peaks	 during	 the	 key	 SAPS	 high-density	
operations	that	were	relevant	to	these	areas.	Murder	levels	vary	throughout	the	
21	 year	 period,	 but	 generally	 decline	 from	 the	 late	 1990s,	 and	 then	 mostly	
escalate	 after	 2010/11.	 Such	 a	 trajectory	 pattern	 was	 observable	 in	 9	 station	
areas	(6.8%)	and	was	most	common	in	precincts	in	the	Western	Cape	that	have	
regularly	been	affected	by	gang	violence,	such	as	Mitchells	Plain,	Elsies	River	and	










trend	 line	 over	 the	 21-year	 period.	 Both	 lines	 may	 vary	 over	 time,	 and	 the	
trajectory	lines	do	not	cross	one	other	but	may	converge	in	later	years.	The	IPFA	
trend	line	does	not	consistently	reflect	increases	during	the	years	of	major	high-
density	 operations.	 Thirteen	 precincts	 (9.9%)	 displayed	 such	 a	 pattern,	 which	
included	some	of	 the	most	violent	police	areas	 in	South	Africa,	 such	as	Nyanga	

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































a	 noteworthy	 number	 of	 SAPS	 station	 areas	 a	 striking	 trajectory	 pattern	
characteristic	was	displayed.	That	 is,	 there	appeared	to	be	a	significant	 inverse	
association	 between	 the	 murder	 and	 IPFA	 trajectories.	 More	 specifically,	 in	 a	
significant	number	of	precincts	over	at	least	two	consecutive	years	an	increase	in	
the	 annual	 number	 of	 IPFA	 cases	 corresponded	 with	 a	 decline	 in	 the	 annual	






132	 SAPS	 station	 areas	 (26%).	 In	 addition,	 within	 at	 least	 15	 of	 these	 34	
precincts	 the	 apparent	 symbiotic	 association	 was	 observable	 on	 at	 least	 two	
occasions	between	1994/95	and	2014/15.	This	possible	symbiotic	relationship	
was	 not	 consistently	 demonstrated	 in	 terms	 of	 all	 six	 general	 patterns,	with	 it	
being	more	prevalent	 in	station	areas	that	presented:	the	converging	crossover	
pattern	 (18	 stations);	 the	 variable	 crossover	 pattern	 (7	 stations);	 and	 the	




Appendix	 4	 provides	 details	 of	 107	 apparent	 inverse	 associations	 between	
murder	and	IPFA	levels	from	these	34	stations	and	the	time	periods	in	which	the	
inverse	 increases/decreases	 took	 place.	 In	 addition,	 the	 related	 percentage	
increases/decreases	in	the	levels	of	murder	and	IPFA	are	included.	Of	these	107	
inverse	 relationships,	 57	 were	 related	 to	 an	 IPFA-increase/murder-decrease	
association;	 and	 50	 were	 related	 to	 an	 IPFA-decrease/murder-increase	
association.	In	terms	of	the	former,	25	out	of	the	57	inverse	associations	related	
to	 the	 period	 of	 Operation	 Crackdown	 (44%);	 12	 were	 during	 the	 period	 of	
Operation	 Sword	 and	 Shield	 (21%);	 11	 took	 place	 possibly	 during	 a	 specific	
provincial	 operation	 or	 Operation	 Duty	 Calls;	 six	 were	 during	 a	 period	 of	






increase	 in	 IPFA	 cases	was	 higher	 than	 the	 percentage	 decrease	 in	murder.	 In	
58%	 of	 IPFA-decrease/murder-increase	 associations	 the	 relative	 percentage	
decrease	 in	 IPFA	 cases	was	 higher	 than	 the	 percentage	 increase	 in	murder.	 In	
general	 a	 significant	 percentage	 increase	 in	 IPFA	 cases	 corresponded	 with	 a	
significant	 decrease	 in	 the	 percentage	 of	 murder	 cases,	 but	 this	 was	 not	
consistent	across	station	areas.	For	example,	in	Ngcobo,	a	500%	increase	in	IFPA	
cases	 between	 1995/96	 and	 1997/98	 yielded	 a	 30%	decrease	 in	murder	 over	
this	 period,	 while	 in	 Atteridgeville,	 a	 26%	 increase	 in	 IPFA	 cases	 between	
2001/02	 and	 2003/04	 resulted	 in	 a	 45%	 reduction	 in	 murder.	 Similarly	 a	
sizeable	decline	 in	 the	percentage	of	 IPFA	cases	was	directly	associated	with	a	
considerable	increase	in	murder,	but	this	was	also	not	a	consistent	dynamic.	For	





In	 at	 least	 17	 other	 station	 areas	 across	 three	 pattern	 types	 (converging	
crossover;	 converging	 connection;	 and	 variable	 crossover)	 there	 appeared	 to	
have	been	a	delayed	inverse	association	between	IPFA	and	murder	trajectories.	
That	 is,	 murder	 levels	 did	 not	 decline	 significantly	 in	 the	 same	 year	 as	 a	
noticeable	 increase	 in	 the	 number	 of	 IPFA	 cases,	 and	 only	 decreased	 the	
following	year.	In	the	case	of	Ivory	Park,	for	example,	there	was	a	91%	increase	




This	was	also	 the	case	with	Everton	where	 there	was	a	224%	increase	 in	 IPFA	
cases	between	1995/96	and	1996/97	(during	the	period	of	Operation	Sword	and	
Shield),	 while	 the	 number	 of	 murder	 cases	 only	 decreased	 from	 1997/98	 (by	
29%).	 Similar	 trajectory	 displays	 were	 observable	 in	 the	 case	 of	 Rietgat	
(immediately	 after	 Operation	 Sword	 and	 Shield),	 as	 well	 as	 in	 Jeppe	 (shortly	
after	 Operation	 Crackdown).	 Other	 station	 areas	 where	 this	 was	 distinctively	
observable	 included:	 Giyani;	 Grahamstown;	 Ikageng;	 Mankweng;	 Mariannhill;	
Mmabatho;	Paarl	East;	Phoenix;	Richards	Bay;	Roodepoort	and	Tlhabane.	
	
In	 some	 townships,	 such	 as	 Nyanga	 and	 Motherwell,	 there	 was	 a	 series	 of	
consecutive	elevations	in	the	IPFA	levels	before	there	was	a	noteworthy	decline	





average	 of	 74%	 increase	 over	 these	 five	 years	 compared	 to	 1999/00.	 The	
murder	level	declined	significantly	between	2002/03	and	2004/05,	from	485	to	
263	 (43%	 decrease).	 Likewise	 in	 Motherwell,	 murder	 levels	 only	 consistently	






In	 addition	 to	 the	 station	 areas	 discussed	 above	 at	 least	 another	 ten	 precincts	
displayed	 elevated	 IPFA	 levels	 that	 corresponded	 with	 consistent	 declines	 in	
annual	 murder	 cases	 over	 a	 period	 of	 several	 years	 (60%	 of	 which	 displayed	
converging	 crossover	 patterns).	Minor	 troughs	 in	 the	 IPFA	 trend	 lines	 did	 not	
result	 in	 significant	 increases	 in	 murder,	 but	 did	 appear	 to	 equate	 with	 a	
slackening-off	in	the	declining	trajectory	of	murder	cases,	or	negligible	increases.	
This	was	specifically	the	case	for	Daveyton	(1998/99–2002/03);	Durban	Central	
(2006/07–2012/13);	 Hillcrest	 (2008/09–2011/12);	 Meadowlands	 (1996/97–
2003/04);	 Mitchells	 Plain	 (1998/99–2006/07);	 Nelspruit	 (2010/2011–




In	 at	 least	 15	 station	 areas	 there	 appeared	 to	 be	 no	 consistent	 inverse	
association	between	the	trajectories	of	the	two	data	categories,	with	there	being	
no	corresponding	decrease	in	murder	levels	relative	to	increases	in	IPFA	cases,	
and	 vice	 versa.	 In	 Gugulethu,	 for	 instance,	 there	 were	 dramatic	 increases	 and	
elevations	in	the	IPFA	cases	between	1998/99	and	2002/03,	yet	murder	levels,	
remained	 relatively	 constant	 during	 this	 period.	 Similar	 trajectories	were	 also	
observable	 in	Vanderbijlpark	during	 the	 same	period.	Other	 station	areas	with	
similar	 characteristics	 included:	 Bloemspruit;	 Brits;	 Eshikawini;	 Galeshewe;	







variable	 separation	pattern,	which	 included	mostly	police	 areas	with	 relatively	
low	 IPFA	 levels	 (an	 annual	 average	 of	 10	 IPFA	 cases)	 in	 rural	 areas,	 such	 as	
Groblershoop	and	Boithuso.	
	
In	 addition,	 in	 at	 least	 six	 more	 precincts	 some	 degree	 of	 inverse	 association	
between	the	IPFA	and	murder	trajectories	was	observable	for	most	of	the	focal	
period,	but	during	some	consecutive	years,	particularly	after	2009/10,	increases	
in	 IPFA	were	matched	with	 increases	 in	murder.	This	was	notably	prevalent	 in	
areas	 that	 exhibited	 the	 variable	 inverted	 pattern	 such	 as	 Delft,	 Elsies	 River,	
Manenberg	 and	 Mitchells	 Plain.	 These	 areas	 have	 traditionally	 been	 prone	 to	










Existing	 theory	 and	 evidence	 can	 potentially	 account	 for	 the	 apparent	 inverse	
association	between	the	IPFA	(as	a	proxy	for	SAPS	high-density	operations)	and	
murder	 trajectories	 that	 were	 observable	 between	 1994/95	 and	 2014/15	 in	
more	 than	 half	 of	 the	 132	 SAPS	 station	 areas	 included	 in	 this	 study.	 This	was	
especially	 the	 case	 in	 those	 areas	 where	 there	 was	 a	 seemingly	 immediate	
interdependent	 inverse	 association	between	 the	 two	 trajectory	 lines.	Hence,	 in	
the	 section	 below,	 theory	 and	 evidence	 concerning	 to	 the	 following	 will	 be	
discussed	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 apparent	 inverse	 association	 between	murder	 and	




As	 previously	 indicated,	 since	 1995	 the	 SAPS	 have	 consistently	 combined	
elements	 of	 placed-based	 policing	 and	 ‘broken	 windows’	 (or	 ‘zero	 tolerance’)	
policing	 into	 their	 high-density	 operational	 methodology.	 As	 discussed	 in	
Chapter	2	and	Chapter	3,	there	is	a	wealth	of	research	findings	that	demonstrate	
that	place-based	policing	can	result	in	place-specific	reductions	in	violent	crime,	
including	 murder	 (Braga,	 et	 al.,	 2015,	 Sherman,	 1992).	 The	 same	 applies	 to	
studies	on	 ‘broken	windows’	policing,	which	suggests	that	violent	crime	can	be	
reduced	 through	 geographically-concentrated	 disruption	 and	 penalisation	 of	
routine	 misdemeanour	 offending,	 as	 such	 criminality,	 and	 the	 norms	 and	





SAPS	high-density	 operations	 have	 consistently	 prioritised	 the	 seizure	 of	 large	
quantities	 of	 illegal	 firearms	 and	 ammunition.	 As	 discussed	 in	 Chapter	 2,	 the	
majority	of	 international	research	on	 firearm	violence	suggests	 that	high	 levels	
of	 firearm	 prevalence	 contributes	 to	 elevated	 homicide	 levels	 (Hepburn	 and	
Hemenway,	2004,	Monuteaux,	et	al.,	2015,	Siegel,	et	al.,	2013).	Rigorous	studies	
have	 also	 indicated	 that	 a	 reduction	 in	 the	 availability	 of	 firearms	 can	 lead	 to	
significant	 decreases	 in	 the	homicide	 rate	 (Chapman,	 et	 al.,	 2015,	 Loftin,	 et	 al.,	
1991,	Villaveces,	et	al.,	2000).		
	
In	 addition,	 as	 discussed	 in	 Chapter	 7,	 there	 was	 a	 dramatic	 reduction	 in	 the	
issuing	of	new	firearm	licences	from	the	early	2000s	due	to	more	discerning	and	











Hence,	 the	net	effect	of	all	 these	measures	was	that	 those	persons	that	were	at	
risk	 of	 perpetrating	 firearm	 violence	 found	 it	 considerably	 more	 difficult	 to	
acquire	firearms	and	ammunition	(both	illegal	and	legal).		
	
As	 previously	 indicated,	 studies	 undertaken	 by	 the	 National	 Injury	 Mortality	
Surveillance	System	have	shown	that	there	were	substantial	reductions	in	non-
natural	deaths	due	 to	 firearm	 injuries	between	2000	and	2008	 in	 five	of	South	
Africa’s	 largest	 cities,	while	 deaths	 due	 to	 sharp-force	 and	 blunt-force	 injuries	
remained	 relatively	 constant	 (National	 Injury	 Mortality	 Surveillance	 System,	
2009).	Therefore,	it	is	possible	that	the	arms	control	and	disarmament	measures	




As	 earlier	 discussed,	 a	 further	 key	 component	 of	 the	 SAPS	 high-density	
operations	was	the	arrest	of	large	numbers	of	offenders	and	suspected	offenders.	
There	 is	 considerable	 North	 American	 research	 that	 indicates	 that	 the	
imprisonment	of	violent	offenders	can	have	crime	reduction	effects	(Marvell	and	
Moody,	 1998,	 McDowall,	 et	 al.,	 1992,	 Spelman,	 2000,	 Zimring	 and	 Hawkins,	
1995)	 (Groff,	 et	 al.,	 2015).	 Hence,	 it	 is	 possible	 that	 murder	 levels	 may	 have	
declined	in	high	crime	areas	 in	the	aftermath	of	high-density	operations	due	to	
the	 incarceration	 of	 some	 of	 the	 most	 dangerous	 individuals	 as	 well	 as	 those	
responsible	for	lesser	crimes.	The	reason	being	is	that	such	arrests	may	have	had	
the	effect	of	altering	the	criminogenic	dynamics	of	these	spaces	in	two	respects.	
Firstly,	 a	 substantial	 number	 of	 violent	 residents	 from	 these	 areas	 could	 no	
longer	 perpetrate,	 and/or	 directly	 mobilise	 peers	 to	 perpetrate	 violent	 crime	
(more	commonly	known	as	the	 ‘incapacitation	effect’)	(Altbeker,	2007,	Leggett,	
et	 al.,	 2003,	 South	 African	 Police	 Service,	 2010b).	 Secondly,	 large	 numbers	 of	




The	trajectory	patterns	 in	at	 least	15	station	areas,	chiefly	 those	that	displayed	
the	variable	separation	and	variable	inverted	patterns,	revealed	that	significant	
increases	 in	 IPFA	 cases	 did	 not	 consistently	 correspond	 with	 a	 subsequent	
downturn	 in	 the	murder	 trajectory.	 In	 some	 instances	murder	 and	 IPFA	 levels	
increased	 simultaneously	 over	 successive	 years.	 This	was	particularly	 the	 case	
for	 station	 areas	 with	 the	 variable	 inverted	 pattern.	 In	 a	 notable	 number	 of	
stations	 areas	 that	 conformed	 to	 the	 variable	 separation	 pattern,	 the	 murder	
trend	line	varied	over	the	21-year	period,	whilst	the	IPFA	trend	line	was	at	a	low	
level	 and	 remained	 relatively	 constant.	 In	 addition,	 in	 a	 small	 number	 of	
precincts	where	the	variable	convergence	and	variable	crossover	patterns	were	
observable	 there	 was	 no	 distinct	 inverse	 association	 between	 the	 IPFA	 and	









IPFA	 and	 murder	 trajectories,	 that	 the	 key	 determinants	 of	 murder	 were	
impervious	 to	 the	 crime	 reduction	 pressures	 of	 the	 high-density	 operations.	
There	 are	 five	 such	 key	 determinants	 that	 appear	 to	 have	 been	 specifically	
relevant	to	some	of	the	areas	in	question,	which	are	as	follows:	excessive	alcohol	
consumption;	 violence	 in	 the	minibus	 taxi	 industry;	 political	 violence;	 harmful	




alcohol	has	contributed	considerably	 to	all	 forms	of	 injuries,	with	Schneider,	et	





Alcohol	 is	 considered	 a	 common	 catalyst	 for	 homicide	 as	 it	 often	 results	 in	
aggressive	 behaviour,	 particularly	 amongst	 young	 men	 (Parry	 and	 Dewing,	
2006).	 Such	 aggression	 frequently	 translates	 into	 interpersonal	 violence,	 and	
even	 fatalities.	 Alcohol	 has	 also	 been	 identified	 as	 a	 risk	 factor	 in	 relation	 to	
gender-based	violence	(Seedat,	et	al.,	2009),	including	in	rural	areas	(Jewkes,	et	
al.,	 2006).	 An	 unpublished	 study	 by	 Lamb	 (2016)	 of	 SAPS	 murder	 dockets	 in	
SAPS	 precincts	 in	 rural	 KwaZulu-Natal	 from	 2008	 and	 2009	 indicated	 that	
murder	was	often	the	outcome	of	disagreements	between	individuals	who	were	
intoxicated	 at	 the	 time.	 Such	 dynamics	may	 possibly	 also	 apply	 to	 other	 rural	
areas.	 In	 most	 publications	 on	 the	 relationship	 between	 alcohol	 and	 violence,	
shebeens	 have	 frequently	 been	 identified	 as	 an	 epicentre	 for	 alcohol	 related	
murders	in	high	crime	communities	(Faull,	2013,	Redpath,	et	al.,	2008)	.	
	
Recent	 ethnographic	 research	 on	 shebeens	 in	 Sweet	 Home	 Farm,	 an	 informal	
settlement	near	Philippi	(Cape	Town),	has	however	suggested	that	shebeens	“are	
not	 simple	 unidirectional	 drivers	 of	 crime	 and	 criminality.	 They	 are	 instead	
complex	 social	 spaces	 that	 form	 part	 of	 the	 constellation	 of	 risk	 factors	 for	
violence”	(Herrick	and	Charman,	2013:31).	That	 is,	some	shebeen	owners	have	
introduced	 design	 features,	 entertainment	 resources,	 social	 controls	 and	
selective	 entry	 criteria	 in	 order	 to	 reduce	 the	 potential	 risk	 for	 interpersonal	
violence.	Moreover,	shebeen	owners	 in	 the	Sweet	Home	Farm	became	adept	at	
keeping	their	businesses	open	despite	regular	raids	by	the	police.	Some	shebeen	
owners	 had	paid	 bribes	 to	 the	 police	 to	 prevent	 police	 raids	 of	 their	 premises	
(Charman,	 et	 al.,	 2014,	 Herrick	 and	 Charman,	 2013).	 It	 is	 likely	 that	 these	
characteristics	apply	to	shebeens	in	many	other	parts	of	South	Africa.		
	
Therefore,	 where	 the	 contextual	 violence	 reduction	measures	 are	 not	 in	 place	








Violent	 feuds	 between	 clans	 and	 villages	 have	 existed	 in	many	 rural	 areas	 for	
decades,	 particularly	 in	 KwaZulu-Natal	 and	 the	 Eastern	 Cape.	 Towns	 such	 as	
Idutywa,	Ngcobo	and	Lusikisiki	have	been	named	as	hot	spots	for	these	types	of	
murders	 (Helen	 Suzeman	 Foundation,	 1999,	 Mathis,	 2013).	 Similarly,	 the	
minibus	 taxi	 industry	 has	 been	 prone	 to	 persistently	 fierce	 rivalries	 in	 urban	
townships	and	rural	 towns	 throughout	South	Africa	with	countless	passengers,	
drivers	and	taxi	owners	losing	their	lives	as	a	result.	The	report	of	the	Ntsebeza	
Inquiry	 into	 the	 minibus	 taxi	 industry	 in	 Cape	 Town	 revealed	 that	 ‘warlords’	






Strong	beliefs	 in	witchcraft	have	also	been	at	 the	core	of	numerous	murders	 in	
the	rural	hinterland	of	South	Africa	for	decades	(Ashforth,	2005).	For	example,	in	
Lusikisiki,	 Libode,	 Mount	 Frere	 and	 Ngcobo,	 witchcraft	 or	 ‘muti’	 has	 been	
attributed	in	SAPS	and	media	reports	to	numerous	murders	and	violent	attacks	
between	 May	 2009	 and	 September	 2016	 (Fuzile,	 2016).	 Witchcraft	 related	




In	 rural	 communities	 within	 Eastern	 Cape	 botched	 circumcision	 procedures	
during	 initiation	 ceremonies	 has	 led	 to	 the	 death	 of	 hundreds	 of	 young	 men,	
which	 the	SAPS	have	often	recorded	as	murder.	According	 to	 the	Eastern	Cape	
Provincial	 Government,	 between	 June	 2006	 and	 June	 2013	 some	 453	 initiates	
died	 in	 the	 Eastern	 Cape	 (Douglas	 and	 Hongoro,	 2016),	 with	 Libode	 (Koyana,	
2016),	 Lusikisiki	 (Nchabeleng,	 et	 al.,	 2012)	 and	 Duncan	 Village	 (South	 African	
Press	Association,	2003b)	having	been	regarded	as	hot	spots	for	such	deaths.	
	
Numerous	 parts	 of	 South	 African	 have	 a	 long	 history	 of	 ‘political’	 violence,	
namely	 that	 inter-	 and	 intra-party	 rivalries	 are	 resolved	 through	 the	 use	 of	
violence.	 This	 has	 been	 especially	 prevalent	 in	 KwaZulu-Natal	 (Taylor,	 2002)	
(Bruce,	 2009)	 (Madlala,	 2016,	 Schuld,	 2013).	 Eshikawini,	 for	 example,	 has	
regularly	experienced	party	political	violence	dating	back	to	the	1990s,	including	
assassinations	 and	 massacres	 (Truth	 and	 Reconciliation	 Commission	 of	 South	
Africa,	 1998).	 Eshikawini	 has	 continued	 to	 be	 affected	 by	 political	 violence,	
combined	 with	 ordinary	 criminal	 violence	 and	 under-performance	 by	 SAPS	
members	 in	 the	 area	 (Maseko,	 2010).	 Other	 areas	 reportedly	 affected	 by	 such	




levels	 of	 murder.	 In	 Cato	 Manor,	 for	 instance,	 a	 SAPS	 organised	 crime	 unit	
	
	186	
operating	 in	 the	 area	 was	 reportedly	 responsible	 for	 lethally	 shooting	 an	
excessive	number	of	suspects	between	2008	and	2011,	with	45	individuals	dying	
as	 a	 result	 of	 police	 action	 in	 this	 station	 area	 (Bruce,	 2015,	 Hofstatter,	 et	 al.,	
2011).	 Reports	 by	 the	 Independent	 Police	 Investigative	 Directorate	 have	 also	
shown	 that	 SAPS	 members	 have	 perpetrated	 murders	 in	 Daveyton,	 Giyani,	
Groblershoop,	Hillbrow,	Mankweng,	New	Brighton,	Orange	Farm	and	Rietgat	(to	





accounted	 for	 a	 lack	 of	 an	 inverse	 relationship	 between	 IPFA	 and	 murder	 in	
some	 areas.	 This	 is	 partially	 supported	 by	 published	 analyses	 of	 non-natural	
deaths	in	2009	by	the	Medical	Research	Council,	which	found	that	firearms	only	
accounted	 for	 29%	 of	 all	 homicides,	 and	 the	 percentage	 was	 even	 less	 in	 the	
Eastern	 Cape,	 Northern	 Cape,	 Free	 State	 and	 the	 North	 West	 Province	
(Matzopoulos,	et	al.,	2013).	
	
This	 use	 of	 other	 weapons,	 such	 as	 knives,	 to	 commit	 murder	 has	 been	
particularly	 the	case	 in	policing	areas	 that	are	mostly	comprised	of	 small	 rural	
towns,	 such	as	Groblershoop,	Boithuso	and	Odendaalsrus,	where	 there	has	not	
been	 widespread	 availability	 of	 firearms.	 In	 the	 Northern	 Cape	 Province,	 for	




The	 crime	 reduction	 effect	 of	 imprisonment	 has	 been	 contested	 by	 a	 range	
criminologists	 and	 penologists	 arguing	 that	 incarceration	 has:	 a	 negligible	
impact	 on	 crime	 (DeFina	 and	 Arvanites,	 2002);	 diminishing	 marginal	 crime	
prevention	returns	 (Levitt,	2004);	and	causes	 long-term	societal	damage	 (Rose	
and	Clear,	1998)	(Tonry,	2004).	The	link	between	imprisonment	and	crime	levels	
in	South	Africa	has	not	been	subjected	 to	rigorous	studies.	Publications	on	 this	
topic	have	 tended	 to	be	normative	 and	 speculative,	 arguing	 that	 South	Africa’s	




Nonetheless,	 there	 is	 consensus	 in	 some	 of	 the	 criminological	 literature	 that	 a	
significant	 risk	 of	 recidivism	 exists	 for	 prisoners	 released	 from	 prisons	 in	











Firearm	 possession	 and	 firearm	 violence	 are	 defining	 features	 of	 many	 street	
gangs	 in	 South	 Africa.	 Gangs	 frequently	 use	 firearms	 against	 members	 of	
opposing	 gangs,	 and	 the	 nature	 of	 ‘career	 pathing’	 in	 many	 gang	 hierarchies	
encourages	 violent	 offending	 in	 order	 to	 acquire	 prison	 credentials	within	 the	
Numbers	(prison)	gangs	(Pinnock,	2016,	Steinberg,	2004b).	Such	gangs	typically	
have	established	methods	and	networks	of	securing	firearms,	which	are	likely	to	
be	 more	 difficult	 for	 police	 operations	 to	 disrupt	 and	 dismantle.	 Additionally,	
given	 the	 centrality	 of	 firearms	 for	 gangs,	 gang	 members	 tend	 to	 be	 acutely	
motivated	 to	 acquire	 replacement	 firearms	 should	 the	 police	 confiscate	 their	
existing	 firearms.	 Such	 a	 state	 of	 affairs	 may	 contribute	 to	 the	 absence	 of	 a	
consistent	 inverse	 association	 between	 IPFA	 and	murder	 trajectories	 in	 areas	
that	are	frequently	affected	by	gang	violence.	Furthermore,	plans	by	gang	leaders	
to	 expand	 the	 territories	 under	 their	 control	 and	 access	 to	 illicit	markets	may	
result	 in	 such	gang	 leaders	acquiring	a	 large	arsenal	of	 firearms	as	a	means	 to	
achieve	such	an	objective.		
	
During	 the	period	2010/11	 to	2014/15	 some	gang	areas	 in	 the	Western	Cape,	
such	 as	 Bishop	 Lavis,	 Elsies	 River,	 Manenberg	 and	 Mitchells	 Plain	 showed	
substantial	upward	movement	in	annual	IPFA	cases,	which	corresponded	with	a	
sustained	upsurge	 in	murder	cases.	The	possible	reason	 for	 this	state	of	affairs	
was	 that	 these	 areas	 were	 subjected	 to	 a	 dramatic	 intensification	 of	 violent	
confrontations	between	gangs,	following	the	release	of	certain	gang	leaders	from	
prison	 (Swingler,	 2014,	 Zille	 and	 de	 Lille,	 2013),	 and	 large	 injections	 of	 illegal	
firearms	as	a	result	of	the	corrupt	SAPS	firearm	control	officials	(Thamm,	2016)	
(see	 Chapter	 7).	 This	 suggests	 that	 under	 such	 war-like	 conditions	 where	
perpetrators	 of	 violence	 have	 easy	 access	 to	 illegal	 firearms,	 high-density	
operations	may	not	have	a	reduction	effect	on	murder	levels	in	the	short-term.	
	
Inconsistent	 associations	 between	 murder	 and	 IPFA	 trajectories	 were	 also	
observable	 in	 other	 areas	 that	 have	 been	 notorious	 for	 gang	 violence,	 namely	








demonstrate	 that	 in	 a	 significant	 number	 of	 precincts	 an	 apparent	 inverse	
interrelationship	between	annual	trends	in	reported	cases	murder	and	IPFA	(as	
a	 proxy	 for	 the	 annual	 intensity	 of	 SAPS	 high-density	 operations)	 was	
observable.	
	
In	 effect,	 these	 results	 imply	 that	 SAPS’	 high-density	 operations	 may	 have	





the	 aftermath	 of	 major	 operations	 in	 a	 noteworthy	 number	 of	 station	 areas.	




The	 SAPS	 themselves	 have	 publicly	 emphasised	 on	 numerous	 occasions	 that	
high-density	 operations	 are	 a	 stopgap	 to	 ‘stabilise’	 high	 crime	 communities	 in	
order	to	allow	other	government	departments	and	civil	society	organisations	to	
intercede	 in	 addressing	 the	 key	 determinants	 of	 criminality	 and	 violence.	
However,	such	multi-sectoral	interventions	have	typically	not	been	forthcoming.	
Therefore	 SAPS	 have	 found	 themselves	 locked	 into	 a	 cycle	 of	 relentlessly	
bombarding	such	areas	with	high-density	operations	 in	a	concerted	attempt	 to	
constrain	 and	 suppress	 criminal	offending.	 Indeed,	 in	 some	areas,	 high-density	
operations	 appears	 to	 have	 had	 little	 or	 no	 effect	 on	 murder	 levels,	 which	
possibly	denotes	 the	potency	of	a	range	of	pervasive	risk	 factors	 for	murder	 in	
such	 areas.	 These	 factors	 are	 diverse,	 and	 range	 from	 excessive	 alcohol	








The	 principal	 aim	 of	 this	 thesis	 has	 been	 to	 determine	 how	 boundaries	 have	
influenced	 the	 operational	 approaches	 of	 the	 police	 in	 South	 Africa,	 and	what	
impact	 these	 approaches	 have	 had	 on	 violent	 crime.	 In	 order	 to	 pursue	 this	
objective,	 four	 propositions	 were	 developed,	 all	 of	 which	 proposed	 that	
boundaries	have	been	a	 fundamental	component	of	police	work,	and	may	even	
have	profoundly	 shaped	 the	nature	of	 the	 strategies	and	 tactics	 that	 the	police	
have	 historically	 employed.	 Moreover,	 it	 was	 proposed	 that	 the	 policing	 of	
boundaries,	 specifically	 in	 the	 form	 of	 high-density	 operations,	 has	 possibly	
contributed	to	reductions	in	violent	crime.	In	this	regard,	this	concluding	chapter	
condenses	and	draws	together	the	key	empirical	and	analytical	strands	from	the	
preceding	chapters.	 In	addition,	 this	chapter	proposes	a	new	concept	of	 ‘police	





practices	 of	 policing	 bodies	 in	 South	 Africa	 for	 centuries,	 from	 the	 mounted	
colonial	paramilitary	forces	of	the	1800s	to	the	21st	century	professional	police.	
Boundaries	 have	 not	 only	 been	 a	 central	 mechanism	 that	 the	 police	 have	
consistently	used	 to	control	and	regulate	 the	general	population,	but	have	also	
been	catalysts	for	change	in	terms	of	operational	policing	strategies	and	tactics.	
This	 has	 particularly	 been	 the	 case	 when	 a	 threat	 has	 been	 ascribed	 to	 the	
bounded	area	and/or	 to	population	groups	 that	reside	on	 the	other	side	of	 the	
boundary.	 Such	 threat-designated	 boundaries	 have	 tended	 to	 focus	 police	
attention	 and	 action	 towards	 such	 boundaries,	with	 the	 frontier	 areas	 in	 close	
proximity	to	the	boundaries	being	the	sites	for	intense	counter-threat	activities	





During	 the	1700s	and	1800s	 the	police	were	 at	 the	 forefront	of	 expanding	 the	
boundaries	 of	 the	 European	 colonies	 into	 the	 interior	 of	 the	 Southern	 African	
region.	 Indigenous	 populations	 that	 resided	 on	 the	 other	 side	 of	 the	 colonial	
boundaries,	or	in	the	borderlands,	were	widely	regarded	as	the	principal	threat	
to	 the	security	of	 the	colonies,	especially	where	such	groups	 forcefully	resisted	
such	 territorial	 expansion	 by	 the	 settlers.	 The	 colonial	 authorities	
characteristically	responded	to	such	threats	by	teaming	up	policing	entities	with	
the	military	 in	 order	 to	 defeat,	 assimilate	 or	 eradicate	 such	 indigenous	 groups	
and	 thereafter	 extend	 the	 territorial	 boundaries	 of	 the	 colonies.	 As	 a	 result	




Following	 the	 creation	 of	 the	 Union	 of	 South	 African	 in	 1910	 boundaries	




racial	 segregation,	 particularly	 with	 regards	 to	 the	 movement	 of	 black	 South	
Africans.	Furthermore,	 the	South	African	Police	regularly	collaborated	with	 the	
South	African	Defence	 Force	 to	 quell	 internal	 riots	 and	 insurrection	by	 groups	
that	 threatened	 to	 destabilise	 the	 country	 and	 the	 established	 systems	 of	
governance.	 	 Furthermore,	 the	 police	 were	 required	 to	 defend	 the	 national	
borderline	 of	 South	 Africa,	 and	 at	 times	 even	 conducted	 operations	 within	




townships	where	black	people	 lived.	 In	response	 the	government	deployed	 the	
police	and	military	in	large	numbers	to	cordon-off	such	hot	spots	and	quash	the	
protests	 and	 uprisings.	 During	 this	 time	 the	 personnel	 size	 of	 the	 police	
increased	markedly,	and	its	operational	approaches	were	further	militarised.	In	
addition,	the	apartheid	government	actively	sought	to	prevent	black	people	from	





form	 of	 large-scale	 coordinated	 aggressive	 policing	 actions	 that	 have	 had	 an	
explicit	 geographical	 focus.	 That	 is,	 they	 have	 been	 firmly	 oriented	 towards	
distinct	 zones	 beyond	 a	 boundary	 where	 populations	 of	 dangerous	 people	
and/or	 criminals	were	 perceived	 to	 reside.	 These	 police	 actions	 have	 typically	
sought	to	lessen	or	eradicate	the	threats	posed	by	such	people	and	places.	This	
policing	 approach	has	been	 acutely	 influenced	by	 the	boundary,	 as	well	 as	 the	
considerable	 othering	 of	 these	 populations	 beyond	 the	 boundaries.	 The	
pejorative	views	of	the	police,	senior	political	leadership	and	the	general	public	
towards	 such	 groups	have	 contributed	 to	 such	othering,	which	has	 resulted	 in	
the	 emergence	 of	 beliefs	 that	 such	 targeted	 groups	 are	 undesirable,	 and	 a	





The	 relationship	 between	 high-density	 police	 interventions,	 which	 have	 been	
regularly	 pursued	 by	 the	 South	 African	 Police	 Service	 (SAPS)	 since	 the	 mid	
1990s,	 and	violent	 crime	was	assessed	by	means	of	a	 retrospective	case-series	
study	 of	 132	 high	 crime	 SAPS	 station	 areas.	 Trajectories	 in	 annual	 reported	










density	 operations	 may	 have	 possibly	 contributed	 to	 reductions	 in	 annual	
murder	 levels	 in	 a	 noteworthy	 number	 of	 high	 crime	 SAPS	 station	 areas,	
although	 causation	 was	 not	 established.	 Nonetheless,	 the	 possible	 murder	
reduction	effect	of	many	of	these	high-density	policing	interventions	appears	to	
have	been	short-lived,	in	that	annual	murder	levels	rose	in	the	years	shortly	after	
major	high-density	operations	 in	a	 considerable	number	of	 SAPS	station	areas.	
Hence,	 it	 seems	 that	 in	 many	 such	 high	 crime	 areas	 a	 general	 downward	








academic	 disciplines	 that	 are	 typically	 not	 regularly	 used	 to	 study	 the	 police,	
particularly	 geography,	 the	 formulation	 of	 a	 new	 concept	 is	 warranted.	 This	




The	 term	 ‘frontierism’,	which	 in	 essence	 is	 the	 influence	 that	 a	 frontier	has	on	











and	 the	 primacy	 of	 individualism,	 inventiveness,	 liberty	 and	 idealism	 amongst	
settler	communities	on	the	US	western	frontiers	shaped	the	fundamental	values	
and	 ‘spirit’	 underpinning	 US	 political	 culture	 and	 democratic	 institutions	
(Turner,	 1921).	 The	 essence	 of	 Turner’s	 hypothesis	 is	 that	 the	 frontier	
experience,	 particularly	 the	 domestication	 of	 the	 wild,	 was	 an	 evolutionary	













society	 and	 generated	 from	 their	 ruins	 new	 institutions	 more	 appropriate	 to	 those	
liberty-loving	individuals	called	Americans.	
	
There	 has	 been	 extensive	 and	 vigorous	 debate	 about	 Turner’s	 frontier	
hypothesis	 among	 scholars	 of	 US	 history,	 as	 well	 as	 between	 other	 historians	
regarding	 its	applicability	 to	non-US	contexts	 (Jones	and	Wills,	2009)	 (Pierson,	
1994).	The	general	consensus	is	that	the	influence	of	the	US	frontier	experience	
was	 somewhat	 exceptional,	 but	 that	 frontiers	 have,	 to	 varying	 degrees,	
influenced	the	nature	and	dynamics	of	modern	states	and	societies	in	countries	
such	 as	 Canada,	 Russia,	 Australia,	 New	 Zealand,	 Germany	 and	 South	 Africa	
(Bassin,	1993,	Careless,	1954,	Coleman,	1958,	Fifer,	1982,	Gerhard,	1959).	There,	
however,	has	been	almost	no	consideration	of	the	manner	in	which	frontiers	may	




The	 concept	 of	 police	 frontierism	 posits	 that	 the	 control	 and	 governance	 of	








police	 work	 is	 fundamentally	 framed	 by	 societal	 and	 territorial	 boundaries,	
which	 delineates	 perceived	 safe	 or	 ‘civilised’	 spaces	 from	 dangerous	 or	
‘uncivilised’	 ones.	 The	 police	 concentrate	 their	 resources	 in	 the	 frontier	 zone	
immediately	 adjacent	 to	 the	 boundary	 in	 order	 to	 preserve	 or	 extend	 the	
boundary	 of	 safety	 and	 ‘civilisation’,	 and	 restrict,	 subdue	 or	 eliminate	 those	
individuals,	 groups	 or	 circumstances	 from	 the	 ‘uncivilised’	 spaces	 that	 a	
government	authority	or	elites	have	deemed	to	be	a	threat	to	order	and	peace.		
	
An	 essential	 dynamic	 of	 this	 policing	 approach	 is	 that	 the	 boundary	 and	 the	
adjoining	frontier	zone	strongly	influence	police	practices	and	behaviour	in	this	
context.	In	particular,	territorial	delineations	amplify	and	distort	existing	police	
prejudices	 towards	 those	 communities	 on	 the	 other	 side	 of	 the	 boundary.	 The	
police	often	engage	in	 ‘othering’,	where	the	communities	of	 interest	are	viewed	
negatively,	and	almost	alien,	and	are	predominantly	seen	as	‘objects’	of	disorder	
and	 law	 breaking.	 This	 othering	 may	 lead	 to	 an	 intensification	 of	 aggressive	
police	behaviour	towards	the	targeted	communities.		
	
Police	 frontierism	 often	 has	 a	 technological	 aspect,	 namely	 the	 use	 of	 more	
advanced	policing	equipment	and	techniques	(relative	to	the	policing	of	the	day)	







There	 are	 essentially	 four	 general	 varieties	 of	 police	 frontierism	 that	 can	 be	




boundary	 and	 the	 ‘othered’	 populations	 that	 reside	 on	 the	 other	 side	 of	 the	
boundary.	 All	 types	 of	 police	 frontierism	 are	 influenced	 by	 the	 perceived	 or	
actual	behaviour	of	the	othered	populations,	as	well	as	by	internal	and	external	




Containment	 entails	 police	 action	 that	 is	 specifically	 geared	 towards	 the	
maintenance	 (and	 even	 the	 fortification)	 of	 boundaries	 between	 areas	 of	
perceived	or	actual	danger	and	safety,	with	the	aim	of	restricting	the	diffusion	of	








and	 even	 the	 police	 (Jackson,	 1989,	 Jacobs,	 1979).	 In	 such	 circumstances	 the	
police	may	provide	basic	policing	services	 to	 the	othered	community,	but	 their	
priority	 remains	 boundary	 maintenance.	 This	 is	 characteristically	 achieved	
through	 intensive	patrolling	of	 the	 frontier	 zones	and	harassment	of	perceived	
members	of	the	othered	community,	particularly	young	men	who	are	perceived	
to	 be	 disproportionately	 prone	 to	 criminal	 offending.	 The	 techniques	 of	
containment	typically	entail	vehicular	and	pedestrian	stops	by	police	patrols,	as	







such	 violence	 transcending,	 or	 threatening	 to	 transcend,	 the	 boundary.	 This	
violence	can	take	the	form	of	civil	disobedience,	riots,	mob	violence,	strikes	and	
looting	 (Earl,	 et	 al.,	 2003).	 Confrontation	 can	 also	 be	 used	 as	 a	 pre-emptive	
strategy	to	pacify	types	of	social	movement	mobilisation	and	protest	action	that	
the	 police	 and/or	 elites	 feel	 may	 threaten	 the	 stability	 and	 even	 the	
sustainability	of	the	boundary.		
	
With	 this	 type	 of	 frontierism	 police	 resources	 and	 public	 order	 policing	 are	




to	 repel	 or	 suppress	 the	 outbreak	 of	 collective	 disorder.	 The	 additional	 police	
resources	are	generally	withdrawn	from	the	othered	space	once	the	disorder	has	
been	 contained,	 or	 the	 perceived	 threat	 subdued.	 Riot	 control	 policing	
techniques	are	the	mainstay	of	confrontational	police	frontierism,	and	can	entail	
the	 use	 of	 both	 non-aggressive	 crowd	management	 and	 forceful	 (and	 at	 times	
militarised)	 crowd	 dispersal	 techniques.56	The	 military	 may	 be	 deployed	 to	






of	 examples	 of	 confrontational	 police	 frontierism.	 Some	 of	 these	 examples	
include	 police	 forcefully	 quelling	 violent	 uprisings	 in:	 African	 American	
neighbourhoods	 in	 Los	 Angeles	 in	 1992	 (Gooding-Williams,	 1993);	 Parisian	
localities	 where	 there	 were	 concentrations	 of	 immigrant	 men	 (mainly	 from	
Africa)	during	mass	protests57	in	1961	and	riots	in	2005	(Schneider,	2008);	and	
Cairo’s	Tahrir	Square	during	the	2011	‘Arab	Spring’	pro-democracy	protests	(El-






The	 objective	 of	 conversion	 is	 to	 transform	 areas	 beyond	 a	 boundary	 that	 are	
designated	 to	be	disorderly	or	unsafe	 into	safer,	more	orderly	and	acquiescent	
(to	 the	 interests	of	 the	 state)	 spaces	 through	 the	deployment	of	 resources	 and	
processes,	principally	by	the	police.	In	such	spaces	the	authority	of	the	police	is	
either	 not	widely	 contested,	 or	 the	 populations	 in	 question	 lack	 the	 necessary	
coercive	 capabilities	 to	 repel	 police	 intrusions.	 These	 police	 interventions,	 at	
times	 in	 partnership	 with	 other	 government	 agencies,	 tend	 to	 be	 limited	 in	
timeframe,	 and	 range	 from	 small-scale	 visible	 policing	 interventions,	 to	 large-
scale	 crime	 reduction	operations	with	police	personnel	 saturating	 the	 targeted	
areas.	
	
Conversion	 techniques	 can	 include	 crackdowns	 focusing	 on	 known	 criminal	
offenders	 and/or	 criminal	 activities,	 such	 the	 possession	 of	 illegal	 drugs	 and	
firearms;	 ‘zero	 tolerance’	 or	 ‘broken	 windows’	 policing;	 hot	 spots	 policing;	
curfews	and	truancy	enforcement;	as	well	as	community	policing	where	willing	
residents	of	the	targeted	areas	are	allocated	policing	responsibilities.		With	many	
of	 these	 conversion	 approaches	 the	 police	 may	 temporarily	 occupy	 these	
																																																								








targeted	 areas	 and	 conduct	 large-scale	 search-and-seizure	 operations,	 and	
pursue	a	strategy	of	mass	arrests.		
	
The	 murkier	 side	 of	 conversion	 police	 frontierism	 involves	 the	 use	 of	
counterinsurgency	 techniques	 and	 extrajudicial	 killing	 by	 the	 police,	 often	 in	
collaboration	 with	 the	 military	 and	 intelligence	 agencies.	 Death	 squads	 and	
proxy	 forces	 have	 been	 employed	 to	 eliminate	 suspected	 insurgents,	 activists	
and	undesirables	 in	 an	 attempt	 to	make	 the	 targeted	 space	more	 compliant	 to	
the	 social	 control	 efforts	 of	 the	 state.	 This	 has	 not	 only	 taken	 place	 in	 South	
Africa,	but	in	a	variety	of	other	countries	too,	such	as	Guatemala	(Morrison	and	
May,	 1994),	 Colombia	 (Bagley,	 1988),	 India	 (Gossman,	 2002)	 and	Turkey	 (van	
Bruinessen,	1996).	In	Spain,	for	example,	the	Interior	Ministry	unleashed	a	proxy	






to	 long-term	 intervention	 by	 the	 police	 beyond	 the	 boundary	 in	 an	 effort	 to	
appropriate	 spaces	 that	 are	 under	 the	 control	 of	 well-resourced	 non-state	
groups.	 It	 ultimately	 seeks	 to	 establish	 state	 authority	over	 the	 targeted	areas,	
and	 subjugate	 the	 population	 therein	 to	 the	 rules	 and	 norms	 of	 the	 state	 by	
means	 of	 forceful	 policing.	 Excessive	 forms	 of	 othering	 take	 place	 where	 the	




The	 conquest	 type	 of	 police	 frontierism	 generally	 involves	 the	 deployment	 of	
large	numbers	of	heavily	armed	police,	often	alongside	soldiers.	Clashes,	or	even	
battles,	 with	 the	 non-state	 groups	 and	 their	 supporters	 may	 ensue.	 After	 the	
police	 have	 captured	 the	 coveted	 spaces	 a	 strategy	 of	 highly	 visible	 and	
overbearing	 policing	 is	 then	 typically	 pursued.	 This	 can	 include	 the	
establishment	 of	 police	 posts	 and	 checkpoints,	 intensive	 police	 patrols,	 the	
aggressive	imposition	of	widespread	curfews,	and	at	times	mass	arrests.	In	South	
Africa	this	form	of	policing	was	typically	pursued	during	the	colonial	era,	as	well	
as	 during	 the	 apartheid	 period.	 In	 addition,	 conquest	 police	 frontierism	 was	








these	 previously	 out-of-bounds	 neighbourhoods	 (Jaffe,	 2012,	 Schwartz,	 2011).	
																																																								
58	These	 are	 urban	 neighbourhoods	 in	 Jamaica	 that	 entirely	 are	 controlled	 by	 criminal	 groups	




Other	 cases	 include:	 the	 deployment	 of	 the	 Israeli	 Police	 into	 the	 occupied	
Palestinian	 territories	 during	 the	 1970s	 and	 1980s	 (Milton‐Edwards,	 1998);	
the	 occupation	 of	 East	 Timor	 between	 the	 late	 1970s	 and	 late	 1990s	 by	 the	
Indonesian	 police	 and	 military	 (Jardine,	 1996);	 and	 the	 Royal	 Ulster	




frontierism	 have	 been	 the	 occupation	 and	 ‘pacification’	 of	 certain	 favelas	
(slums/shanty	 towns)	 in	 Rio	 de	 Janeiro’s	 by	 the	 Special	 Police	 Operations	
Battalion	(BOPE)	and	its	Unidades	the	Polícia	Pacificadora	(UPP)	(or	Pacification	
Police	 Units).	 This	 type	 of	 police	 action,	 which	 has	 been	 undertaken	 in	
collaboration	with	military	personnel,	was	 initiated	 in	2008	in	order	to	 impose	
state	 control	 in	 these	 marginalised	 communities	 that	 had	 traditionally	 been	
viewed	 as	 ‘enemy	 territory’	 by	 the	 state,	 as	 they	 were	 mainly	 governed	 by	
criminal	groups	(Penglase,	2009,	Stahlberg,	2011,	Veloso,	2010).	
	
The	 modus	 operandi	 has	 entailed	 the	 pre-announced,	 large-scale,	 militarised	
incursion	 (often	with	 air	 support)	 into	 favelas	 in	 an	 effort	 to	 forcibly	 oust	 the	




operations	 have	 been	 combined	 with	 a	 veneer	 of	 ‘winning-hearts-and-minds’	
counterinsurgency	 policing	 where	 the	 police	 have	 pursued	 a	 handful	 of	
infrastructure	 projects	 in	 an	 attempt	 to	 build	 legitimacy	 with	 favela	 residents	
(Arsenault,	2012,	Watts,	2013).	This	has	resulted	in	the	UPP	interventions	being	














to	 how	 the	 SAPS	 intended	 to	 police	 South	 Africa	 into	 the	 future.	 Instead	 it	
appeared	 to	be	an	attempt	at	 rebuilding	 trust	with	Parliament	and	 the	general	
public	 by	 means	 of	 a	 re-commitment	 from	 high	 political	 office	 that	 the	 SAPS	
would	seek	to	reinvigorate	its	efforts	to	systematically	contain	and	reduce	crime	
through	improved	discipline,	dedication	and	visibility.	This	would,	according	to	
the	 Minister	 of	 Police,	 entail	 “every	 police	 officer	 doing	 the	 basics	 of	
policing…properly	and	consistently”	 so	 that	 “all	people	 in	South	Africa	are	and	
feel	 safe”	 (Nhleko,	 2016b).	 The	 slogan	 for	 this	 new	 strategy	 was	




A	 fundamental	 component	 of	 this	 ‘Back-to-Basics’	 strategy	 is	 the	 use	 of	 force,	
which	 has	 been	 combined	with	 notions	 of	 problem-oriented	 policing,	 and	will	
prominently	entail	“the	targeted,	informed	deployment	of	operational	resources	
to	ensure	the	optimal	utilisation	of	the	limited	resources	that	the	Police	have	at	
their	 disposal,	 ensuring	 that	 they	 are	 applied	 for	 maximum	 effect”	 (Nhleko,	




that	 acts	 of	 criminality	 can	 be	 mitigated	 by	 strong-arm	 policing	 methods,	
particularly	 high-density	 operations.	 It	 was	 no	 coincidence	 that	 at	 the	 same	
briefing	 the	 Minister	 of	 Police	 provided	 detailed	 feedback	 from	 the	 2015/16	






SAPS	 appears	 to	 be	 convinced	 that	 police	 frontierism	 approaches	 yield	 crime	
reduction	 results,	 which	 is	 a	 supposition	 that	 has	 typically	 been	 dismissed	 by	
many	crime	analysts	in	South	Africa.	This	thesis	has	however	shown	that	certain	




This	 forceful	 and	 militaristic	 approach	 to	 crime	 prevention	 is	 nevertheless	 a	
double-edged	sword.	That	is,	while	such	an	approach	has	plausibly	enabled	the	
post-apartheid	 government	 to	wrestle	 down	murder	 levels,	 it	 has	 come	 at	 the	
cost	of	substantial	long-term	trade-offs.	In	addition,	violent	crime	in	South	Africa	
remains	 alarmingly	 high,	with	murder	 levels	 having	 increased	 in	 recent	 years.	
Comparatively,	very	small	amounts	of	government	resources	have	been	devoted	
																																																								















considerably	 every	 year	 since	 1995/96.	 In	 the	 2014/15	 financial	 year,	 for	
example,	 the	 SAPS	 spent	 R72.5	 billion,	 which	 was	 in	 excess	 of	 11%	 of	
government	spending	for	that	year.	For	2015/16	the	SAPS	was	allocated	R76.4	
billion,	 which	 was	more	 than	 the	 combined	 financial	 resources	 that	 had	 been	
apportioned	 to:	 Health;	 Basic	 Education;	 Trade	 and	 Industry;	 Economic	
Development;	 Agriculture,	 Forestry	 and	 Fisheries;	 Sport	 and	 Recreation;	 and	
Women	(National	Treasury,	2015).	Sound	international	research	has	shown	that	
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